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The Russian Kidnappings of Ukrainian Children Illustration by Jonathan Rockford LISTEN TO THIS ARTICLE Another day begins in a small village in the Ukrainian region of Kherson. The morning is relatively peaceful for a place that Russia has occupied for more than four years. Ukrainian didi (grandfathers) lament the lack of cabbage in the markets while babusi (grandmothers) collect mushrooms at the edge of the forest. Children from the local orphanage play in the yard. Suddenly, the quiet is pierced by the sound of armored military vehicles. When the trucks roll to a stop in the village center, masked Russian soldiers pour out. They’ve come not to wage war on the village or demand supplies from its citizens, but rather to give candy to the children at the orphanage. Once the soldiers have gained the Ukrainian children's trust with a few chocolates, they will load them into their trucks and drive them further behind Russian lines. There, Russian “caretakers” will indoctrinate the Ukrainian children into Russian nationalism. They will change their names and give them new passports and birth certificates. Finally, they will send them to be adopted by Russian families. Why is Russia Stealing Children? Though Russia claims it is taking Ukrainian children to save them from the war, this hardly explains the new birth certificates and indoctrination camps. Ukraine, instead, argues that the deportation of children is part of a greater strategy to integrate Ukraine fully into Russia. Through targeting the country’s youngest and most vulnerable generation, Ukraine, international legal experts, and human rights organizations argue that Russia is trying to erase Ukrainian identity. If Russia succeeds in turning every Ukrainian child into a Russian citizen, the future of Ukrainian identity will, in theory, cease to exist. How Ukrainian Children are Being Indoctrinated with Russian Nationalism Russia is working to erase Ukrainian identity through large-scale institutions which impact both Ukrainian children who simply live in Russian-occupied territory and those who have already been taken. Ukrainian children in occupied territories are forcibly enrolled in youth organizations such as Yunarmiya or “The Youth Army,” where they receive a militarized education about Russian history and national values. Russia has a history of using children’s organizations like The Youth Army as a method of spreading its values across generations. During the Soviet Union, children were enrolled in a similar sociopolitical organization called The Young Pioneers. Like the Soviet Young Pioneers, Yunarmiya is designed to socialize the children through military education, patriotic activities, and state-sponsored engagement. The Youth Army portrays Russian soldiers as heroes and role models. Children are often enrolled in weapons training, and Ukrainian parents are sometimes made to sign release forms for their children to go to training exercises or summer camps with the organization. Despite being told their children will only be gone for a short time, they do not return. Once children are taken, they go to camps either in Russia or further behind Russian lines in Ukraine. Many testimonies from returned children indicate that they were not allowed to speak Ukrainian or express their Ukrainian cultural identity in any way. They instead spent time writing letters to Russian soldiers, participating in military drills designed for children, and singing the Russian national anthem. The children reported to United24 Media that they were placed in isolation cells or physically punished for disobedience or refusal to participate. This treatment of children serves two specific purposes: forcing pro-Russian nationalistic beliefs onto the children and erasing their Ukrainian culture and identity. This erasure, in turn, threatens the future of a Ukrainian national identity. The Impacts of the Kidnappings The kidnappings are extremely stressful and psychologically harmful to Ukrainian children. Psychologists are finding it to be extremely difficult to reverse the impacts and thought patterns of indoctrination, reporting that those who come back to Ukraine are traumatized and alarmingly docile. One psychologist described some returned children as behaving like obedient “little soldiers,” displaying symptoms of trauma, emotional withdrawal, and apathy. In addition to the difficult reversal of indoctrination, stolen children are suffering psychological consequences on an individual level. Those who return are reported to have “left normal” and come back completely changed. One kidnapped child died by suicide in Russia while living with an adoptive family in Krasnodar. Even if Russian soldiers were to stop kidnapping children and return all of those who have already been stolen, the psychological toll on Ukraine’s youngest generation will continue to have a widespread impact. Some estimates suggest that more than 200,000 Ukrainian children have been taken. But because soldiers largely target orphans in group homes, foster children, and children whose parents have died during the war, many do not have anyone in Ukraine who would know to look for them. It’s hard to know just how many children are missing. How Can the International Community Help Ukraine’s Children? Despite the fact that international organizations have condemned the deportation of Ukrainian children and demanded their immediate return, fewer than 1,400 children have been brought home as of June 2025. Russia refuses to discuss the issue publicly, often denying taking children at all. Additionally, because many children’s legal documentation has been changed by Russia and international organizations lack access to occupied areas, recovery efforts are tedious and slow-going. Because stolen Ukrainian children rarely make headlines, one of the first steps international organizations, governments, and news sources can take is to recognize the plight of kidnapped Ukrainian children. Greater public recognition of the situation may lead to its inclusion in more negotiations and peace talks with Russia. It should be one of the underlying reasons for continued sanctions and international condemnation. Even as Russia is trying to erase the true identities of Ukrainian children, the international community can help ensure they are recognized. International organizations can also partner with Ukrainian organizations such as Save Ukraine, Bring Kids Back, and Children of War. These organizations know the most about the missing children, have established contact with some Ukrainian families whose children have been taken, and most importantly, are already working to get them back. The Future of Ukraine Russia is not only stealing children from their homes and families but also stealing the future of Ukraine’s national identity. Russia’s crimes against both the humanity of individual children and Ukraine as a nation should remain at the forefront of every negotiation, sanction, and media report. With every child whom Russia steals and every day they are not returned, the future of the Ukrainian national identity becomes more endangered. It is only with the return of these children that Ukraine’s future can be protected and the children, themselves, can begin to heal. Anna Kubas is an International Security student with a concentration in Strategic Intelligence. Her focus is on Russian Arctic strategy, especially regarding critical minerals and the Northern Sea Route, as well as geopolitics and sociology of the greater post-Soviet space. If you enjoyed this work, please consider sharing this content and supporting a non-profit promoted by the author above. DISCLAIMER Mooreposts publishes independent analysis, commentary, and research for informational and educational purposes only. Content on Mooreposts—including articles, Mooreposts Bites, strategic intelligence assessments, opinion pieces, interviews, and visual materials—does not constitute legal, financial, medical, or professional advice, nor does it represent any government agency, official position, or classified assessment. Unless explicitly stated, all analyses and interpretations reflect the views and analytic judgments of the individual author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Mooreposts, its editorial staff, or affiliated contributors. Strategic intelligence and analytical content is based on open-source information and publicly available materials. Mooreposts strives for accuracy, transparency, and rigorous sourcing; however, information may change as events develop. Readers are encouraged to consult primary sources and exercise independent judgment.

Audio & Transcript Executive Producers: John Lamberger, Lindsey Ferrini, Connor JL Moore This transcript has been edited for clarity and readability while preserving the speakers’ original meaning and conversational tone. Minor repetitions, filler words, and false starts have been removed. Speaker attributions have been carefully reviewed against the audio to ensure accuracy. John Nobody wants to look weak. So maybe you stand a little taller. Maybe you lower your voice. Maybe you act in a way that says I am strong. Countries do the same thing. But instead of a clenched fist, we see an aircraft carrier moving into position, or a country buying guns or rockets firing across a border. And this is where communicating strength can turn into war and violence, where people are asked to fight, suffer and die over ideas. We discussed this with Doctor Hilary Matfess, who researches war, political violence and the gender dynamics of conflict. This conversation is not about historic battles or what weapons are used. It is about how war and violence shape who we are, how they define strength, dignity, sacrifice, and who belongs. She planned our flock, the fence, and the wolves. Dr. Matfess I like to tell my students my career is really a function of a series of mistakes. Happy little accidents. But I never intended to study international security. Never intended to look at the gender dynamics of conflict or war. When I started undergrad, I really thought I was going to be a lawyer. And then I took a con law class, and I was like, wow, I hate this. I hate the set up. I hate the studying. Hate all of it. And I was in an international trade class, and I was like, wow, I really love economics. And then I realized I am just not good enough at math to be a real economist. And alongside that, all of these studies of economics and particularly developmental economics, where I was focused on during my brief foray into that world, the story always seemed to get derailed by war. It seemed to always be like. And then they were on track for development. And now this war broke out. And so I found myself really fascinated by this, this interregnum, this interruption. And Paul Collier, who is a very famous world Bank affiliated economist, once wrote that, war is development in reverse. And so I, I kind of came into the world of international security through the roots of economics and the way that I started focusing on gender and security, was because I was working with Doctor Peter Lewis at sites, and I was getting my master's degree. And I was working with him because my scholarship had run out and I needed money. And so I kind of walked into his office with all of that swagger that a year old can have. I was like, do you have research funds? And he was like, I sure do. And so even though I had learned Swahili wanted to work in East Africa, I started working with him on a project. On social violence in Nigeria. And that was around the time that the Boko Haram insurgency was becoming more and more mainstream. Were getting a lot of reporting. The violence was ramping up. And so I spent week after week reading all of these Nigerian newspaper reports about the violence and tallying events and deaths and all of these things. And I was frustrated that I was learning so much about a place that I had never been. So I, I then pestered Doctor Lewis into giving me like a grand to go to, to Nigeria, and talk to people and get the real story. And, you know, I really thought like, okay, you know, at that point, maybe, I'm going to go to Nigeria and I'm going to sort out this whole Boko Haram thing. I'm going to get to the bottom of it. And for me, at that time, that meant talking to, you know, young men with arms. And I had this, like, image of myself. I'm going to be like Christiane Amanpour, like, I'm going to be on the ground, wind in my hair, flak jacket on, talking to these guys. And it turns out when insurgents don't want to be found. It's hard to find them when you know no one in the country crazy. And so for my first couple trips, really, the only people I could speak to, were women who had been displaced by the conflict. And it's embarrassing to admit, but I treated that like a consolation prize. At first, I was like, oh, talk to these, like, women. Oh. Well, I wait to, to get the real story from the man. But once I, like, put aside my internalized misogyny, I realized these conversations with women were revealing things that just hadn't been reported on. I was learning about conflict dynamics that weren't being appreciated because we had focused so heavily on the kind of big military story and men's experiences. And so I, over time, became focus on, really getting women's perspectives on the insurgency and the war against Boko Haram in northeast Nigeria. And that became the subject of my first book, women in the War on Boko Haram Wives, weapons, witnesses, subtitle I liked a lot more at the time that I pitched it. And yeah, I from there I was just like I, you know, became a zealous convert, to kind of feminist security studies and fully believe that we've been leaving a lot of empirical and analytical heft on the table because we haven't paid attention to the the gender dynamics of Camp. Lindsey The idea of war. It's an emotional one. It's tied directly to our national identity and to our universal experience as humans. Heated debate can range from being called a warhawk to being weak on defense. How do we discuss war responsibly? Dr. Matfess It's such a good question, and it's something that I wrestle with all of the time because there are so many heavy political implications surrounding war and political violence, and who participates and who benefits. And I remember I was briefing at Africom and, I was talking about, you know, why would people join Boko Haram and talking about all of the the state failures and the state abuses and the the lack of opportunity for a generation of young people who felt that, you know, civilian life couldn't provide for them what they expected or what they wanted. And this military guy, you know, calls me like a terrorist sympathizer. And, I mean, he was really heated about it. And I remember just, like, thinking to myself, what? I'm never being invited back here. Right? I've just been accused of supporting terrorism in front of, like, people. If I ever get a job with the government, there's no way I'm getting a security clearance. But I also just remember thinking, like, oh, we have a real problem when we can't, you know, consider what might drive someone to take up arms. You know, how dire does the situation have to be? Or how appealing does the alternative offered by these armed groups have to be in order to to make you put your life on the line? And so I, I think centering the individuals and the humanity of the people involved is a really important step. In discussing war responsibly. And when I was getting my PhD, I had a very good friend who was getting his master's degree, and he was also a U.S. Army infantry officer. And he would say, you know, every now and then things like, oh, you know, the bad guys. And I would get so mad because I was like, you are too smart. And like, frankly, too high ranking to be talking like that. That that narrative of bad guys versus good guys is, you know, it's appealing and it's mobilizing, but like, can't actually take that seriously, right? Because I think it is just really dehumanizing and unhelpful. So paying attention to the, the humanity of folks on both sides or whichever side of of conflicts, I think is really critical for being able to discuss political violence and war and all of these other kind of violent interactions in a way that's ethical and responsible. John On that note, Doctor Mattis wore. What is it good for? Dr. Matfess Actually some things. John O-okay! Dr. Matfess Say it, again! Yeah. I mean, it's, there's a real anti-military strain in feminist security studies, which I don't totally disagree with, but I, I sometimes find myself a little frustrated by because I can sometimes sidestep that. Yeah. The war has been linked to, you know, a variety of civil rights movements in the United States and elsewhere. Participation in war has been a way in which marginalized communities have gotten kind of citizenship and become a part of, you know, national communities, all of these imagined communities, as Benedict Anderson would call them. You know, sacrificing during war has been linked to citizenship rights and valorization. And I think we can't really look past that. Right. When we think about the the United States civil rights movement. A lot of the, the kind of fervor and movement came in the aftermath of World War II to when American troops had served alongside integrated European armies and came back and said, we fought for liberty over there. Why are we treated as second class citizens at home? And because I also focus on gender. So much of my research, you know, there's this finding that's often treated as paradoxical, which is that civil war can often lead to improvements in women's rights and representation in the short to medium term. And a lot of that is because war opens up opportunities for women to break out of traditionally feminine roles that are devalued, then participate in traditionally masculine roles that are valued. So that means things like going into the factories. There's a reason that in the United States, Rosie the Riveter became an iconic image. That also means, you know, playing a bigger role in politics in the absence of, you know, men who are mobilized to participate in conflict. So war, what is it good for? I don't want to act like war is, you know, unmitigated good. Because it's not, War is bad art, but it has been associated with opportunities to advance causes that I think kind of normatively we all agree with. And so it's, I think, a pressing question to think through, you know, are there other opportunities that don't require, you know, militarization or the violence implicated in war to push forward political agendas like civil rights, like equal rights, things like that? You know, it's also worth considering why do we devalue things that are associated with femininity and work in the home and all of these things? Why do women traditionally only get political rights and representation when they take on quote unquote men's work? And all of those things are worth investigating at the root. But at the same time, we can't ignore that war seems to be a pretty consistent feature of modern life. Certainly earlier than modern life as well. And we can find ways to, to leverage that opportunity, in order to advance pushes for equal rights. John War is unimaginably horrific. No one here is saying otherwise. But Doctor Mathis highlights an uncomfortable history. Marginalized communities have sometimes turned war time participation and sacrifice into claims for citizenship rights, representation and political power. So if war can redefine politics in that way, the next question is where violence comes from. Is it human nature, or is it part of a larger system around us? Lindsey We obviously never want to resort to violence. That's not the goal. Do you think violence is built into human nature, or do you think we're naturally peaceful? Dr. Matfess I don't want to give in to the like, evolutionary biologist burros who are like, you know, because, like, apes fought, we're going to fight. But I also, I think. John You know, this is like a, like a Hobbesian take. Dr. Matfess Right? Like, what would what would people be if they were left to their to their own devices and. I'll do that, like academic thing, which is infuriating, which is like, please. Yeah. Which is like. John You could say anything. Lindsey And do whatever you want. Dr. Matfess There's infinite recording space! No, but I, I wonder how relevant the idea of human nature is because it kind of posits like, humans in a vacuum, and it's like, but the vacuum does not exist. You know, like, we have all of these, you know, cultural, political, social, economic institutions that have, you know, evolved, in the face of war that can perpetuate war. I mean, unfortunately, whether or not human nature is, you know, naturally war like or naturally peace loving, we we do have a system where certain disputes are handled through violence. The United States spends quite a lot of money making sure that we have a large, well-trained, well-equipped army. And you can optimistically say that's to deter violence, but that's also so that we can make good on our threats of violence that we use to try and compel other actors in the international system to do what we want. And so it's, you know, it really speaks to the importance of making sure that we have good people in a system that is built with kind of violence baked into the available tools. What the system that's, that has just a foundation of violence. We want peaceful people involved in that to try to balance it out a little bit. Is that kind of what you're getting at? Yeah. And just folks who understand kind of the the awesome weight and the toll of warfare and political violence and the deployment of the military. And, you know, the, the implicit harm that comes through militarization as well. So when you think through, not just like the deployment of force, but also the training of U.S. military members to be able to practice that violence is is both it's expensive in terms of money, in terms of staff calories, but also it shapes how people think about themselves and their surroundings and shapes how they relate to their community members. You know, I mean, those training and deployment schedules are also really hard on families. So when we think through that, like total weight and cost, it's not something that should be done lightly or flippantly or without, you know, clear strategic objectives which, you know, I think we've unfortunately seen a lot of missteps in the past , years, with the use of American military power. John Is violence inherent in humans is an impossible question because there aren't humans in a vacuum to compare. What we can compare are the cultural, political, social, and economic systems. People live inside and inside those systems. Violence can become one of the available tools. So if society chooses violence tomorrow, how does it explain that choice? How does it justify it? And would everyone agree on what that violence means? Dr. Matfess I find it really hard to disaggregate, you know, the the ideological, the political and the economic drivers underneath war. And I think part of that is, you know, you can ask ten members of an armed group, you know, why they're fighting and get ten different answers, because motivation to to join an armed group is often a reflection of an individual's position within that political, economic and social structure. And so, you know, my partner as all my students now, went to West Point or entered infantry, served his country because in the aftermath of , he wanted to protect American lives. And he has this, like, very kind of an earnest, plaintive patriotism. His father served. There was a real understanding that this was a good he could do for a country that he loved. I don't the same time, I know you know, folks who had a similar path not to West Point, but into the U.S. Army where it was like, man, I forgot to apply to college. Like, woops, gotta do something or I can't afford college. And this is a way that I can, you know, serve my country but also improve my economic standing. You know, I think it's also worth considering, particularly in the United States context, the extent to which, like service in the US military has become almost an inherited profession. You know, so it's since the introduction of the