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Audio & Transcript Executive Producers: John Lamberger, Lindsey Ferrini, Connor JL Moore This transcript has been edited for clarity and readability while preserving the speakers’ original meaning and conversational tone. Minor repetitions, filler words, and false starts have been removed. Speaker attributions have been carefully reviewed against the audio to ensure accuracy. Teaser Lindsey: Around the 1700’s, Imperial Russia expanded by absorbing Ukrainian territory. The Russian Revolution, a multi-sided four-year war within Ukraine and the incorporation of the Soviet Union in 1922 cemented Moscow's centralized control over the region. On December 26th, 1991, the Soviet Union formally dissolved- breaking apart into several republics. Among these new independent countries were the Russian Federation and Ukraine, which shared a 1,200-mile-long border.  Show Stinger Hello, I'm Lindsay Ferrini and I'm John Lamberger. Welcome to Sheepland, the wide green pastures of our modern media environment. Sheepland where people are fenced in by politics, graze on sound bites, and fall prey to the wolves of propaganda. So where are we? Sheepland a program about the great issues facing humanity.  A Mooreposts podcast.  Introduction John: In 2014, Russia began an armed conflict with its neighbor, Ukraine, seizing the Crimean Peninsula and eastern portions of the country. The next eight years were marked by skirmishes, ceasefire violations and irregular fighting between Ukraine and Russian controlled armed groups. By February 24th, 2022, over 14,000 people had been killed or wounded when Russia openly launched a wide-scale invasion. In the fall of 2022, Russia declared its annexation of four Ukrainian regions it did not fully control. The international community has condemned, diplomatically isolated, and economically sanctioned Russia for beginning a conflict considered the largest military attack in Europe since World War Two.  John: With us to discuss the Russo-Ukrainian War is Dr. Rachel Epstein, a professor of international relations at the University of Denver. Her research spans topics from financial crises and reform- to the enlargement of the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Lindsey: Well, first, we'd like to thank you for being here Dr. Rachel Epstein: Thank you so much for having me L: Yeah, and taking time out of your busy schedule to answer some questions for us and inform us about the Russian-Ukrainian war J: Yes, Very generous of you to stop by and speak to us about this, Like, really great issue facing humanity right now L: So, I'm going to start with a more personal question Epstein: Okay Why Study Economic and Security Politics of Europe? Lindsey: So, Rachel, what in your life inspired you to center your career in the economic and security politics of Europe? Hmm Epstein: Well, I am fundamentally like many people my age, I mean, I am a kid of the Cold War, an American kid of the Cold War. And so, growing up in Portland, Oregon, in the 70’s and 80’s, I was really concerned about the nuclear standoff between the Soviet Union and the United States. And probably for a seventh grader, knew an unhealthy amount about nuclear weapons. And I would say that's where my interest started. But I also traveled a couple times on extended trips to Europe, around Europe with my family, also as a teenager, and that also sparked my interest. I would say a third thing is my Jewish heritage and knowledge of the Holocaust and a lack of understanding also as a kid, about how people could engage in such horrific atrocities. So that sparked my interest in Europe. Definitely, I was interested in understanding German, German, politics, German language better so that I could try to come to grips with how that country descended into the barbarity that it did in the 30’s and 40’s. So that combination of things, and then the end of the Cold War, when I was an undergraduate doing my BA in international relations at Stanford, when I was a sophomore, the wall came down, the Berlin Wall came down. So that was probably the fourth thing that really moved me very strongly in the direction of studying Europe and specifically post-Communist Europe. John: It really shaped your college choices where you focused your studies and research? Epstein: Yes, so I went to Berlin to study international relations, study German, but also to be there during German unification in 1990. And at that time, you know, the difference between East and West Berlin- It was night and day- I mean, it was just it was it was like seeing two different worlds that had been so profoundly and distinctively shaped by their respective histories. So that was fascinating and then, of course, you know, the East European, what we think of as East Central Europe now Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, etc., Baltic states, all the way down to the Western Balkans- that region had a series of really critical choices to make about their political futures and so my research interests took off from there. John: That must have been fascinating! Epstein: It's pretty interesting time John: The epicenter of the Cold War for so long. Epstein: Yeah Berlin Time Lindsey: How much time did you spend in Berlin at that point?  Epstein: I was there for six months So, like the University of Denver, Stanford was on quarters, So it was, I think September through March, I was there and also for unification. John: And the wall had already been down? Epstein: Yeah, so it had come down the previous year in 1989. And a remarkable development of that time was the decision, and with the agreement of Germany, West Germany's allies, for the country to unify that quickly. I think people, you know, don't talk about it a lot now, but that was a monumental shift for all of Europe. Obviously, Germany was really strongly in favor of the country's unification, but many other countries were extremely nervous. And in critical ways the decision for Germany to unify was then linked to additional steps the Europeans took to integrate further in order to counter German power, and in particular, the origins of the common currency in Europe, the euro lie within the decision of German unification. Russian Whiplash John: So, getting into the topic of the current conflict, the Russo-Ukrainian war, how did the threat from Moscow go from Soviet domination of Eastern Europe to embraced member of the global community? They became a G8 member, they hosted the Olympics and now they're back to Russian Domination of Eastern Europe. How did how did that- almost whiplash, come about?  Epstein: So, this is a great question and I would say, in keeping with my decision to study East Central Europe and the post-communist transition, the mood in the 1990’s, particularly in the West, it was extremely optimistic with respect to the trajectory the political and economic trajectories of the East Central European countries, but also with respect to Russia. So I think in the United States, under the Clinton administration, the Americans were very excited about the idea of having a totally different and much more productive relationship with Russia, which emerged as the Russian Federation following the collapse of the Soviet Union to a huge extent, and even consideration and questions about conversations about whether Russia could be in NATO or whether NATO could be dissolved and we might use a different security architecture, which included Russia. The Russians, after all, as a population, the leadership long considered themselves European and as belonging within the European fold. And I think when Yeltsin was president in Russia, his close relationship with Bill Clinton and, you know, other elements of international politics at the time, the agreement to return all of the nuclear weapons, for example, that were in Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to Russia for safe keeping-right? There was just an enormous amount of optimism in the 90’s about a broader reconciliation between Russia, what had been the Soviet bloc, and the West. And, you know, to the heart of your question, why did that turn sour? Economic reform in Russia was catastrophic, volatile, and painful for many normal citizens of the country. What developed was enormous concentration of economic power. A lot of economic advising coming from the West that was not appropriately contextualized, and some of it was very self-serving. So, you know, enormous, enormous hardship and unhappiness in Russia itself. By the time Putin comes to power in 1999 and 2000, I think he's very intent on establishing a different trajectory, which ultimately became very authoritarian and now somewhat argue even totalitarian. So increasing tensions over NATO enlargement, which the previous president Yeltsin, had accepted. Tensions over Russian behavior in its near abroad, tensions over NATO intervention in the Western Balkans. Tensions over how to define international terrorists and how to treat them, I mean, a myriad of difficult diplomatic issues emerged, and I think a very difficult point in that relationship was the 2008 Russian invasion of Georgia and I think things have only gotten more difficult from there. But I think as we'll get to in this conversation, also a lot of disagreement and tension with respect to Ukraine. Source of the Conflict Lindsey: Well, I know that there's a long list of tensions that you just named, one of them being the NATO enlargement. So how much of the decision to begin this war is structured by that NATO or EU expansion, or was the decision how much of the decision of Russian elites or just Vladimir Putin, caused the war?  Epstein: I put most of the source of the conflict with Putin, Russia, Russia's vision of itself in the world You know, if you're trying to establish the causal forces in social phenomena, the NATO explanation doesn't add up very well in terms of timing and then action. But what we do see over time is that the Ukrainians, you know, since the early 1990’s, increasingly look for ways to chart their own path independent of Russia. And that becomes highly problematic from a Russian point of view. So, in 2004, in Ukraine, you had the Orange Revolution, which was a major mass mobilization against the perceived rigged election of Yanukovych. And what happens in that instance is that the opposition, Yushchenko and Tymoshenko, they managed to rerun those Ukrainian elections and that nationalist coalition comes to power instead. So that is an important data point, I think, for the Russians and for Putin to see that the preferred Russian candidate can't necessarily win in free and fair Ukrainian elections. Now, interestingly, Yanukovych comes back in a later election and does win free and fair elections without what, you know, anyone observing would have thought was undue influence. But the relationship, I think, between Ukraine and Russia nevertheless becomes more tense because even with Yanukovych in power, Yanukovych representing Ukraine, does want to move closer to the EU. And so agreed in twenty thirteen to sign an association agreement with the European Union. At the very last minute, Yanukovych had a meeting with Putin, and we don't know what transpired during that meeting. But on very short notice, he informed the public in Ukraine that he was no longer going to sign the EU Association Agreement John: And these are economic ties? These are trade agreements? Epstein: These are trade agreements that establish regulatory harmonization, to make more trade possible and to liberalize trade and to reduce tariff and non-tariff barriers. So, at the last minute, in late twenty thirteen, Yanukovych reneges on his earlier agreement to sign this deal and you get another mass mobilization in Ukraine, particularly in Kyiv. And Russia is watching this, Putin is watching this and essentially comes to the conclusion that Russia is no longer in a position to have a pro-Russian government in power, necessarily, because what happens with the mass mobilization is that Yanukovych calls out the security services. The security services end up killing a number of the protesters and this, you can imagine in flames, even more outrage in Ukraine. And Yanukovych ends up fleeing to Russia, and he certainly would have been removed from office, had decided to stay in Ukraine. So, at that point, Putin, I think, tries to paint a picture as dictators around the world often do, that there's nefarious foreign interference in Ukrainian politics and uses Yanukovych's ouster to justify the Russian invasion of eastern Ukraine in 2014 and to justify the seizure of Crimea. And, of course, at the same time, part of the nefarious foreign influence that he gravitates towards as an explanation, because it's very convincing vis a vis his public is NATO enlargement. And it is true that in 2008, the alliance under US pressure had said to Georgia and Ukraine, you will become members of NATO. At the same time, there was no time frame for that and there was no action plan for accession. So, by 2014, Ukraine and Georgia were in essence no closer to NATO membership than they had been earlier. But nevertheless, at that time, Putin used NATO enlargement as a pretext for his invasion. Signs of the War Ending John: As we've established in 2014, Russia seizes Crimea, they build the Kerch Bridge. They have, separatists in eastern portions of Ukraine, and in 2022- February 24th, 2022, a wide scale invasion along their long border happens. So, it's been almost four years for both Ukraine and Russia. What is your perspective on their capacity to sustain and continue this war? Is there any signs of this war may be ending? I don't see signs of it ending? Epstein: As you probably know, the Trump administration came into office very intent that they could negotiate an end to the conflict rather quickly. And that's turned out not to be true, I think, because the, you know, the Russian side is extremely committed to, you know, their idea of a victory. I think primarily for domestic political reasons. I think that, you know, for Putin and his power position, and it's very hard to see into the inner workings of the Russian regime. But they've lost a lot of life. A lot of soldiers have absorbed, you know, terrible injury, trauma. I think, you know, the sunk cost of the situation, even though rationally they might suggest Russia should get out before it loses more life. The opposite effect, psychologically, is taken hold. So, I think Putin's power position depends on the conflict ending in a way that allows him to save face. And given everything that he's said about why Russia is there fighting, it seems that it would be very hard for him to save face. Short of a victory that accords Russia a lot of authority over who's running Ukraine and authority to keep control of the territory that they've taken by force. So short of those things, it's not clear to expert observers that Russia is prepared to give up the fight. Ukraine, in the intervening period, if it had been on a trajectory before Russian or Russia's invasion in 2014 Towards the west, towards the EU, even towards NATO membership. Those impulses and desires have only been strengthened and concretized by the war. And because it's Ukrainian territory and sovereignty and independence, Identity, Language, Democratic governance, economic opportunity. The Ukrainian population sees all of these things as being at stake, and they are also very reluctant to give up. So, to the extent that psychology helps us understand the continuation of war when we know how horrible war is, the psychology of this war is that both sides seem to be extremely committed. And from that point of view,  it's really hard to see a way out. In terms of the logistical question, of course, Russia has the personnel advantage. They have a financial advantage. In some ways, we know that the Russian economy is under enormous strain, as is the Ukrainian economy. You know, for Westerners or even Ukrainians to look at the state of the Russian economy and to conclude that, you know, the economy in Russia must break at some point is probably a kind of triumphalism that we should not resort to, right? I think Russia and Putin's regime and even the population historically that country has put up with incredible, unthinkable misery in order to prevail in conflicts. They've done that. And the political culture may be that they will do that again. So, for as many people as Russia is losing, and we think it's around a thousand people a day to death or injury, they have the capacity for some time to continue to do that. And I think the Ukrainians are looking for ways to not have to reduce the age of conscription, um, to save their younger generations of people. So, they're looking at, you know, how can we fight more effectively while trying to guarantee simultaneously that we don't lose enormous life or we don't lose people to injury? And they're, you know, they're very effective at that, I mean, they're running pretty effective operations deep into Russian territory that affect that country's munitions situation and transport and energy. Transformational Ideological Divisions Lindsey: How has the ideological division shaped Ukraine as a nation and the Ukrainian identity in the face of total war? For example, when I think about this question, I think of the territorial defense forces, um, as a Ukrainian identity unification. Epstein: Yeah, I think that's right, I think that wars can be transformative in all kinds of ways. And I think this one has spurred a kind of Ukrainian identity, which is built around some of the things that we talked about before independence, sovereignty, having the authority to decide for itself with whom it's allied in the international system. When I talk to Ukrainians about this very question, I mean, they will also say, given the existential threat that the Ukrainians face, they feel more connected to government in a way and governance, and they are more inclined to hold government accountable. And I think we saw that recently with protests against the threatened incursions on independence for the anti-corruption agency in Ukraine. So, getting to territorial defense forces, this is a really interesting phenomenon in, in Eastern Europe, because when NATO was first contemplating enlarging to places like Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, which NATO did in 1999. The existence and elevation of territorial defense forces, particularly in Poland, where it was kind of a hot idea, I would say in the 1990’s since that country had just regained its independence. It encouraged new NATO members to downsize their forces, make their forces voluntary, and spend less money on defense, but to do it more efficiently. And in the 1990’s and early two thousand, for the Americans and for the broader alliance, that meant creating expeditionary forces to assist countries like the United States in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. So the idea now that we're returning, including in places like Poland and the Baltic states and in Ukraine to this idea of territorial or total defense, where, you know, members of the public have responsibility for protecting their homeland is, Lindsey, I think, in the spirit of your question, an identity forming and concretizing exercise which will very likely endure, you know, for a very long period after the war ends. And it's part, I think, of what drives the psychology of commitment on the Ukrainian side for people to feel very invested in and responsible for their own country's defense and survival. Putin and His Regime Epstein: We should appreciate about the Russian regime at this point is that Putin and his regime have killed, imprisoned, sent into exile all of his major opponents. And I think for members of the public, the idea that you would participate in a protest, uh, would, you know, certainly end in your arrest or death. I think that the Russian regime today is similarly repressive as the Iranian regime. And we know that thousands, if not tens of thousands of people were just killed in Iran. Given their willingness and bravery to protest. And that is certainly not something I would wish on any population. So, I look at Russia and I think it is, you know, it is too dangerous for ordinary Russians to contemplate getting out into the streets and voicing a view different from that of the government's. The other thing I would say is that surveys that are conducted by Russian pollsters, at least in some cases, frame questions in ways that seem to be designed not to get a pulse on what people are thinking, but to tell them what they should be thinking. And one is also under the impression that as pollsters are doing their surveys, they're collecting information. I mean, I would definitely not as a research subject in Russia, take it for granted that somebody actually wanted to know my opinion for knowing my opinions sake. I would think they would want to know my opinion in case they wanted to come after me. The judicial system in Russia is also terribly politicized and compromised, and there is no equal protection under the law, as we would understand it. So, in answer to your initial question, John, about why isn't it a similar dynamic? I mean, fundamentally, the Russian regime now is too repressive. It's too dangerous. Opposition leaders have been eliminated, and I think it would be very difficult. I don't know what the circumstances would have to be for people to come out and revolt. You know, I said, they're Russians are divided on this. When I express my skepticism about how well we can actually assess Russian public opinion. A couple Russians have come up to me and said, you know, there's actually more genuine enthusiasm for Putin and the war than what you, Rachel, are saying. So, I also, you know, that's also valuable information that I think a lot of the propaganda, a lot of the framing of the war that Putin has very successfully done really resonates with people that Russia is under attack, it's being humiliated, it's encircled. It's not respected. The Ukrainians, you know, in the Russian discourse, are either actually Russian or, you know, don't have a meaningful identity of their own- I think that's also a sentiment that's out there.  West vs East? John: During the Cold War, there's very much this concept of the free world, the Eastern Bloc, the Warsaw Pact. Is that still useful to use these terms, like West, like we're in the West and they're in the East? It's us versus them? Poland is this NATO country, liberal democracy- they're clearly in the West now, is this is this a useful term?  Epstein: Increasingly, no, I think because of developments in the United States, I mean, I think Europe, for the most part is, you know, it's highly democratic. It's wealthy for the post-communist countries, including Poland, that have joined the EU since 2004. It's provided enormous economic opportunity. Of course, the EU isn't perfect. No international organization or government is. But from a prosperity, democratic and stability point of view, membership in the EU and NATO has been life changing for those countries. I mean, so transformational like they've never they've never had the degree, I think, of independence and, um, volition choice opportunity in the international system voice. They have voice in these organizations that they've never enjoyed before. But given the state of US politics, I feel that the United States is increasingly divided from some of the core democratic principles that underpin the EU's functioning. So, I wouldn't necessarily, in the current period, refer to the West as a quasi-unified whole based on shared values, at least if we're talking about the people in power. European Transformation John: How has this war shaped Europe? Do you think we'll see more European integration, possibly less reliance on the United States,  Epstein: So, less reliance on the United States? Not necessarily because of the war, but because the United States at this point is reluctant to assist Ukraine directly? I think I hope it will result in more integration in the in the following very critical way. The advantage of NATO for almost eighty years has been that in addition to having been victorious in the Cold War and the Soviet Union broke up and was no longer occupying and essentially running puppet governments through East-Central Europe was the fact that the alliance successfully really quashed regional rivalries within Europe itself and restructured relationships critical ones, including between certainly Germany and France, but Germany and the rest of Europe fundamentally. And that has been really essential for the prosperity and democratic governance in most of Europe to really accelerate and expand the way that I hope that it shapes European integration going forward, is that as the Europeans take more independent responsibility, both for securing their own borders and military security, well-being, let's say that they do it in a way where it is a genuinely shared enterprise and done collaboratively rather than competitively among them. So, you know, I think what the Europeans are trying to do is to be able to assist Ukraine independently to replace what had been over the last four years, but really since 2014, American military assistance, advising, observation. So that's one way in which we see a shift happening. And we just want to understand that it's partly a consequence of the war, but it's partly a consequence of from the Biden administration to this Trump administration, a shift in U.S policy, which is urging Europe to become more independent. So that's one change. The other enormous change is, and I don't think this gets reported on enough, the energy transition that's underway in Europe as a consequence of radically reducing the continent's reliance on Russian energy resources. And that's critical for accelerating the green transition. So, it's been incredibly costly and painful, particularly for economies like Germany but also some of the East European economies. But I'd say that's also a very important way in which Europe is being changed. And then I think political sensibilities on the continent are changing to a certain extent. It's shaping political cleavages in many European countries, in Germany, in France, for example, where you have current governing parties which are highly critical of Russia's war in Ukraine, but in opposition are also major political parties embraced by the Trump administration. But, you know, political parties that are much more interested in probably returning to a situation where they can do business with Russia and they're less concerned about Ukraine's ultimate fate. Global View on Conflict Lindsey: Aside from Europe, because I know we just talked about their view on the on the war in the previous question, how has this war shaped the global view on conflict and what normal behavior is for a state?  