Taiwan’s Defense Strategy Seeks to Raise the Cost of a Chinese Invasion
Army University Press documentary examining the China's PLA force and its regional force projection.
ASSESSMENT High Confidence: Taiwan is likely relying on a cost-imposition-focused military strategy in order to deter a possible invasion by the People’s Republic of China. |
Taipei is responding to Beijing’s recent moves to consolidate control over Taiwan’s nearby waters by developing more modern military capabilities to prevent a possible invasion. On September 11th, Taiwan’s executive branch submitted a bill appropriating 4.59 billion USD for drone production. This follows the 2027 proposed defense budget, which would increase overall spending by 18% from the previous year (to 35 billion USD). American aid has also increased, with over 10 billion USD in arms sales to Taiwan for mid-range missiles, artillery, and small-scale, AI-driven suicide drones (often called “loitering munitions”) approved by the Trump administration.
Over the past two years, Taiwan has also invested in a “whole-of-society” civil defense strategy to build civilian resistance to an invasion. This strategy focuses on increasing individual citizens’ willingness to fight on against Chinese military advances or occupation. Taipei’s published guidance includes invasion preparedness and guarding against false narratives of government collapse in an invasion scenario. Beyond this, Taiwan has developed decentralized command-and-control structures and continuity-of-government protocols. Anticipating an attempted decapitation strike by Beijing’s forces, these ensure all Taiwanese leaders have a ready replacement, guaranteeing that resistance will continue under new political leadership.
In the event of an invasion, Taipei likely believes its new defense strategy will force China to expend advanced and expensive resources. The use of drones and loitering munitions will likely make a sustained Chinese military presence on Taiwan untenable. Research indicates drone warfare could heavily disrupt China’s deployment of naval, air and land assets, as well as logistics supporting these. Drone-based strategy achieves this through asymmetric attacks on naval platforms, mid-range battlefield interdiction, and attacks on supply nodes. Civil defense strategies concentrate on making the population resilient to the pressures of invasion and more likely to fight on even amidst humanitarian catastrophe and political degradation. Both strengthen Taiwan’s government and its people to resist any attempt to assert control over or occupy the island while also deterring Beijing from initiating such an invasion.
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