all volunteer force, we've seen, you know, certain communities kind of opt out of service entirely. And, a lot more of this, like, inherited. Oh, my father served. So I served, like, understanding of service. And that's a little bit troubling to me as someone who never served, but I grew up in a military town, has been served, I was really struck when I went back north, for my PhD, that, some people I'd never met in Active-Duty service men in their lives. You know, we're in our mid s. Had worked, but we're completely divorced from the lived experiences of, you know, our men and women in uniform. And that was, I don't know, that was really troubling to me. We had someone who was getting a PhD who was going to go teach at West Point. And so that's how it came up in conversation was a number of people were like, oh, yeah, it's my first time meeting someone who's active duty. And that was yeah, I mean, just mind blowing to me. You know, I think that we have a lot of publicly articulated reasons for war. And then there are often much more crass political calculations behind closed doors when we think about the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. What always springs to mind is that, then First Lady Laura Bush gave a guest presidential radio address where she really wanted the American people to know that the Taliban was abusing women and that it was the United States duty to step in and protect these women. Right. So very similar to that kind of narrative of like our the United States is going into Europe to protect democracy. The United States was going to go into Afghanistan to protect these women who are abused by the Taliban. And certainly the Taliban was engaging in gross human rights abuses, gross violations of women's rights. I'm I'm certainly not a defender of the Taliban's policies, but I also find it very interesting the narratives that are articulated publicly and particularly by women that are associated with like government officials and then kind of the discussions behind closed doors about what is the national security threat presented by the Taliban. So I don't think that it's possible to detangle all of these because I think they're all wrapped up in each other, but I find it really useful to think through which audiences are being given which set of reasons. And how do they converse with each other, and are there ever going to be uncomfortable moments when kind of the the inherent contradictions that often accompany decisions to go to war, when those audiences kind of come in conversation with one another? What does that look like? Yeah. If you've been sold a bill of goods about what this war is about, and then someone comes and tells you like, oh, no, actually it's, you know, about getting oil or, you know, whatever. It's about keeping the military industrial complex afloat. All of these things, you know, that's going to lead to some cognitive dissonance and real frustration. John War is not one thing. People can experience the same war with different meanings patriotism, economic opportunity, public duty, political calculation, and different audiences can be presented with different reasons for the same violence. But when those meanings collide, any contradiction becomes part of the war's legacy. So before we ask whether any war can be morally defended, we have to sit with that tension. Who gets to decide what a war meant? John The following excerpt from the book With the Old Breed by Eugene Sledge. United States Marine who fought in the Pacific during World War two. He recalls when his military unit heard about the end of the war. Quote, we received the news with quiet disbelief coupled with an indescribable sense of relief. We thought the Japanese would never surrender. Many refused to believe it. Sitting in stunned silence, we remembered our dead. So many dead. So many maimed. So many bright futures. Consigned to the ashes of the past. So many dreams lost in the madness that had engulfed us. Except for a few widely scattered shouts of joy. The survivors of the abyss sat hollow-eyed and silent, trying to comprehend a world without war. Doctor Matfess, are there just wars? Wars that are righteous? Dr. Matfess That’s’ a really beautiful excerpt. It's impossible to think through this question without returning to the kind of hack adage write that history is written by the victors. And so I think during wartime mobilization around the idea that you're going to go fight a just war. And I think that's common to armed groups around the world. All right. No one recruits on the kind of platform of, yeah, and we're going to be the bad guys. What we're doing here is illegal, wrong and immoral. And then in the aftermath of conflict, you know, those who survived or those who won the war also then get to kind of write the history. And that can come with refashioning their experiences. It can come with, you know, justifying what they did. I think part of the reason that, you know, this excerpt is so compelling and also the reason that Kurt Vonnegut's writing has been so popular is because it shows the vulnerability and the uncertainty surrounding the end of war and participation in violence. And this this understanding that even though it could be a righteous cause or you participated because you believed it was a righteous cause that comes with tremendous loss, and sacrifice. And so I, I do believe that there are just wars and that could be me drinking the, you know, US military industrial complex Kool-Aid. But, also the descendant of Jewish immigrants. And it's hard for me to think through. Oh, what those who had been, you know, interned in concentration camps were feeling when they were liberated by, you know, U.S. forces and allied forces and, you know, I just can't bring myself to think that that's not a righteous cause, even when it came on, you know, on the backs and in the face of so much loss, I mean, truly indescribable loss. In terms of the lives lost, but also just I mean, in terms of the. The wholesale destruction of a generation. So I, I do believe in just wars and I, you know, I don't I don't need to pull out my Sir Thomas Aquinas and be like, oh, here are the conditions for, you know, just war theory. I'm not a theorist. Never have been, never will be. But I also think it's it's worth particularly as academics and analysts and folks that want to work in policy world really considering what it means when both sides think that they're fighting a righteous war. You know, when those narratives have come head to head with one another and, you know, God, I think I'm going to, I believe, quote, Ronald Reagan, which is a rarity. But, you know, one man's terrorism is another man's freedom fighter is very real. And part of that is, again, you know, you don't mobilize people by saying, like, we're going to do bad shit to people who don't deserve it. That's that's not a compelling reason to take up arms. But like, if we think through the narratives that are being propagated by the Kremlin right now about Ukraine, it's not. Yeah. I really think we need this land because, like, we're bigger and tougher, right? They're selling it as this idea of, well, you know, we're going to restore ourselves to this previous greatness by reclaiming territory that was unjustly taken from us. And, you know, Ukrainians are saying, no, we have the right to sovereignty and self-determination and territorial integrity, and we are fighting this just cause to protect ourselves from this illegal onslaught. And like, yeah. But no, I think it's it's really worth considering, particularly if you're thinking through like post-conflict reintegration or transitional justice, like how do we square different notions of what was right in war? And then coexist in the post-conflict period? I mean, it is a tremendous task. Particularly, you know, if you've been involved in, like, protracted political violence to, to kind of undo the idea of, like, yeah, I was, I was fighting a just war. Yeah. So I do think there are just wars, as I think most people think they're fighting a just war, which makes it very tricky to to figure out who which war is actually draws. Lindsey Well, this next question's kind of about the population on either side of a conflict. And I know we were just talking about the Russo Ukraine conflict. So I'm thinking about the people of Russia and the people of Ukraine. The government has complete oversight of violence and the legal authority to wage war. How responsible are the people for the violence conducted on their behalf by their government? Dr. Matfess Such a good question. You know, to say that each individual citizen is culpable for the violence perpetrated by their government kind of invites collective punishment, which I don't want to do. Right. Attacks on U.S. citizens in response to U.S. military intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan would still be considered acts of terrorism. So stipulating I don't believe in collective punishment. I do think particularly for those of us living in electoral democracies, I do think that those of us who are living in democracies, whether they be imperfect or well-oiled machines, do have a responsibility to to voice our displeasure. Right. And to stand up and articulate what it is we expect from our professional practitioners of violence, and hold that standard and, you know, really demand that the legal system of checks and balances to restrain the power of any one governmental entity, be respected. And that, you know, when those who have been entrusted to use violence on behalf of its citizenry misbehave or break the law, that they are punished in accordance with, you know, the guidelines governing them, right? And that means that means that we have to speak out when we see police violence, when we see our military behaving inappropriately overseas. You know, I, I certainly don't think that we can hold citizens responsible for the violence that that government enacts. But I do think that we can judge people for not when they have the capability to do so relatively safely. Speaking out against that and demanding that their government uphold the values that they believe in. Traditionally we're supposed to do that at the ballot box. John In his January 1848 speech opposing the Mexican-American War, Congressman Abraham Lincoln accused President Polk of unjustly rallying war support by, quote, fixing the public gaze upon the exceeding brightness of military glory, that attractive rainbow that rises in showers of blood, doctor madness. What makes military glory and war and violence so attractive? Dr. Matfess Man, this Abe Lincoln guy's a real good public speaker, he's really going places. If only he had a signature hat to really stand out of the crowd. Yeah. So like I said, a little bit earlier, so often military glory and sacrifice has been connected to citizenship and respect and heroism, and it comes with the kind of coding of like the public sphere, which is such a like clunky academic term to mean, like anything that's not domestic life, as a place that's masculine and for men, and home and kind of softness and femininity all being wrapped up in this idea of like, womanhood, but part of making the public sphere, you know, masculine and for men is also speaking to like a hierarchy that exists among men in gender hierarchy. Right? It's not just about like men are given more status than women, more prestige, more respect. So it's certain types of men are held up as like the apex of masculinity. And the Association of Militarization and Warfighting and masculinity has so often meant that, like the manliest dude, the guy that's like, most worthy of being in the public sphere is like a military man, is someone with this kind of distinguished career as a practitioner of violence. And I've talked about this in my classes before, like, you know, that's harmful to a lot of people. Right. If if participation in warfare is a means by which men distinguish themselves and compete with one another, well, then that kind of produces a motor towards militarization and towards war. And that's obviously destructive and problematic. And that's to, you know, have sympathy for men. What's the tough thing to do in ? But it does seem, you know, exhausting that there's this hierarchy of men is is a never ending treadmill of, of trying to be the toughest and the biggest. And we have all of these really interesting psychological studies about how masculinity is easily lost, you know, like one singular display of feminine behavior. And you suddenly have to like, quote unquote, like return your man card in a way that, like, I'm wearing pants today. This hasn't dampened my femininity. I don't have to prove myself to be a woman. I'm out here earning money at a job. When I go home, I don't have to be like, My God, let me go full s housewife to reclaim my femininity. Because it's not attached to as much prestige or stature. Whereas I think, John, if you came to school today in a skirt, there would be like a lot of like, what's up with John? You know, and like, oh, is John as tough as I thought he was? In ways that are really damaging to men. And bringing this back to, to violence, we see in armed groups, you know, state affiliated, non-state affiliated, whatever. The closer you are to the front lines, the more respect you get. And it I mean, even within like super, you know, specialized aspects of service, you can be an infantryman in the U.S. Army. Do you have your range or tap? Well, have you got your Ranger tab? Did you go Ranger Regiment? Well, if you want Ranger Regiment, then why don't you go over to Delta? You know, like there's always the next thing about being, like, super tough. There's always a next level of of masculinity to be achieved. So what makes military glory and war so attractive? To go back, because it comes with prestige and respect and kind of climbing up that pyramid of masculinity and status, Yeah. So to the point where I had a friend who was like, very successful at performing masculinity, which is a weird thing to say. And I think if he heard it, he'd be like, what the fuck are you talking about? Sounds like a really nice way of putting it. I don't know, I don't know exactly what you're about to say, but it sounds very nice. He's a good looking guy. He's a tall guy, full head of hair, despite his age, which is compelling. I got it. Yep. It was, my husband does too. And, like, he was in the Army and was, like, doing, you know, cool guy, tough guy. Shit. But he was so frustrated by this, like, performative, preening masculinity that he was, like, wear t shirts about, like, mental health matters, like. And all of these kind of, like, softer, you know, quote unquote, like girly things I want to point out, like, you know, no, I don't need to I don't need to compete with you guys to be the toughest because I'm comfortable with myself. Which, like, I don't think that this man would be like, yeah, I'm a radical feminist. But I do think that that behavior, like, does help kind of undermine gender hierarchy and undermine the sort of like, I don't know, race to be a protein powder snorting Neanderthal who, like, hates anything feminine or associated with women. John It's like a, like a positive thing that men can do to, like, use privilege to change things in society? So not to brag on my husband because I, we joke, we don't say nice things to each other. We say nice things about each other. It's great. It's a very solid way to communicate. I highly recommend, Lindsey You just go around insulting each other. Dr. Matfess Pretty much. Yeah, but behind each other's backs, it's positive. Yes. Yeah. No, no. To his face. I did, I, I taught our daughter, who's like two and some change, a call and response where I go. What is that? You know, she goes, nothing. And I'm like, that's right, daddy. No, nothing. Yeah. It's he gives it as well as he gets it. Don't worry. But anyway, when we were engaged, we're still living in Connecticut, and he was at his office where there's a bunch of, like, pro dudes. And they were talking some guy in the office whose fiance I wasn't going to take his last name. Basically, like a fucking pussy. Like. Well, my wife took mine. It like an incredible thing to try and flex about. And my husband is also very successful at performing masculinity. So without a full head of hair, like, he's, you know, he's a tough, strong guy. He's got a military background, all of that stuff that's associated with prestige, like interrupt him is like, my fiance is not going to take my name. Do you have a problem with that? And they all like, shut up. Because my husband's a strong man. And I think they were a little bit like me. Okay. But I do think, like. Yeah, it matters when men stand up and are like, what you're doing is ridiculous, right? And like, oh, no. Like, disrespecting women are like exerting control over them is not a means in which are like proving what a big tough guy you are. Like, so yeah, no, I as I say this very frequently to my husband, like, guys that don't respect women aren't going to listen to me. Right. So I can, you know, I could literally talk all day about like, patriarchy and gender hierarchy and discrimination and, you know, precarious masculinity, blah, blah, blah. But like, they're not going to take me seriously. And so it requires people that are already pretty high up on that hierarchy of men to say, like, this is all bullshit, and the way that you're acting is ridiculous. For for change to come about from certain, you know, subsets of people. John At the height of the Cold War, the president of France, Charles de Gaulle, announced that France would withdraw from NATO's integrated military command, and he asked the US to remove its military bases and armed forces from French soil. President Lyndon Johnson reportedly then asked whether that decision also applied to Americans buried in French cemeteries. Doctor Memphis do the dead of past wars belong to history? Or does the meaning of their deaths continue to guide how societies should act in the present? Dr. Matfess I'm trying to think of this in a way that's not quite so America centric. Because the United States has this particular relationship, to to those that we lost in war. Right? We have annual commemorations of it. We have. I mean, Arlington National Cemetery is a national icon. It is a revered space because of the kind of weight and the understanding that those men and women sacrificed our lives in the service of the American project. And what there's always debate over what is the American project, right. Like, should we be intervening to promote democracy? Should we be doing x, y, z? You know, there's intense political debates around it, but it's kind of anathema in American political life to say anything along the lines of like, we need to forget about the dead, or, you know, their their sacrifice was in vain. Because we have it so deeply ingrained, in our national consciousness that there's was a sacrifice that is to be respected and lauded and remembered. And as an American that grew up near a military town, though in a deeply civilian family, you know, I was I was obviously raised in that. And so. You know, I, I don't think really anywhere there's like a kind of waiving off of past sacrifices that have been made in people's minds. I do think in places where, you know, the military has been complicit in violence against their own civilians, that there's perhaps more complicated, feeling. But I do think when we we think about what motivates people to take up arms, to join militaries, to join non-state armed groups, it is worth considering the kind of narratives we tell about those that have lost their lives in the service of that cause. Because I do think it's a compelling way in which, you know, imagined communities of all sorts really define themselves. So I don't think they belong to the history. I think that kind of the sacrifices of those who served in armed groups are unfortunately very frequently politicized in the service of this idea that, like, their sacrifice shouldn't be in vain. But yeah, that's, that's all I've got to say about that. No, I will also say, like, as I'm like, realize like, you know, I can't even bring myself to, like, speak ill of of those who lost their lives in service of their country. I do you think it's worth noting you can serve your country quite a lot of ways. And we have a tendency to valorize military service, but, like, if you've ever toured the CIA headquarters, you also see that they have a, a wall full of those who, you know, died during their their service to the intelligence community. And there's also those who lost their lives as diplomats, as aid workers. I certainly don't want to suggest the only way that you can serve your country is through the military. Lindsey With conflict and thinking about, just devastation. We tend to focus on Taiwan, Venezuela, Iran, Ukraine and Gaza. What wars are we not hearing about and why aren't we hearing about them? I've spent a lot of my career working on political violence in sub-Saharan Africa. So like my initial slate of like I have one should be paying attention to these conflicts is pretty much focused there. So, like, I'm really struck by how quiet the press has been about the war in Sudan. Right? There was a kind of initial burst of reporting, and now it's kind of faded into the background of like, oh, yeah, still war in Sudan isn't that crazy? And it's like, yes. And geopolitically quite important. More broadly, you know, we focus a lot on kind of declared wars between, you know, either different government in two different governments or a government and a non-state armed group. But I don't think that the international community, academics, analysts are paying enough attention to kind of inter fighting, between non-state armed groups. So battles between, you know, Salafi jihadist insurgents in the Sahel, disagreements between cartels and non-state armed groups. Yeah, all of those are really significant contributors to the instability and insecurity throughout the world. And then the final thing I'll say that we we don't really focus on that we should is the the loss of life and the violence, that go on in the home and the kind of really troublingly high rates of intimate partner violence and domestic violence. And we don't frame it as a war because it's not, but it is a significant form of violence that shapes, you know, so many people's lives. And we frame it often as a private matter. And that takes away a lot of the politics of it and the ways in which it's, you know, an assertion of masculinity and men's power over women. Let's step back and widen the frame. Our conversation began where conversations about war usually begin countries, militaries, armed groups, and clearly defined conflicts. But Doctor Mattis pushes us beyond that. She is careful here. Domestic violence is not war, but it is a significant form of violence. And when it is treated as a private matter, we can miss the politics inside it power, gender control and whose safety gets treated as a public concern. John So the next turn may feel sharp, but it follows the same thread. If violence can be framed as protection, dignity, discipline or control, then stopping it becomes much harder than simply deciding the harm should end. Lindsey We've been talking a lot about what causes war, what prolongs it, why does it happen? What is it with ending a long and difficult war? Is it the perception of weakness on the world stage? The global stage? Is it an aversion to betraying the public good? Dr. Matfess You know, the sunk cost fallacy is a really powerful force, right? This idea that like, well, we've already sacrificed so much, we've spent so much time, we have to at least accomplish this objective before we can get out. And, you know, I'm, I'm a s baby, so I was raised in the kind of era of America's endless wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. And from my perspective, it seemed like so often there was just this sunk cost fallacy of like, well, we can't cut and run. We've already spent so much there. Iraq's going to be a democracy, you know, like we're we're going to democratize and that there's just no way around it. And, you know, that the the Taliban was going to be eradicated. And, it's safe to say here in , neither one of those goals were achieved. And I don't think had we stayed on for another