Epstein: So, I think in much of the world it probably hasn't changed it at all. I think one of the hard things for Europeanists to accept is that the Russian invasion of Ukraine does not stir the sympathies of a lot of people in India or China or on the African continent. I mean, it is true. The United States led a coalition building effort at the United Nations after the full-scale invasion, which was impressively large in terms of the number of countries, but really not very impressive with respect to the share of the global population represented, because it's mostly wealthier, Industrialized, post-industrial countries that came to Ukraine's defense. So, in one way, it doesn't seem to have changed many normal global citizens perceptions. Many people around the world seem to accept that Ukraine is in Russia's sphere of influence. Um, NATO enlarged to include many post-communist countries. Russia over time did not perceive this development to be in its interests. So, I think for many people around the world, it is normal state behavior that one country will invade another if it feels like its own existence is threatened, which is the case that Putin has made in my mind, not very convincingly. But, you know, I don't represent the minds of many people living in India and China and elsewhere in terms of what it means for, you know, countries that have with more vigor come to Ukraine's defense. I think it it's it appears to be very, very out of bounds, really antithetical to what a lot of people thought the post-World War Two order, at least among countries in the transatlantic community, should be about. It's a clear violation of the UN charter. The idea that Ukraine was in a position to do any meaningful harm to Russia in a military sense, is implausible. But again, going back to what we were talking about earlier with respect to Ukraine's evolution and evolution increasingly in the direction of the West, that I think was a threat to Russia in the sense that Ukraine was never going to launch a land invasion. But if you had a democratic, prosperous, Western oriented, active civil society country on Russia's neighbor, that was going to make it very hard for Putin to maintain, I think his style of rule, both in Russia and in Belarus. We saw also enormous protests erupt in Belarus a few years ago that were quashed with Russian support. In Belarus, people imprisoned, people killed, people disappeared So I think in answer to the question, is this normal behavior? Um, maybe we could reframe the question to say, is this the kind of behavior that we want to encourage in the international system? Is this the direction in which we want to go? And I think hopefully everybody would say, no, this is not the direction in which we should be going. The Threat of Democratic Proximately John: Something that I just thought of was, you know, this, you know, perceived threat from NATO You know, if Ukraine joined NATO, joined EU, is it really like just bordering like the proximity? Is that like a spillover effect? Is that really a phenomenon they're looking at, like Moscow is so far away? Can something truly like a domino theory, if you will, if I could use an old Cold War idea? Is that still- is that a plausible concept?  Epstein: I think it is plausible, especially given what had been the really intense familial, civil society and economic ties between Ukraine and Russia a couple of years ago. Well, it must have been more than a couple of years ago. It must have been. In 2022, the Korbel School hosted four mayors, um, from East Ukrainian cities, including the mayor of Kharkiv, which is in the news all the time. And one of the questions they got was, you know, what is the state of your relationship with people in Russia now? Family members, business partners, etc.? And, you know, the relationships were had been devastated by the conflict, in part because I think the Ukrainians felt that their Russian counterparts were not sympathetic to their cause. But part of what I learned in those conversations was how deeply integrated and tied together these countries were, and particularly in that eastern part of Ukraine. So, we do think, especially in an age of pretty rapid and large-scale information flows, which, of course, we understand governments can shut off at certain points. But one engine of change in the Soviet Union itself was certainly the perception, which was correct among people living in the Soviet bloc and the Eastern Bloc, that their Western counterparts had more economic opportunity, educational opportunity, freedom, personal autonomy, efficacy, everything. And that discontent, particularly in countries like Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia during the Cold War led to very large and repeated protest movements. So, I think we can say with some certainty that it is harder for countries that are autocratic to reside in comfort and seeming, you know, security next to highly democratic. You know, if they're prospering countries, I think that does make it a lot harder for autocratic countries to stay the course. Russian Leverage and Ukrainian Children John: There has been an extensive Russian campaign to specifically target civilians in drone bombings and missile strikes. The rhetoric from Putin and the Kremlin has been a denial of a Ukrainian identity as a group Yale University has tracked that 35,000 Ukrainian children have been taken and deported to Russia. Do you think the intent and actions committed by Russia constitute an attempt to eradicate Ukrainian identifying peoples? Epstein: So, the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, you know, has long engaged in a kind of Russification. I don't I don't think eradication of Ukrainian people is necessarily the goal. I think that would be self-defeating in terms of the productivity of the region. After the war, assuming the war ends. But I do think it is a sustained, purposeful strategic plan to try to subdue the country and to create a situation which Russia has so much leverage. And this is partly what's going on, I think, with the kidnapped children. These children, we think, are being sent either into Russian homes for reeducation and total acculturation or into, you know, a couple hundred different, essentially reeducation facilities. And, you know, from what we read in the press in the United States, the infiltration of schools and the recasting of people's ideological frames for young people, it can be quite effective for turning young Ukrainians against the Ukrainian cause. So, it's not necessarily the elimination of Ukrainians. I think that is the goal, but a reorientation of people's thinking, including children's thinking about what appropriate modes of governance is and who has the right justification in this war. Something unfortunately, we've seen in many conflicts in the past. Certainly, this was a really important and terrible feature of Nazi activity during World War Two as well. That's all an effort, I think, to try to subdue Ukraine using multiple tools and channels. Well, after hearing about how the war started and the nitty gritty of the war and just devastating actions taken by Russia and states.  How does this War End? Lindsey: I have possibly the most loaded question of the day. How does this war end?  Epstein: I think there are a few ways it could end. One would be if there is political change within Russia itself, right? And this could be an internal conflict that results in Putin's ouster. You know that whatever group of people, though, that would seek to replace Putin, even if they're critical of the war, we would have to think that the job they have in ending the war and justifying the end to that war to the Russian public would be very difficult. So anybody who's unhappy with the war in Russia at the highest levels of leadership right now, even if they disagree with Putin's chosen course of action, would have a really difficult task figuring out a how to remove Putin and b how to change course in a way that wouldn't compound the already, I think, very heavy sense of humiliation that Russians feel they live under. So that's difficult to see. The other place that we could look for defection would be in the armed forces itself. So that could also. Right? If you have defections within the armed forces, generals not willing to continue to fight this war, that could be another source of change. The public and public protest, in concert with either of the other two things could also lead to a change. What would get the public out? What would get the public agitated? I think you know what John was saying before a lot of the recruiting for personnel is coming from the periphery. If it turns out that ultimately more economically and socially, politically empowered families and social groups see their children swept up in this conflict, I think the more likely it is that people will resist in a meaningful way. There are already movements of mothers and grandmothers in Russia against the mobilizations that have taken place so far. So, there are certain pressure points within Russia that could help generate a settlement. You know, the other scenario is that Ukraine, especially with a very serious divide between the United States and Europe over Greenland, trade, etc., that the United States cuts off weapons sales to Europe that are bound for Ukraine. And Ukraine becomes military militarily overwhelmed at a certain point, and then they feel pressure to negotiate an end. You know, we could also see a change in the West and a continuing ramping up of Ukrainian autonomous military capability so that they ultimately either continue on in a stalemate that Russia ultimately finds unacceptably costly, or for various reasons, they might be able to overwhelm Russia militarily and just make the cost of the war too high with certain kinds of technological innovation. But I think, you know, what we would need to see is some pressure point exerted somewhere in one of those five ways. And right now, I think what we're seeing instead is just more of the same, a kind of very costly, unproductive stalemate. Well, the other terrible eventuality, I think twice within the last two months, Russia has fired nuclear capable missiles at Ukraine, which is a not very veiled threat that the Russians could use a nuclear weapon, which would be catastrophic, certainly for the warring parties, but also for the entire global population. That would certainly precipitate a change. But we don't know in what direction. Lindsey: Taking into account these potential outcomes and the trajectory of how it's going now, how long do you think it could go on for? Or is it just too complicated to measure?  Epstein: I think it's really hard to know how long it could go on in order for the Russian economy to come to a very, very serious breaking point on its current trajectory. If it gets harder for the Russians to sell their oil, if the United States and or Europe got serious about stopping the shadow fleet, which would be a it would be escalatory. But of the things that I've just mentioned, maybe the least escalatory and most effective thing- John: -That's the illegal oil shipments? Epstein: Exactly, And the United States in recent weeks has shown itself to be very competent at tracking down oil tankers and stopping them. You know, a two-year process with increased economic pressure on Russia might result in a changed cost calculation on Russia's part. So, I think we're looking at years, not months, which still isn't very precise. But I don't think nobody I've read or listened to thinks that there's an immediate resolution within this year. Lindsey: Well, Rachel, in the time remaining, thank you so much for coming here John: This is very gracious of your time Cultural Beauty Recommendation Lindsey: We have two remaining questions unrelated to the Russo-Ukrainian War. If you could personally recommend one place that everyone should visit for its beauty or culture, where would it be?  Epstein: So, I have thought about this, I mean, the city in Europe where I've spent the most time is Berlin. It's fascinating. It's sprawling. It's not beautiful. There are parts of it that are beautiful, but it's culturally very interesting, in part because of its Cold War history of having been divided. And now when you go there, it's really hard to discern where the east was separated from the west. And it's really got everything. It's got a lot of interesting alternative culture, Turkish culture, but also, you know, lots of interesting people have moved there from the Middle East. Twenty fifteen sixteen country's been very effective at assimilating and helping people get into the labor market. And I think Berlin is among the locations in Germany that has been, in some ways at least the most open and accepting and really thrives on the vibrancy of diverse culture and backgrounds. But the other place I would recommend to people is Warsaw, where I lived in 1999 for most of the year, doing my original field research for my dissertation, and it was interesting. Then I think it's even more interesting now. I was there most recently in June, and it's got an incredible art scene, music scene. Also, you know, when we think about how countries were affected by World War Two and recovered from World War Two, Poland lost six million people in that war, which was the highest proportion of population of any country that was a combatant in World War Two. Their history in that war is extraordinary, their recovery also extraordinary. I mean, they are the country about which, you know, Westerners might feel the most sad that they ended up behind the Iron Curtain because of the very valiant efforts they made on behalf of the allies during the war and the ways in which they were betrayed, not just by the Soviets, but also ultimately the Americans and their West European counterparts. But the city of Warsaw is thriving in the current context, so I would also highly recommend going there. Lindsey: Those are both great answers. I've never been to Warsaw, have you, John?  John: No, no, but I want to go. It's on my list. Lindsey: It's on my list now Epstein: Yeah, it's great, I mean, the country was so badly destroyed. Warsaw was just decimated by the war. So, some of the historic buildings they built back stone by stone, you know, up until the nineteen seventies to try to reconstruct, for example, the historic Old Market Square and all of the beautiful homes surrounding it. It's a remarkable testament to their resilience. Non-Profit Spotlight John: At more posts, we want to make it a point to promote non-profits or organizations that create positive impacts. Are there any that you would like to share with us? So, one organization that I like a lot, I keep an eye on? Epstein: I always listen to their people being interviewed as Doctors Without Borders, and I think their work is so important. They, you know, manifest so much courage and bravery. Sometimes they're speaking against the mainstream, but they have a, you know, such an admirable humanitarian orientation and they bring so much expertise and, um, you know, in a way just love and care to the work that they do and the conflict zones that we're talking about. So, you know, if we funded Doctors Without Borders the way we fund our militaries, I feel like the world would be in much better shape. John: Dr. Rachel Epstein, thank you so much for being here and talking to us. Epstein: This was really great John:  Sheepland. A program about the great issues facing humanity. Lindsey:  A Mooreposts Podcast. If you enjoyed this work, please consider sharing our content and website or donating to a non-profit organization linked in the Donate  tab. DISCLAIMER The views and opinions expressed by podcast guests are their own and do not necessarily reflect those of Mooreposts, its editors, contributors, or affiliates. Podcast transcripts are edited for clarity and readability; section headers have been added for navigational purposes. The substance and intent of all remarks remain unchanged.

Illustration by Jonathan Rockford LISTEN TO THIS ARTICLE On February 28th , the United States of America and the State of Israel initiated a campaign of airstrikes against the Islamic Republic of Iran, eliminating  the country’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, and vast swathes of the upper echelons of the Iranian leadership. These two states then progressed  on to an effort at degrading Iranian military capabilities and industry. From the outset, it looked like Washington aimed   to replicate the rapid success  it had seen in its decapitation strike against the Maduro regime in Venezuela while neutralizing the threat to Middle Eastern stability that Iran’s nuclear and conventional weapons programs represent. The latter objective would be achieved through undermining Iranian efforts to reconstruct their ballistic missile program and deterring any progress towards a nuclear weapon. Months later, it looks more and more like any American ambitions of obtaining a quick strategic victory in Iran along those lines were predicated on a fundamental misestimation of Iran’s capacity for resistance. On the political front, the regime remains intact and, in fact, more willing to resist American efforts to facilitate its overthrow or force any major change in its behavior. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and paramilitary Basij appear empowered , even while their actual capacities have degraded, leading to a deepening of hardline policy. On the military front, Iran has leveraged its asymmetric advantages  against the US to a profound effect. Tehran has blockaded the Strait of Hormuz, thus disrupting global shipping and sending oil prices soaring, while also using its Shahed drones to inflict damage on US and Israeli assets, attacking Iran’s Persian Gulf neighbors to boot. In the coming days and weeks, there may be a negotiated settlement or a further escalation of the conflict. The actual progression towards some kind of agreement is something that the eyes of the global public have rarely seen, outside of recent talks in Pakistan as part of an abortive ceasefire . This has created a dynamic where it’s difficult to assess whether or not they even have a remote likelihood of success. Escalation would likely include tit-for-tat strikes by the Iranians and the Gulf States on each others’ energy infrastructure and desalination plants, as foreshadowed by previous developments . This would be coupled with something like an attempted takeover of the Iranian military complex at Kharg Island  and/or the Strait of Hormuz  by the US, moving beyond the existing American blockade , in addition to the continuation of Israel’s airstrikes and operations against Hezbollah  in southern Lebanon. Regardless of where this conflict is headed, it is worth considering how American strategy has impacted the actual play-by-play of the conflict in order to assess how the current situation developed. To a large extent, the current war is the direct product of a desire to promote full-on regime change  premised on opportunistically attacking at a time when the Islamic Republic appeared weak. As international media have extensively documented , US President Donald Trump originally threatened intervention after the Iranian regime’s brutal crackdown on widespread protests began in late January. These protests, stemming from frustrations with Iran’s recent economic downturn, saw the heavy involvement  of figures like Reza Pahlavi, the exiled crown prince of Iran, in catalyzing protests and coordinating some international anti-regime efforts. Public life was fully disrupted, protests grew violent, and the regime responded with what amounts to a brutal politicide: likely killing more than thirty thousand protestors ,  hunting wounded dissidents down in hospitals, and imprisoning many thousands more. It was assessed  by Iranian experts like Karim Sadjadpour that no actual regime change would come from these particular protests, barring the sudden defection of security forces like the conventional military, the Artesh, from the regime. Regardless, the way they proceeded proved that the Islamic Republic was highly vulnerable and could no longer rely on anti-Western nationalism and national security as an airtight source for legitimacy. After all, the regime casting protestors  as Western stooges failed to stymie further participation. In the midst of this, Washington and Jerusalem likely perceived an opportunity to incapacitate the regime militarily and kill its most prominent leaders. It was believed that, then, either their successors would calculate that capitulation was in their best interests or a new, more vigorous popular uprising would start, with enhanced potential to overthrow the regime. In this, both Israel and the US fatally miscalculated. They failed to apprehend the extent of the regime’s entrenchment in Iranian society, as well as its capacity for resistance along the aforementioned asymmetric line. The result has been a turn towards a longer war, now concluding its second month. Behind this failure, there is a fundamental strategic sickness, one that comes out of the specific policy preferences Trump has avowed and a failure to appreciate the limits of American military power, one which I have previously discussed. Late last year, I proposed  a new foreign policy paradigm for the US premised on leveraging the proximity of America’s allies to major destabilizing challenges as a means of mitigating their effect. I called this approach “sponsorial hegemony” and cast it against comparatively wrong-headed kinds of unilateralism that the US has previously pursued. This would mean giving less powerful countries aligned with the United States the room and resources necessary for deterring aggressive policy actions by states opposed to American and allied interests, while also creating ways for stable commerce and diplomacy to continue in their respective regions. While I was cautiously hopeful for what the Trump administration could achieve via its possible employment of sponsorial hegemony, it seems clear to me that it has little interest in recalibrating in that direction. Instead, we are seeing something I feared: a movement towards the revival of 19th-century gunboat diplomacy. Gunboat diplomacy is an interventionist method of foreign policy premised on using limited military actions to either destabilize a foe or extract a certain concession or set of concessions from them. This policy was traditionally  the domain of globe-spanning empires, like the British, prior to the creation of the post-World War II international system , and it gave way to multilateral military action and/or extended interventions on the part of major superpowers, as in Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, etc. To a large extent, this was a positive change, as the insistence on multilateral and democratic consultations before an intervention made certain powers less likely to engage in interventions while creating a way for states that did pursue unilateral action to see immediate economic and political consequences for their actions, either at a ballot box influenced by the global public square or in the form of increased isolation. In another sense, the fixation on large-scale operations with open-ended ambitions like “nation-building” produced risks of long-run strategic miscalculation and the constant risk of the US biting off more than it could chew, leading to notable failures , something which has directly motivated the turn towards gunboat diplomacy. What is lost in the pursuit of this new mission is a capacity for risk management. Now fully abandoning the Powell Doctrine , the US and Israel proceeded with these strikes without seeking international support for military action or coordination with Persian Gulf allies. As a result, Iran’s deployment of a decentralized “ mosaic defense ” and its initiation of a widespread campaign of airstrikes and commercial disruption against its neighbors expanded the conflict. Now, with further destruction potentially on the horizon, a rethink of American foreign policy’s current descent into gunboat diplomacy appears worthwhile. The emerging multipolar world is extremely complex. A simplistic foreign policy built on ham-fisted intervention cannot deal with this new international system in a comprehensive way. The US carries along with its desire to revive the style of 19th-century imperialism at its – and all the world’s – peril, and one can only hope for a change of course. Nikolas Vacano is a master’s candidate in international security at the University of Denver’s Josef Korbel School of Global and Public Affairs, specializing in the study of geoeconomics and grand strategy. If you enjoyed this work, please consider sharing our content and website, or donating to a non-profit organization linked in the Donate tab. DISCLAIMER Mooreposts publishes independent analysis, commentary, and research for informational and educational purposes only. Content on Mooreposts—including articles, Mooreposts Bites, strategic intelligence assessments, opinion pieces, interviews, and visual materials—does not constitute legal, financial, medical, or professional advice, nor does it represent any government agency, official position, or classified assessment. Unless explicitly stated, all analyses and interpretations reflect the views and analytic judgments of the individual author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Mooreposts, its editorial staff, or affiliated contributors. Strategic intelligence and analytical content is based on open-source information and publicly available materials. Mooreposts strives for accuracy, transparency, and rigorous sourcing; however, information may change as events develop. Readers are encouraged to consult primary sources and exercise independent judgment.

