Syria On The Brink: A Path to a Better Tomorrow

Illustration by Bodhi Harrison

Listen to this article

On December 8, 2024, the world watched in astonishment as Bashar al-Assad’s regime collapsed after his family’s 50-year reign in Syria. As Assad’s two critical partners, Russia and Iran, became incapable of supporting the regime due to the Russo-Ukrainian War and Israel’s decapitation of Hezbollah, the environment was ripe for overthrow. In just ten days, the leading opposition—Hay-at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)—took de facto control over Syria. With Assad fleeing to Moscow, Syria’s bloody 13-year civil war came to a relatively nonviolent, but possibly tentative conclusion.

The question now is how to foster a stable and fair Syria with the debate largely revolving around sanction relief. Some believe complete sanction removal is necessary to rebuild Syria. Others promote a wait-and-see approach to maintain leverage around the situation and over the HTS, which remains listed as a terrorist organization despite its significant steps to rehabilitate its image. Moreover, many perspectives typically advocate for what one player should do (i.e., the U.S. challenging Türkiye) instead of looking at larger multilateral approaches.

While Assad’s deposition is widely celebrated among Syrians and many across the world, emerging threats and competing foreign interests make the climb to a stable and just Syria daunting. This situation, however, presents a tremendous opportunity for international players to coalesce over Syria via shared interests and interdependencies. Through continued, substantial, and unconditional humanitarian aid, underpinned by sanction exemptions and multilateral action, Syria can stabilize.

For 13 years, Assad’s violence against his population and subsequent international sanctions decimated Syria’s infrastructure and economy. 90% of Syrians are below the poverty line, there’s mass energy scarcity, 13 million face food insecurity, and 14 million remain displaced. The UN projects that 33 million Syrians will require critical assistance this coming year, creating the potential for further deterioration of an already dire humanitarian crisis.

Even with HTS’ now interim president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, positioned to consolidate power, the country remains fractured, and with competing foreign interests, a power vacuum persists. To unify Syria, HTS needs further sanction relief and to integrate the U.S.-backed Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The SDF desires a seat at the table in the new government, full integration of their forces into a centralized Syrian army, shared energy revenues, and administrative autonomy in their controlled regions. Yet, they remain in conflict with Turkish-backed groups, and their influence and security rely on the U.S., which desires a withdrawal from Syria.

Beyond wanting to repatriate its Syrian refugee population, Türkiye desires to dismantle the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), who has members in the SDF, out of concerns that an autonomous Kurdish entity in Syria could embolden actors like the PKK to elicit more insurgencies in Türkiye. Worried about Türkiye’s ambitions and influence in Syria, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates aim to financially shape and integrate Syria into the Arab League. However, all actors need Türkiye’s influence within the HTS. At the same time, Türkiye needs the Gulf states and EU’s financial weight in rebuilding Syria and could benefit from help in disbanding the PKK.

Citing security concerns, Israel has occupied Syrian territory and conducted tactical strikes against Syrian military infrastructure, which hinders Syria’s capability to fend off internal and external threats. Yet, Israel relies on support from the U.S. and Gulf states. The EU, moreover, is primarily concerned with HTS’ intent of forming a fair government as Sharaa has largely excluded key Syrian opposition groups from the new government and made concerning unilateral moves.

Along with such interdependencies between players, significant shared interests can spark a new bloc aimed at stabilizing Syria. These include securing 9,000 incarcerated extremists in SDF regions, suppressing a resurgence of extremist cells, combating a hostile Iran, and locating missing chemical weapons from Assad’s arsenal. These threats actively endanger any potential for a stable Syrian government to form.

International players must continue to provide constant, unconditional, and substantial humanitarian aid. This, however, won’t be sufficient for stabilizing Syria as it depends on economic recovery. Large, expedited exemptions are necessary, which luckily have started with the EU and U.S. lifting specific sector-related sanctions. Yet, if Syria does not sufficiently rebound fast enough, enhanced exemptions will need to be hastened before the country spirals into chaos.

These will not only immediately save lives but also create some stability by reversing fleeing refugees and, importantly, extend an olive branch to Syrians—reducing the risk of armed uprisings. To elicit further sanction relief, HTS must include diverse Syrian organizations and armed oppositions in its formation of a new government, which critically places safeguards against authoritarian impulses.

This overture needs to be met with concurrent multilateral diplomacy, which comes with tradeoffs for all. The bloc needs to pressure Israel to withdraw from Syrian territory and halt its strikes. In turn, HTS and Türkiye must normalize relations with Israel by reestablishing the 1974 disengagement agreement, signing a non-aggression pact, and devising ways to foster further economic interdependency to solidify such efforts.

Simultaneously, the bloc must establish methods to secure incarcerated extremists, suppress extremist cells from forming, locate missing chemical weapons, and thwart any Iranian efforts to upend Syrian unification. While promising negotiations continue between the SDF and HTS, the bloc needs to assist Türkiye’s ongoing efforts to disband the PKK via a parole deal with its founder, Abdullah Ocalan. In return, HTS and Türkiye will need to integrate most of the SDF forces, ensure that energy revenue is equitably dispersed, and both sides will need to secure an agreement that protects Syrian unity while also acknowledging the autonomy aspirations of Kurdish peoples.

When agreements have been reached, foreign players can further legitimize the new government by opening embassies in Damascus. Once Syria’s economy stabilizes and infrastructure is rebuilt, the bloc can also deploy a joint humanitarian stabilization force that assists with the safe return of Syrian refugees who desire to return, creating a major win for Türkiye and the EU, given rising populist sentiments.

Finally, as requested by the Syrian National Council, UN assistance via its election monitoring could permit free and fair elections in 18 months. Regardless, as inclusive talks continue and a timeline is set for such elections, external players can delist HTS as a terrorist organization. Upon the election, moreover, players like the U.S. will have the opportunity to withdraw American troops.

Given the volatile nature of the situation, where a deteriorating humanitarian crisis and permeating power vacuum could exacerbate collective threats and bring them to fruition, any wait-and-see approach is not just inadequate, but dangerous. Without continued, unconditional and, if needed, enhanced humanitarian aid and exemptions, Syria risks falling into chaos that would likely spill into the greater region. Policymakers should therefore err on the side of a fast-paced sanction relief approach, as sanctions can always be reimposed. It will not only save lives, but along with pragmatic multilateralism, a secure and stable Syria could emerge.

Connor JL Moore is a current master’s candidate for International Security at the University of Denver’s Josef Korbel School of Global and Public Affairs.

If you enjoyed this work, please consider sharing our content and website or donating to a non-profit organization linked in the Donate tab.