years, they would have been achieved that. But it's very difficult to admit defeat. It's very difficult to admit that, like, you have spent a lot of time, money, energy, and lost so many lives in the service of an objective that you did not accomplish. So, yeah, I mean, that would be. That would be my guess. Lindsey If violence is being committed against me, aka if someone punches me in the face, I would feel the need to respond violently by punching them in the face. In self-defense, of course. Is there a paradox to violence, and is war self-perpetuating? Dr. Matfess Yeah. I mean, I definitely think that there's kind of an inherent escalatory nature to this. And, you know, in conflict studies, there's this idea of kind of the escalation ladder, and how I was one person is advancing up the other party feels the need to, to advance further so that they're not caught off guard. I mean, you can also see it in the sort of arms race that accompany the cold War. This idea of, like, you don't even have to be punched in the face so you can see someone, you know, putting on brass knuckles and you're like, oh, shit, should I get my brass knuckles? And then someone cocks their fists and you're like, guess what? Both hands have brass knuckles on it. Now, I've never been in a fight. I assume people just carry their brass knuckles with- John -I left mine at home. Dr. Matfess Oh, no. Oh, I hate when that happens. But I do think that there's there's something self-perpetuating in that kind of cycle of escalation. And then also, I think in, in kind of the sense of we have to restore our dignity through enacting harm, which like, I like chuckled midway through because it sounds ridiculous on its face, but that is at the heart of quite a lot of violence. Right? Like from bar fights where it's like, hey man, you couldn't again never been in a bar fight. But like, do you cut in line or you bumped into my girl and like, that harmed my dignity. So now I need to throw punch all the way to, you know, the Cuban missile crisis and the encroachment. You know, too close to America's territory with Soviet nuclear weapons. And, yeah, I mean, if I'm going to go full feminist security studies, it's worth considering the ways that that attempt to restore dignity through a show of force is linked to masculinity and militarism and and that kind of Gordian knot that really has implications for all of our well-being. John If we could like, scale this to like how states perceive like a fist. Yeah. Coming out or anything, is it is it almost like a, like a language of like recognizing, oh, you're moving muscles in Cuba. We have to react. Dr. Matfess Yeah. I mean, you see- John Miscommunications as well. Dr. Matfess Miscommunications and perception and there's this sort of inherent tension. But yeah, you think about like in the aftermath of like tough talk, you'll hear like, oh, you know, the United States moved an aircraft carrier closer to Taiwan and it's like, okay, that is to some the equivalent of taking a defensive posture, but could be perceived to others as a raised fist. And so what do you what do you do from there? How do you make sure that, like if you see someone advancing towards you in a way that's threatening, how do you adopt a defensive posture that isn't kind of cowering in fear? And we see a lot of this in international relations, a lot of posturing at the same time that you try to reassure someone, saying, like, I'm not going to attack you first, but if you attack me, you're going to regret it. You know, if you're a casual consumer of the news and you read these reports about like troop movements and deployments and even, you know, high level talks about like weapons sales or transfers, it's worth considering, like, okay, what are they reacting to? And what is the message that they're trying to portray? There is a lot of like performance of national identity wrapped up in this, and attempts to like, protect the, the dignity of your nation. John In an undelivered speech written just before his death, President Franklin Roosevelt summarized his hope following the Second World War, quote, but the mere conquest of our enemies is not enough. We must go on to do all in our power to conquer the doubts and the fears, the ignorance and the greed which made this horror possible. Today, science has brought all the different corners of the globe so close together that it is impossible to isolate them from one another. We are faced with the preeminent fact that if civilization is to survive, we must cultivate the science of human relationships, the ability of all peoples of all kinds to live together and work together in the same world at peace. Doctor Matfess, is a better world possible? Are we capable of cultivating this ability to wage peace? Dr. Matfess Not to be too self-serious about what it is we're doing here at Korbel, but that's very much the mission. Is cultivation of a a more stable, more peaceful, more prosperous world through the study of international relations, and by training the next generation of analysts and policymakers and thinkers and doers to work towards a more peaceful world. And, you know, to tie back to the, our discussion of World War Two earlier and whether or not there can be just wars to also be prepared to fight when there's a challenge to that. Karl Popper, who was a political theorist, has this idea that for a tolerant society to emerge, the only thing that we cannot tolerate is intolerance. And it becomes this, like fun little paradox. But I very much think that way about like, yes, a more peaceful world is possible, but it also requires standing up to or pugnacious and dominating forces, unjustly, using violence when necessary. The debate comes in when it's necessary. But yeah, no, I, I think there are a God. I hope there can be a brighter future. I've got a two year old here, like two competing approaches to this is a better world possible question. And one is yes, and it's radical. And we have to uproot the whole system and put in place something brand spanking new. And I have a lot of friends who believe that, and I respect that. And it's very romantic. And then on the other hand, there are the like marginal improvements over time. People, and I count myself amongst them. And it is boring and unsexy, and it's very hard to convince people like you don't go out marching like, what's the GI Bill for this generation? I want like a marginally better set up for upward mobility through tax credits and education subsidies like it's not a great rallying cry, but that's also like where I see a better world being possible is using and reforming existing institutions to improve our lives and work towards that world. Yeah. I want to direct to the front like, yeah, I'm not huge into revolutions because they tend to blame the Jews and I don't feel safe. So yeah, no, I think like the there's a really compelling debate about is it is the revolutionary or the incremental approach the way to go? And I think what's really fun about being at Korbel is you have people on both sides of that debate, and you can learn, you know, what each side expects. Lindsey Well, we would like to thank you for taking the time to do this and answer some of these tough questions. So to lighten the mood, we have two more fun questions to end it. One of them being, if you could personally recommend one place that everyone should visit for its beauty or culture. Where would that be? Dr. Matfess There's so many places that spring to mind. I loved living in Ethiopia. I just, I love coffee, I love kind of I was had the ability to kind of travel in the North a little bit. And it's got this, like, really beautiful mountainous terrain. And, there's this great little, like Lake City and Amhara state called Vardar and like, I was able to take a boat to all of these little islands that had old Orthodox churches on them and you'd like kind of island hop. And I saw a hippo in the lake. And Ethiopian food is just so good. And as a vegetarian, that is not always exciting when you're traveling. But in Ethiopia, there's a ton of incredible vegetarian food. So that would definitely be one the other one, and I'll limit myself to two. Crested Butte, Colorado, to do one domestic is just one of the most breathtakingly beautiful places I've ever been. My husband and I have gone two years in a row now, and just. It is stunning. And for the parents out there, really incredible playground, which is something I never, ever thought I would care about. But after, like, driving the five hours or whatever to get there, my toddler wanted to play, and she was able to, like, play on this gorgeous playground. And I was able to look at these, like, beautiful panoramic mountain views. And they've got great pizza, a place called Secret Stash and a little local bookstore that's also great. Like, a very solid mountain town that often does not have the crowds of Vail or Breck. So Crested Butte, Colorado. John Here at Mooreposts. We want to make it a point to promote nonprofits or organizations that create positive impacts. Are there any you would like to share with us? Dr. Matfess Yeah. Since we focus so much on global violence, right. I'll kind of direct my, recommendations in that vein, Doctors Without Borders does incredible work. All over the world, they provide lifesaving medical care in some of the most intense conflicts, and they are one of the most worthy organizations in the world I can think of. So, yeah, Doctors Without Borders is incredible. I also am so deeply grateful to the folks at places like Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, International Crisis Group, who are really focusing on providing clarity and well-researched accounts of how wars are actually fought. So any of those three, I think, are also incredibly deserving. And then the last one I would say would be, the International Planned Parenthood Foundation, who provide reproductive and women's health care all around the world. And I think her fighting the good fight, in a particularly difficult time to provide those types of services. Doctor Hilary Matfess, thank you so much for being here. This is awesome. No, thank you all. John After discussing maybe the heaviest subject imaginable, we ended somewhere quieter. Family trips to beautiful mountain towns and the work of health organizations. I don't think those are separate from the conversation. I think they point to the same reality. War and violence are not just things that happened far away or long ago, or only between armies. They reach into how we understand strength, dignity, sacrifice and who belongs. And maybe restoration begins with what violence tries to take away family, truth and the chance to live without proving anything through force. So the question is not only how we prevent war and violence, it is how we start mistaking them for strength. Thanks for listening. If you enjoyed this work, please consider sharing our content and website or donating to a non-profit organization linked in the Donate tab. DISCLAIMER The views and opinions expressed by podcast guests are their own and do not necessarily reflect those of Mooreposts, its editors, contributors, or affiliates. Podcast transcripts are edited for clarity and readability; section headers have been added for navigational purposes. The substance and intent of all remarks remain unchanged.

Ramifications for Great Power Competition Illustration by Jonathan Rockford LISTEN TO THIS ARTICLE The ‘Digital Silk Road’ (DSR) is a plan developed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to provide a technological framework to developing nations and middle powers, intending to grow Chinese technological dominance. Much like the physical Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the CCP views investment in middle powers and developing nations as a key mechanism of its revisionist world-order agenda, which seeks to challenge US hegemony through influence. The Middle East offers fertile soil for technological development. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members—namely Saudi Arabia and the UAE—have shown a consistent interest in developing sovereign AI mechanisms, smart cities, and digital infrastructure. China not only offers greater accessibility, tending to approve large infrastructure projects rapidly, often rolling them out faster than their Western counterparts or international entities like the World Bank, but also affordability, noted to be 20-30% cheaper. GCC states are simultaneously deepening ties with both American and Chinese tech ecosystems while pursuing their own sovereign AI capabilities; Estimates indicate that AI could contribute up to $135 billion to the Middle East’s GDP by 2030. China now looks to telecommunications, computer chips, and AI development to expand its access to this market, posing an imminent threat to US security assets, including intellectual property, critical data, strategic planning, American intelligence assets, and partnerships abroad. GCC Technological Sovereignty Ambitions Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) appear to be leading the region's drive to advance cutting-edge technology, making them key investment targets for China. Both nations have publicly launched efforts to develop sovereign AI models trained on Arabic-language data, Islamic jurisprudence, and local regulatory frameworks. At present, only about 15% of Arabic online content is suitable for training AI models, compared to over 50% for English, creating a key challenge motivating sovereign development "China now looks to telecommunications, computer chips, and AI development to expand its access to this market, posing an imminent threat to US security assets, including intellectual property, critical data, strategic planning, American intelligence assets, and partnerships abroad." to account for cultural and language-based nuances. The KSA's National Strategy for Data & AI aims to make the kingdom one of the top 15 global AI leaders by 2030. They have invested significant resources in positioning themselves as a regional economic leader, committing over $100 billion by 2026 to AI infrastructure, semiconductor manufacturing, and advanced computing. Similarly, the UAE provides another great opportunity for tech investment. In line with the KSA, the UAE is developing sovereign AI models aimed at the same goals as the Saudi model. With the addition of the UAE's tech leader approach, it positions itself as one of the most ambitious GCC countries investing in technology. Goals include a massive investment in smart vehicles, a national AI strategy embedded in governance, and the construction of the world's largest AI data center outside the US. The program aims to double the nation’s GDP from 1.49 trillion to 3 trillion AED, with a particular focus on generating non-oil exports to diversify the economy. The US Technology Relationship with the GCC Historically, the US has maintained a relatively positive relationship with many GCC nations, hosting military bases, strategic military camps, airspace, and ports. As the Gulf is a strategic location for military support, intelligence collection, partnerships, and trade, the US has continued to support GCC technological development. However, the push for GCC technological growth posits a supply chain gap ready to be filled by great powers with the capabilities to provide foundational support, whoever it may be. Limitations & Tensions Although military and strategic partnerships underpin the initial investment into Gulf technology, the US is far behind. Under the Biden administration, restrictions on sensitive tech exports capped annual chip sales, amid fears that Russia and China would use Gulf countries to evade sanctions and threaten American intellectual property. This export control uncertainty, which varies from administration to "Foreign nations have also grown weary of potential US kill-switch options—the ability to disable technology at the touch of a button—for security concerns, rendering sovereign technology useless if the underlying compute stack fails." administration, may be considered a longevity concern by Gulf countries seeking long-term consistency. Moreover, US computing chips and tech platforms come with compliance obligations, including monitoring and audit requirements under the Validated End User framework and the 2018 Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data Act. These allow US federal law enforcement to compel US-based technology companies to provide data stored on their servers, regardless of whether the data is stored in the US or on foreign soil, meaning that if US hyperscalers build a data center physically inside Saudi Arabia, the US government can legally demand access to data. Foreign nations have also grown weary of potential US kill-switch options—the ability to disable technology at the touch of a button—for security concerns, rendering sovereign technology useless if the underlying compute stack fails. On the other hand, China has no equivalent extraterritorial law affecting Gulf-stored data, but rather defensive laws to prevent foreign access to data within the mainland. China's Digital Silk Road as an Alternative Model In contrast to US tech capabilities, China offers a different kind of advantage than technological superiority: its technology is inexpensive, readily available, and ready to be integrated. The Huawei telecom infrastructure, power plant construction, smart city platforms, surveillance systems, and data centers, all bundled together and enabled by AI, offer easy integration in one fell swoop across critical infrastructure. This rivals the current US framework, which offers the technology without the integration or expertise. Beijing-controlled tech firms have adapted their strategies to local political and regulatory conditions in each GCC country, tailoring them to each nation’s specific political context, priorities, leadership, and cultural and linguistic nuances. For example, Alibaba Cloud was the first major hyperscaler to enter the KSA market, willing to satisfy the Kingdom's required domestic cloud capacity for government data via a joint venture. The DSR Framework To position its packaged technology, China launched the Digital Silk Road (DSR) in 2015 as the tech branch of the BRI. As part of this, Huawei—a Chinese tech hyper-scaler and leading telecommunications provider—plans to invest $400 million in Saudi Arabia's cloud region over five years. At the 2025 Mobile World Congress, Huawei and Zain KSA announced a "Cloud-First" agreement that aims to integrate AI-driven services into Saudi infrastructure, like building out 5G for smart city applications. Huawei Cloud's Riyadh hub has onboarded more than 1,000 customers in two years, including Saudi government agencies and major financial institutions. CSIS further identified 73 Huawei Safe City agreements across 52 countries, where potential products include facial recognition, license plate recognition, social media monitoring, and other surveillance capabilities. ZTE and Tencent, along with other Chinese tech firms, rolled out 5G test networks in the UAE and supported the digital transformation of 14 KSA government departments. The major investment makes the DSR’s angle clear: invest early and invest big in the hopes of a greater return on interest, namely influence, access to information, and competing with the US tech firms. Security Implications & Great Power Competition Though Chinese intentions in heavy technological investment in the Middle East may be altruistic, ambiguous, and multifaceted, it is clear that their increasing influence in the region poses security and political threats to the US. In the UAE, the US military shares the Al-Dhafra airbase, which hosts 3,500 US troops and acts as an essential Air Force site, particularly for reconnaissance. In the KSA, more than 2,300 US soldiers are stationed for collaborative air and missile defense, using Prince Sultan Air Base as a key US. Army outpost. Already, Chinese embedded digital infrastructure poses a security threat in these nations, however, in the region at large, the US has several other critical military establishments; CENTCOM, in Qatar, which houses over 10,000 troops and over a hundred aircraft drones and the US Navy’s 5th Fleet in Bahrain, which houses over 8,300 troops, are key military assets in a traditionally hot-conflict region for the military. Deployed in these bases are mission-critical technologies, intelligence information, key strategic plans, and sensitive information about high-level American officials. As the DSR continues to pour money and resources into the Middle East, the US faces a heightened risk of cyber espionage. Importantly, China’s 2017 National Intelligence Law requires Chinese companies to comply with the government's intelligence apparatus by sharing data, providing clarification, and ensuring complete transparency. The requirements, paired with leaks revealing hacking campaigns targeting critical infrastructure projects in other DSR partner nations, such as Vietnam, involve the use of surveillance technology. If this is any indication of the CCP's intentions, it may be a path forward for exporting a system of mass surveillance and data collection. If Chinese firms are building 5G networks, cloud platforms, and smart city systems around US military bases, the potential for significant intelligence vulnerabilities is greatly increased. Chinese digital infrastructure firms in the Gulf are not just delivering technology; they are shaping the Gulf‘s digital ecosystems in ways that globalize Chinese technical norms. Beyond the intelligence vulnerabilities, Chinese influence threatens to erode US hegemony in mediation and security umbrellas for Gulf states. With recent strikes on US-partnered countries in the wake of the US conflict with Iran, there have been concerns about the reliability of US security guarantees. After the 2025 Israeli attack on Qatar, the GCC Joint Defence Council held an emergency session, signaling a sense of distress. Some scholars argue that Gulf states may seek alternative guarantors, and that China could be an option. Conclusion As investment in evolving technology becomes an investment in the future for economic diversification and power, GCC countries are actively seeking suppliers to fulfill their orders. In the past few decades, these Middle Eastern nations have relied heavily on their American partners. Now, however, it’s clear that they are hedging their bets between the US and China, which could have serious security and geopolitical implications for the US China’s ability to offer technology as a package at a much lower cost creates an asymmetric problem for the US, as embedded infrastructure from Chinese technology in energy grids, telecommunications, and other critical infrastructure projects ties them to China for the foreseeable future. As US policy has oscillated between restricting tech exports and engaging in such, a consistent long-term plan as an alternative is more attractive for GCC countries seeking development. Mia is the Deputy Editor-in-Chief of Mooreposts and an M.A. candidate in International Security at the Josef Korbel School of Global and Public Affairs. If you enjoyed this work, please consider sharing Mooreposts’ content, following Mia on the social media platforms listed in her bio, or supporting a non-profit organization linked in the Donate tab. DISCLAIMER Mooreposts publishes independent analysis, commentary, and research for informational and educational purposes only. Content on Mooreposts—including articles, Mooreposts Bites, strategic intelligence assessments, opinion pieces, interviews, and visual materials—does not constitute legal, financial, medical, or professional advice, nor does it represent any government agency, official position, or classified assessment. Unless explicitly stated, all analyses and interpretations reflect the views and analytic judgments of the individual author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Mooreposts, its editorial staff, or affiliated contributors. Strategic intelligence and analytical content is based on open-source information and publicly available materials. Mooreposts strives for accuracy, transparency, and rigorous sourcing; however, information may change as events develop. Readers are encouraged to consult primary sources and exercise independent judgment.