Illustration by Connor JL Moore LISTEN TO THIS ARTICLE The European Union Military Committee (EUMC) should advise EU leadership to implement a coordinated, multi-year EU-Ukraine production and sustainment framework for Ukrainian air defense and artillery ammunition, as Russia likely retains the capacity to continue its war of attrition, and diverting U.S. commitments risks enhancing critical capability gaps. Strategic Context Russia’s war in Ukraine has evolved into a protracted conflict of attrition in which industrial production, manpower replenishment, and external military assistance increasingly shape battlefield outcomes.  Current assessments indicate that Moscow likely has the economic and military ability to sustain military operations for several more years , despite heavy losses and economic pressures. Russia continues to replenish its forces at sufficient rates  while expanding its defense industrial production  (e.g., weapons manufacturing, combat training, and battlefield innovation). This quick force adaptation  has resulted in intense missile and drone campaigns against Ukraine’s critical infrastructure and civilians.  Russia has fired over 700 missiles  since the start of 2026 against Ukraine’s infrastructure.  As of late January, Ukraine’s electrical system could reportedly meet only ~60% of national demand . Russia’s drone production capacity is ~30,000 per year and could double   in 2026. Ukraine’s ability to resist this strategy remains heavily dependent  on Western military assistance, particularly advanced air-defense systems and critical munitions.  Western support has enabled Kyiv to maintain frontline operations  and offset Moscow’s advantages in defense production and manpower. Although European states account for most assistance, the U.S. still supplies critical military assets dubbed ‘high-end enablers’ (e.g., High Mobility Artillery Rocket System [HIMARS], Patriot systems [PAC-3], and howitzer ammunition).  Ukraine’s annual interceptor demand  is estimated at ~4,800.  These trends likely reinforce Moscow’s belief  that prolonging the war will gradually erode Western support and Kyiv’s ability to sustain its defense. Critical Analysis Three factors threaten the sustainability of Ukraine’s defenses.   (1)  Europe’s current support structure continues to treat the war as a   crisis-response aid   instead of a prolonged war. Through ad hoc national initiatives, European states have transferred critical equipment from national stockpiles and launched numerous assistance programs, but these efforts have remained fragmented  across national procurement systems and lack sustained coordination for long-term force deployment. As U.S. military aid is projected to decline— sharply by 2028 —the EU’s current voluntary, ad hoc support framework is insufficient to the predictable, strategically coordinated, industrial-scale production needed to offset the loss of U.S. assistance.  (2)  This production gap is compounded by Europe and Ukraine’s structural reliance on U.S. systems. Ukraine’s U.S.-made munitions  include 70% of long-range anti-aircraft systems, 86% of rocket artillery, and 82% of howitzer ammunition. While the European defense base has significantly ramped up production of ballistic missile defense interceptors, it has not kept pace  with Moscow’s ballistic missile production.  (3)  The expanding U.S. conflict in Iran could further complicate this situation as the U.S. risks depleting its stockpiles  (i.e., PAC-3 systems). Over the four years of war in Ukraine, Kyiv has received ~600 PAC-3s  for its air defense, whereas the U.S. used 800 in just the first five days  of its war with Iran. Although the U.S. aims to scale up PAC-3 production to 2,000 per year, this increase is likely too late  to adequately support Ukrainian air defenses in 2026, forcing Kyiv to make difficult decisions about what to protect. Recommendations (1)  The EUMC should advise the Political and Security Committee to establish a coordinated multi-year European munitions sustainment framework  focused on expanding production of air defense systems, artillery ammunition, and other high-demand munitions required for prolonged industrial warfare. The conflict has demonstrated the necessity  for sustained production capacity and reliable supply chains. Coordinated European procurement  and long-term contracts  would meet the demand required for Europe's defense industry to further ramp up production and reduce reliance on depleting U.S. stockpiles.  (2)  Coinciding with the European framework, the EUMC should direct the EU Military Staff to establish a standing, integrated EU-Ukraine force-and-industry partnership . Ukraine’s wartime innovation has rapidly expanded  domestic capabilities in drones, electronic warfare systems, and other battlefield technologies. Integrating these networks would increase output and procurement  efficiency for Ukraine while also bolstering Europe’s long-term deterrence posture. Connor JL Moore is a current master’s candidate for International Security at the University of Denver’s Josef Korbel School of Global and Public Affairs.  If you enjoyed this work, please consider sharing our content and website or donating to a non-profit organization linked in the Donate tab. DISCLAIMER Mooreposts publishes independent analysis, commentary, and research for informational and educational purposes only. Content on Mooreposts—including articles, Mooreposts Bites, strategic intelligence assessments, opinion pieces, interviews, and visual materials—does not constitute legal, financial, medical, or professional advice, nor does it represent any government agency, official position, or classified assessment. Unless explicitly stated, all analyses and interpretations reflect the views and analytic judgments of the individual author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Mooreposts, its editorial staff, or affiliated contributors. Strategic intelligence and analytical content is based on open-source information and publicly available materials. Mooreposts strives for accuracy, transparency, and rigorous sourcing; however, information may change as events develop. Readers are encouraged to consult primary sources and exercise independent judgment.

Photos via the United States Navy LISTEN TO THIS WORK Key Takeaway The US’s increased commitment to Operation Epic Fury is highly likely to continue costing American lives and material. U.S. Costs On February 28th, US Central Command (CENTCOM) initiated  Operation Epic Fury. Per the White House, the operation makes up part of a " precise, overwhelming military campaign "   to dismantle  Iran’s short-range ballistic missiles and naval capabilities. By March 2nd, 7 US service members had been killed  from Iranian counterattacks that struck  US bases in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Those lost include:  Sgt. 1 st  Class Nicole M. Amor Spc. Declan J. Coady Capt. Cody A. Khork Chief Warrant Officer Robert Marzan Maj. Jeffrey O'Brien Sgt. Benjamin N. Pennington Sgt. 1 st  Class Noah L. Tietjens By March 23rd, the operation had   cost the US  15 aircraft: 11 Reaper Drones , 3 F-15s , and 1 KC-135 . The MK-9 Reapers   were shot down  by missiles and ground-based arms fire. Friendly Kuwaiti air defenses mistakenly shot down   three F-15s . On March 13th, CENTCOM confirmed  the loss of a KC-135, a refueling aircraft , in western Iraq due to a non-combat incident, killing all 6 crew members: Maj. John A. Klinner Capt. Ariana G. Savino Tech. Sgt. Ashley B. Pruitt Capt. Seth R. Koval Capt. Curtis J. Angst Tech. Sgt. Tyler H. Simmons In all, 13 US service members have died . 232 US service members have been wounded , including 10 seriously wounded . US Aircraft Carriers  Three US Aircraft Carriers are involved in the current operation at different levels. The USS Abraham Lincoln, located 500 miles south of Iran in the Indian Ocean, continues to provide aerial support  for the operation. On March 12th, after nearly 10 months into its Mediterranean Sea deployment, a maintenance-related fire forced the USS Gerald R. Ford (USSGRF) to withdraw to Greece  for repairs. The fire took 30 hours to extinguish , injured 3 sailors , and exposed  200 to smoke inhalation. On March 5th, the USS George H.W. Bush completed training  to enable deployment to the Middle East, most likely to replace  the exhausted USSGRF, which could signal operational longevity. Invasion Potential Additional ground forces are currently moving  to the Iranian area of operation. The 31st and 11th Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU) are continuously deployed  units stationed on ships that are fully capable of conducting ground combat, aviation, and logistical operations. The Pentagon has also ordered  2,000 soldiers from the 82nd Airborne Division to the Middle East. Diplomatic Disengagement The current state of US-Iranian diplomacy remains nonconstructive and elusive. On March 24th, President Trump said that there is a “ very good chance ” that the Iranians would like to “ make a deal .” Pakistan has emerged  as a peace broker, sharing the US’s 15-point plan  with Tehran. Iran has dismissed this plan and offered  a 5-point counter-proposal. Assessment The deployment of additional ground forces, the USS George H.W. Bush, and ongoing diplomatic disengagement all signal a strong likelihood that America’s War with Iran will continue into the foreseeable future, risking greater costs for America. DISCLAIMER This assessment reflects the judgments of the author, based on open-source information, and does not represent official positions or the views of Mooreposts.

Illustration by Jonathan Rockford LISTEN TO THIS ARTICLE In December 2025, Japan’s cabinet approved a record defense budget  – a 9.4 percent increase over the prior year and the fourth consecutive annual rise under its five-year plan  to double defense spending. The plan, worth roughly $320 billion in total, has placed Japan third in the world for defense expenditure. For a country once defined by its pacifist constitution , this marks a dramatic shift in strategic posture. It also signals a missed opportunity – not only for Japan, but for middle powers worldwide. Multipolarity’s Promise and Japan’s Divergence The international order is once again shifting into multipolarity , placing middle or regional powers like Japan at a critical juncture. Will they emulate the great powers of the past with strong militaries and a general distrust of their neighbors? Or will they forge a new path that values diplomacy and cooperation over hard power? Japan’s recent defense policy decisions suggest the former. Its unprecedented  defense budgets, reinterpretation of Article 9  of its pacifist constitution, and development of counterstrike capabilities  all signal a fundamental transformation in Japan’s strategic posture.  The stakes of that choice are now being articulated at the highest levels of global governance. In January 2026, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney issued a pointed challenge  to middle powers everywhere: Compete with each other for the favor of great powers, or coalesce to create a “third path with impact.” Accommodation of hegemons, Carney warned, is not sovereignty. Middle powers like Japan have a chance to emerge as leaders in peacebuilding, development, and cooperation. By investing in soft power rather than military buildup, these states could reshape the world order into one that explicitly values human security and global justice over military strength. The Weight of Hard Power The late Prime Minister Shinzo Abe laid the groundwork for constitutional reinterpretation  that would allow Japan to exercise collective self-defense. Subsequent administrations have deepened this shift, and Japan now has counterstrike capabilities  in what it describes as a response to escalating regional threats. These concerns are not unfounded, as North Korea’s provocations  and China’s assertiveness  in the East and South China Seas present genuine security challenges.  Compounding this, US trends  toward a transactional, isolationist international policy have cast doubt on the reliability of America’s extended deterrence. At the Munich Security Conference in February 2026, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio framed US commitment  to its alliances in terms that place the burden squarely on partners. He warned that US allies must be capable of defending themselves so that no adversary will be tempted to test their collective strength. This validates Tokyo’s rearmament, but it reflects an alliance logic that prioritizes US strategic convenience over Japan’s long-term identity and influence. Militarization also carries weighty historical baggage for Japan that the region has not forgotten. Unlike post-war Germany , Japan has not fully reckoned  with the atrocities it committed during its imperial era, including its colonization of neighboring countries and its “comfort women” system , in which the Japanese Imperial Army subjected women to sexual slavery.  Japan’s refusal to engage in meaningful historical reconciliation continues to fuel mistrust . This matters not just for diplomatic relations but for the state’s global credibility. Japan is using its identity as a “ proactive contributor to peace ” to justify its militarization. However, a rearmed Japan with unresolved historical tensions  appears less like a force for peace and more like a reemerging threat. Setting the Wrong Precedent Instead of competing in a new arms race, middle powers could invest resources and global influence in diplomacy, peacebuilding, climate action, and technological innovation. These are not only the tools of a modern power, but are also areas in which Japan has excelled . Its reputation as a development partner, its role in global health, and its cultural diplomacy have earned Japan significant soft power . Militarization threatens to squander what Japan has built for itself. While some may argue that military preparedness and soft power can coexist, Japan’s unresolved wartime legacy complicates this balance. In the context of Japan’s history and its lack of historical reconciliation , rearmament risks reviving regional distrust rather than bolstering deterrence. Regionally, this defense buildup risks fueling a security dilemma. The Republic of Korea may feel pressured to expand its military capabilities; in fact, public opinion  in South Korea has shifted on the issue over the past few years. This is in response to cycles of failed reconciliation with North Korea and questions around the US nuclear umbrella . Whether Japan’s armament is seen as a threat or through a lens of cooperation, the move may push South Korea further into hardening its national defense policy. Even ASEAN nations , which have generally emphasized neutrality and non-alignment, may rethink their defense policies in response. Meanwhile, China will almost certainly use Japan’s rearmament to justify further military expansion and aggressive behavior, claiming provocation . Then there are the broader normative consequences: Japan’s militarization risks setting a precedent that middle powers must choose hard power to stay relevant. This undermines potential solidarity among like-minded states that could otherwise prioritize human security, multilateralism, and sustainable development as the foundation of a new global order.  Last Best Chance to Lead Differently Ultimately, middle powers face a pivotal decision. They can either gamble on the repetition of history through a push toward militarization, or they can redefine what power looks like in a modern world. Japan’s current trajectory suggests the former, but this would be a missed opportunity for the international community.  Carney’s Davos argument reflected a concrete geopolitical reality: If Japan and other middle powers choose to embrace solidarity, trust-building, and diplomacy over hard power deterrence, they can chart a new course. This could be a generational opportunity to reshape international norms. Madalyn Jane Shircliff is a M.A. candidate in International Security from the Josef Korbel School of Global and Public Affairs. If you enjoyed this work, please consider sharing our content and website or donating to a non-profit organization linked in the Donate tab. DISCLAIMER Mooreposts publishes independent analysis, commentary, and research for informational and educational purposes only. Content on Mooreposts—including articles, Mooreposts Bites, strategic intelligence assessments, opinion pieces, interviews, and visual materials—does not constitute legal, financial, medical, or professional advice, nor does it represent any government agency, official position, or classified assessment. Unless explicitly stated, all analyses and interpretations reflect the views and analytic judgments of the individual author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Mooreposts, its editorial staff, or affiliated contributors. Strategic intelligence and analytical content is based on open-source information and publicly available materials. Mooreposts strives for accuracy, transparency, and rigorous sourcing; however, information may change as events develop. Readers are encouraged to consult primary sources and exercise independent judgment.