South Korean Women's Historic Lawsuit Illustration by John Lamberger & Connor JL Moore LISTEN TO THIS ARTICLE Park Young-ja was 15 when she went to a job placement agency seeking work. She was placed in a coffee shop and sold for 15,000 Won. She tried to escape after experiencing sexual abuse and was sold again—this time to bars in the military camptowns of Dongducheon and later Uijeongbu. Debt made leaving impossible. Bar or club owners recorded the cost of a woman's purchase price, housing, food, and clothing—this all became money she owed them. These manufactured debts compounded faster than they could ever be repaid, trapping women inside a system that considered their captivity a business contract. Every week, camp authorities required her to submit to STD testing. When she tested positive, she was forcibly detained in a medical detention center and injected with penicillin. If she was caught without her health card during a random inspection, she was detained without any testing at all. Park spent 24 years in the camptown system. In 2014, she was one of 122 women who sued the South Korean government. She testified: “We were abandoned in this country where we were born. In the kijich’ons [US military camptowns], we were only subjected to violence and extortion. Nobody cared about us.” In 2022, South Korea's Supreme Court ruled that the government had mediated, aided, and abetted an illegal sex trade, violating the government’s duty to protect its citizens. The court found that survivors had a right to compensation. This ruling was historic, but the next step for these survivors was US accountability. GI Heaven The camptown system trapped as many as one million South Korean women and girls across five decades—a state-sanctioned sex trade built into the infrastructure of the US-South Korean alliance. The system was bureaucratized: government-managed, medically surveilled, and coordinated with US military priorities. American soldiers called the strip of camptowns stretching from the DMZ down to Seoul “GI Heaven.” For these girls, the reality was the opposite. This isn't simply a story of interpersonal violence or wartime chaos. It implicates actors whom the dominant historical narrative treats as liberators, which is part of why the camptowns remain largely absent from international memory. While many may be aware of the Japanese “comfort women,” the camptown system has no obvious villain for Western audiences. The perpetrators are allies, the infrastructure was built under the banner of collective security, and the violence was administered through bureaucratic procedure. It is harder to assign blame or seek accountability when the perpetrators are also your protectors. Archival photographs of U.S. military personnel and camptown (gijichon) life in South Korea during the Cold War era. Images courtesy of Blair KH Naujok, Founder & Director, Korean Image Archive. In the 1960s, rates of STIs among American soldiers in South Korea were “far above the norm for American military installations in Japan and Europe.” In response, the South Korean and US governments jointly launched a “cleanup” campaign to control the spread of STIs. This campaign led to the creation of a detention facility, colloquially called the “Monkey House” in Dongducheon, where women suspected of carrying STIs were involuntarily held. US military personnel conducted random inspections at clubs, rounding up women without valid registration or VD test cards. Women wore numbered badges or name tags at the clubs, and the US military kept photo files of women at base clinics to help infected soldiers identify contacts. Failure to produce a card—or a positive test result—meant forced detention. Once detained, these women were forcibly examined and injected with penicillin, often administered by US military medics in doses higher than Korean physicians would typically prescribe, without adequate research into side effects. According to survivors, many women received overdoses; some died. The 2022 South Korean Supreme Court ruling upheld the finding that these detentions violated human rights. This ruling established the legal and moral groundwork for asking what the Korean government's security partner owes. The New Lawsuit: How it Works, Why it's Complicated In 2025, survivors of the camptown system filed a new suit against the South Korean Justice Ministry. They are seeking 10 million won (roughly $7,200) per plaintiff, but more than that, they are seeking a formal apology and official acknowledgement of US complicity. The South Korean government is the named defendant, but the US military is the real target. The Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which governs the legal status of US military personnel in South Korea, contains no mechanism for naming the US military as an institutional defendant in Korean civil courts. Survivors cannot sue the US government directly for what was done to them. SOFA, in this sense, functions as a built-in accountability gap—a legal architecture designed to insulate US military conduct from host-nation redress. The South Korean Justice Ministry is serving as a defendant by proxy. This isn't the first time SOFA has blocked Korean civilians from seeking justice against US military conduct. In 2002, two US soldiers driving an armored vehicle killed two 14-year-old girls, Shin Hyo-sun and Shim Mi-seon. SOFA required the soldiers to be tried in American military courts. Both were acquitted. The same legal architecture that shielded those soldiers is what prevents the survivors of US camptowns from naming their actual defendant. This new lawsuit seeks something the US has never offered: accountability. The plaintiffs want the US to admit it was directly involved in a state-sponsored sex trade, that American medics administered dangerous doses of penicillin to detained women, and that US military personnel operated and benefited from a system of gendered violence. As one plaintiff shared, “Our story is not a history of shame. Our story is a cry for truth. We are victims. We are human beings. We will fight to the very end.” Madalyn Jane Shircliff is an M.A. candidate in International Security from the Josef Korbel School of Global and Public Affairs. If you enjoyed this work, please consider sharing our content and website or donating to a non-profit organization linked in the Donate tab. DISCLAIMER Mooreposts publishes independent analysis, commentary, and research for informational and educational purposes only. Content on Mooreposts—including articles, Mooreposts Bites, strategic intelligence assessments, opinion pieces, interviews, and visual materials—does not constitute legal, financial, medical, or professional advice, nor does it represent any government agency, official position, or classified assessment. Unless explicitly stated, all analyses and interpretations reflect the views and analytic judgments of the individual author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Mooreposts, its editorial staff, or affiliated contributors. Strategic intelligence and analytical content is based on open-source information and publicly available materials. Mooreposts strives for accuracy, transparency, and rigorous sourcing; however, information may change as events develop. Readers are encouraged to consult primary sources and exercise independent judgment.

Illustration by Jonathan Rockford LISTEN TO THIS ARTICLE In December 2025, Japan’s cabinet approved a record defense budget – a 9.4 percent increase over the prior year and the fourth consecutive annual rise under its five-year plan to double defense spending. The plan, worth roughly $320 billion in total, has placed Japan third in the world for defense expenditure. For a country once defined by its pacifist constitution, this marks a dramatic shift in strategic posture. It also signals a missed opportunity – not only for Japan, but for middle powers worldwide. Multipolarity’s Promise and Japan’s Divergence The international order is once again shifting into multipolarity, placing middle or regional powers like Japan at a critical juncture. Will they emulate the great powers of the past with strong militaries and a general distrust of their neighbors? Or will they forge a new path that values diplomacy and cooperation over hard power? Japan’s recent defense policy decisions suggest the former. Its unprecedented defense budgets, reinterpretation of Article 9 of its pacifist constitution, and development of counterstrike capabilities all signal a fundamental transformation in Japan’s strategic posture.  The stakes of that choice are now being articulated at the highest levels of global governance. In January 2026, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney issued a pointed challenge to middle powers everywhere: Compete with each other for the favor of great powers, or coalesce to create a “third path with impact.” Accommodation of hegemons, Carney warned, is not sovereignty. Middle powers like Japan have a chance to emerge as leaders in peacebuilding, development, and cooperation. By investing in soft power rather than military buildup, these states could reshape the world order into one that explicitly values human security and global justice over military strength. The Weight of Hard Power The late Prime Minister Shinzo Abe laid the groundwork for constitutional reinterpretation that would allow Japan to exercise collective self-defense. Subsequent administrations have deepened this shift, and Japan now has counterstrike capabilities in what it describes as a response to escalating regional threats. These concerns are not unfounded, as North Korea’s provocations and China’s assertiveness in the East and South China Seas present genuine security challenges.  Compounding this, US trends toward a transactional, isolationist international policy have cast doubt on the reliability of America’s extended deterrence. At the Munich Security Conference in February 2026, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio framed US commitment to its alliances in terms that place the burden squarely on partners. He warned that US allies must be capable of defending themselves so that no adversary will be tempted to test their collective strength. This validates Tokyo’s rearmament, but it reflects an alliance logic that prioritizes US strategic convenience over Japan’s long-term identity and influence. Militarization also carries weighty historical baggage for Japan that the region has not forgotten. Unlike post-war Germany, Japan has not fully reckoned with the atrocities it committed during its imperial era, including its colonization of neighboring countries and its “comfort women” system, in which the Japanese Imperial Army subjected women to sexual slavery.  Japan’s refusal to engage in meaningful historical reconciliation continues to fuel mistrust. This matters not just for diplomatic relations but for the state’s global credibility. Japan is using its identity as a “proactive contributor to peace” to justify its militarization. However, a rearmed Japan with unresolved historical tensions appears less like a force for peace and more like a reemerging threat. Setting the Wrong Precedent Instead of competing in a new arms race, middle powers could invest resources and global influence in diplomacy, peacebuilding, climate action, and technological innovation. These are not only the tools of a modern power, but are also areas in which Japan has excelled. Its reputation as a development partner, its role in global health, and its cultural diplomacy have earned Japan significant soft power. Militarization threatens to squander what Japan has built for itself. While some may argue that military preparedness and soft power can coexist, Japan’s unresolved wartime legacy complicates this balance. In the context of Japan’s history and its lack of historical reconciliation, rearmament risks reviving regional distrust rather than bolstering deterrence. Regionally, this defense buildup risks fueling a security dilemma. The Republic of Korea may feel pressured to expand its military capabilities; in fact, public opinion in South Korea has shifted on the issue over the past few years. This is in response to cycles of failed reconciliation with North Korea and questions around the US nuclear umbrella. Whether Japan’s armament is seen as a threat or through a lens of cooperation, the move may push South Korea further into hardening its national defense policy. Even ASEAN nations, which have generally emphasized neutrality and non-alignment, may rethink their defense policies in response. Meanwhile, China will almost certainly use Japan’s rearmament to justify further military expansion and aggressive behavior, claiming provocation. Then there are the broader normative consequences: Japan’s militarization risks setting a precedent that middle powers must choose hard power to stay relevant. This undermines potential solidarity among like-minded states that could otherwise prioritize human security, multilateralism, and sustainable development as the foundation of a new global order.  Last Best Chance to Lead Differently Ultimately, middle powers face a pivotal decision. They can either gamble on the repetition of history through a push toward militarization, or they can redefine what power looks like in a modern world. Japan’s current trajectory suggests the former, but this would be a missed opportunity for the international community.  Carney’s Davos argument reflected a concrete geopolitical reality: If Japan and other middle powers choose to embrace solidarity, trust-building, and diplomacy over hard power deterrence, they can chart a new course. This could be a generational opportunity to reshape international norms. Madalyn Jane Shircliff is a M.A. candidate in International Security from the Josef Korbel School of Global and Public Affairs. If you enjoyed this work, please consider sharing our content and website or donating to a non-profit organization linked in the Donate tab. DISCLAIMER Mooreposts publishes independent analysis, commentary, and research for informational and educational purposes only. Content on Mooreposts—including articles, Mooreposts Bites, strategic intelligence assessments, opinion pieces, interviews, and visual materials—does not constitute legal, financial, medical, or professional advice, nor does it represent any government agency, official position, or classified assessment. Unless explicitly stated, all analyses and interpretations reflect the views and analytic judgments of the individual author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Mooreposts, its editorial staff, or affiliated contributors. Strategic intelligence and analytical content is based on open-source information and publicly available materials. Mooreposts strives for accuracy, transparency, and rigorous sourcing; however, information may change as events develop. Readers are encouraged to consult primary sources and exercise independent judgment.

Photos via the United States Navy LISTEN TO THIS WORK Key Takeaway The US’s increased commitment to Operation Epic Fury is highly likely to continue costing American lives and material. U.S. Costs On February 28th, US Central Command (CENTCOM) initiated Operation Epic Fury. Per the White House, the operation makes up part of a "precise, overwhelming military campaign" to dismantle Iran’s short-range ballistic missiles and naval capabilities. By March 2nd, 7 US service members had been killed from Iranian counterattacks that struck US bases in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Those lost include:  Sgt. 1st Class Nicole M. Amor Spc. Declan J. Coady Capt. Cody A. Khork Chief Warrant Officer Robert Marzan Maj. Jeffrey O'Brien Sgt. Benjamin N. Pennington Sgt. 1st Class Noah L. Tietjens By March 23rd, the operation had cost the US 15 aircraft: 11 Reaper Drones, 3 F-15s, and 1 KC-135. The MK-9 Reapers were shot down by missiles and ground-based arms fire. Friendly Kuwaiti air defenses mistakenly shot down three F-15s. On March 13th, CENTCOM confirmed the loss of a KC-135, a refueling aircraft, in western Iraq due to a non-combat incident, killing all 6 crew members: Maj. John A. Klinner Capt. Ariana G. Savino Tech. Sgt. Ashley B. Pruitt Capt. Seth R. Koval Capt. Curtis J. Angst Tech. Sgt. Tyler H. Simmons In all, 13 US service members have died. 232 US service members have been wounded, including 10 seriously wounded. US Aircraft Carriers  Three US Aircraft Carriers are involved in the current operation at different levels. The USS Abraham Lincoln, located 500 miles south of Iran in the Indian Ocean, continues to provide aerial support for the operation. On March 12th, after nearly 10 months into its Mediterranean Sea deployment, a maintenance-related fire forced the USS Gerald R. Ford (USSGRF) to withdraw to Greece for repairs. The fire took 30 hours to extinguish, injured 3 sailors, and exposed 200 to smoke inhalation. On March 5th, the USS George H.W. Bush completed training to enable deployment to the Middle East, most likely to replace the exhausted USSGRF, which could signal operational longevity. Invasion Potential Additional ground forces are currently moving to the Iranian area of operation. The 31st and 11th Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU) are continuously deployed units stationed on ships that are fully capable of conducting ground combat, aviation, and logistical operations. The Pentagon has also ordered 2,000 soldiers from the 82nd Airborne Division to the Middle East. Diplomatic Disengagement The current state of US-Iranian diplomacy remains nonconstructive and elusive. On March 24th, President Trump said that there is a “very good chance” that the Iranians would like to “make a deal.” Pakistan has emerged as a peace broker, sharing the US’s 15-point plan with Tehran. Iran has dismissed this plan and offered a 5-point counter-proposal. Assessment The deployment of additional ground forces, the USS George H.W. Bush, and ongoing diplomatic disengagement all signal a strong likelihood that America’s War with Iran will continue into the foreseeable future, risking greater costs for America. DISCLAIMER This assessment reflects the judgments of the author, based on open-source information, and does not represent official positions or the views of Mooreposts.