China’s Military AI Modernization and the Taiwan Flashpoint Illustration by Connor JL Moore LISTEN TO THIS ARTICLE Key Takeaway ASSESSMENT: The People’s Republic of China is integrating artificial intelligence (AI) and cyber capabilities into its weapons systems and command, control, and intelligence networks. Through Military-Civil Fusion (MCF), China aims to accelerate decision-making, improve precision targeting, and challenge the United States' capabilities. Although we lack information on China’s potential deadline for an attack on Taiwan, we expect China’s AI-military and cyber developments to increase its readiness and willingness to do so, given that Taiwan’s ‘reunification’ is considered one of its “core interests.” 12   U.S. and allied defense operations in a Taiwan contingency will likely   face AI-enhanced combat capabilities across all warfare domains, posing increased risks of Chinese systems targeting U.S. and allied critical infrastructure.  Key Judgment 1 : Through its state-led MCF strategy, China is pursuing next-generation combat capabilities. This strategy is grounded in its vision of future conflict called “intelligentized warfare,” defined by the expanded use of AI, quantum computing, and other advanced technologies at every level of warfare. 3 Key Judgment 2 : China’s AI-military fusion and cyber enhancements are very likely aimed at achieving tactical advantages. Precision-guided weapons, autonomous systems, complex military simulations, and information operations are designed to undermine U.S. and allied resolve in a Taiwan contingency. 4 Key Judgment 3 : If Beijing believes that conflict with Washington is imminent, China is likely to consider aggressive cyber operations against U.S. and allied domestic critical infrastructure. 5   Recent Chinese state-backed cyberattack campaigns demonstrate Beijing’s capabilities to compromise critical sectors, including communications, energy, and transportation. These capabilities would likely impede decision-making and interfere with the movement of U.S. and allied forces. 6 China is prioritizing the integration of AI and cyber capabilities as central components of its military modernization through its MCF strategy. These efforts aim to secure tactical and information superiority in a Taiwan contingency and undermine the operational effectiveness of U.S. and allied forces. 7   By fostering stronger ties and promoting competition between the civilian and defense sectors, MCF facilitates technology transfer, diversifies its domestic supply base, and reduces barriers for private firms   to compete for defense contracts. 8   Since China does not renounce the use of force to achieve ‘reunification’ with Taiwan, it likely assesses that its MCF strategy will drive the integration of AI into its military to build an “intelligentized” force equipped with high-tech weapons, advanced communications, and information technologies. 9  This scenario would likely degrade U.S. and allied military superiority. China’s official defense budget reached nearly $247 billion in 2025, which is five times as much on defense as Japan and nearly seven times as much as South Korea—key regional competitors and U.S. allies. 10   As Taiwan remains Beijing’s top strategic priority, this defense spending 11  indicates China’s focus on achieving regional dominance. 12 Procurement data from 2023-2024 shows that nontraditional vendors (NTVs)—firms without state ownership ties—have won an increasing monetary   share of AI-related contracts in China’s defense industrial base. 13 Most of the 1,560 state-owned enterprises (SOEs), NTVs, and research institutes assessed from 2023-2024 supplying AI and cyber-related capabilities 14  to the PLA are not subject to U.S. sanctions or trade restrictions. 15 China integrates AI into its command, control, and intelligence networks to gain tactical advantages. Their inclusion of autonomous   systems in military and information operations aims to maximize superiority for   faster operational planning, further reducing U.S. and allied reaction time in a Taiwan conflict. 16   China very likely seeks to use AI to enhance the lethality and reach of its surface ships and to deny its enemies access to critical locations. 17  By building a wide array of AI-enabled military capabilities across air, ground, and sea operations, China is strengthening its already robust ability to conduct complex naval operations around Taiwan, coordinate multi-domain strikes, and transport forces across the Taiwan Strait. 18 As early as 2016, a director at the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation 19   claimed that the company’s next generation of cruise missiles would use AI to adapt to specific combat conditions, such as adjusting flight profiles and warhead yields. 20   At the Zhuhai Airshow in November 2024, Chinese defense manufacturer Norinco revealed a combat system called “AI-Enabled Synthetic Brigade,” which combines advanced armored vehicles, swarming drones, loitering munitions, and electronic warfare tools into one unit. 21 In May 2025, a report published by a university in northwest China showed that the PLA used a DeepSeek AI model to generate 10,000 military simulation scenarios in 48 seconds for the purpose of assessing how commanders make decisions in battle. 22   AI systems, such as the intelligence-assessment chatbot “ChatBIT,” are being utilized by PLA-affiliated researchers to sort through massive amounts of data for strategic insights, suggesting experimentation with AI in intelligence gathering. 23 China’s AI-integrated cyber operations aim to compromise U.S. and allied critical infrastructure, as well as collect sensitive intelligence to impede military logistics during a Taiwan contingency. Beijing is almost certainly integrating AI into its cyberattack operations to adapt malware, enhance espionage, and conduct malign influence operations. 24   With the advanced rate of AI-military integration, the PLA can potentially   scale critical infrastructure disruptions more quickly and efficiently than ever before. 25  Top Chinese leaders almost certainly view such cyber operations as critical for ‘reunification’ with Taiwan, as well as affecting an adversary’s political system, economy, and civilian critical infrastructure. 26   China remains the most active and persistent cyber threat to U.S. national security. In a Taiwan conflict scenario, the likelihood of an AI-integrated Chinese military seeking to destabilize the domestic affairs of the U.S. and its allies is expected to increase as Beijing pursues technological dominance. 27 In January 2025, Volt Typhoon, a Chinese state-backed hacker group, targeted and gained control of hundreds of internet routers in the U.S. to serve as launch pads for critical infrastructure cyberattacks. 28 Salt Typhoon, a Chinese state-backed hacker group, breached at least nine U.S. telecommunications networks and providers as of 2024, demonstrating China’s capability and intent to conduct more advanced cyberespionage operations. 29 A Chinese state-sponsored cyberattack on the U.S. Treasury Department in December 2024 marked an escalation in Beijing’s use of hybrid tactics to test its offensive cyberattack capabilities and undermine its strategic competitors. The operation also sought to gather sensitive intelligence and prepare for future potential conflict. 30 Policy Options To develop and deploy its AI-enhanced military assets and offensive cyber capabilities against the U.S. and allies, China depends on internet infrastructure (e.g., undersea cables, telecommunications networks, internet exchange points, data centers, and cloud service providers). 31  Further, China has long relied on Western cloud-based AI training models, semiconductor technology, and advanced computing power, exposing China’s dependence on foreign technology. 32  While China probably benefits from its MCF strategy, it also allows for public bidding on a portion of its defense contracts, including for sensitive systems. 33 Allied coordination in the Indo-Pacific on AI threat intelligence has shown promise but remains uneven in scope, consistency, and resilience. 34   Chinese AI-enhanced cyberattacks and military capabilities would likely struggle to overcome shared threat intelligence networks and stricter cybersecurity standards, as these enhance collective situational awareness and create a more resilient regional defense posture against Chinese AI use. 35 Despite limited information on China’s defense contracts, the existing paper trail is likely sufficient to gain insight into AI-critical Chinese economic sectors and supply chains for targeted export controls. 36  China may immediately   double down on its MCF strategy for AI-military development, but this probably impairs China’s ability to maintain competitive, long-term progress towards “intelligentized warfare” and train the most powerful AI-military models. 37   Caden Scates is a current master’s candidate for International Security at the University of Denver’s Josef Korbel School of Global and Public Affairs.  If you enjoyed this work, please consider sharing our content and website or donating to a non-profit organization linked in the Donate tab. Endnotes 1.  Cole McFaul, Sam Bresnick, and Daniel Chou, “Pulling Back the Curtain on China’s Military-Civil Fusion: Howthe PLA Mobilizes Civilian AI for Strategic Advantage” (Center for Security and Emerging Technology, September2025), 4, https://doi.org/10.51593/20240030 .; Jiayu Zhang, “China’s Military Employment of Artificial Intelligenceand Its Security Implications,” The International Affairs Review, August 16, 2020, https://www.iar-gwu.org/print-archive/blog-post-title-four-xgtap .    2.  “White Paper: The Taiwan Question and China’s Reunification in the New Era_Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of America,” n.d., https://us.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/zgyw/202208/t20220810_10740168.htm#:~:text=The%20Constitution%20of%20the%20People's,brook%20no%20violation%20or%20separation .; Department of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China , 2024, 4, https://media.defense.gov/2024/Dec/18/2003615520/-1/-1/0/MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA-2024.PDF . 3.  Department of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China , 2024, VIII–IX, https://media.defense.gov/2024/Dec/18/2003615520/-1/-1/0/MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA-2024.PDF .  4.  Department of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China , 2024, 93–96, https://media.defense.gov/2024/Dec/18/2003615520/-1/-1/0/MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA-2024.PDF .  5.  Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,” 2025, 12. 6.  Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,” 2025, 11. 7.  Department of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China , 2024, 124-125, https://media.defense.gov/2024/Dec/18/2003615520/-1/-1/0/MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA-2024.PDF . 8.  Cole McFaul, Sam Bresnick, and Daniel Chou, “Pulling Back the Curtain on China’s Military-Civil Fusion: How the PLA Mobilizes Civilian AI for Strategic Advantage” (Center for Security and Emerging Technology, September 2025), 5, https://doi.org/10.51593/20240030 . 9.  Michael S. Chase and William Marcellino, “Incentives for U.S.-China Conflict, Competition, and Cooperation Across Artificial General Intelligence’s Five Hard National Security Problems,” RANDas much as, August 4, 2025, https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA4189-1.html .; Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,” 2025, 13.; Cole McFaul, Sam Bresnick, and Daniel Chou, “Pulling Back the Curtain on China’s Military-Civil Fusion: How the PLA Mobilizes Civilian AI for Strategic Advantage” (Center for Security and Emerging Technology, September 2025), 5, https://doi.org/10.51593/20240030 .; “White Paper: The Taiwan Question and China’s Reunification in the New Era_Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of America,” n.d., https://us.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/zgyw/202208/t20220810_10740168.htm#:~:text=The%20Constitution%20of%20the%20People's,brook%20no%20violation%20or%20separation . 10.  Matthew P. Funaiole and Brian Hart, “China’s Military in 10 Charts,” Center for Strategic and International Studies , September 2, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-military-10-charts . 11.  If China maintains current trends, its defense spending is expected to increase at an annual rate of about 6%.  12.  Matthew P. Funaiole and Brian Hart, “China’s Military in 10 Charts,” Center for Strategic and International Studies , September 2, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-military-10-charts .  13.  Cole McFaul, Sam Bresnick, and Daniel Chou, “Pulling Back the Curtain on China’s Military-Civil Fusion: How the PLA Mobilizes Civilian AI for Strategic Advantage” (Center for Security and Emerging Technology, September 2025), 21, https://doi.org/10.51593/20240030 . 14.  These AI and cyber capabilities include: natural language processing, remote sensing, target recognition, and aerospace.  15.  Cole McFaul, Sam Bresnick, and Daniel Chou, “Pulling Back the Curtain on China’s Military-Civil Fusion: How the PLA Mobilizes Civilian AI for Strategic Advantage” (Center for Security and Emerging Technology, September 2025), 22-33, https://doi.org/10.51593/20240030 . 16.  Department of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China , 2024, 124–27, https://media.defense.gov/2024/Dec/18/2003615520/-1/-1/0/MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA-2024.PDF .  17.  Alex Stephenson et al., “How AI Would — and Wouldn’t — Factor Into a U.S.-Chinese War,” War on the Rocks, May 3, 2022, https://warontherocks.com/2022/05/how-ai-would-and-wouldnt-factor-into-a-u-s-chinese-war/ .  18.  Eric Rosenbach et al., The Autonomous Arsenal in Defense of Taiwan  (Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 2025), 22, https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/2025-02/DETS_The%20Autonomous%20Arsenal_1.pdf .  19.  China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation is a key Chinese aerospace and defense SOE. 20.  Alex Stephenson et al., “How AI Would — and Wouldn’t — Factor Into a U.S.-Chinese War,” War on the Rocks, May 3, 2022, https://warontherocks.com/2022/05/how-ai-would-and-wouldnt-factor-into-a-u-s-chinese-war/ .  21.  Davud Sablak and U.S. Army, “Where Does the Cyber Arms Race Lead to in the Age of Artificial Intelligence?,” www.army.mil , September 30, 2025, https://www.army.mil/article/288851/where_does_the_cyber_arms_race_lead_to_in_the_age_of_artificial_intelligence .  22.  Davud Sablak and U.S. Army, “Where Does the Cyber Arms Race Lead to in the Age of Artificial Intelligence?,” www.army.mil , September 30, 2025, https://www.army.mil/article/288851/where_does_the_cyber_arms_race_lead_to_in_the_age_of_artificial_intelligence .  23.  Abdullah Kazim, “The Role of AI in Shaping US-China Diplomacy: A Case Study of the Taiwan Strait Crisis,” Journal of Regional Studies Review  4, no. 1 (March 30, 2025): 438, https://doi.org/10.62843/jrsr/2025.4a090 .  24.  Julian E. Barnes, “China Turns to A.I. in Information Warfare,” The New York Times, August 6, 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/06/us/politics/china-artificial-intelligence-information-warfare.html . 25.  Julian E. Barnes, “China Turns to A.I. in Information Warfare,” The New York Times, August 6, 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/06/us/politics/china-artificial-intelligence-information-warfare.html .  26.  Benjamin Jensen, Erica Lonergan, and Kathleen McInnis, “Securing Cyber and Space: How the United States CanDisrupt China’s Blockade Plans,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 28, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/securing-cyber-and-space-how-united-states-can-disrupt-chinas-blockade-plans . 27.  Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,” 2025, 11.  28.  U.S. Department of Justice, “U.S. Government Disrupts Botnet People’s Republic of China Used to Conceal Hacking of Critical Infrastructure,” January 31, 2024, https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/us-government-disrupts-botnet-peoples-republic-china-used-conceal-hacking-critical#:~:text=%E2%80%9CChina's%20hackers%20are%20targeting%20American,we%20see%20them%20threaten%20Americans.%E2%80%9D . 29.  Gaby Tejeda, “China Strategically Infiltrates U.S. Critical Infrastructure as Cyberattacks Escalate,” The Soufan Center, January 10, 2025, https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2025-january-10/ .  30.  Gaby Tejeda, “China Strategically Infiltrates U.S. Critical Infrastructure as Cyberattacks Escalate,” The Soufan Center, January 10, 2025, https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2025-january-10/ . 31.  Benjamin Jensen, Erica Lonergan, and Kathleen McInnis, “Securing Cyber and Space: How the United StatesCan Disrupt China’s Blockade Plans,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 28, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/securing-cyber-and-space-how-united-states-can-disrupt-chinas-blockade-plans .  32.  Benjamin Jensen, Erica Lonergan, and Kathleen McInnis, “Securing Cyber and Space: How the United StatesCan Disrupt China’s Blockade Plans,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 28, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/securing-cyber-and-space-how-united-states-can-disrupt-chinas-blockade-plans .  33.  Josh Chin, “China Is Using the Private Sector to Advance Military AI,” The Wall Street Journal, September 3,2025, https://www.wsj.com/world/china/china-military-ai-partners-7836a2bc .  34.  Benjamin Jensen, Erica Lonergan, and Kathleen McInnis, “Securing Cyber and Space: How the United States Can Disrupt China’s Blockade Plans,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 28, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/securing-cyber-and-space-how-united-states-can-disrupt-chinas-blockade-plans .  35.  Benjamin Jensen, Erica Lonergan, and Kathleen McInnis, “Securing Cyber and Space: How the United States Can Disrupt China’s Blockade Plans,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 28, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/securing-cyber-and-space-how-united-states-can-disrupt-chinas-blockade-plans .  36.  Josh Chin, “China Is Using the Private Sector to Advance Military AI,” The Wall Street Journal, September 3,2025, https://www.wsj.com/world/china/china-military-ai-partners-7836a2bc .   37.  Benjamin Jensen, Erica Lonergan, and Kathleen McInnis, “Securing Cyber and Space: How the United States Can Disrupt China’s Blockade Plans,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 28, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/securing-cyber-and-space-how-united-states-can-disrupt-chinas-blockade-plans . DISCLAIMER Mooreposts publishes independent analysis, commentary, and research for informational and educational purposes only. Content on Mooreposts—including articles, Mooreposts Bites, strategic intelligence assessments, opinion pieces, interviews, and visual materials—does not constitute legal, financial, medical, or professional advice, nor does it represent any government agency, official position, or classified assessment. Unless explicitly stated, all analyses and interpretations reflect the views and analytic judgments of the individual author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Mooreposts, its editorial staff, or affiliated contributors. Strategic intelligence and analytical content is based on open-source information and publicly available materials. Mooreposts strives for accuracy, transparency, and rigorous sourcing; however, information may change as events develop. Readers are encouraged to consult primary sources and exercise independent judgment.