Audio & Transcript Executive Producers: John Lamberger, Lindsey Ferrini, Connor JL Moore This transcript has been edited for clarity and readability while preserving the speakers’ original meaning and conversational tone. Minor repetitions, filler words, and false starts have been removed. Speaker attributions have been carefully reviewed against the audio to ensure accuracy. Teaser Lindsey: Around the 1700’s, Imperial Russia expanded by absorbing Ukrainian territory. The Russian Revolution, a multi-sided four-year war within Ukraine and the incorporation of the Soviet Union in 1922 cemented Moscow's centralized control over the region. On December 26th, 1991, the Soviet Union formally dissolved- breaking apart into several republics. Among these new independent countries were the Russian Federation and Ukraine, which shared a 1,200-mile-long border.  Show Stinger Hello, I'm Lindsay Ferrini and I'm John Lamberger. Welcome to Sheepland, the wide green pastures of our modern media environment. Sheepland where people are fenced in by politics, graze on sound bites, and fall prey to the wolves of propaganda. So where are we? Sheepland a program about the great issues facing humanity.  A Mooreposts podcast.  Introduction John: In 2014, Russia began an armed conflict with its neighbor, Ukraine, seizing the Crimean Peninsula and eastern portions of the country. The next eight years were marked by skirmishes, ceasefire violations and irregular fighting between Ukraine and Russian controlled armed groups. By February 24th, 2022, over 14,000 people had been killed or wounded when Russia openly launched a wide-scale invasion. In the fall of 2022, Russia declared its annexation of four Ukrainian regions it did not fully control. The international community has condemned, diplomatically isolated, and economically sanctioned Russia for beginning a conflict considered the largest military attack in Europe since World War Two.  John: With us to discuss the Russo-Ukrainian War is Dr. Rachel Epstein, a professor of international relations at the University of Denver. Her research spans topics from financial crises and reform- to the enlargement of the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Lindsey: Well, first, we'd like to thank you for being here Dr. Rachel Epstein: Thank you so much for having me L: Yeah, and taking time out of your busy schedule to answer some questions for us and inform us about the Russian-Ukrainian war J: Yes, Very generous of you to stop by and speak to us about this, Like, really great issue facing humanity right now L: So, I'm going to start with a more personal question Epstein: Okay Why Study Economic and Security Politics of Europe? Lindsey: So, Rachel, what in your life inspired you to center your career in the economic and security politics of Europe? Hmm Epstein: Well, I am fundamentally like many people my age, I mean, I am a kid of the Cold War, an American kid of the Cold War. And so, growing up in Portland, Oregon, in the 70’s and 80’s, I was really concerned about the nuclear standoff between the Soviet Union and the United States. And probably for a seventh grader, knew an unhealthy amount about nuclear weapons. And I would say that's where my interest started. But I also traveled a couple times on extended trips to Europe, around Europe with my family, also as a teenager, and that also sparked my interest. I would say a third thing is my Jewish heritage and knowledge of the Holocaust and a lack of understanding also as a kid, about how people could engage in such horrific atrocities. So that sparked my interest in Europe. Definitely, I was interested in understanding German, German, politics, German language better so that I could try to come to grips with how that country descended into the barbarity that it did in the 30’s and 40’s. So that combination of things, and then the end of the Cold War, when I was an undergraduate doing my BA in international relations at Stanford, when I was a sophomore, the wall came down, the Berlin Wall came down. So that was probably the fourth thing that really moved me very strongly in the direction of studying Europe and specifically post-Communist Europe. John: It really shaped your college choices where you focused your studies and research? Epstein: Yes, so I went to Berlin to study international relations, study German, but also to be there during German unification in 1990. And at that time, you know, the difference between East and West Berlin- It was night and day- I mean, it was just it was it was like seeing two different worlds that had been so profoundly and distinctively shaped by their respective histories. So that was fascinating and then, of course, you know, the East European, what we think of as East Central Europe now Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, etc., Baltic states, all the way down to the Western Balkans- that region had a series of really critical choices to make about their political futures and so my research interests took off from there. John: That must have been fascinating! Epstein: It's pretty interesting time John: The epicenter of the Cold War for so long. Epstein: Yeah Berlin Time Lindsey: How much time did you spend in Berlin at that point?  Epstein: I was there for six months So, like the University of Denver, Stanford was on quarters, So it was, I think September through March, I was there and also for unification. John: And the wall had already been down? Epstein: Yeah, so it had come down the previous year in 1989. And a remarkable development of that time was the decision, and with the agreement of Germany, West Germany's allies, for the country to unify that quickly. I think people, you know, don't talk about it a lot now, but that was a monumental shift for all of Europe. Obviously, Germany was really strongly in favor of the country's unification, but many other countries were extremely nervous. And in critical ways the decision for Germany to unify was then linked to additional steps the Europeans took to integrate further in order to counter German power, and in particular, the origins of the common currency in Europe, the euro lie within the decision of German unification. Russian Whiplash John: So, getting into the topic of the current conflict, the Russo-Ukrainian war, how did the threat from Moscow go from Soviet domination of Eastern Europe to embraced member of the global community? They became a G8 member, they hosted the Olympics and now they're back to Russian Domination of Eastern Europe. How did how did that- almost whiplash, come about?  Epstein: So, this is a great question and I would say, in keeping with my decision to study East Central Europe and the post-communist transition, the mood in the 1990’s, particularly in the West, it was extremely optimistic with respect to the trajectory the political and economic trajectories of the East Central European countries, but also with respect to Russia. So I think in the United States, under the Clinton administration, the Americans were very excited about the idea of having a totally different and much more productive relationship with Russia, which emerged as the Russian Federation following the collapse of the Soviet Union to a huge extent, and even consideration and questions about conversations about whether Russia could be in NATO or whether NATO could be dissolved and we might use a different security architecture, which included Russia. The Russians, after all, as a population, the leadership long considered themselves European and as belonging within the European fold. And I think when Yeltsin was president in Russia, his close relationship with Bill Clinton and, you know, other elements of international politics at the time, the agreement to return all of the nuclear weapons, for example, that were in Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to Russia for safe keeping-right? There was just an enormous amount of optimism in the 90’s about a broader reconciliation between Russia, what had been the Soviet bloc, and the West. And, you know, to the heart of your question, why did that turn sour? Economic reform in Russia was catastrophic, volatile, and painful for many normal citizens of the country. What developed was enormous concentration of economic power. A lot of economic advising coming from the West that was not appropriately contextualized, and some of it was very self-serving. So, you know, enormous, enormous hardship and unhappiness in Russia itself. By the time Putin comes to power in 1999 and 2000, I think he's very intent on establishing a different trajectory, which ultimately became very authoritarian and now somewhat argue even totalitarian. So increasing tensions over NATO enlargement, which the previous president Yeltsin, had accepted. Tensions over Russian behavior in its near abroad, tensions over NATO intervention in the Western Balkans. Tensions over how to define international terrorists and how to treat them, I mean, a myriad of difficult diplomatic issues emerged, and I think a very difficult point in that relationship was the 2008 Russian invasion of Georgia and I think things have only gotten more difficult from there. But I think as we'll get to in this conversation, also a lot of disagreement and tension with respect to Ukraine. Source of the Conflict Lindsey: Well, I know that there's a long list of tensions that you just named, one of them being the NATO enlargement. So how much of the decision to begin this war is structured by that NATO or EU expansion, or was the decision how much of the decision of Russian elites or just Vladimir Putin, caused the war?  Epstein: I put most of the source of the conflict with Putin, Russia, Russia's vision of itself in the world You know, if you're trying to establish the causal forces in social phenomena, the NATO explanation doesn't add up very well in terms of timing and then action. But what we do see over time is that the Ukrainians, you know, since the early 1990’s, increasingly look for ways to chart their own path independent of Russia. And that becomes highly problematic from a Russian point of view. So, in 2004, in Ukraine, you had the Orange Revolution, which was a major mass mobilization against the perceived rigged election of Yanukovych. And what happens in that instance is that the opposition, Yushchenko and Tymoshenko, they managed to rerun those Ukrainian elections and that nationalist coalition comes to power instead. So that is an important data point, I think, for the Russians and for Putin to see that the preferred Russian candidate can't necessarily win in free and fair Ukrainian elections. Now, interestingly, Yanukovych comes back in a later election and does win free and fair elections without what, you know, anyone observing would have thought was undue influence. But the relationship, I think, between Ukraine and Russia nevertheless becomes more tense because even with Yanukovych in power, Yanukovych representing Ukraine, does want to move closer to the EU. And so agreed in twenty thirteen to sign an association agreement with the European Union. At the very last minute, Yanukovych had a meeting with Putin, and we don't know what transpired during that meeting. But on very short notice, he informed the public in Ukraine that he was no longer going to sign the EU Association Agreement John: And these are economic ties? These are trade agreements? Epstein: These are trade agreements that establish regulatory harmonization, to make more trade possible and to liberalize trade and to reduce tariff and non-tariff barriers. So, at the last minute, in late twenty thirteen, Yanukovych reneges on his earlier agreement to sign this deal and you get another mass mobilization in Ukraine, particularly in Kyiv. And Russia is watching this, Putin is watching this and essentially comes to the conclusion that Russia is no longer in a position to have a pro-Russian government in power, necessarily, because what happens with the mass mobilization is that Yanukovych calls out the security services. The security services end up killing a number of the protesters and this, you can imagine in flames, even more outrage in Ukraine. And Yanukovych ends up fleeing to Russia, and he certainly would have been removed from office, had decided to stay in Ukraine. So, at that point, Putin, I think, tries to paint a picture as dictators around the world often do, that there's nefarious foreign interference in Ukrainian politics and uses Yanukovych's ouster to justify the Russian invasion of eastern Ukraine in 2014 and to justify the seizure of Crimea. And, of course, at the same time, part of the nefarious foreign influence that he gravitates towards as an explanation, because it's very convincing vis a vis his public is NATO enlargement. And it is true that in 2008, the alliance under US pressure had said to Georgia and Ukraine, you will become members of NATO. At the same time, there was no time frame for that and there was no action plan for accession. So, by 2014, Ukraine and Georgia were in essence no closer to NATO membership than they had been earlier. But nevertheless, at that time, Putin used NATO enlargement as a pretext for his invasion. Signs of the War Ending John: As we've established in 2014, Russia seizes Crimea, they build the Kerch Bridge. They have, separatists in eastern portions of Ukraine, and in 2022- February 24th, 2022, a wide scale invasion along their long border happens. So, it's been almost four years for both Ukraine and Russia. What is your perspective on their capacity to sustain and continue this war? Is there any signs of this war may be ending? I don't see signs of it ending? Epstein: As you probably know, the Trump administration came into office very intent that they could negotiate an end to the conflict rather quickly. And that's turned out not to be true, I think, because the, you know, the Russian side is extremely committed to, you know, their idea of a victory. I think primarily for domestic political reasons. I think that, you know, for Putin and his power position, and it's very hard to see into the inner workings of the Russian regime. But they've lost a lot of life. A lot of soldiers have absorbed, you know, terrible injury, trauma. I think, you know, the sunk cost of the situation, even though rationally they might suggest Russia should get out before it loses more life. The opposite effect, psychologically, is taken hold. So, I think Putin's power position depends on the conflict ending in a way that allows him to save face. And given everything that he's said about why Russia is there fighting, it seems that it would be very hard for him to save face. Short of a victory that accords Russia a lot of authority over who's running Ukraine and authority to keep control of the territory that they've taken by force. So short of those things, it's not clear to expert observers that Russia is prepared to give up the fight. Ukraine, in the intervening period, if it had been on a trajectory before Russian or Russia's invasion in 2014 Towards the west, towards the EU, even towards NATO membership. Those impulses and desires have only been strengthened and concretized by the war. And because it's Ukrainian territory and sovereignty and independence, Identity, Language, Democratic governance, economic opportunity. The Ukrainian population sees all of these things as being at stake, and they are also very reluctant to give up. So, to the extent that psychology helps us understand the continuation of war when we know how horrible war is, the psychology of this war is that both sides seem to be extremely committed. And from that point of view,  it's really hard to see a way out. In terms of the logistical question, of course, Russia has the personnel advantage. They have a financial advantage. In some ways, we know that the Russian economy is under enormous strain, as is the Ukrainian economy. You know, for Westerners or even Ukrainians to look at the state of the Russian economy and to conclude that, you know, the economy in Russia must break at some point is probably a kind of triumphalism that we should not resort to, right? I think Russia and Putin's regime and even the population historically that country has put up with incredible, unthinkable misery in order to prevail in conflicts. They've done that. And the political culture may be that they will do that again. So, for as many people as Russia is losing, and we think it's around a thousand people a day to death or injury, they have the capacity for some time to continue to do that. And I think the Ukrainians are looking for ways to not have to reduce the age of conscription, um, to save their younger generations of people. So, they're looking at, you know, how can we fight more effectively while trying to guarantee simultaneously that we don't lose enormous life or we don't lose people to injury? And they're, you know, they're very effective at that, I mean, they're running pretty effective operations deep into Russian territory that affect that country's munitions situation and transport and energy. Transformational Ideological Divisions Lindsey: How has the ideological division shaped Ukraine as a nation and the Ukrainian identity in the face of total war? For example, when I think about this question, I think of the territorial defense forces, um, as a Ukrainian identity unification. Epstein: Yeah, I think that's right, I think that wars can be transformative in all kinds of ways. And I think this one has spurred a kind of Ukrainian identity, which is built around some of the things that we talked about before independence, sovereignty, having the authority to decide for itself with whom it's allied in the international system. When I talk to Ukrainians about this very question, I mean, they will also say, given the existential threat that the Ukrainians face, they feel more connected to government in a way and governance, and they are more inclined to hold government accountable. And I think we saw that recently with protests against the threatened incursions on independence for the anti-corruption agency in Ukraine. So, getting to territorial defense forces, this is a really interesting phenomenon in, in Eastern Europe, because when NATO was first contemplating enlarging to places like Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, which NATO did in 1999. The existence and elevation of territorial defense forces, particularly in Poland, where it was kind of a hot idea, I would say in the 1990’s since that country had just regained its independence. It encouraged new NATO members to downsize their forces, make their forces voluntary, and spend less money on defense, but to do it more efficiently. And in the 1990’s and early two thousand, for the Americans and for the broader alliance, that meant creating expeditionary forces to assist countries like the United States in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. So the idea now that we're returning, including in places like Poland and the Baltic states and in Ukraine to this idea of territorial or total defense, where, you know, members of the public have responsibility for protecting their homeland is, Lindsey, I think, in the spirit of your question, an identity forming and concretizing exercise which will very likely endure, you know, for a very long period after the war ends. And it's part, I think, of what drives the psychology of commitment on the Ukrainian side for people to feel very invested in and responsible for their own country's defense and survival. Putin and His Regime Epstein: We should appreciate about the Russian regime at this point is that Putin and his regime have killed, imprisoned, sent into exile all of his major opponents. And I think for members of the public, the idea that you would participate in a protest, uh, would, you know, certainly end in your arrest or death. I think that the Russian regime today is similarly repressive as the Iranian regime. And we know that thousands, if not tens of thousands of people were just killed in Iran. Given their willingness and bravery to protest. And that is certainly not something I would wish on any population. So, I look at Russia and I think it is, you know, it is too dangerous for ordinary Russians to contemplate getting out into the streets and voicing a view different from that of the government's. The other thing I would say is that surveys that are conducted by Russian pollsters, at least in some cases, frame questions in ways that seem to be designed not to get a pulse on what people are thinking, but to tell them what they should be thinking. And one is also under the impression that as pollsters are doing their surveys, they're collecting information. I mean, I would definitely not as a research subject in Russia, take it for granted that somebody actually wanted to know my opinion for knowing my opinions sake. I would think they would want to know my opinion in case they wanted to come after me. The judicial system in Russia is also terribly politicized and compromised, and there is no equal protection under the law, as we would understand it. So, in answer to your initial question, John, about why isn't it a similar dynamic? I mean, fundamentally, the Russian regime now is too repressive. It's too dangerous. Opposition leaders have been eliminated, and I think it would be very difficult. I don't know what the circumstances would have to be for people to come out and revolt. You know, I said, they're Russians are divided on this. When I express my skepticism about how well we can actually assess Russian public opinion. A couple Russians have come up to me and said, you know, there's actually more genuine enthusiasm for Putin and the war than what you, Rachel, are saying. So, I also, you know, that's also valuable information that I think a lot of the propaganda, a lot of the framing of the war that Putin has very successfully done really resonates with people that Russia is under attack, it's being humiliated, it's encircled. It's not respected. The Ukrainians, you know, in the Russian discourse, are either actually Russian or, you know, don't have a meaningful identity of their own- I think that's also a sentiment that's out there.  West vs East? John: During the Cold War, there's very much this concept of the free world, the Eastern Bloc, the Warsaw Pact. Is that still useful to use these terms, like West, like we're in the West and they're in the East? It's us versus them? Poland is this NATO country, liberal democracy- they're clearly in the West now, is this is this a useful term?  Epstein: Increasingly, no, I think because of developments in the United States, I mean, I think Europe, for the most part is, you know, it's highly democratic. It's wealthy for the post-communist countries, including Poland, that have joined the EU since 2004. It's provided enormous economic opportunity. Of course, the EU isn't perfect. No international organization or government is. But from a prosperity, democratic and stability point of view, membership in the EU and NATO has been life changing for those countries. I mean, so transformational like they've never they've never had the degree, I think, of independence and, um, volition choice opportunity in the international system voice. They have voice in these organizations that they've never enjoyed before. But given the state of US politics, I feel that the United States is increasingly divided from some of the core democratic principles that underpin the EU's functioning. So, I wouldn't necessarily, in the current period, refer to the West as a quasi-unified whole based on shared values, at least if we're talking about the people in power. European Transformation John: How has this war shaped Europe? Do you think we'll see more European integration, possibly less reliance on the United States,  Epstein: So, less reliance on the United States? Not necessarily because of the war, but because the United States at this point is reluctant to assist Ukraine directly? I think I hope it will result in more integration in the in the following very critical way. The advantage of NATO for almost eighty years has been that in addition to having been victorious in the Cold War and the Soviet Union broke up and was no longer occupying and essentially running puppet governments through East-Central Europe was the fact that the alliance successfully really quashed regional rivalries within Europe itself and restructured relationships critical ones, including between certainly Germany and France, but Germany and the rest of Europe fundamentally. And that has been really essential for the prosperity and democratic governance in most of Europe to really accelerate and expand the way that I hope that it shapes European integration going forward, is that as the Europeans take more independent responsibility, both for securing their own borders and military security, well-being, let's say that they do it in a way where it is a genuinely shared enterprise and done collaboratively rather than competitively among them. So, you know, I think what the Europeans are trying to do is to be able to assist Ukraine independently to replace what had been over the last four years, but really since 2014, American military assistance, advising, observation. So that's one way in which we see a shift happening. And we just want to understand that it's partly a consequence of the war, but it's partly a consequence of from the Biden administration to this Trump administration, a shift in U.S policy, which is urging Europe to become more independent. So that's one change. The other enormous change is, and I don't think this gets reported on enough, the energy transition that's underway in Europe as a consequence of radically reducing the continent's reliance on Russian energy resources. And that's critical for accelerating the green transition. So, it's been incredibly costly and painful, particularly for economies like Germany but also some of the East European economies. But I'd say that's also a very important way in which Europe is being changed. And then I think political sensibilities on the continent are changing to a certain extent. It's shaping political cleavages in many European countries, in Germany, in France, for example, where you have current governing parties which are highly critical of Russia's war in Ukraine, but in opposition are also major political parties embraced by the Trump administration. But, you know, political parties that are much more interested in probably returning to a situation where they can do business with Russia and they're less concerned about Ukraine's ultimate fate. Global View on Conflict Lindsey: Aside from Europe, because I know we just talked about their view on the on the war in the previous question, how has this war shaped the global view on conflict and what normal behavior is for a state?  Epstein: So, I think in much of the world it probably hasn't changed it at all. I think one of the hard things for Europeanists to accept is that the Russian invasion of Ukraine does not stir the sympathies of a lot of people in India or China or on the African continent. I mean, it is true. The United States led a coalition building effort at the United Nations after the full-scale invasion, which was impressively large in terms of the number of countries, but really not very impressive with respect to the share of the global population represented, because it's mostly wealthier, Industrialized, post-industrial countries that came to Ukraine's defense. So, in one way, it doesn't seem to have changed many normal global citizens perceptions. Many people around the world seem to accept that Ukraine is in Russia's sphere of influence. Um, NATO enlarged to include many post-communist countries. Russia over time did not perceive this development to be in its interests. So, I think for many people around the world, it is normal state behavior that one country will invade another if it feels like its own existence is threatened, which is the case that Putin has made in my mind, not very convincingly. But, you know, I don't represent the minds of many people living in India and China and elsewhere in terms of what it means for, you know, countries that have with more vigor come to Ukraine's defense. I think it it's it appears to be very, very out of bounds, really antithetical to what a lot of people thought the post-World War Two order, at least among countries in the transatlantic community, should be about. It's a clear violation of the UN charter. The idea that Ukraine was in a position to do any meaningful harm to Russia in a military sense, is implausible. But again, going back to what we were talking about earlier with respect to Ukraine's evolution and evolution increasingly in the direction of the West, that I think was a threat to Russia in the sense that Ukraine was never going to launch a land invasion. But if you had a democratic, prosperous, Western oriented, active civil society country on Russia's neighbor, that was going to make it very hard for Putin to maintain, I think his style of rule, both in Russia and in Belarus. We saw also enormous protests erupt in Belarus a few years ago that were quashed with Russian support. In Belarus, people imprisoned, people killed, people disappeared So I think in answer to the question, is this normal behavior? Um, maybe we could reframe the question to say, is this the kind of behavior that we want to encourage in the international system? Is this the direction in which we want to go? And I think hopefully everybody would say, no, this is not the direction in which we should be going. The Threat of Democratic Proximately John: Something that I just thought of was, you know, this, you know, perceived threat from NATO You know, if Ukraine joined NATO, joined EU, is it really like just bordering like the proximity? Is that like a spillover effect? Is that really a phenomenon they're looking at, like Moscow is so far away? Can something truly like a domino theory, if you will, if I could use an old Cold War idea? Is that still- is that a plausible concept?  