Illustration by John Lamberger LISTEN TO THIS ARTICLE In October 2021, Boris Johnson  stood on the observation deck of the Colosseum for an interview  with Channel 4. His odd manner – a mix of aristocratic bewilderment and the look of a suburban pub lout – clashed intensely with the enigmatic ruins. The focus of his semi-intellectual fumblings was the most downtrodden of the global order: climate refugees. He did his best to summon the classic image of the fall of the Empire; hordes of unwashed barbarians tearing down the symbols of a glittering civilization to replace them with indoor excrement buckets and illiteracy. In the interview, he spoke briefly of the history, brushing past it as a simple, clarifiable fact: “The Roman Empire fell because of out-of-control immigration,” and that “People should not be so naive to think that history moves in one direction,” that “history is moving backwards.” In reality, Johnson's muddied xenophobic reframing of history is blissful, clean, pure nonsense. I pick Johnson’s example out of a myriad right-wing reactionaries using this “interpretation” of Roman history because it's the least effective and, thus, the funniest. The wider right-wing consistently holds up migration as the reason for the Empire’s fall and a universal warning sign for an Empire in decline. The “historical” example is then applied to the position of the contemporary West: These Twitter posts are much more deft examples of right-wing reactionary propaganda than Boris’. They’re interesting in the way that the best propaganda is – it grabs your attention. But they’re just that: propaganda. The rigor of the Classics, the study of the ancient Mediterranean world, comes not from reading the ancient documents, but in understanding how every subsequent generation of historians understood the period that they’re describing. Many of what we consider “primary sources” from the Roman Period were written hundreds of years after the events described, or inextricably politically biased. What few extant secondary and tertiary sources are biased in both respects. In other words, Roman history has always been highly political and highly fluid. So any study of the Classics is inherently a reflection of the author's contemporary political feelings; to what extent is almost impossible to decipher. The reactionary right’s interpretation of the Empire’s fall, however, is not founded in history whatsoever. It’s constrained to 140-character tweets and 7-minute interviews; in other words, the Late Empire becomes a simple rhetorical device.  A real study of Rome’s relationship with Germanic immigration can inform, as the right is suggesting, national policy and migration policy in the upcoming period of climate migration. As the period of contemporary climate migration intensifies over the next quarter-century, studying how the Romans interacted with their Germanic neighbors during the Period of Migration (300 AD - 600 AD) can help illuminate how we can successfully withstand the great demographic changes that will soon grip our own political systems. The truth is, the Fall of the Roman Empire was precipitated not by the acceptance of German immigrants but by their violent rejection. The Empire enjoyed a hundred-year-long “stay of execution” by essentially throwing open its borders to German immigration. Let me be the first to say that the story below is also a thumbnail sketch of Late Roman Imperial scholarship. It perhaps isn’t even a good one. Classicists more ideologically conservative than I would certainly accuse me of selecting, as every historian does, information based on how I view contemporary politics. I encourage you to keep that in mind while reading this article. Without further ado, let's travel back in time together. The Crisis of the Third Century (234-284) In 234 AD, overlapping and self-reinforcing environmental, economic, and political crises enveloped the entire Mediterranean world. Plague, probably smallpox , devastated urban and rural populations alike. Hyperinflation devoured a huge portion of the Roman economy, rendering the currency so valueless that the Empire ceased collecting taxes in money . A permanent change in the climate , the end of the Roman Warm Period, made agriculture permanently less productive. This is just to name a few of the existential issues that all of Europe faced. The Empire needed to adapt to fundamentally different circumstances than it had faced throughout its history. Roman administrators pulled off some of the most agile feats of bureaucratic gymnastics in history, sticking the landing almost every time on the first attempt. They pursued an agenda marked by radically open immigration reform, political reorganization, systemic changes to the basic functions of the Roman economy, and the creation of entirely new socioeconomic classes. 284 AD is perhaps a more logical beginning to the Middle Ages than the expulsion of Romulus Augustulus in 476. The reforms of the late 200s AD created what we understand as Medieval: patrimonial labor organizations, serfdom, and the divinely appointed monarch. The Germanic tribes outside the Empire’s borders simply collapsed in the face of climate migration, plague, economic collapse, and external invasion. They migrated en masse to the Empire, looking for safety and competent administration. The Romans, for their part, were ecstatic to welcome new bodies to serve their legions and in the marketplaces sapped by the compounding crises. Roman administrators, looking at their empty streets and unplowed fields, essentially threw open the doors. The Process of Roman Immigration What we might understand as “legal immigration” into the Roman Empire happened through a process called consensus. Roman borders, with few exceptions, were almost entirely porous to individuals and small parties. As an individual, one could cross the border and become a Roman taxpayer with all the benefits that came with it. As a large group, however, you needed consensus. What this process looked like varied between time and place, but was much the same in its essential characteristics. A tribe of 250,000 or more would appear at the border and petition for admittance into the empire. Local magistrates would collect certain information on the new arrivals and call in a legionary presence to meet the barbarians at a pre-arranged spot. The Germans would cross the border, leave their weapons behind, and swear allegiance to the Emperor. The Roman apparatus would then split the tribe up and disperse them evenly across the vast size of the Empire; this family to Spain, this one to Italy, and so on. They were disarmed, separated, and settled . To put it plainly, the Empire needed these injections of manpower between the third and fourth centuries. To a lesser extent, that’s the way the Romans had always worked. To be Roman wasn’t like being German; to be Roman was a way of life, a system of values, not an ethnicity. The Imperii Populii Romanii, the Power of the Roman People, always rested on their ability to convince new people to become Romans and lend their efforts to the imperial project. New Arrivals (376) The positive feedback loop between Roman power and German immigration established in the aftermath of the Crisis of the Third Century suffered a relatively simple end. For one, the Huns were galloping over the Eastern European Plain, from where we aren’t sure, displacing more people and causing cascading refugee waves. The Romans had been at the top of their integration game, welcoming or forcing hundreds of thousands of Goths, Franks, Quadii, and Marcomanii into the fabric of Roman society for the last hundred years. Their ability to welcome newcomers had been the only reason the Empire had not collapsed back in the third century. In 376, a group of 200,000 Goths, likely from modern Ukraine, presented themselves at the Roman border requesting asylum from the unstoppable Hunnic invasion from the East. Then, Roman Emperor Valens was ecstatic. One of the recurrent outbreaks of the Antonine Plague had devastated the legions at the very start of a major conflict with the Sassanians, an equally powerful empire centered in modern Iran.  This massive group of Goths crossed the Danube and, as usual, they left their weapons on the far bank of the Danube, content in the knowledge that now they were safe in Roman territory. Because of the extensive conflict in the East and recurrent cycles of plague, the Roman force that met them was large but not overwhelmingly so. A temporary camp was set up to accommodate the Goths before they were dispersed by their new Roman leaders across the Empire.  The Romans were never a people to protest their bureaucrats skimming a bit of the top, but the abuse suffered by the Goths at the hands of their Roman administrators while in this temporary camp was cruel. The camp became semi-permanent as weeks of waiting turned into months. The Roman administrators of this camp schemed constantly to separate the Goths under their purview from their gold. Going so far as to exchange dog meat for their women and children to abate starvation. This was after, of course, they had sold the provisions the central government had been sending them to feed the Goths on the private market. When the Goths heard that Emperor Valens was on his way, their leaders gathered to petition him to punish the greedy administrators who wreaked such cruelty on their people. The administrators of the camp, in way over their heads, killed the Gothic leaders before they could inform their bosses of their misdeeds. The Goths were enraged. In convulsions of pain only known to the dispossessed and abused, they broke out of camp, sacked a nearby city for all its food, and relished in torturing the Roman citizens they were once so hopeful to become. The Beginning of the End (376 - 476) Emperor   Valens was furious. The greed and ineptitude of a few low-level bureaucrats had turned hundreds of thousands of allies into an apocalyptic threat. The Empire was fighting a war with a near-peer adversary to the East and now had to contend with a large-scale enemy army within its borders. The Emperor ordered the legions stationed on the border to join the major force the Emperor was leading with all haste towards the Gothic army.  He attacked the Gothic army outside the city of Hadrianopolis near the modern Greek border with Bulgaria. The Romans were crushed. Emperor Valens was killed on the field, two-thirds of the Roman army was slaughtered, and Hadrianopolis was burned to the ground. The borders were undefended, and no army within a thousand miles could challenge the Goths now, let alone the Huns from which they were initially fleeing. The Western Empire never truly recovered from the blow suffered at Adrianople. The Huns penetrated Roman territory, now completely undefended. The Romans bargained with the Goths to ally with them against the Huns in exchange for gold and political privileges. Valens’ successors were increasingly unable to impose terms on the arriving tribes. They began crossing the borders without first asking Roman officials, bringing their weapons, settling together, and only coming to those “agreements” after they had taken what they could. Consensus was permanently broken. The Romans could no longer effectively impose their terms and culture on the new arrivals. The Western Roman Empire went with a whimper, not a bang. Tribes were increasingly only nominally subservient to the Emperor in Rome and, in practice, held all the cards in the relationship. The last Roman emperors even abandoned Rome as the capital, unable to defend such a large and attractive pile of treasure. The Eternal City was looted twice in the 400s AD. Instead, they ruled from Ravenna, playacting as masters of the world from behind the swamps that encircled the city.  Conclusion Studying the Migration Period (300-600 AD) to understand how the Romans and German migrants interacted with one another can help policymakers determine how to react to the upcoming period of climate migration. The Migration Policy Institute predicts up to 1.2 billion people will be internationally displaced by 2050; the vast majority moving north from the equator. It’s imperative that leaders understand the decisions that caused alignment of Roman and Gothic interests versus those that pitted them against each other. There are two lessons that present themselves to me as a Roman historian and scholar of current events: The United States is facing a demographic cliff and entering into competition with the most populous nation on Earth. Just as Rome needed German immigration to fill its legions and coffers, the United States needs immigrants from the South. The wisest course of action is to model Roman consensus and make friends where natural friends exist. Welcome them under the auspices of overwhelming power but extend a generous hand; In other words, talk softly but carry a big stick. Go to elaborate lengths to avoid violent confrontation with large groups of migrants. At some point, the flow of migrants will be such as to represent an irresistible faction. Appearances of overwhelming power on the part of the assimilating group are more important than the actual ability to militarily resist the newcomers. Avoiding the possibility of an Adrianople is paramount to the survival of the American Empire. Of course, the same reason these lessons can’t be learned in hindsight is the same reason simplified tellings are so rhetorically attractive. It is, however, important to distinguish leaders from Twitter influencers. I can understand why the backwards interpretation of history proliferates on a platform like Twitter, but to be repeated by the decision-makers themselves signals a fundamental issue. If Boris Johnson is himself repeating the propaganda and perhaps believing it, how can we trust him and people like him to make discerning, unbiased strategic decisions? Let this be realized: if we make unnecessary enemies of these people, they will learn quickly that we can’t stop them even if we try. Braxton Fuller is a current master’s candidate for International Studies at the University of Denver’s Josef Korbel School of Global and Public Affairs. If you enjoyed this work, please consider sharing our content and website or donating to a non-profit organization linked in the   Donate  tab. DISCLAIMER Mooreposts publishes independent analysis, commentary, and research for informational and educational purposes only. Content on Mooreposts—including articles, Mooreposts Bites, strategic intelligence assessments, opinion pieces, interviews, and visual materials—does not constitute legal, financial, medical, or professional advice, nor does it represent any government agency, official position, or classified assessment. Unless explicitly stated, all analyses and interpretations reflect the views and analytic judgments of the individual author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Mooreposts, its editorial staff, or affiliated contributors. Strategic intelligence and analytical content is based on open-source information and publicly available materials. Mooreposts strives for accuracy, transparency, and rigorous sourcing; however, information may change as events develop. Readers are encouraged to consult primary sources and exercise independent judgment.

How Moscow Sustains its War in Ukraine on the Front Lines and at Home Illustration by Connor JL Moore & Kash Harrison LISTEN TO THIS ARTICLE In the days before Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Western intelligence believed Kyiv’s fall was imminent . Yet, as the war approaches its fourth year, it has devolved into the bloodiest conflict in Europe since the Second World War.  Estimates place total Russian battlefield casualties —those killed, wounded, and missing—at 1.2 million, with deaths believed to be as high as 325,000. These numbers are remarkable, given that Moscow has advanced only 50 to 230 feet per day . In total, Russia has acquired just 12% of Ukrainian territory since 2022. Experts have noted that Moscow’s willingness to endure high losses indicates a belief it can outlast Ukraine’s ability  to continue fighting. Given this, one might wonder how Moscow has sustained its attritional war strategy and public support amid mounting losses. Replenishing Russia’s Frontlines To avoid a nationwide conscription—like in Ukraine—Moscow has pursued a variety of efforts to replenish its frontlines. Research indicates that the Kremlin continues to recruit 30,000–40,000 troops  each month.  Recruitment efforts have focused on low-income Russians in rural areas, who make up most of its forces. Financial incentives like high pay and bonuses  have been found instrumental, often several times  what most Russians earn each paycheck.  Rights activists, however, dispute these recruitment numbers . In some cases, conscripts were forced to sign contracts  requiring them to serve on the front lines. In others, what were originally one-year terms of service have been indefinitely extended .  Other methods of replenishing Russian forces have included recruiting convicts and foreign nationals. Legislation signed in 2024 by Russian President Vladimir Putin permits Russians with criminal convictions—or those facing sentencing—to avoid prosecution by enlisting  in the military.  Further, after Russia’s   mutual defense treaty   with North Korea in 2024, Western officials estimate 14,000–15,000 North Korean soldiers  are now fighting on Russia’s frontlines. Investigative journalists and rights groups have uncovered that foreign nationals from 128 nations  have been trafficked to the front or recruited under false pretenses. Domestic Repression  Under immense human and economic  losses, Moscow’s strategy of outlasting Ukraine has coincided with intensified domestic repression. Since the invasion, Moscow has enhanced censorship laws, making public dissent or scrutiny  of Russia’s ‘special military operation’ risky. Those spreading information deemed contradictory to Moscow's official positions could face up to 15 years’ imprisonment .  These measures have empowered Putin to eliminate all opposition to his regime, most notably key political opponent   Alexei Navalny , and former ally Yevgeny Prigozhin, who led a revolt against Moscow  in June of 2023.  Further, major news outlets like The Moscow Times , Echo Moskvy , and Dozhd  have been banned or shut down under newly expanded ‘foreign influence laws’. Some claim these actions have effectively put an end to all  independent media groups in Russia.  The Russian state has also been accused of classifying and  hiding data  regarding losses in the war. Exiled Russian media reported that by the end of 2025, lawsuits seeking a formal declaration of killed or missing military personnel amounted to 90,000 , of which 70,000 related cases  quickly vanished. Payments to Russian families who lost or had injured service members in the war (amounting to $15.3 billion) have been highlighted as a means to mitigate unrest and maintain domestic support . Militarizing Russian Youth  In tandem with its   domestic repression, Moscow appears to be pursuing long-term efforts to condition its people for a prolonged struggle and future conflict. Scholars note that Moscow’s amplified use of   nationalism, traditional values, and historical narratives is intended to frame and legitimize  the conflict as an existential threat to Russian values from a ‘demonic’ West. These efforts are reflected in Moscow’s policy initiatives to militarize the country’s youth. Between 2022 and 2024, funding for new “patriotic” educational initiatives increased tenfold . Required courses like Health and Safety, now called Fundamentals of Security and Defense of the Homeland , focus on military basics , from the structure of the Russian Armed Forces to battlefield medical care.  Moreover, newly implemented history textbooks  reportedly focus on narratives that justify and glorify Russia’s ‘special military operation’ in Ukraine. Other independent investigations have highlighted new classrooms equipped to train students in drone operation , a warfare capability that has become essential  in the conflict.  The Oscar-nominated documentary Mr. Nobody Against Putin  reveals how state-mandated classroom recordings—intended to enforce compliance with a new curriculum—depict lectures branding dissenters as “parasites” who should leave Russia. Lessons also incorporated Moscow’s historical narratives, teaching about the necessity to ‘denazify’ Ukraine and praising those fighting today as akin to Soviet troops against Nazi Germany.  Further footage shows members of the Wagner Group—mercenaries infamous for their brutality  and war crimes —teaching primary school students how to handle weapons and mitigate battlefield risks of losing limbs.  Other school activities   across all grades include loyalty oaths, military drills, and grenade-throwing contests. Analysts have argued that this militarization of Russian youth is intended to prepare the country for extended conflict ,  which will require a growing population forever loyal to the war effort.  Conclusion Russia’s war in Ukraine has imposed unprecedented losses on both sides, yet under current circumstances—heavy Russian losses and slow battlefield progress—it would take 152 years  for Russian forces to conquer the rest of Ukraine. For the time being, Moscow appears committed to its war strategy of outlasting Ukraine, no matter the cost.  Connor JL Moore is a current master’s candidate for International Security at the University of Denver’s Josef Korbel School of Global and Public Affairs.  If you enjoyed this work, please consider sharing our content and website or donating to a non-profit organization linked in the Donate tab. DISCLAIMER Mooreposts publishes independent analysis, commentary, and research for informational and educational purposes only. Content on Mooreposts—including articles, Mooreposts Bites, strategic intelligence assessments, opinion pieces, interviews, and visual materials—does not constitute legal, financial, medical, or professional advice, nor does it represent any government agency, official position, or classified assessment. Unless explicitly stated, all analyses and interpretations reflect the views and analytic judgments of the individual author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Mooreposts, its editorial staff, or affiliated contributors. Strategic intelligence and analytical content is based on open-source information and publicly available materials. Mooreposts strives for accuracy, transparency, and rigorous sourcing; however, information may change as events develop. Readers are encouraged to consult primary sources and exercise independent judgment.