Epstein: I think it is plausible, especially given what had been the really intense familial, civil society and economic ties between Ukraine and Russia a couple of years ago. Well, it must have been more than a couple of years ago. It must have been. In 2022, the Korbel School hosted four mayors, um, from East Ukrainian cities, including the mayor of Kharkiv, which is in the news all the time. And one of the questions they got was, you know, what is the state of your relationship with people in Russia now? Family members, business partners, etc.? And, you know, the relationships were had been devastated by the conflict, in part because I think the Ukrainians felt that their Russian counterparts were not sympathetic to their cause. But part of what I learned in those conversations was how deeply integrated and tied together these countries were, and particularly in that eastern part of Ukraine. So, we do think, especially in an age of pretty rapid and large-scale information flows, which, of course, we understand governments can shut off at certain points. But one engine of change in the Soviet Union itself was certainly the perception, which was correct among people living in the Soviet bloc and the Eastern Bloc, that their Western counterparts had more economic opportunity, educational opportunity, freedom, personal autonomy, efficacy, everything. And that discontent, particularly in countries like Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia during the Cold War led to very large and repeated protest movements. So, I think we can say with some certainty that it is harder for countries that are autocratic to reside in comfort and seeming, you know, security next to highly democratic. You know, if they're prospering countries, I think that does make it a lot harder for autocratic countries to stay the course. Russian Leverage and Ukrainian Children John: There has been an extensive Russian campaign to specifically target civilians in drone bombings and missile strikes. The rhetoric from Putin and the Kremlin has been a denial of a Ukrainian identity as a group Yale University has tracked that 35,000 Ukrainian children have been taken and deported to Russia. Do you think the intent and actions committed by Russia constitute an attempt to eradicate Ukrainian identifying peoples? Epstein: So, the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, you know, has long engaged in a kind of Russification. I don't I don't think eradication of Ukrainian people is necessarily the goal. I think that would be self-defeating in terms of the productivity of the region. After the war, assuming the war ends. But I do think it is a sustained, purposeful strategic plan to try to subdue the country and to create a situation which Russia has so much leverage. And this is partly what's going on, I think, with the kidnapped children. These children, we think, are being sent either into Russian homes for reeducation and total acculturation or into, you know, a couple hundred different, essentially reeducation facilities. And, you know, from what we read in the press in the United States, the infiltration of schools and the recasting of people's ideological frames for young people, it can be quite effective for turning young Ukrainians against the Ukrainian cause. So, it's not necessarily the elimination of Ukrainians. I think that is the goal, but a reorientation of people's thinking, including children's thinking about what appropriate modes of governance is and who has the right justification in this war. Something unfortunately, we've seen in many conflicts in the past. Certainly, this was a really important and terrible feature of Nazi activity during World War Two as well. That's all an effort, I think, to try to subdue Ukraine using multiple tools and channels. Well, after hearing about how the war started and the nitty gritty of the war and just devastating actions taken by Russia and states.  How does this War End? Lindsey: I have possibly the most loaded question of the day. How does this war end?  Epstein: I think there are a few ways it could end. One would be if there is political change within Russia itself, right? And this could be an internal conflict that results in Putin's ouster. You know that whatever group of people, though, that would seek to replace Putin, even if they're critical of the war, we would have to think that the job they have in ending the war and justifying the end to that war to the Russian public would be very difficult. So anybody who's unhappy with the war in Russia at the highest levels of leadership right now, even if they disagree with Putin's chosen course of action, would have a really difficult task figuring out a how to remove Putin and b how to change course in a way that wouldn't compound the already, I think, very heavy sense of humiliation that Russians feel they live under. So that's difficult to see. The other place that we could look for defection would be in the armed forces itself. So that could also. Right? If you have defections within the armed forces, generals not willing to continue to fight this war, that could be another source of change. The public and public protest, in concert with either of the other two things could also lead to a change. What would get the public out? What would get the public agitated? I think you know what John was saying before a lot of the recruiting for personnel is coming from the periphery. If it turns out that ultimately more economically and socially, politically empowered families and social groups see their children swept up in this conflict, I think the more likely it is that people will resist in a meaningful way. There are already movements of mothers and grandmothers in Russia against the mobilizations that have taken place so far. So, there are certain pressure points within Russia that could help generate a settlement. You know, the other scenario is that Ukraine, especially with a very serious divide between the United States and Europe over Greenland, trade, etc., that the United States cuts off weapons sales to Europe that are bound for Ukraine. And Ukraine becomes military militarily overwhelmed at a certain point, and then they feel pressure to negotiate an end. You know, we could also see a change in the West and a continuing ramping up of Ukrainian autonomous military capability so that they ultimately either continue on in a stalemate that Russia ultimately finds unacceptably costly, or for various reasons, they might be able to overwhelm Russia militarily and just make the cost of the war too high with certain kinds of technological innovation. But I think, you know, what we would need to see is some pressure point exerted somewhere in one of those five ways. And right now, I think what we're seeing instead is just more of the same, a kind of very costly, unproductive stalemate. Well, the other terrible eventuality, I think twice within the last two months, Russia has fired nuclear capable missiles at Ukraine, which is a not very veiled threat that the Russians could use a nuclear weapon, which would be catastrophic, certainly for the warring parties, but also for the entire global population. That would certainly precipitate a change. But we don't know in what direction. Lindsey: Taking into account these potential outcomes and the trajectory of how it's going now, how long do you think it could go on for? Or is it just too complicated to measure?  Epstein: I think it's really hard to know how long it could go on in order for the Russian economy to come to a very, very serious breaking point on its current trajectory. If it gets harder for the Russians to sell their oil, if the United States and or Europe got serious about stopping the shadow fleet, which would be a it would be escalatory. But of the things that I've just mentioned, maybe the least escalatory and most effective thing- John: -That's the illegal oil shipments? Epstein: Exactly, And the United States in recent weeks has shown itself to be very competent at tracking down oil tankers and stopping them. You know, a two-year process with increased economic pressure on Russia might result in a changed cost calculation on Russia's part. So, I think we're looking at years, not months, which still isn't very precise. But I don't think nobody I've read or listened to thinks that there's an immediate resolution within this year. Lindsey: Well, Rachel, in the time remaining, thank you so much for coming here John: This is very gracious of your time Cultural Beauty Recommendation Lindsey: We have two remaining questions unrelated to the Russo-Ukrainian War. If you could personally recommend one place that everyone should visit for its beauty or culture, where would it be?  Epstein: So, I have thought about this, I mean, the city in Europe where I've spent the most time is Berlin. It's fascinating. It's sprawling. It's not beautiful. There are parts of it that are beautiful, but it's culturally very interesting, in part because of its Cold War history of having been divided. And now when you go there, it's really hard to discern where the east was separated from the west. And it's really got everything. It's got a lot of interesting alternative culture, Turkish culture, but also, you know, lots of interesting people have moved there from the Middle East. Twenty fifteen sixteen country's been very effective at assimilating and helping people get into the labor market. And I think Berlin is among the locations in Germany that has been, in some ways at least the most open and accepting and really thrives on the vibrancy of diverse culture and backgrounds. But the other place I would recommend to people is Warsaw, where I lived in 1999 for most of the year, doing my original field research for my dissertation, and it was interesting. Then I think it's even more interesting now. I was there most recently in June, and it's got an incredible art scene, music scene. Also, you know, when we think about how countries were affected by World War Two and recovered from World War Two, Poland lost six million people in that war, which was the highest proportion of population of any country that was a combatant in World War Two. Their history in that war is extraordinary, their recovery also extraordinary. I mean, they are the country about which, you know, Westerners might feel the most sad that they ended up behind the Iron Curtain because of the very valiant efforts they made on behalf of the allies during the war and the ways in which they were betrayed, not just by the Soviets, but also ultimately the Americans and their West European counterparts. But the city of Warsaw is thriving in the current context, so I would also highly recommend going there. Lindsey: Those are both great answers. I've never been to Warsaw, have you, John?  John: No, no, but I want to go. It's on my list. Lindsey: It's on my list now Epstein: Yeah, it's great, I mean, the country was so badly destroyed. Warsaw was just decimated by the war. So, some of the historic buildings they built back stone by stone, you know, up until the nineteen seventies to try to reconstruct, for example, the historic Old Market Square and all of the beautiful homes surrounding it. It's a remarkable testament to their resilience. Non-Profit Spotlight John: At more posts, we want to make it a point to promote non-profits or organizations that create positive impacts. Are there any that you would like to share with us? So, one organization that I like a lot, I keep an eye on? Epstein: I always listen to their people being interviewed as Doctors Without Borders, and I think their work is so important. They, you know, manifest so much courage and bravery. Sometimes they're speaking against the mainstream, but they have a, you know, such an admirable humanitarian orientation and they bring so much expertise and, um, you know, in a way just love and care to the work that they do and the conflict zones that we're talking about. So, you know, if we funded Doctors Without Borders the way we fund our militaries, I feel like the world would be in much better shape. John: Dr. Rachel Epstein, thank you so much for being here and talking to us. Epstein: This was really great John:  Sheepland. A program about the great issues facing humanity. Lindsey:  A Mooreposts Podcast. If you enjoyed this work, please consider sharing our content and website or donating to a non-profit organization linked in the Donate  tab. DISCLAIMER The views and opinions expressed by podcast guests are their own and do not necessarily reflect those of Mooreposts, its editors, contributors, or affiliates. 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Illustration by Jonathan Rockford LISTEN TO THIS ARTICLE On February 28th , the United States of America and the State of Israel initiated a campaign of airstrikes against the Islamic Republic of Iran, eliminating  the country’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, and vast swathes of the upper echelons of the Iranian leadership. These two states then progressed  on to an effort at degrading Iranian military capabilities and industry. From the outset, it looked like Washington aimed   to replicate the rapid success  it had seen in its decapitation strike against the Maduro regime in Venezuela while neutralizing the threat to Middle Eastern stability that Iran’s nuclear and conventional weapons programs represent. The latter objective would be achieved through undermining Iranian efforts to reconstruct their ballistic missile program and deterring any progress towards a nuclear weapon. Months later, it looks more and more like any American ambitions of obtaining a quick strategic victory in Iran along those lines were predicated on a fundamental misestimation of Iran’s capacity for resistance. On the political front, the regime remains intact and, in fact, more willing to resist American efforts to facilitate its overthrow or force any major change in its behavior. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and paramilitary Basij appear empowered , even while their actual capacities have degraded, leading to a deepening of hardline policy. On the military front, Iran has leveraged its asymmetric advantages  against the US to a profound effect. Tehran has blockaded the Strait of Hormuz, thus disrupting global shipping and sending oil prices soaring, while also using its Shahed drones to inflict damage on US and Israeli assets, attacking Iran’s Persian Gulf neighbors to boot. In the coming days and weeks, there may be a negotiated settlement or a further escalation of the conflict. The actual progression towards some kind of agreement is something that the eyes of the global public have rarely seen, outside of recent talks in Pakistan as part of an abortive ceasefire . This has created a dynamic where it’s difficult to assess whether or not they even have a remote likelihood of success. Escalation would likely include tit-for-tat strikes by the Iranians and the Gulf States on each others’ energy infrastructure and desalination plants, as foreshadowed by previous developments . This would be coupled with something like an attempted takeover of the Iranian military complex at Kharg Island  and/or the Strait of Hormuz  by the US, moving beyond the existing American blockade , in addition to the continuation of Israel’s airstrikes and operations against Hezbollah  in southern Lebanon. Regardless of where this conflict is headed, it is worth considering how American strategy has impacted the actual play-by-play of the conflict in order to assess how the current situation developed. To a large extent, the current war is the direct product of a desire to promote full-on regime change  premised on opportunistically attacking at a time when the Islamic Republic appeared weak. As international media have extensively documented , US President Donald Trump originally threatened intervention after the Iranian regime’s brutal crackdown on widespread protests began in late January. These protests, stemming from frustrations with Iran’s recent economic downturn, saw the heavy involvement  of figures like Reza Pahlavi, the exiled crown prince of Iran, in catalyzing protests and coordinating some international anti-regime efforts. Public life was fully disrupted, protests grew violent, and the regime responded with what amounts to a brutal politicide: likely killing more than thirty thousand protestors ,  hunting wounded dissidents down in hospitals, and imprisoning many thousands more. It was assessed  by Iranian experts like Karim Sadjadpour that no actual regime change would come from these particular protests, barring the sudden defection of security forces like the conventional military, the Artesh, from the regime. Regardless, the way they proceeded proved that the Islamic Republic was highly vulnerable and could no longer rely on anti-Western nationalism and national security as an airtight source for legitimacy. After all, the regime casting protestors  as Western stooges failed to stymie further participation. In the midst of this, Washington and Jerusalem likely perceived an opportunity to incapacitate the regime militarily and kill its most prominent leaders. It was believed that, then, either their successors would calculate that capitulation was in their best interests or a new, more vigorous popular uprising would start, with enhanced potential to overthrow the regime. In this, both Israel and the US fatally miscalculated. They failed to apprehend the extent of the regime’s entrenchment in Iranian society, as well as its capacity for resistance along the aforementioned asymmetric line. The result has been a turn towards a longer war, now concluding its second month. Behind this failure, there is a fundamental strategic sickness, one that comes out of the specific policy preferences Trump has avowed and a failure to appreciate the limits of American military power, one which I have previously discussed. Late last year, I proposed  a new foreign policy paradigm for the US premised on leveraging the proximity of America’s allies to major destabilizing challenges as a means of mitigating their effect. I called this approach “sponsorial hegemony” and cast it against comparatively wrong-headed kinds of unilateralism that the US has previously pursued. This would mean giving less powerful countries aligned with the United States the room and resources necessary for deterring aggressive policy actions by states opposed to American and allied interests, while also creating ways for stable commerce and diplomacy to continue in their respective regions. While I was cautiously hopeful for what the Trump administration could achieve via its possible employment of sponsorial hegemony, it seems clear to me that it has little interest in recalibrating in that direction. Instead, we are seeing something I feared: a movement towards the revival of 19th-century gunboat diplomacy. Gunboat diplomacy is an interventionist method of foreign policy premised on using limited military actions to either destabilize a foe or extract a certain concession or set of concessions from them. This policy was traditionally  the domain of globe-spanning empires, like the British, prior to the creation of the post-World War II international system , and it gave way to multilateral military action and/or extended interventions on the part of major superpowers, as in Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, etc. To a large extent, this was a positive change, as the insistence on multilateral and democratic consultations before an intervention made certain powers less likely to engage in interventions while creating a way for states that did pursue unilateral action to see immediate economic and political consequences for their actions, either at a ballot box influenced by the global public square or in the form of increased isolation. In another sense, the fixation on large-scale operations with open-ended ambitions like “nation-building” produced risks of long-run strategic miscalculation and the constant risk of the US biting off more than it could chew, leading to notable failures , something which has directly motivated the turn towards gunboat diplomacy. What is lost in the pursuit of this new mission is a capacity for risk management. Now fully abandoning the Powell Doctrine , the US and Israel proceeded with these strikes without seeking international support for military action or coordination with Persian Gulf allies. As a result, Iran’s deployment of a decentralized “ mosaic defense ” and its initiation of a widespread campaign of airstrikes and commercial disruption against its neighbors expanded the conflict. Now, with further destruction potentially on the horizon, a rethink of American foreign policy’s current descent into gunboat diplomacy appears worthwhile. The emerging multipolar world is extremely complex. A simplistic foreign policy built on ham-fisted intervention cannot deal with this new international system in a comprehensive way. The US carries along with its desire to revive the style of 19th-century imperialism at its – and all the world’s – peril, and one can only hope for a change of course. Nikolas Vacano is a master’s candidate in international security at the University of Denver’s Josef Korbel School of Global and Public Affairs, specializing in the study of geoeconomics and grand strategy. If you enjoyed this work, please consider sharing our content and website, or donating to a non-profit organization linked in the Donate tab. DISCLAIMER Mooreposts publishes independent analysis, commentary, and research for informational and educational purposes only. Content on Mooreposts—including articles, Mooreposts Bites, strategic intelligence assessments, opinion pieces, interviews, and visual materials—does not constitute legal, financial, medical, or professional advice, nor does it represent any government agency, official position, or classified assessment. Unless explicitly stated, all analyses and interpretations reflect the views and analytic judgments of the individual author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Mooreposts, its editorial staff, or affiliated contributors. Strategic intelligence and analytical content is based on open-source information and publicly available materials. Mooreposts strives for accuracy, transparency, and rigorous sourcing; however, information may change as events develop. Readers are encouraged to consult primary sources and exercise independent judgment.

Illustration by Connor JL Moore LISTEN TO THIS ARTICLE The European Union Military Committee (EUMC) should advise EU leadership to implement a coordinated, multi-year EU-Ukraine production and sustainment framework for Ukrainian air defense and artillery ammunition, as Russia likely retains the capacity to continue its war of attrition, and diverting U.S. commitments risks enhancing critical capability gaps. Strategic Context Russia’s war in Ukraine has evolved into a protracted conflict of attrition in which industrial production, manpower replenishment, and external military assistance increasingly shape battlefield outcomes. Current assessments indicate that Moscow likely has the economic and military ability to sustain military operations for several more years, despite heavy losses and economic pressures. Russia continues to replenish its forces at sufficient rates while expanding its defense industrial production (e.g., weapons manufacturing, combat training, and battlefield innovation). This quick force adaptation has resulted in intense missile and drone campaigns against Ukraine’s critical infrastructure and civilians.  Russia has fired over 700 missiles since the start of 2026 against Ukraine’s infrastructure.  As of late January, Ukraine’s electrical system could reportedly meet only ~60% of national demand. Russia’s drone production capacity is ~30,000 per year and could double in 2026. Ukraine’s ability to resist this strategy remains heavily dependent on Western military assistance, particularly advanced air-defense systems and critical munitions. Western support has enabled Kyiv to maintain frontline operations and offset Moscow’s advantages in defense production and manpower. Although European states account for most assistance, the U.S. still supplies critical military assets dubbed ‘high-end enablers’ (e.g., High Mobility Artillery Rocket System [HIMARS], Patriot systems [PAC-3], and howitzer ammunition).  Ukraine’s annual interceptor demand is estimated at ~4,800.  These trends likely reinforce Moscow’s belief that prolonging the war will gradually erode Western support and Kyiv’s ability to sustain its defense. Critical Analysis Three factors threaten the sustainability of Ukraine’s defenses.  (1) Europe’s current support structure continues to treat the war as a crisis-response aid instead of a prolonged war. Through ad hoc national initiatives, European states have transferred critical equipment from national stockpiles and launched numerous assistance programs, but these efforts have remained fragmented across national procurement systems and lack sustained coordination for long-term force deployment. As U.S. military aid is projected to decline—sharply by 2028—the EU’s current voluntary, ad hoc support framework is insufficient to the predictable, strategically coordinated, industrial-scale production needed to offset the loss of U.S. assistance.  (2) This production gap is compounded by Europe and Ukraine’s structural reliance on U.S. systems. Ukraine’s U.S.-made munitions include 70% of long-range anti-aircraft systems, 86% of rocket artillery, and 82% of howitzer ammunition. While the European defense base has significantly ramped up production of ballistic missile defense interceptors, it has not kept pace with Moscow’s ballistic missile production.  (3) The expanding U.S. conflict in Iran could further complicate this situation as the U.S. risks depleting its stockpiles (i.e., PAC-3 systems). Over the four years of war in Ukraine, Kyiv has received ~600 PAC-3s for its air defense, whereas the U.S. used 800 in just the first five days of its war with Iran. Although the U.S. aims to scale up PAC-3 production to 2,000 per year, this increase is likely too late to adequately support Ukrainian air defenses in 2026, forcing Kyiv to make difficult decisions about what to protect. Recommendations (1) The EUMC should advise the Political and Security Committee to establish a coordinated multi-year European munitions sustainment framework focused on expanding production of air defense systems, artillery ammunition, and other high-demand munitions required for prolonged industrial warfare. The conflict has demonstrated the necessity for sustained production capacity and reliable supply chains. Coordinated European procurement and long-term contracts would meet the demand required for Europe's defense industry to further ramp up production and reduce reliance on depleting U.S. stockpiles.  (2) Coinciding with the European framework, the EUMC should direct the EU Military Staff to establish a standing, integrated EU-Ukraine force-and-industry partnership. Ukraine’s wartime innovation has rapidly expanded domestic capabilities in drones, electronic warfare systems, and other battlefield technologies. Integrating these networks would increase output and procurement efficiency for Ukraine while also bolstering Europe’s long-term deterrence posture. Connor JL Moore is a current master’s candidate for International Security at the University of Denver’s Josef Korbel School of Global and Public Affairs.  If you enjoyed this work, please consider sharing our content and website or donating to a non-profit organization linked in the Donate tab. DISCLAIMER Mooreposts publishes independent analysis, commentary, and research for informational and educational purposes only. Content on Mooreposts—including articles, Mooreposts Bites, strategic intelligence assessments, opinion pieces, interviews, and visual materials—does not constitute legal, financial, medical, or professional advice, nor does it represent any government agency, official position, or classified assessment. Unless explicitly stated, all analyses and interpretations reflect the views and analytic judgments of the individual author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Mooreposts, its editorial staff, or affiliated contributors. Strategic intelligence and analytical content is based on open-source information and publicly available materials. Mooreposts strives for accuracy, transparency, and rigorous sourcing; however, information may change as events develop. Readers are encouraged to consult primary sources and exercise independent judgment.