The Role of Women in Building Sustainable Peace in Israel and Palestine Illustration by Mia Navarro and Connor JL Moore LISTEN TO THIS ARTICLE It has been over two years since the deadly October 7th attacks that exacerbated the destructive conflict between Israel and Palestine. With over 72,000 dead  and counting ,  the world is looking for any glimmer of hope to produce a lasting peace agreement. Attempts at a ceasefire have been at the forefront of foreign policy agendas, yet no enduring solution has materialized. This persistent failure has prompted the following questions: Is there a new way to look at the Israel-Palestinian conflict-resolution process? Which perspectives have been neglected that could lead to an organic and sustainable end to this conflict? The answer may be as simple as including women at the negotiating table.  Historically, women’s political action in the Middle East has aligned with other social justice movements . Most recently, during the Arab Spring, women's role on social media and at protests calling for democratization and civil liberties was remarkably impactful. At present, Palestinian women protest Israeli occupation, while Israeli women have lodged their own protest against Israel’s continued war. A key factor that makes the role of women in the Middle East so consequential at present is the disproportionate impact the Israel-Palestinian conflict has on women, versus those at the negotiating table . Women continue to face sexual assault and harassment , miss critical prenatal care windows, and lack access to reproductive care. By October 2024, women in Gaza were three times more likely to die from childbirth and three times more likely to miscarry  compared to levels before October 2023. Yet the international community seems to overlook the role of women in global conflict resolution and their propensity to coalesce grassroots peace campaigns and civil society across ethnic and socioeconomic divides.  Traditional perspectives that dominate decision-making processes have an exclusionary focus on areas considered 'high' politics , such as sovereignty and military security, overlooking women's decision-making, social influence, and the gendered impacts of global politics. In particular, the female perspective is beneficial for understanding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as it uncovers the gendered power structures that shape military conflict while amplifying women’s contributions to peace-building. A deep understanding of international relations and the foundations of peace-building requires a lens that examines the role of women and their often untapped diplomatic potential. Including women’s voices in high-level decision-making highlights the importance of intersectionality in global politics, emphasizing the need for a bottom-up approach to peace, rather than a trickle-down one.  Why then are women positioned to be a key factor in the peace-making process?  The United Nations Development Programme indicates that   women’s involvement in peace negotiations  contributes to the “quality and durability” of peace agreements, including stipulations aimed at political reform, human security, and, overall, higher implementation rates. Beyond their roles as intermediaries,   women are adept at building coalitions  for peace. Women frequently mobilize groups in civil society, working across ethnic, religious, political, and cultural divides, otherwise referred to as horizontal bridge-building. Their involvement in community-building and influence on maternal protection can help to build trust and safety within communities. Women also bridge the   vertical divide between elites and the grassroots , increasing the odds of lasting peace through promoting buy-in incentives and community-based legitimacy. The participation or representation of civil society groups in the peace-making process   reduces the likelihood of a peace agreement failing by 64% .  What’s more, female security sector officials tend to have access to populations and organizations that are either closed to men or female-dominated, as seen in the Afghan conflict, where only women security officials were able to visit, speak to, and gather information from Afghan women in hospitals, camps, and even at their homes. This advantage allows women to gather intelligence, observe lived experiences, and understand the desires and needs of the general population within the framework of peace-building. This ground-level work allows women to focus on human security that improves civilians’ quality of life, rather than focusing solely on big-picture diplomacy, which often lacks the necessary nuance. It is important to note that although the importance of women’s participation in governance and conflict prevention and resolution has been enshrined in policy by both the   Israeli  and   Palestinian  governments,   both parties have fallen short  in   achieving  inclusive representation. In essence, empirical benchmarks don’t necessarily translate to de facto representation and inclusion, particularly at the negotiating table.  It is important to note that although the importance of women’s participation in governance and conflict prevention and resolution has been enshrined in policy by both the   Israeli  and   Palestinian  governments,   both parties have fallen short  in   achieving  inclusive representation. In essence, empirical benchmarks don’t necessarily translate to de facto representation and inclusion, particularly at the negotiating table.  It is important to note that although the importance of women’s participation in governance and conflict prevention and resolution has been enshrined in policy by both the   Israeli  and   Palestinian  governments,   both parties have fallen short  in   achieving  inclusive representation. In essence, empirical benchmarks don’t necessarily translate to de facto representation and inclusion, particularly at the negotiating table.  The Israeli-Palestinian conflict’s disproportionate gendered impacts and exclusive high politics peace-building neglect a key voice at the negotiating table. Gender-inclusive policymaking helps to question the automatic assumption that military force is the most effective or appropriate response, and reiterate the importance of basic human security measures and stability. The lived experience of women may guide decision-makers away from continued violence and towards a more sustainable and inclusive peace. Mia is the Deputy Editor-in-Chief of Mooreposts and an M.A. candidate in International Security at the Josef Korbel School of Global and Public Affairs. If you enjoyed this work, please consider sharing Mooreposts’ content, following Mia on the social media platforms listed in her bio , or supporting a non-profit organization linked in the Donate tab. DISCLAIMER Mooreposts publishes independent analysis, commentary, and research for informational and educational purposes only. Content on Mooreposts—including articles, Mooreposts Bites, strategic intelligence assessments, opinion pieces, interviews, and visual materials—does not constitute legal, financial, medical, or professional advice, nor does it represent any government agency, official position, or classified assessment. Unless explicitly stated, all analyses and interpretations reflect the views and analytic judgments of the individual author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Mooreposts, its editorial staff, or affiliated contributors. Strategic intelligence and analytical content is based on open-source information and publicly available materials. Mooreposts strives for accuracy, transparency, and rigorous sourcing; however, information may change as events develop. Readers are encouraged to consult primary sources and exercise independent judgment.

Audio & Transcript Executive Producers: John Lamberger, Lindsey Ferrini, Connor JL Moore This transcript has been edited for clarity and readability while preserving the speakers’ original meaning and conversational tone. Minor repetitions, filler words, and false starts have been removed. Speaker attributions have been carefully reviewed against the audio to ensure accuracy. Introduction Atomic bombs. Thermonuclear warheads. Intercontinental ballistic missiles. The bomb. The big one. The fat man. The little boy. Lindsey:  Hello, I'm Lindsey Ferrini. John:  And I'm John Lamberger. Welcome to Sheepland, the wide green pastures of our modern media environment. Lindsey:  Sheepland, where people are fenced in by politics, graze on soundbites, and fall prey to the wolves of propaganda. So where are we? John:  Sheepland, a program about the great issues facing humanity. Lindsey:  A Mooreposts Podcast… Lindsey: All nuclear weapons employ a phenomenon called fission to create a chain reaction that releases an immense amount of energy in a fraction of a second. John:  A fission or fusion reaction involving the unstable atoms of uranium or plutonium releases an immense amount of energy, creating an explosion so powerful that a single device can destroy an entire city. Lindsey:  The physical blast, thermal radiation, and radioactive fallout combined with long-term environmental damage have the potential to kill hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of people. John:  On September 23, 1992, the United States conducted its 1,054th and final nuclear weapons test. Soon after, President Clinton signed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. With the Soviet Union dissolved, It seemed as though an era had ended, an era in which the science of human relationships finally outpaced the science of waging war. Lindsey:  Today, roughly 90% of the world's 12,241 nuclear weapons remain in the arsenals of the United States and Russia. The rest are held by China, the United Kingdom, France, North Korea, India, Pakistan and Israel. John:  So did the nuclear age really end with the Cold War? Or merely fall silent, waiting for humanity to forget? Introducing Dr. Debak Das Lindsey:  Dr. Debak Das is an assistant professor in peace and security at the Joseph Korbel School of Global and Public Affairs at the University of Denver. John:  The scope of his research and study includes international security, nuclear proliferation, crises, and international history. Lindsey:  Nuclear weapons is obviously a very important topic and it can be scary, it can be a lot to take in and controversial. So how did you first learn about them? Dr. Das:  Thanks, that's a great question. I first learned about nuclear weapons as a kid actually. So I grew up in India. In a city called Kolkata. And in 1998, India conducted five nuclear tests, nuclear weapons tests, in Western India, in the desert of Rajasthan. And for the first time, nuclear weapons suddenly were in the public domain. People were talking about it, newspapers were writing about it, culturally, too, we have this huge festival which happens actually around October in Kolkata especially where all kinds of it's like the city becomes this moving art installation. There was a lot of art dedicated to nuclear weapons in a way that did not necessarily convey the dangers that we think of today. It was more of a celebration of strength of power and things like that. And really, that's my first memory of getting introduced to this idea of what nuclear weapons are.  Then 1999 happens, India and Pakistan fight this war, which is under the nuclear shadow, both countries have nuclear weapons. They're fighting a war. Again, this is being talked about a fair amount, internationally, but also in the public domain. So those are some of my early memories of how I thought of or got interested in nuclear weapons. And of course, then as graduate school progresses, as you may well know, you go into different kinds of specializations. I was fortunate enough to have a few professors and a few classes offered on nuclear weapons, took those, got involved in the think tank circle, started organizing track two dialogues between India and Pakistan on nuclear issues, India, Pakistan and China as well. So really that's when what was an early interest transformed into a broader academic interest. What do we think about these weapons? How do these weapons proliferate? What are the different ways in which we should be thinking about the dangers and threats posed by these weapons? So I started thinking about that a lot more. Why Study Nuclear Weapons? John:  What has really, like, what about nuclear weapons stood out to you the most? That, like, is there like a deeper just thing that drives you to center a career around this? Like, something about nuclear weapons that is just so different from any other interesting subject. Dr. Das:  Absolutely. I think in terms of the sheer destruction and the sheer nature and magnitude of the, the weapon itself is awe-inspiring? So there is this broader question of what are we doing here? Why are we building more of these things? Why is it that these weapons have become a core part of the security strategies of the countries that have nuclear weapons? Why do countries covet nuclear weapons, even non-nuclear countries? Why haven't we, and when I say we, I don't just mean academics, I mean we as a broader public, interested in survival, interested in thriving in a future that is positive and good for the climate, good for the environment, good for the future generations. Why do we embrace these horrendously dangerous systems? And make them an almost everyday part of the business of securing ourselves. It's very antithetical. There are a lot of dilemmas in that? And there are a lot of contradictions in that. That to me is fascinating. Lindsey:  Yeah, it's just such a complex topic. Dr. Das:  Yeah, absolutely. Lindsey:  A lot of people, when they think of nuclear weapons and even when I like brought up that, we're going to be speaking with you to family members and things and they just say, well, what are you going to talk about? Like, do we use them? Do we like them? I'm like, no, it's actually, there's a lot that goes into it. It's not just the nuclear weapon itself. That's like the center of all these topics and politics and, it's, it's really complex. Dr. Das:  Yeah, absolutely. And, and when you say there are a lot of things that go into it that really resonates. Because first it's like peeling an onion. Of course, there's the bomb. There's and in fact, even before the bomb, there's the uranium that's like in under a mountain somewhere that has to be mined. There's an entire mining operation there that has to get extracted. There are scientific processes that, pre-process that turn it into uranium that could potentially be used in a weapon. So that means enrichment. Things that you hear about when you talk about Iran's nuclear program potentially. Then there's a question of, will you use plutonium? Then you have to reprocess the waste from the uranium. Then you have to take all of that, package that into a bomb itself. But the bomb can't go anywhere by itself, so you have to build delivery vehicles. So missiles, nuclear submarines, aircraft? Then there's a question of, okay, how are we going to control these weapons? So what is our command and control setup? So there's satellites, communication cables underwater? There's this entire infrastructure, which is not just the bomb and the missile? And then there's the broader political question of where is, where are the people here? Are the people, are the public involved? And do they have a role in this decision making process? Is it just the political elite and nuclear weapons? Decision making is a very Elite driven Enterprise. There's so many different layers. And that's another going back to your earlier question. That's another thing that fascinates me about the subject itself. Human Consequences of Nuclear Weapons John:  It sort of touches everything, environment, democracy, anything. I have two little short stories that really shook me that have stayed with me for a while. Just to preface, flavor the question. So Moto Musuro, and her daughter Toshiko Saiki lived in Hiroshima. Because of the Second World War and American firebombing, Toshiko had evacuated her son to the outlying suburbs of the city. In mid-summer 1945, she went to visit him. On August 6th, the United States exploded the first atomic bomb over Hiroshima. Toshiko, in the suburbs, rushed back to the city but could not find her mother. Misoru. A month later, Toshiko's brother-in-law searched the destroyed home and was able to recover only her head. Glasses, which she always wore, were stuck to it. I saw those glasses at the Hiroshima Peace Museum in Japan. The 2017 Nobel Peace Prize winning organization the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, conducted an interview with George Coleman. He was a former Navy officer. In 1952, he participated as a test subject on the risks of being exposed to a nuclear blast. He recalled in the interview of lying in a trench with his hands covering his closed eyes as a shield from the bright light. When the bomb exploded, he recalled seeing the bones in his hands as if he were looking at an x-ray. He soon began losing his hair, his thyroid stopped functioning, and he later developed prostate cancer. So I say both of those things because it is just so unimaginable. And we have inherited this legacy and these weapons. But our humans, including those in the future, are capable of truly understanding the destructive scope of these weapons. Dr. Das:  Both of those stories are so evocative and both true stories which give us a flavor of how truly dangerous and destructive these weapons are in a way that we do not talk about, you know, when we talk about nuclear weapons policy, when we are talking about building more nuclear weapons, when we are talking about deterrence, we are not talking about some of the effects of what does this actually mean? What do your policies actually lead to? Sort of encapsulated in these stories that you just said. Are we capable of understanding the scope of the harm and damage? I think we are. I think the more you actually are curious and you learn, you find out that these weapons have in fact affected millions of lives over the years and I don't just mean in Hiroshima, which, you know, your story very much sort of brought out an aspect of what happens when you use nuclear weapons in or on a population, on a civilian population, more importantly. It's also people who have lived in areas where nuclear testing has taken place. So I'm thinking about the South Pacific, the Marshall Islands. I'm also thinking of the United States, places like New Mexico and Nevada. And people have lived with the effects of radiation in those populations. And lived with the intergenerational sort of damage that has been done to their bodies, which has probably passed down through different generations. So I think we have the science, we have the knowledge, we have the stories of survivors, these accounts, which are extremely harrowing. If you listen to the stories of the Hibakusha, the folks who survived the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and those stories are extremely well documented. So it's a question of do you have the interest of going out and finding out what is the effect of these weapons? And it's not just about your own interest, it's also a question of the policy community and us as the academic community, are we able to communicate these stories across to the broader public so that people understand? And I think there are efforts there. Perhaps those efforts aren't enough. There can always be more. I think my direct answer to you is yes, we can understand the scope of the harm. And at the same time we are not understanding it because there is a gap in access to that knowledge. And that's what we need to try and bridge. Arms Racing and Nuclear Reduction Lindsey:  In 1986, there were around 70,000 nuclear warheads in the world. Today, there are about 12,241, most of those being held by the United States and the Soviet Union. Why were there so many to begin with, and what led to that reduction? Dr. Das:  So one, To answer the question of why we get to those numbers, of course, this was a great power competition. We were in a world in the 1960s and 1970s. In the 50s, it was a slow ramping up, but there was definitely President Eisenhower who sent sort of a full push forward towards building as many nuclear weapons as possible. A part of that was feeling insecure about what the Soviet Union was doing. And at the same time, the Soviet Union was feeling insecure about what the United States was doing. This is what we call a classic security dilemma. I think that I'm not safe enough, and so I keep building more. And you think that you're not safe enough because you don't know exactly what I'm doing, and so you keep building more, or you don't trust me. So you keep building more regardless of what's going on in terms of diplomacy, etc. And so that's how we get to this mind blowing sort of 70,000 is just such a ridiculous number when you think about the number of nuclear weapons that two countries possess. John:  It seems divorced from like how many do you even need?  Dr. Das:  Exactly. And in the 60s, there used to be this talk of a gap. A nuclear gap. So if there is a gap, we have to meet it because we have to be at parity. And people always perceived there to be a gap. There was talk of a missile gap. If you have 100 missiles, I need to have 100 missiles. But hey, you're probably going to build 50 more, so let me try and build 200. And then you look at me trying to build 200 and you think, I need to build 250. And so on and so forth. And that's how you get to 70. So that's one. I think in the 80s, what happens is slowly but surely there is a broader sense of the danger that is present in, and pretty much the, the idea of head trigger alerts, where you could potentially launch a nuclear weapon pretty much as soon as you thought that the other side was to launch. Because you needed time to fill your missiles, it would take time to actually launch those missiles, etc. So we were in the United States as well as in the Soviet Union pretty much on the precipice. There was an exercise called the Able Archer exercise in the early 80s, which the NATO countries, including the United States, conducted, and that really freaked the Soviet Union out. As a part of while all of this is taking place, of like, you know, states sort of posturing against each other, building up more, there's also a very strong disarmament movement, which is grassroots organizations, non-governmental organizations, college campuses, people on the streets. About a million people land up in Central Park in New York protesting against nuclear weapons, which was at that point in time the largest sort of gathering of people for a cause, any political cause. So there's that happening in the United States. The other thing that's very interesting is, and this sounds a little ridiculous, but it actually did happen, which is that in 1983, there's this movie called the Day After that was released. And the Day After is about NATO and Warsaw Pact countries sort of basically ramping up the rhetoric and eventually launching nuclear weapons against each other. And then the destruction that follows the day after the nuclear bombs have fallen. And a million people, at least I think millions of people, watch this on the same evening that it's sort of broadcast in the United States. One of the people who watched it was President Reagan. And it freaks President Reagan out. And it truly represents this change in somebody who is fairly, before that, hawkish on a number of different security issues, to think we can't destroy ourselves. Then, of course, Reagan finds a partner in Gorbachev, who's the premier of the Soviet Union, who also is like minded in the sense of thinking there is an inherent danger to keeping nuclear weapons and staying on this hair trigger alert. So those two actually come together to bring forward all these treaties like the INF, which is the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, like START, which is, you know, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. And so there is a move as you kind of reach this height of 70,000 and great vulnerability for people, there is a backlash against that, not only from the people but also from the political class. And so hence we start seeing a reduction. And then, of course, the Soviet Union collapses. The threat of nuclear weapons strike from a great power adversary reduces. So the United States is also ready to reduce the number of nuclear weapons that it has. Countries like France give up a leg. So you generally have an air, sea and land-based sort of nuclear weapons. And the French give up their land-based nuclear weapons. In the 90s, because they say, look, the threat has changed, the threat has reduced. So there is this hopeful moment where people are reducing numbers, the START treaty has come into place, there's a dramatic reduction. Of course, today we are in a place that's very different. We'll talk about that in a second, I'm sure, but that's kind of the story of the dramatic reduction. Tactical Nuclear Weapons and Escalation John:  That's a good place to transition so that was a hopeful peak of nuclear weapons. I'm really concerned about the valley. And if we're entering a valley today, Russia has deployed tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus and has begun joint tactical drills around them. These weapons are intended to be used on the battlefield against troops, although it could vary greatly. Battlefield nukes could unleash an explosion from less than one kiloton, which is a kiloton is 1000 tons of TNT, if you can even imagine that, to tens of kilotons. For reference, the bomb used in Hiroshima was 15 kilotons. Do you think that it's possible to use nuclear weapons in a responsible manner or within some sort of ethical framework where harm is proportional, like against troops on a battlefield? Dr. Das: I think the answer to that is no. The answer to that is no because when you say in proportional terms you assume that there is a certain level of controllability, that you can control the proportion, the harm that is being caused by the nuclear explosion itself but also the radiation that comes after. Then there's a question of what happens to the other side. Do they think of it as being proportional or not? So can you control escalation? Once a single nuclear weapon has been used, there is this spiral that you're very likely to fall into where I think that I need to use more against you and you might think that you need to use more against me. And before you know it, there is no tactical use of nuclear weapons. There is another fallacy around this idea of a tactical use of nuclear weapons. If you think of where are these weapons going to be used, so if you think of a nuclear competition between countries like say India and Pakistan, if a single tactical nuclear weapon is used in a battlefield along the border of India and Pakistan, the population densities are such that there can never be just a tactical use where only members of the military are being affected. Broader and larger civilian populations will be impacted naturally. And then there's that question that we talked about earlier about intergenerational harm. What does this mean for harm of the land, but also of the people, of the animals on it? The Physicians for Social Responsibility, which is a set of scientists who look at nuclear weapons use and also advocate for nuclear disarmament, did this study on what would happen if a few tactical nuclear weapons were used in South Asia. And they came to the conclusion that 2 billion people in the world would be at risk because the use of these weapons would lead to maybe a very marginal change in the climate, the temperatures that you would have, which might then lead to famine, which would lead to crop failure broadly. Which would then lead to all this death. So when we say tactical nuclear weapons use, we should be really careful about what we are talking about and how do you actually differentiate between tactical and strategic? Deterrence and the Kargil Conflict John: The Cold War is often framed as an indirect conflict in which the US, Soviet Union, two nuclear armed states confronted each other through third party actors, espionage, and extremely violent wars in satellite