China’s Military AI Modernization and the Taiwan Flashpoint Illustration by Connor JL Moore LISTEN TO THIS ARTICLE Key Takeaway ASSESSMENT: The People’s Republic of China is integrating artificial intelligence (AI) and cyber capabilities into its weapons systems and command, control, and intelligence networks. Through Military-Civil Fusion (MCF), China aims to accelerate decision-making, improve precision targeting, and challenge the United States' capabilities. Although we lack information on China’s potential deadline for an attack on Taiwan, we expect China’s AI-military and cyber developments to increase its readiness and willingness to do so, given that Taiwan’s ‘reunification’ is considered one of its “core interests.” 12   U.S. and allied defense operations in a Taiwan contingency will likely   face AI-enhanced combat capabilities across all warfare domains, posing increased risks of Chinese systems targeting U.S. and allied critical infrastructure.  Key Judgment 1 : Through its state-led MCF strategy, China is pursuing next-generation combat capabilities. This strategy is grounded in its vision of future conflict called “intelligentized warfare,” defined by the expanded use of AI, quantum computing, and other advanced technologies at every level of warfare. 3 Key Judgment 2 : China’s AI-military fusion and cyber enhancements are very likely aimed at achieving tactical advantages. Precision-guided weapons, autonomous systems, complex military simulations, and information operations are designed to undermine U.S. and allied resolve in a Taiwan contingency. 4 Key Judgment 3 : If Beijing believes that conflict with Washington is imminent, China is likely to consider aggressive cyber operations against U.S. and allied domestic critical infrastructure. 5   Recent Chinese state-backed cyberattack campaigns demonstrate Beijing’s capabilities to compromise critical sectors, including communications, energy, and transportation. These capabilities would likely impede decision-making and interfere with the movement of U.S. and allied forces. 6 China is prioritizing the integration of AI and cyber capabilities as central components of its military modernization through its MCF strategy. These efforts aim to secure tactical and information superiority in a Taiwan contingency and undermine the operational effectiveness of U.S. and allied forces. 7   By fostering stronger ties and promoting competition between the civilian and defense sectors, MCF facilitates technology transfer, diversifies its domestic supply base, and reduces barriers for private firms   to compete for defense contracts. 8   Since China does not renounce the use of force to achieve ‘reunification’ with Taiwan, it likely assesses that its MCF strategy will drive the integration of AI into its military to build an “intelligentized” force equipped with high-tech weapons, advanced communications, and information technologies. 9  This scenario would likely degrade U.S. and allied military superiority. China’s official defense budget reached nearly $247 billion in 2025, which is five times as much on defense as Japan and nearly seven times as much as South Korea—key regional competitors and U.S. allies. 10   As Taiwan remains Beijing’s top strategic priority, this defense spending 11  indicates China’s focus on achieving regional dominance. 12 Procurement data from 2023-2024 shows that nontraditional vendors (NTVs)—firms without state ownership ties—have won an increasing monetary   share of AI-related contracts in China’s defense industrial base. 13 Most of the 1,560 state-owned enterprises (SOEs), NTVs, and research institutes assessed from 2023-2024 supplying AI and cyber-related capabilities 14  to the PLA are not subject to U.S. sanctions or trade restrictions. 15 China integrates AI into its command, control, and intelligence networks to gain tactical advantages. Their inclusion of autonomous   systems in military and information operations aims to maximize superiority for   faster operational planning, further reducing U.S. and allied reaction time in a Taiwan conflict. 16   China very likely seeks to use AI to enhance the lethality and reach of its surface ships and to deny its enemies access to critical locations. 17  By building a wide array of AI-enabled military capabilities across air, ground, and sea operations, China is strengthening its already robust ability to conduct complex naval operations around Taiwan, coordinate multi-domain strikes, and transport forces across the Taiwan Strait. 18 As early as 2016, a director at the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation 19   claimed that the company’s next generation of cruise missiles would use AI to adapt to specific combat conditions, such as adjusting flight profiles and warhead yields. 20   At the Zhuhai Airshow in November 2024, Chinese defense manufacturer Norinco revealed a combat system called “AI-Enabled Synthetic Brigade,” which combines advanced armored vehicles, swarming drones, loitering munitions, and electronic warfare tools into one unit. 21 In May 2025, a report published by a university in northwest China showed that the PLA used a DeepSeek AI model to generate 10,000 military simulation scenarios in 48 seconds for the purpose of assessing how commanders make decisions in battle. 22   AI systems, such as the intelligence-assessment chatbot “ChatBIT,” are being utilized by PLA-affiliated researchers to sort through massive amounts of data for strategic insights, suggesting experimentation with AI in intelligence gathering. 23 China’s AI-integrated cyber operations aim to compromise U.S. and allied critical infrastructure, as well as collect sensitive intelligence to impede military logistics during a Taiwan contingency. Beijing is almost certainly integrating AI into its cyberattack operations to adapt malware, enhance espionage, and conduct malign influence operations. 24   With the advanced rate of AI-military integration, the PLA can potentially   scale critical infrastructure disruptions more quickly and efficiently than ever before. 25  Top Chinese leaders almost certainly view such cyber operations as critical for ‘reunification’ with Taiwan, as well as affecting an adversary’s political system, economy, and civilian critical infrastructure. 26   China remains the most active and persistent cyber threat to U.S. national security. In a Taiwan conflict scenario, the likelihood of an AI-integrated Chinese military seeking to destabilize the domestic affairs of the U.S. and its allies is expected to increase as Beijing pursues technological dominance. 27 In January 2025, Volt Typhoon, a Chinese state-backed hacker group, targeted and gained control of hundreds of internet routers in the U.S. to serve as launch pads for critical infrastructure cyberattacks. 28 Salt Typhoon, a Chinese state-backed hacker group, breached at least nine U.S. telecommunications networks and providers as of 2024, demonstrating China’s capability and intent to conduct more advanced cyberespionage operations. 29 A Chinese state-sponsored cyberattack on the U.S. Treasury Department in December 2024 marked an escalation in Beijing’s use of hybrid tactics to test its offensive cyberattack capabilities and undermine its strategic competitors. The operation also sought to gather sensitive intelligence and prepare for future potential conflict. 30 Policy Options To develop and deploy its AI-enhanced military assets and offensive cyber capabilities against the U.S. and allies, China depends on internet infrastructure (e.g., undersea cables, telecommunications networks, internet exchange points, data centers, and cloud service providers). 31  Further, China has long relied on Western cloud-based AI training models, semiconductor technology, and advanced computing power, exposing China’s dependence on foreign technology. 32  While China probably benefits from its MCF strategy, it also allows for public bidding on a portion of its defense contracts, including for sensitive systems. 33 Allied coordination in the Indo-Pacific on AI threat intelligence has shown promise but remains uneven in scope, consistency, and resilience. 34   Chinese AI-enhanced cyberattacks and military capabilities would likely struggle to overcome shared threat intelligence networks and stricter cybersecurity standards, as these enhance collective situational awareness and create a more resilient regional defense posture against Chinese AI use. 35 Despite limited information on China’s defense contracts, the existing paper trail is likely sufficient to gain insight into AI-critical Chinese economic sectors and supply chains for targeted export controls. 36  China may immediately   double down on its MCF strategy for AI-military development, but this probably impairs China’s ability to maintain competitive, long-term progress towards “intelligentized warfare” and train the most powerful AI-military models. 37   Caden Scates is a current master’s candidate for International Security at the University of Denver’s Josef Korbel School of Global and Public Affairs.  If you enjoyed this work, please consider sharing our content and website or donating to a non-profit organization linked in the Donate tab. Endnotes 1.  Cole McFaul, Sam Bresnick, and Daniel Chou, “Pulling Back the Curtain on China’s Military-Civil Fusion: Howthe PLA Mobilizes Civilian AI for Strategic Advantage” (Center for Security and Emerging Technology, September2025), 4, https://doi.org/10.51593/20240030 .; Jiayu Zhang, “China’s Military Employment of Artificial Intelligenceand Its Security Implications,” The International Affairs Review, August 16, 2020, https://www.iar-gwu.org/print-archive/blog-post-title-four-xgtap .    2.  “White Paper: The Taiwan Question and China’s Reunification in the New Era_Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of America,” n.d., https://us.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/zgyw/202208/t20220810_10740168.htm#:~:text=The%20Constitution%20of%20the%20People's,brook%20no%20violation%20or%20separation .; Department of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China , 2024, 4, https://media.defense.gov/2024/Dec/18/2003615520/-1/-1/0/MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA-2024.PDF . 3.  Department of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China , 2024, VIII–IX, https://media.defense.gov/2024/Dec/18/2003615520/-1/-1/0/MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA-2024.PDF .  4.  Department of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China , 2024, 93–96, https://media.defense.gov/2024/Dec/18/2003615520/-1/-1/0/MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA-2024.PDF .  5.  Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,” 2025, 12. 6.  Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,” 2025, 11. 7.  Department of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China , 2024, 124-125, https://media.defense.gov/2024/Dec/18/2003615520/-1/-1/0/MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA-2024.PDF . 8.  Cole McFaul, Sam Bresnick, and Daniel Chou, “Pulling Back the Curtain on China’s Military-Civil Fusion: How the PLA Mobilizes Civilian AI for Strategic Advantage” (Center for Security and Emerging Technology, September 2025), 5, https://doi.org/10.51593/20240030 . 9.  Michael S. Chase and William Marcellino, “Incentives for U.S.-China Conflict, Competition, and Cooperation Across Artificial General Intelligence’s Five Hard National Security Problems,” RANDas much as, August 4, 2025, https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA4189-1.html .; Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,” 2025, 13.; Cole McFaul, Sam Bresnick, and Daniel Chou, “Pulling Back the Curtain on China’s Military-Civil Fusion: How the PLA Mobilizes Civilian AI for Strategic Advantage” (Center for Security and Emerging Technology, September 2025), 5, https://doi.org/10.51593/20240030 .; “White Paper: The Taiwan Question and China’s Reunification in the New Era_Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of America,” n.d., https://us.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/zgyw/202208/t20220810_10740168.htm#:~:text=The%20Constitution%20of%20the%20People's,brook%20no%20violation%20or%20separation . 10.  Matthew P. Funaiole and Brian Hart, “China’s Military in 10 Charts,” Center for Strategic and International Studies , September 2, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-military-10-charts . 11.  If China maintains current trends, its defense spending is expected to increase at an annual rate of about 6%.  12.  Matthew P. Funaiole and Brian Hart, “China’s Military in 10 Charts,” Center for Strategic and International Studies , September 2, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-military-10-charts .  13.  Cole McFaul, Sam Bresnick, and Daniel Chou, “Pulling Back the Curtain on China’s Military-Civil Fusion: How the PLA Mobilizes Civilian AI for Strategic Advantage” (Center for Security and Emerging Technology, September 2025), 21, https://doi.org/10.51593/20240030 . 14.  These AI and cyber capabilities include: natural language processing, remote sensing, target recognition, and aerospace.  15.  Cole McFaul, Sam Bresnick, and Daniel Chou, “Pulling Back the Curtain on China’s Military-Civil Fusion: How the PLA Mobilizes Civilian AI for Strategic Advantage” (Center for Security and Emerging Technology, September 2025), 22-33, https://doi.org/10.51593/20240030 . 16.  Department of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China , 2024, 124–27, https://media.defense.gov/2024/Dec/18/2003615520/-1/-1/0/MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA-2024.PDF .  17.  Alex Stephenson et al., “How AI Would — and Wouldn’t — Factor Into a U.S.-Chinese War,” War on the Rocks, May 3, 2022, https://warontherocks.com/2022/05/how-ai-would-and-wouldnt-factor-into-a-u-s-chinese-war/ .  18.  Eric Rosenbach et al., The Autonomous Arsenal in Defense of Taiwan  (Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 2025), 22, https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/2025-02/DETS_The%20Autonomous%20Arsenal_1.pdf .  19.  China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation is a key Chinese aerospace and defense SOE. 20.  Alex Stephenson et al., “How AI Would — and Wouldn’t — Factor Into a U.S.-Chinese War,” War on the Rocks, May 3, 2022, https://warontherocks.com/2022/05/how-ai-would-and-wouldnt-factor-into-a-u-s-chinese-war/ .  21.  Davud Sablak and U.S. Army, “Where Does the Cyber Arms Race Lead to in the Age of Artificial Intelligence?,” www.army.mil , September 30, 2025, https://www.army.mil/article/288851/where_does_the_cyber_arms_race_lead_to_in_the_age_of_artificial_intelligence .  22.  Davud Sablak and U.S. Army, “Where Does the Cyber Arms Race Lead to in the Age of Artificial Intelligence?,” www.army.mil , September 30, 2025, https://www.army.mil/article/288851/where_does_the_cyber_arms_race_lead_to_in_the_age_of_artificial_intelligence .  23.  Abdullah Kazim, “The Role of AI in Shaping US-China Diplomacy: A Case Study of the Taiwan Strait Crisis,” Journal of Regional Studies Review  4, no. 1 (March 30, 2025): 438, https://doi.org/10.62843/jrsr/2025.4a090 .  24.  Julian E. Barnes, “China Turns to A.I. in Information Warfare,” The New York Times, August 6, 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/06/us/politics/china-artificial-intelligence-information-warfare.html . 25.  Julian E. Barnes, “China Turns to A.I. in Information Warfare,” The New York Times, August 6, 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/06/us/politics/china-artificial-intelligence-information-warfare.html .  26.  Benjamin Jensen, Erica Lonergan, and Kathleen McInnis, “Securing Cyber and Space: How the United States CanDisrupt China’s Blockade Plans,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 28, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/securing-cyber-and-space-how-united-states-can-disrupt-chinas-blockade-plans . 27.  Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,” 2025, 11.  28.  U.S. Department of Justice, “U.S. Government Disrupts Botnet People’s Republic of China Used to Conceal Hacking of Critical Infrastructure,” January 31, 2024, https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/us-government-disrupts-botnet-peoples-republic-china-used-conceal-hacking-critical#:~:text=%E2%80%9CChina's%20hackers%20are%20targeting%20American,we%20see%20them%20threaten%20Americans.%E2%80%9D . 29.  Gaby Tejeda, “China Strategically Infiltrates U.S. Critical Infrastructure as Cyberattacks Escalate,” The Soufan Center, January 10, 2025, https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2025-january-10/ .  30.  Gaby Tejeda, “China Strategically Infiltrates U.S. Critical Infrastructure as Cyberattacks Escalate,” The Soufan Center, January 10, 2025, https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2025-january-10/ . 31.  Benjamin Jensen, Erica Lonergan, and Kathleen McInnis, “Securing Cyber and Space: How the United StatesCan Disrupt China’s Blockade Plans,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 28, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/securing-cyber-and-space-how-united-states-can-disrupt-chinas-blockade-plans .  32.  Benjamin Jensen, Erica Lonergan, and Kathleen McInnis, “Securing Cyber and Space: How the United StatesCan Disrupt China’s Blockade Plans,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 28, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/securing-cyber-and-space-how-united-states-can-disrupt-chinas-blockade-plans .  33.  Josh Chin, “China Is Using the Private Sector to Advance Military AI,” The Wall Street Journal, September 3,2025, https://www.wsj.com/world/china/china-military-ai-partners-7836a2bc .  34.  Benjamin Jensen, Erica Lonergan, and Kathleen McInnis, “Securing Cyber and Space: How the United States Can Disrupt China’s Blockade Plans,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 28, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/securing-cyber-and-space-how-united-states-can-disrupt-chinas-blockade-plans .  35.  Benjamin Jensen, Erica Lonergan, and Kathleen McInnis, “Securing Cyber and Space: How the United States Can Disrupt China’s Blockade Plans,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 28, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/securing-cyber-and-space-how-united-states-can-disrupt-chinas-blockade-plans .  36.  Josh Chin, “China Is Using the Private Sector to Advance Military AI,” The Wall Street Journal, September 3,2025, https://www.wsj.com/world/china/china-military-ai-partners-7836a2bc .   37.  Benjamin Jensen, Erica Lonergan, and Kathleen McInnis, “Securing Cyber and Space: How the United States Can Disrupt China’s Blockade Plans,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 28, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/securing-cyber-and-space-how-united-states-can-disrupt-chinas-blockade-plans . DISCLAIMER Mooreposts publishes independent analysis, commentary, and research for informational and educational purposes only. Content on Mooreposts—including articles, Mooreposts Bites, strategic intelligence assessments, opinion pieces, interviews, and visual materials—does not constitute legal, financial, medical, or professional advice, nor does it represent any government agency, official position, or classified assessment. Unless explicitly stated, all analyses and interpretations reflect the views and analytic judgments of the individual author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Mooreposts, its editorial staff, or affiliated contributors. Strategic intelligence and analytical content is based on open-source information and publicly available materials. Mooreposts strives for accuracy, transparency, and rigorous sourcing; however, information may change as events develop. Readers are encouraged to consult primary sources and exercise independent judgment.