countries such as Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan. Yet virtually no American or Soviet military forces ever directly fought each other because of the nuclear exchange that could possibly escalate from that. However, in 1999 from May to July, a violent conflict occurred between two nuclear armed states, Pakistan and India. In the Cargill War. Depending on the source, the number of casualties on both sides range from hundreds to several thousands. Please correct me if you have a good source for that. War between two nuclear armed states. Do you feel as though that is an encouraging development that this conflict remained limited without the use of nuclear weapons? Or is this a discouraging development as it hollows out that deterrent value of not avoiding conflict at all times between these two states? Dr. Das: Any time nuclear weapons are not used, that’s encouraging. So let me start there. The good news is that we did not see an escalation beyond the theater of Kashmir, where the two armies fought, which is where the, which is why we call it a limited war. Other parts of the India-Pakistan border could have potentially been opened up. Both sides did not decide to open up those borders. So, the conflict remained limited. And so that's a good thing. Now, you asked me about the deterrent value of, of nuclear weapons, what's, how does that figure in this story? And I think this is where we need to question, what is deterrence by you. What does this idea of nuclear weapons mean to you? So in 1999, when the Pakistani irregular forces as well as the Army forces crossed over to the Indian side and occupied about 500 square miles of territory before, at, let me say, in the, in the height of winter in the Himalayas, which is no mean feat. India only found out that this had happened when the snow started thawing and sometime in April. When they realized that, oh, we don't actually have those, those peaks anymore. People who were going out to graze with their animals were like, that's not you up there. And so then there's the question of, Well, India had nuclear weapons in 1999. Why did that not deter Pakistan from doing that? India has had nuclear weapons since 1998. We still see terrorist attacks happen on it, on its soil, intermittently. With the most recent one taking place earlier this year in May. So why does that continue to happen? Why do conventional armies fight each other even when both sides have nuclear weapons? Why does one side attack another one? So it's telling us and it's giving us these data points that, well, nuclear weapons don't actually deter that. There is, let's, let's temper our expectations about what deterrent value we get from nuclear weapons. It's not going to deter everything. There's folks who might say, you know, maybe it doesn't deter much at all. So if these weapons are in fact unusable, which a lot of people have talked about and claimed, then what is it actually deterring? The Korean Peninsula and Demilitarization Lindsey: So nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula. Are often cited by North Korea as an obstruction to peace and reunification. But South Korea doesn't have any nuclear weapons. I mean, they rely on the, you know, the United States for that. And would this mean that, like, demilitarization and the removal of American troops in South Korea, would it allow for, like, a future United Korea or Korean Peninsula? Dr. Das: That’s a very difficult question. There are no easy answers. Lindsey:  Yeah, it is. That's why we're asking you. Dr. Das:  No easy questions here. You know, it's difficult to say whether the demilitarization, in the sense whether the removal of US troops from South Korea would lead to reunification. But I would say that that would be the first step because you cannot have reunification without the removal of US troops. The other thing here is you have between North Korea and South Korea and the United States, the Korean War has not ended officially for any of these countries. There's a ceasefire and we've been in that ceasefire for the last, let's say, 70 something years. So step one is to actually acknowledge that this war has ended. And can we talk about the terms of what that peace would look like? And that in itself would lead to some kind of demilitarization presumably because then you would stop treating the Korean Peninsula as an active war zone where US troops for example have to be deployed. That's pretty much step one. Then it's a business of diplomacy. How can you actually have a stable situation between South Korea and North Korea along the border? Can you have diplomatic relations? And then can you talk reunification? That's up to those two parties specifically. And at the same time, North Korea has security concerns. South Korea has very severe security concerns. So there's a question of how can you assure if you're the United States or if you're China. Interested parties in that peninsula, how can you assure that there is some kind of security provided or there are some sort of assurances of security given? To either side so that there can be some kind of negotiation around either reunification or coexistence. But as you say, demilitarization is probably the first step and I don't think that's going to happen without first acknowledging the end of the war. South Korean Nuclearization and Proliferation Risks Lindsey:  My follow-up question to that and I'm I'm specifically curious about this, especially because you previously talked about how much deterrent value nuclear weapons actually hold. So as tensions of the Indo-Pacific conflict with China and North Korea increase, and the future commitment by the United States starts to become uncertain, Should South Korea compete in nuclear armament to protect itself? Would that cause an uproar? Just increase the tension in that region? Dr. Das:  It would certainly increase the tension in the region. And yes, it would certainly create an uproar. South Korea getting nuclear weapons would be an extremely dangerous outcome for the world. And I'll tell you why I say that. One is, of course, for the region itself, because then you'll have, for the first time, a sort of contiguous number of countries in Asia which have nuclear weapons that share borders? So you'll have, let's say if we start with Russia right at the top, you would have North Korea, South Korea, North Korea shares a border with China, Russia also shares a border with China, India shares a border with China, Pakistan shares a border with India? So that's one straight line of countries that share each other, that share borders that will have nuclear weapons. So that's one terrifying idea. And even without South Korea, that's terrifying enough? That would just be in addition, more terror. Then there's this question of how do we see North Korea potentially responding to South Korea having nuclear weapons? Does it mean that it's going to ramp up production somehow? Does it mean that it's going to increase its potential nuclear delivery capacity? There's also a question of how China is going to feel about this? Does that mean that we are going to see more Chinese nuclear weapons potentially targeting South Korea? Are we going to just see more ramping up of the Chinese nuclear weapons production line, which, by the way, is already at a pretty high sort of cadence? They're building nuclear weapons pretty fast to the best of our knowledge. And then on the other side, if you think of it beyond the adversary's question, what's Japan going to do if South Korea gets nuclear weapons? And if South Korea gets nuclear weapons and there is no consequence for that, why shouldn't Poland? Because South Korea getting nuclear weapons is also a sign that, hey, we don't believe in the United States' capabilities or assurances to secure our borders or we don't believe in the nuclear umbrella that the United States is giving us. Once that happens, other countries which are under the nuclear umbrella, especially in Europe, are also going to reconsider their position on that nuclear umbrella. So what does that mean for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty? What does that mean for other nuclear, non-nuclear countries? If,  South Korea builds these nuclear weapons and sort of breaks with what has been the international norms of not building more nuclear weapons. It's a difficult question, and it's certainly a very dangerous sort of situation, given the kind of public support there is for South Korean nuclearization right now. Preemptive Strikes and Nuclear Self-Defense Lindsey:  In Chapter 7, Article 51 of the UN Charter, it states that nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations. With the immense speed and destructive power of nuclear weapons is even just the possibility or thought of obtaining them by one state, a threat or a preemptive attack by another state. Dr. Das:  This is something that's happened in the past. Where when a country thinks that another country is going to get a nuclear weapon and that is going to potentially threaten them, Countries have gone in and attacked the potential proliferator. So we saw this with Israel attacking Iraq, the Osirak reactor in the early 80s. We've seen Israel striking Syria's potential nuclear capabilities in I think it was 2006 or around then. The United States and Israel together set back Iran's nuclear program with the use of the Stuxnet cyber attack, as well as the recent attacks this summer over in Iran by the United States. So, do countries often try to conduct preemptive attacks? Yes. Now, then there's a question of how effective those attacks are? If we take the most recent example of these attacks on Iran, have they been effective? We don't know. Even though there are certain folks who have claimed that this was a great success, if you look at the statements of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the IAEA in the following months. They've essentially said, some of these facilities still remain. Iran has a big scientific base to draw from, and it potentially has a fair amount of enriched uranium, which is not terribly far away from reaching weapons agreement. Ultimately, military attacks, preemptive attacks might set back a nuclear program for a certain amount of time, depending on how severe those attacks are. But to give up a nuclear weapons program requires diplomacy. It requires a change in a state's feeling threatened, as well as what is going to make it secure. You have to convince somebody that, hey, this is not going to make you secure. Bombing them is not going to make them feel more secure. I think we've got to think about some of those sorts of questions as we think about whether preemptive strike potentially on a potential nuclear weapons program is going to help that process of denuclearization. You might also potentially strengthen the resolve of the country that you're bombing. And so then you're going to have the opposite outcome of what you were trying to do in the first place. So, that's something to think about. Leadership Psychology and Nuclear Decision-Making Lindsey: Yeah. And I would imagine it would have to also depend on exactly what state would be obtaining that nuclear weapon. I know we keep going back to the Korean Peninsula, but if South Korea were to obtain nuclear weapons like North Korea, we know that the leader is a pretty hawkish leader. That would have a pretty negative outcome, of course, with other states in that region. I think depending on the relationship, you have to take that into account and the leaders and how they're going to respond as well, and the strength of that state. Dr. Das:  Absolutely. I think you're totally right about it matters who the leader is of any country. Whether they're going to feel more threatened. And there's actually literature on this. My colleague Rachel Whitlark, who has written a book on leaders and nuclear counterproliferation, talks about how there is a lot of evidence on how a leader thinks about the world, what their life experiences have been, all of those things shape their political positions. And then it also shapes how they might respond to crises, especially nuclear crises and crises which involve a potential country getting nuclear weapons, that is their adversary. So you see a difference, for example, between Kennedy and Johnson. These are two administrations that are almost the same in terms of staffers, secretaries of state, cabinet, they're exactly the same apart from the fact that the president changes after Kennedy is assassinated. There you see very different outlooks on whether you should be going in and trying to proactively stop a country from getting nuclear weapons or not. So leadership matters, how they think, who they are, how secure do they feel. All of those things matter. John:  And countries have given up nukes like South Africa, Ukraine, although they might not have had access to them, but they still, politics did exist, through diplomacy and pressure to have them do so. Dr. Das:  Absolutely. South Africa giving up nuclear weapons in the 1990s, on somewhat questionable grounds of political change and potentially the ANC coming into power, their bombs themselves were potentially aimed at internally against internal resistance to the apartheid regime. That particular regime I sort of think of as a little bit of an outlier to the broader to other sort of denuclearization examples. When we think about countries like Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus, for example, those are countries that have truly given up nuclear weapons who inherited thousands of nuclear weapons when the Soviet Union collapsed and they gave up those weapons under the most famous memorandum, of course, is the Budapest Memorandum, which we've heard about a lot in recent years. But also Kazakhstan and Belarus had separate agreements with the United States with other P5 countries. In return for giving up these nuclear weapons, there were, you know, financial aid that was given to those countries. And not only that, part of them giving up nuclear weapons was not just external pressure, it was also internal sort of churn and anti-nuclear sentiment. These existed both in Ukraine as well as in Kazakhstan. There are two books which have come out very recently which I think are worth reading. One is called Inheriting the Bomb by Mariana Bujarin talks about Ukraine's nuclear weapons, about Ukraine inheriting nuclear weapons and how they gave them up. And the other one is on Kazakhstan's nuclear weapons called Atomic Step by Tokhtar Kasenova. And that talks about how Kazakhstan had the experience of Kazakhstan as a place where the Soviet Union tested nuclear weapons, harbored nuclear weapons, and then eventually left nuclear weapons. And sort of the anti-nuclear movement within Kazakhstan that led to them giving up nuclear weapons. So it was an interplay of both international politics and domestic politics. John:  Certainly the legacy of Chernobyl was fresh in everyone's mind too. Dr. Das:  Absolutely. And that's where the anti-nuclear sentiment in the region really comes from. This idea that it could happen anywhere. In a sense, that's still true today. We assume that we can control nuclear technology. And here I mean civilian nuclear power technology as well as nuclear weapons technology. But every now and then you have a very, very rare case, what we call a black swan event, and you get a Chernobyl, you get a Fukushima. You get a three mile island. So the United States is not alien to this idea. It has happened on United States soil before. And those are things that we need to think about as we go forward and we think about either nuclear energy as being something that is desirable or building more nuclear weapons as something that is more desirable. The Future, New START, and China John:  So let's talk about where we go from here, the future. In 2017, the Congressional Budget Office estimated the Obama administration's plans for the future of the US nuclear forces would cost $1.2 trillion in 2017 dollars over the 2017 to 2046 period, a figure that has only grown with modernization and subsequent administrations. On February 5th, 2026, the New START treaty, the only remaining bilateral arms control agreement between the US and Russia, will expire, effectively ending any legally binding limits on nuclear arsenal size. And in the deserts of the Gansu province in China, China is constructing about 120 missile silos, part of a broader effort to rapidly expand its strategic forces. And you talked about the high cadence of them. Constructing their nuclear arsenal. According to the US Department of Defense, China could possibly field a stockpile of around 1,500 nuclear warheads by 2035. Are we in that valley? Are we re-entering a nuclear arms race? Will we always be in one? Dr. Das:  First, I'd say we don't always have to be in a nuclear arms race. Being in a nuclear arms race is an active choice. Like most other things in life, you choose to be in one. You can also choose not to be in one. But I see what you're talking about here as being one. That is the issue of China ramping up its nuclear arms production of the New START treaty essentially ceasing to exist in 2026 in February, which is not terribly far away. All of those are points of concern. So let's start with the New START treaty. There is no mechanism to renew the treaty as it stands because it has been extended. President Putin about a month ago, said that he and Russia would unilaterally adhere to the stipulations of the treaty for at least one year. Now it remains to be seen what the United States is going to do. The United States could well say, well, okay, we will do the same, and that will give us a year to potentially negotiate some kind of new agreement. That is very similar to New Start. So that's an option and we can continue to hold out hope for that because despite everything, President Trump has in fact in the past made statements about how dangerous nuclear weapons are. It seems that in the US administration there is hence an understanding that more nuclear weapons might be more dangerous for the world. So one can hold out hope that there might be some kind of agreement there. At the same time, the United States might also be reluctant to come to an agreement like this because once the New START treaty expires, keeping an eye on China and the ramping up of nuclear weapons there, the United States might say, well, this is an opportunity for us now that we are not limited by the new start treaty to build more strategic Warheads and increase our stockpile. And if that happens, there is a broader question of what is strategic logic that is going to drive that? Do more nuclear weapons necessarily make you safer? I'd argue the answer is no. Even somebody like Henry Kissinger, who is extremely hawkish, of course became anti-nuclear towards the end of his life. Even somebody like Henry Kissinger in the 1950s when he was writing about nuclear weapons, says beyond a certain number, what are you going to do with more nuclear weapons? Are you going to make the rubble bounce? Which means that you don't actually need that many nuclear weapons to, say, destroy Beijing, to destroy, you know, Moscow. So beyond the 1550 deployed nuclear weapons, do you need more? And likewise is applicable to China or Russia. Do they need more to be able to target their adversary primarily, which is the United States? And I'd argue the answer is no. Countries like India and Pakistan, for example, have kept the number of nuclear weapons that they have at what they call a minimum, sort of talking about a credible minimum deterrence, which basically says we don't need more than a few hundred. That number could even be lower potentially. But it really depends on what you believe, which is why I say being in an arms race is a choice. Because you could choose to say, how about we cap our nuclear numbers at 100 each? Then we can talk about the next step. So that's, that's one part of it.  I do want to flag something that we don't often talk about, which should be talked about more, which is that there is, beyond these nuclear countries, an entire movement, which is called the tree, which is centered around the treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons. It's called the nuclear ban movement. About 120 countries essentially passed this treaty in the UN in 2017. More than 90 countries are signatories to this. And they essentially are countries that have given up the right to build nuclear weapons. They are in favor of getting nuclear weapons to zero. So they're in favor of nuclear disarmament. And they essentially say, look, the consequences of the use of nuclear weapons is not just going to be on nuclear countries. So, if you use a nuclear weapon against China or if China uses a nuclear weapon against the United States, that's going to affect everybody? That's going to affect the world. Nowhere in the world are you going to be exempt from it. So, even if you're a non-nuclear country, you are affected by something that you have no control over. So, they are trying to build up this movement and, you know, half the countries in the world have signed on to that. Of course, the nuclear countries have not. But it's important to note that there is a countervailing force against this idea that building more nuclear weapons is a normal thing. These countries are saying, no, it's not normal. In fact, you need to be building. Well, you need to stop building and give up your nuclear weapons because you're all making us more unsafe. So let's think about that as well. And how do we factor that into our understanding of what is the threat? Is it a threat that the United States is building more nuclear weapons? Is it a threat that China is building more nuclear weapons? Is it a threat just that there are too many nuclear weapons in the world and something might happen to one one day and then, you know, all bets are off? Public Opinion and Democracy Lindsey: Well, it is hopeful to hear that a lot of the world is rooting for less of them. And it is always a tense subject, isn't it? John:  I mean, something got us from 70,000 to 12,000 is too many, but it's certainly a dramatic shift. Dr. Das:  For sure. And we're seeing at this moment a slow ticking up of that number from 12,000. 12,000. And so it's on us to talk about this more. It's on us to do what you both have just done, which is, you know, talk about this and put this out to the public and help, hopefully spark conversations and also think about what we want? Sure, the intelligence Community thinks something and the government thinks something and the white house thinks something and likewise across the world? Like the leadership of every country thinks a certain thing about what makes us safe. What about the people living in democracies? What do you think makes you safe? If you're sitting in, you know, we are sitting in Colorado? We've got nuclear ICBMs in the northern part of our state? Does that make you feel any safer? I don't know. I certainly worry about those nuclear ICBM silos being potential targets if there is a war between Russia and the United States or China and the United States. So that doesn't necessarily make me feel terribly safe. Does that make you terribly safe? And is it possible for you to shape the conversation from the ground up into trying to craft a policy that you'd like rather than a bunch of people who are elites in the world? Lindsey:  I think you're absolutely right that it needs to be talked about more, especially with the general public and people living in a democracy. I feel like nuclear weapons tend to be sort of taboo to people who don't look into them and don't understand anything about them or what they are and what they do. And, you bring it up and people say, oh, no, that's too much. I can't, I don't know. That's a lot to talk about. I don't know. John:  Or it's, it keeps us safe and they slap their knee or something. Lindsey:  Yeah. So it is, I agree with you that it's important. It should be more of a normal thing to talk about, especially today. Dr. Das:  Absolutely. Yeah. So thank you for doing that. Lindsey:  Yeah. We're glad we got to sit down with you and pick your brain about something we've just been just so curious about, because we talk about it with each other and with our peers, especially in grad school and It's nice to sit down with someone who has built a career around it and studies it and can inform us. John:  This was everything we wanted to ask, but we're too afraid to ask.  Closing Lindsey:  To lighten the mood a little bit, and just to kind of wrap it up, we thought we would ask you a fun question, which is if you could personally recommend one place that everyone should visit, whether it's for its beauty, importance, for its people, whatever it may be. What is one place that everyone should visit? Dr. Das:  So I'm going to give you a very biased answer here. I'm from India, and I think for those of you who have not been to India, you should absolutely visit. And you can visit in any season. And there's always a part of India. It's such a huge country. There's always a part that you can go to. If it's hot, you can go to the Himalayas. If it's kind of, you know, like, cold, you can go to the beach and go. You can come to Calcutta, which is where I'm from, where you'll get the best food in India. And that's, you know, that this, this is, this is not a hot steak, at least in my opinion, but sure to create a little bit of controversy amongst others, but so I would say, you know, go to the subcontinent. There's a lot to do, there's a lot to experience, there's a lot of, uh, not just Scenic Beauty, but also, cultural insight that you might yet, and if you're listening to this in the United States, it's definitely a very different sort of language. I don't mean language in the sense of, like, most Indians will speak in English to you, but the language of how we think and how we're talking about things is often different in different parts of the world. Wherever you go, that's, that's true of any So yeah, I would say go find yourself in India. John:  I'm sold. Organizations to Highlight John:  And lastly, at Mooreposts, we want to make it a point to promote nonprofits or organizations that create positive impacts. Are there any that you'd want to share, promote, or just have people know about that are important to you? Dr. Das:  I'd flag two. One is the Ploughshares Fund. The Ploughshares Fund has been working for decades now on reducing the threat of nuclear weapons in the world. And they also have a podcast. They fund a lot of different projects around community building, as well as spreading information as well as understanding of the threat from nuclear weapons.  Another organization that I've been sort of thinking about and following their work recently is called the NDN Collective. They work with Indigenous communities and Indigenous-led organizations in the United States, Canada, Latin America, and I know that a part of their work has been to work with survivors of areas where there's been nuclear testing in the United States. So areas in New Mexico, for example, especially, and we know the native populations are the ones who have been the most affected by some of those nuclear tests. And so they work with them in trying to create policy advocacy for them. And so those are a couple of organizations that I would follow. Final Thanks and Outro John:  Absolutely. Dr. Das, thank you so much for doing this. This was very generous of your time. Dr. Das:  This was an absolute joy. It's always a pleasure to talk to students. It's always a pleasure for me to be talking about nuclear weapons. Talking about the different ways in which they affect us. So thank you for having me. This was a delight. John:  Sheepland. A program about the great issues facing humanity. Lindsey:  A Mooreposts Podcast. If you enjoyed this work, please consider sharing our content and website or donating to a non-profit organization linked in the Donate  tab. DISCLAIMER The views and opinions expressed by podcast guests are their own and do not necessarily reflect those of Mooreposts, its editors, contributors, or affiliates. Podcast transcripts are edited for clarity and readability; section headers have been added for navigational purposes. The substance and intent of all remarks remain unchanged.