Illustration by John Lamberger LISTEN TO THIS ARTICLE In October 2021, Boris Johnson  stood on the observation deck of the Colosseum for an interview  with Channel 4. His odd manner – a mix of aristocratic bewilderment and the look of a suburban pub lout – clashed intensely with the enigmatic ruins. The focus of his semi-intellectual fumblings was the most downtrodden of the global order: climate refugees. He did his best to summon the classic image of the fall of the Empire; hordes of unwashed barbarians tearing down the symbols of a glittering civilization to replace them with indoor excrement buckets and illiteracy. In the interview, he spoke briefly of the history, brushing past it as a simple, clarifiable fact: “The Roman Empire fell because of out-of-control immigration,” and that “People should not be so naive to think that history moves in one direction,” that “history is moving backwards.” In reality, Johnson's muddied xenophobic reframing of history is blissful, clean, pure nonsense. I pick Johnson’s example out of a myriad right-wing reactionaries using this “interpretation” of Roman history because it's the least effective and, thus, the funniest. The wider right-wing consistently holds up migration as the reason for the Empire’s fall and a universal warning sign for an Empire in decline. The “historical” example is then applied to the position of the contemporary West: These Twitter posts are much more deft examples of right-wing reactionary propaganda than Boris’. They’re interesting in the way that the best propaganda is – it grabs your attention. But they’re just that: propaganda. The rigor of the Classics, the study of the ancient Mediterranean world, comes not from reading the ancient documents, but in understanding how every subsequent generation of historians understood the period that they’re describing. Many of what we consider “primary sources” from the Roman Period were written hundreds of years after the events described, or inextricably politically biased. What few extant secondary and tertiary sources are biased in both respects. In other words, Roman history has always been highly political and highly fluid. So any study of the Classics is inherently a reflection of the author's contemporary political feelings; to what extent is almost impossible to decipher. The reactionary right’s interpretation of the Empire’s fall, however, is not founded in history whatsoever. It’s constrained to 140-character tweets and 7-minute interviews; in other words, the Late Empire becomes a simple rhetorical device.  A real study of Rome’s relationship with Germanic immigration can inform, as the right is suggesting, national policy and migration policy in the upcoming period of climate migration. As the period of contemporary climate migration intensifies over the next quarter-century, studying how the Romans interacted with their Germanic neighbors during the Period of Migration (300 AD - 600 AD) can help illuminate how we can successfully withstand the great demographic changes that will soon grip our own political systems. The truth is, the Fall of the Roman Empire was precipitated not by the acceptance of German immigrants but by their violent rejection. The Empire enjoyed a hundred-year-long “stay of execution” by essentially throwing open its borders to German immigration. Let me be the first to say that the story below is also a thumbnail sketch of Late Roman Imperial scholarship. It perhaps isn’t even a good one. Classicists more ideologically conservative than I would certainly accuse me of selecting, as every historian does, information based on how I view contemporary politics. I encourage you to keep that in mind while reading this article. Without further ado, let's travel back in time together. The Crisis of the Third Century (234-284) In 234 AD, overlapping and self-reinforcing environmental, economic, and political crises enveloped the entire Mediterranean world. Plague, probably smallpox , devastated urban and rural populations alike. Hyperinflation devoured a huge portion of the Roman economy, rendering the currency so valueless that the Empire ceased collecting taxes in money . A permanent change in the climate , the end of the Roman Warm Period, made agriculture permanently less productive. This is just to name a few of the existential issues that all of Europe faced. The Empire needed to adapt to fundamentally different circumstances than it had faced throughout its history. Roman administrators pulled off some of the most agile feats of bureaucratic gymnastics in history, sticking the landing almost every time on the first attempt. They pursued an agenda marked by radically open immigration reform, political reorganization, systemic changes to the basic functions of the Roman economy, and the creation of entirely new socioeconomic classes. 284 AD is perhaps a more logical beginning to the Middle Ages than the expulsion of Romulus Augustulus in 476. The reforms of the late 200s AD created what we understand as Medieval: patrimonial labor organizations, serfdom, and the divinely appointed monarch. The Germanic tribes outside the Empire’s borders simply collapsed in the face of climate migration, plague, economic collapse, and external invasion. They migrated en masse to the Empire, looking for safety and competent administration. The Romans, for their part, were ecstatic to welcome new bodies to serve their legions and in the marketplaces sapped by the compounding crises. Roman administrators, looking at their empty streets and unplowed fields, essentially threw open the doors. The Process of Roman Immigration What we might understand as “legal immigration” into the Roman Empire happened through a process called consensus. Roman borders, with few exceptions, were almost entirely porous to individuals and small parties. As an individual, one could cross the border and become a Roman taxpayer with all the benefits that came with it. As a large group, however, you needed consensus. What this process looked like varied between time and place, but was much the same in its essential characteristics. A tribe of 250,000 or more would appear at the border and petition for admittance into the empire. Local magistrates would collect certain information on the new arrivals and call in a legionary presence to meet the barbarians at a pre-arranged spot. The Germans would cross the border, leave their weapons behind, and swear allegiance to the Emperor. The Roman apparatus would then split the tribe up and disperse them evenly across the vast size of the Empire; this family to Spain, this one to Italy, and so on. They were disarmed, separated, and settled . To put it plainly, the Empire needed these injections of manpower between the third and fourth centuries. To a lesser extent, that’s the way the Romans had always worked. To be Roman wasn’t like being German; to be Roman was a way of life, a system of values, not an ethnicity. The Imperii Populii Romanii, the Power of the Roman People, always rested on their ability to convince new people to become Romans and lend their efforts to the imperial project. New Arrivals (376) The positive feedback loop between Roman power and German immigration established in the aftermath of the Crisis of the Third Century suffered a relatively simple end. For one, the Huns were galloping over the Eastern European Plain, from where we aren’t sure, displacing more people and causing cascading refugee waves. The Romans had been at the top of their integration game, welcoming or forcing hundreds of thousands of Goths, Franks, Quadii, and Marcomanii into the fabric of Roman society for the last hundred years. Their ability to welcome newcomers had been the only reason the Empire had not collapsed back in the third century. In 376, a group of 200,000 Goths, likely from modern Ukraine, presented themselves at the Roman border requesting asylum from the unstoppable Hunnic invasion from the East. Then, Roman Emperor Valens was ecstatic. One of the recurrent outbreaks of the Antonine Plague had devastated the legions at the very start of a major conflict with the Sassanians, an equally powerful empire centered in modern Iran.  This massive group of Goths crossed the Danube and, as usual, they left their weapons on the far bank of the Danube, content in the knowledge that now they were safe in Roman territory. Because of the extensive conflict in the East and recurrent cycles of plague, the Roman force that met them was large but not overwhelmingly so. A temporary camp was set up to accommodate the Goths before they were dispersed by their new Roman leaders across the Empire.  The Romans were never a people to protest their bureaucrats skimming a bit of the top, but the abuse suffered by the Goths at the hands of their Roman administrators while in this temporary camp was cruel. The camp became semi-permanent as weeks of waiting turned into months. The Roman administrators of this camp schemed constantly to separate the Goths under their purview from their gold. Going so far as to exchange dog meat for their women and children to abate starvation. This was after, of course, they had sold the provisions the central government had been sending them to feed the Goths on the private market. When the Goths heard that Emperor Valens was on his way, their leaders gathered to petition him to punish the greedy administrators who wreaked such cruelty on their people. The administrators of the camp, in way over their heads, killed the Gothic leaders before they could inform their bosses of their misdeeds. The Goths were enraged. In convulsions of pain only known to the dispossessed and abused, they broke out of camp, sacked a nearby city for all its food, and relished in torturing the Roman citizens they were once so hopeful to become. The Beginning of the End (376 - 476) Emperor   Valens was furious. The greed and ineptitude of a few low-level bureaucrats had turned hundreds of thousands of allies into an apocalyptic threat. The Empire was fighting a war with a near-peer adversary to the East and now had to contend with a large-scale enemy army within its borders. The Emperor ordered the legions stationed on the border to join the major force the Emperor was leading with all haste towards the Gothic army.  He attacked the Gothic army outside the city of Hadrianopolis near the modern Greek border with Bulgaria. The Romans were crushed. Emperor Valens was killed on the field, two-thirds of the Roman army was slaughtered, and Hadrianopolis was burned to the ground. The borders were undefended, and no army within a thousand miles could challenge the Goths now, let alone the Huns from which they were initially fleeing. The Western Empire never truly recovered from the blow suffered at Adrianople. The Huns penetrated Roman territory, now completely undefended. The Romans bargained with the Goths to ally with them against the Huns in exchange for gold and political privileges. Valens’ successors were increasingly unable to impose terms on the arriving tribes. They began crossing the borders without first asking Roman officials, bringing their weapons, settling together, and only coming to those “agreements” after they had taken what they could. Consensus was permanently broken. The Romans could no longer effectively impose their terms and culture on the new arrivals. The Western Roman Empire went with a whimper, not a bang. Tribes were increasingly only nominally subservient to the Emperor in Rome and, in practice, held all the cards in the relationship. The last Roman emperors even abandoned Rome as the capital, unable to defend such a large and attractive pile of treasure. The Eternal City was looted twice in the 400s AD. Instead, they ruled from Ravenna, playacting as masters of the world from behind the swamps that encircled the city.  Conclusion Studying the Migration Period (300-600 AD) to understand how the Romans and German migrants interacted with one another can help policymakers determine how to react to the upcoming period of climate migration. The Migration Policy Institute predicts up to 1.2 billion people will be internationally displaced by 2050; the vast majority moving north from the equator. It’s imperative that leaders understand the decisions that caused alignment of Roman and Gothic interests versus those that pitted them against each other. There are two lessons that present themselves to me as a Roman historian and scholar of current events: The United States is facing a demographic cliff and entering into competition with the most populous nation on Earth. Just as Rome needed German immigration to fill its legions and coffers, the United States needs immigrants from the South. The wisest course of action is to model Roman consensus and make friends where natural friends exist. Welcome them under the auspices of overwhelming power but extend a generous hand; In other words, talk softly but carry a big stick. Go to elaborate lengths to avoid violent confrontation with large groups of migrants. At some point, the flow of migrants will be such as to represent an irresistible faction. Appearances of overwhelming power on the part of the assimilating group are more important than the actual ability to militarily resist the newcomers. Avoiding the possibility of an Adrianople is paramount to the survival of the American Empire. Of course, the same reason these lessons can’t be learned in hindsight is the same reason simplified tellings are so rhetorically attractive. It is, however, important to distinguish leaders from Twitter influencers. I can understand why the backwards interpretation of history proliferates on a platform like Twitter, but to be repeated by the decision-makers themselves signals a fundamental issue. If Boris Johnson is himself repeating the propaganda and perhaps believing it, how can we trust him and people like him to make discerning, unbiased strategic decisions? Let this be realized: if we make unnecessary enemies of these people, they will learn quickly that we can’t stop them even if we try. Braxton Fuller is a current master’s candidate for International Studies at the University of Denver’s Josef Korbel School of Global and Public Affairs. If you enjoyed this work, please consider sharing our content and website or donating to a non-profit organization linked in the   Donate  tab. DISCLAIMER Mooreposts publishes independent analysis, commentary, and research for informational and educational purposes only. Content on Mooreposts—including articles, Mooreposts Bites, strategic intelligence assessments, opinion pieces, interviews, and visual materials—does not constitute legal, financial, medical, or professional advice, nor does it represent any government agency, official position, or classified assessment. Unless explicitly stated, all analyses and interpretations reflect the views and analytic judgments of the individual author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Mooreposts, its editorial staff, or affiliated contributors. Strategic intelligence and analytical content is based on open-source information and publicly available materials. Mooreposts strives for accuracy, transparency, and rigorous sourcing; however, information may change as events develop. Readers are encouraged to consult primary sources and exercise independent judgment.

How Moscow Sustains its War in Ukraine on the Front Lines and at Home Illustration by Connor JL Moore & Kash Harrison LISTEN TO THIS ARTICLE In the days before Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Western intelligence believed Kyiv’s fall was imminent . Yet, as the war approaches its fourth year, it has devolved into the bloodiest conflict in Europe since the Second World War.  Estimates place total Russian battlefield casualties —those killed, wounded, and missing—at 1.2 million, with deaths believed to be as high as 325,000. These numbers are remarkable, given that Moscow has advanced only 50 to 230 feet per day . In total, Russia has acquired just 12% of Ukrainian territory since 2022. Experts have noted that Moscow’s willingness to endure high losses indicates a belief it can outlast Ukraine’s ability  to continue fighting. Given this, one might wonder how Moscow has sustained its attritional war strategy and public support amid mounting losses. Replenishing Russia’s Frontlines To avoid a nationwide conscription—like in Ukraine—Moscow has pursued a variety of efforts to replenish its frontlines. Research indicates that the Kremlin continues to recruit 30,000–40,000 troops  each month.  Recruitment efforts have focused on low-income Russians in rural areas, who make up most of its forces. Financial incentives like high pay and bonuses  have been found instrumental, often several times  what most Russians earn each paycheck.  Rights activists, however, dispute these recruitment numbers . In some cases, conscripts were forced to sign contracts  requiring them to serve on the front lines. In others, what were originally one-year terms of service have been indefinitely extended .  Other methods of replenishing Russian forces have included recruiting convicts and foreign nationals. Legislation signed in 2024 by Russian President Vladimir Putin permits Russians with criminal convictions—or those facing sentencing—to avoid prosecution by enlisting  in the military.  Further, after Russia’s   mutual defense treaty   with North Korea in 2024, Western officials estimate 14,000–15,000 North Korean soldiers  are now fighting on Russia’s frontlines. Investigative journalists and rights groups have uncovered that foreign nationals from 128 nations  have been trafficked to the front or recruited under false pretenses. Domestic Repression  Under immense human and economic  losses, Moscow’s strategy of outlasting Ukraine has coincided with intensified domestic repression. Since the invasion, Moscow has enhanced censorship laws, making public dissent or scrutiny  of Russia’s ‘special military operation’ risky. Those spreading information deemed contradictory to Moscow's official positions could face up to 15 years’ imprisonment .  These measures have empowered Putin to eliminate all opposition to his regime, most notably key political opponent   Alexei Navalny , and former ally Yevgeny Prigozhin, who led a revolt against Moscow  in June of 2023.  Further, major news outlets like The Moscow Times , Echo Moskvy , and Dozhd  have been banned or shut down under newly expanded ‘foreign influence laws’. Some claim these actions have effectively put an end to all  independent media groups in Russia.  The Russian state has also been accused of classifying and  hiding data  regarding losses in the war. Exiled Russian media reported that by the end of 2025, lawsuits seeking a formal declaration of killed or missing military personnel amounted to 90,000 , of which 70,000 related cases  quickly vanished. Payments to Russian families who lost or had injured service members in the war (amounting to $15.3 billion) have been highlighted as a means to mitigate unrest and maintain domestic support . Militarizing Russian Youth  In tandem with its   domestic repression, Moscow appears to be pursuing long-term efforts to condition its people for a prolonged struggle and future conflict. Scholars note that Moscow’s amplified use of   nationalism, traditional values, and historical narratives is intended to frame and legitimize  the conflict as an existential threat to Russian values from a ‘demonic’ West. These efforts are reflected in Moscow’s policy initiatives to militarize the country’s youth. Between 2022 and 2024, funding for new “patriotic” educational initiatives increased tenfold . Required courses like Health and Safety, now called Fundamentals of Security and Defense of the Homeland , focus on military basics , from the structure of the Russian Armed Forces to battlefield medical care.  Moreover, newly implemented history textbooks  reportedly focus on narratives that justify and glorify Russia’s ‘special military operation’ in Ukraine. Other independent investigations have highlighted new classrooms equipped to train students in drone operation , a warfare capability that has become essential  in the conflict.  The Oscar-nominated documentary Mr. Nobody Against Putin  reveals how state-mandated classroom recordings—intended to enforce compliance with a new curriculum—depict lectures branding dissenters as “parasites” who should leave Russia. Lessons also incorporated Moscow’s historical narratives, teaching about the necessity to ‘denazify’ Ukraine and praising those fighting today as akin to Soviet troops against Nazi Germany.  Further footage shows members of the Wagner Group—mercenaries infamous for their brutality  and war crimes —teaching primary school students how to handle weapons and mitigate battlefield risks of losing limbs.  Other school activities   across all grades include loyalty oaths, military drills, and grenade-throwing contests. Analysts have argued that this militarization of Russian youth is intended to prepare the country for extended conflict ,  which will require a growing population forever loyal to the war effort.  Conclusion Russia’s war in Ukraine has imposed unprecedented losses on both sides, yet under current circumstances—heavy Russian losses and slow battlefield progress—it would take 152 years  for Russian forces to conquer the rest of Ukraine. For the time being, Moscow appears committed to its war strategy of outlasting Ukraine, no matter the cost.  Connor JL Moore is a current master’s candidate for International Security at the University of Denver’s Josef Korbel School of Global and Public Affairs.  If you enjoyed this work, please consider sharing our content and website or donating to a non-profit organization linked in the Donate tab. DISCLAIMER Mooreposts publishes independent analysis, commentary, and research for informational and educational purposes only. Content on Mooreposts—including articles, Mooreposts Bites, strategic intelligence assessments, opinion pieces, interviews, and visual materials—does not constitute legal, financial, medical, or professional advice, nor does it represent any government agency, official position, or classified assessment. Unless explicitly stated, all analyses and interpretations reflect the views and analytic judgments of the individual author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Mooreposts, its editorial staff, or affiliated contributors. Strategic intelligence and analytical content is based on open-source information and publicly available materials. Mooreposts strives for accuracy, transparency, and rigorous sourcing; however, information may change as events develop. Readers are encouraged to consult primary sources and exercise independent judgment.