Audio & Transcript Executive Producers: John Lamberger, Lindsey Ferrini, Connor JL Moore Opening John:  Hello, I'm Jon Lamberger. Lindsey:  I'm Lindsay Ferrini. John:  And you're listening to Sheepland. This is a podcast about great issues. It's not necessarily about the history of everything that's happened. It's not really about the news of today. It's somewhere in the middle. Lindsey:  Yeah, and we're trying to ask the questions that everyone is wondering. They just don't have the outlets to ask them. John:  Sheepland, a program about the great issues facing humanity. Lindsey:  A Mooreposts podcast. Why We’re Studying International Relations John:  So we are currently, we are graduate students. Lindsay, why are you studying international relations? Lindsey:  Well, I actually have quite a bit of background in not necessarily international relations, but cultures and languages. And when I was in high school, I did a study abroad program in Spain for Spanish, and then I did a study abroad program in Argentina for Spanish. And that kind of got me interested in cultures. So I went to Utah State and I did my undergrad in international studies and global peace building, and yeah, after I got done with that, I didn't think that I would ever go back to school, but then I moved to Denver and I saw this international security program here at Denver University. I thought I'd give it a shot. And here we are. John:  So you were already living in Denver and then you came? Lindsey:  I was already living in Denver and then I decided to go back to school. I've only lived here now for a couple of years. I haven't been here very long. I moved here just for fun and I didn't really know what I was doing. It just happened to work out that I'm here at this school and I'm finding my niche and yeah, yeah, what about you, John? What about you? You have quite an extensive background. John’s Background John:  Um, I, in some ways, I think I don't. Like, every day I come to school, I'm like, oh, I don't really know anything about any of this. Lindsey:  I don't think anyone knows anything. John:  That's true. Gosh, where do I start? Well, I graduated high school. I went to film school for two years. It was like a weird trade. Film school. A few years after that, I joined the Marine Corps and they sent me away to Asia and Japan. And I've always loved social studies, geography and history. And I've always found that to be very compelling because this happened. This isn't like, not to say that fiction work isn't beautiful or compelling, but I don't know, nonfiction always spoke to me more. I decided to end my contract when it expired. And before that, I knew I was going to go to college. And I found out about the University of Denver in 2012 when Obama and Romney debated here. Lindsey:  I heard that. I learned that. Just recently. John:  At a Magnus Arena they debated. And I'm like, oh, they have colleges in Denver? You know, imagine that. It's 2011, 2012, I have no idea. So it was always in the back of my mind. And then I was like, well, I should go there for my master's. And then I was looking around other schools for my bachelor's. And I'm like, oh wait, I should just go here too. And I've just, I love it. I love the classes, I love the culture, I love everything about the political science of this all is deeply fascinating. I can't picture a more important thing. Lindsey:  No, no especially in today's world. John:  Maybe like medicine, like being a doctor, I'm sure, you know, that's great. But for me, like, this is it. Lindsey:  It's just such a large scale. You know, you're dealing with the world. And especially in, you know, today's time, it's really, I mean, it's an important topic to be studying. But this is definitely the school to do it at. I didn't realize it. I didn't realize the impact that it had and the type of people that went here, my peers currently, my instructors, everybody. I had no idea the experience that they have and what the school had to offer. And it's just a great environment to be in. And it's interesting because we're studying such, I mean, depressing topics, but somehow, like our peers in the classes that we're in, we still find a way to find hope and positivity and smile and giggle a little bit, which I think is pretty cool. Is It Better to Know or Not Know? John:  And a lot of the subjects are very like these things happen. People get hurt. It's how the world is operating. And while it can get really dark, I feel very proud because it's me that is putting myself out there to look at this, to be at the forefront of studying this. Lindsey:  Yeah. John:  Because part of me was like, I don't want [No message] a protective thing, I guess. I'll talk to my relatives and some of them will be like, oh yeah, like, mispronounce this group of people in a different part of the world or like... Yeah, totally. Lindsey:  I mean, I used to, I kind of am not too happy to admit this, but I used to be pretty ignorant and I just would say leave me out of it. I don't like it, I don't want conflict, like keep me out of it, I don't want to know, it's too depressing. And it's just been interesting. Since being here to feel that shift and be like, wow, I'm actually really proud that I'm studying this. And like what you said, putting myself out there to be willing to do such important things and essentially make a difference or an impact on something super important that's affecting people's lives. John:  Right. I always think about this deep question, but like, is it better to know or to not know? Lindsey:  Yeah. John:  About anything. Lindsey:  I know. Well, people say ignorance is bliss. John:  Right. Lindsey:  Which is true, but then you're not, nothing's getting better. John:  Yeah. Lindsey:  So I don't know. John:  Right. Lindsey:  It's a tough question. John:  Right. Lindsey:  We'll never know. We'll never know, really. John:  Well, I would rather know, because I think I can be the one that maybe can help people. Lindsey:  Yeah. John:  Or to make things easier or just to be part of the process. Lindsey:  Right. John:  I think I have a good brain, I think. Lindsey:  Yeah, you got something up there. John:  I got a good brain, the brain said. Lindsey:  It's not completely hollow when I talk. John:  Not completely. Yeah, there's some loose change up there, I think. But to be in it, I think, is important. Mooreposts and Why a Podcast Lindsey:  Yeah, it is. More posts, the website. How did you get into it? Just tell me how you, yeah, tell me the process. John:  I was last spring. I got a text from a peer, a student, a friend of mine. His name is Connor Moore. And he, out of the blue, just asked me, Hey, do you want to live together next year? And I'm like, Sure. So then we moved in together and then I was in the kitchen. He might have been in the living room and he was like, Hey, do you want to do creative work for this publication? And I said, Sure. That's really it. And here we are. And here we are. And I've always wanted to start a podcast, but why start a podcast? Lindsey:  Yeah, right. John:  Like in 2025, podcasting is almost over, but I feel like it's a good medium to talk to people, to listen to people, to hear. Lindsey:  Yeah. John:  It's like a new golden age of radio. Lindsey:  Yeah, it is actually. That's a good way to put it. John:  So this is really episode zero of just introducing us to each other in a way, but then to anyone who listens to this. Yeah. But we want to do episodes around great issues essentially. So we're really excited. Our episode one will be about nuclear weapons. Lindsey:  Yeah. It'll be with Debak Das, who is an expert, and his primary studies are nuclear weapons. John:  Right. Lindsey:  And everything around them. John:  Yeah, it's kind of, I'm, I'm pretty excited because it's like, oh wow, like a world class expert. I just like it, I know. Lindsey:  And there's just so many questions. I mean, I even have brought it up to people like, oh, I'm gonna interview this guy. And he's in love, he studies nuclear weapons. And they're like, what do you mean he studies nuclear weapons? Like how do you use them? I was like, no. I mean, everyone has so many questions. John:  Right. Lindsey:  And it's just such a profound topic. So it'll be interesting to pick his brain. John:  Right. Lindsey:  You know? John:  Everything you wanted to know about nuclear weapons, but were too afraid to ask. Like, what about, like, what if they were bigger? I don't know. No, it'll be a little, a little better, I think. We're gonna, we've compiled a bunch. Lindsey:  Yeah, we got some questions to ask him. John:  And it's beyond like, nuclear weapons, great or the greatest to use or not use. Good, bad, what do you think? It'll be nuanced and fun, interesting. Lindsey:  Kind of just, Stuff that no one, including ourselves, like, thinks about when we talk about nuclear weapons. John:  Yeah. And we are laughing and very excited, but it is actually very scary and surreal. It is. Lindsey:  It's an intense topic, it's a very intense topic. John:  Right. I'm laughing because I'm uncomfortable. Lindsey:  Yeah. Right. John:  Right? That's why we laugh. Lindsey:  We just laugh for the next one. John:  Anywho, the apocalypse. Do you like podcasts? Podcast Tastes and Format Lindsey:  I do like podcasts. I mean, I pretty much listen to crime podcasts just because when I listen to, you know, when I listen to podcasts, it's in my free time and I'm trying to Well, when I say I'm trying to unwind by listening to a crime podcast, that doesn't sound too great. But I've done that. John:  I've listened to, like, I like Cereal a lot. Lindsey:  Cereal was a good one. John:  I liked, what was it called? Lindsey:  What was the podcast? You were just, I know you really like podcasts as well. What was the one that you were telling me to listen to? And I think they talk about any subject. John:  In Our Time by the BBC. Lindsey:  Yeah, In Our Time. Yeah, what's that one about again? John:  Melvin Bragg, he's the BBC, like, he basically just sits down with a few subject matter experts, like world-class academic voices on whatever, and for 50 minutes they all compile the most important, concise way of thinking or talking about that topic. And they'll talk about, like, Jupiter, they'll talk about the Christmas Carol. Lindsey:  Like the most random, just miscellaneous. John:  Miscellaneous things, but like they are miscellaneous, but they're not though. It was like, oh my God, 15th century Chinese poetry is changing my life. You know, deeply fascinating things. But my favorite part is that it has to be concise. And so he's constantly ensuring that the subject experts don't stray too far. And he's like, no, I'm sorry, we can't be talking about that. Reel it in, reel it in. Outside the scope, reel it in, reel it in. And the experts are like, no, no, this is actually important to know about the War of 1786, whatever. And he's like, I'm sorry, that's outside the scope. We're moving on. So it's like... Lindsey:  Keeps everyone on track. John:  Highly recommend it. He's retiring this year. Lindsey:  Oh. John:  Very sad, but he's done it for 20 years. Lindsey:  Right when I'm about to get into this podcast. John:  Well, they're all available at 20 years worth of these podcasts. They're all... That'll do. There's no commercials. They just put them out online. What do you look for in a podcast? Lindsey:  What do I look for in a podcast? Hmm. I mean, flow is really important. You know? John:  Dead silence. Lindsey:  Yeah, no flow. But I don't know. I mean, I personally have a fairly short attention span, so when the episodes get too long, you lose me. So I like short and sweet podcasts. I like information, I like informative podcasts, you know? Pretty much the opposite of what you and I are doing right now. John:  Right, well, this isn't that long. No, we're not. So a four hour epic on the first year of World War I doesn't interest you? Silence, Flow, and Conversation Lindsey:  Yeah. John:  I think we can lean into silence. I think we can be, you know, it doesn't have to, we don't have. Lindsey:  To fill every, that's funny, I was actually just watching a podcast and it was a casual one. It was two actors from like SNL, Saturday Night Live, I can't remember, but they were talking and she was like, One of your many talents is leaning into silence. How do you do that? And the other one's just sitting there, like not saying a word, like leaning into the silence. And I don't know, I just thought it was kind of funny. John:  Is it Amy Palmer? Lindsey:  Yes, it was Amy. Yes, it was Amy Poehler and Dakota Johnson. But Amy Poehler was like, how do you just, how do you handle silence so well. And the other one's just sitting there nodding her head. John:  I think silence, I think we should use silence more in our daily lives. You know, it doesn't, it doesn't have to be like this hostile thing. Lindsey:  Like awkward, weird. John:  It doesn't have to be. And even if it is awkward, like life is awkward. Lindsey:  It's only, it's as awkward as you make it. John:  Yeah. Yeah. Call to action. Lindsey:  And on a serious note. And on a serious note. John:  War, politics, sports. Closing: Looking Ahead Lindsey:  No, but actually, I think it's pretty cool that we're given a platform. Like more posts to be able to do something like this. And we're able to even have the opportunity to, in the future, interview and pick experts' brains about these kinds of topics and great issues. And we're just excited to see what happens and who we get to meet and what we learn. And yeah, we're looking forward to it. John:  I find this to be an extension of everything else that I think is important about learning about international relations, international studies, the science of humans and communities, and I absolutely agree. Sheepland. Lindsey:  Sheepland. If you enjoyed this work, please consider sharing our content and website or donating to a non-profit organization linked in the Donate  tab. DISCLAIMER The views and opinions expressed by podcast guests are their own and do not necessarily reflect those of Mooreposts, its editors, contributors, or affiliates. Podcast transcripts are edited for clarity and readability; section headers have been added for navigational purposes. The substance and intent of all remarks remain unchanged.

Illustration by Connor JL Moore LISTEN TO THIS ARTICLE The general goal of the peculiar brand of conservatism that grew out of twentieth century America was to decrease the role of government by creating markets that achieve policy aims. While a strong public-private nexus is certainly important to the functioning of a modern state, the United States’ legislation during the ‘War on Drugs’ seemed to flip the script entirely, prioritizing market stimulation over completion of traditional Republican policy goals. American anti-drug policy is best understood in this context of comparison between its lack of effect on the international illicit marketplace and its creation of multibillion dollar domestic industries. This can be seen no clearer than in the steps the U.S. has taken in combating the ever-notorious cocaine trade. Despite decades of effort and billions of dollars of taxpayer money, the cocaine marketplace has only grown more efficient in bringing products to market. The price has consistently fallen year over year for the last three decades. All the while, domestic industries spawned from the same ineffective anti-drug policies which saw outsized corporate returns to American shareholders. It’s clear from the contrast between the lack of damage to the drug marketplace and the rapidly growing domestic industries that support American anti-drug policy, that the War on Drugs has essentially benefited, and continues to benefit, private corporations far more than it hinders drug traffickers, manufacturers or users. This paper will narrow its focus from the temporal and corporeal totality of the War on Drugs to specifically the cocaine marketplace between 1990 and 2005. To preface, American anti-cocaine policy has been further divided into two main strategies: Foreign Market Interventions (FMIs) and Increasing Jurisdictional Severity (IJS). FMIs are focused primarily on undermining the functions of the international cocaine supply chain through diplomatic, military, and economic agreements with foreign nations. Two FMIs occurred in the period being studied: The Andean Initiative and Plan Colombia. Both emphasized the delivery of military hardware to assist South American countries in directly combating traffickers, as well as herbicidal aerial fumigation to destroy coca crops in their fields. The plans also included insignificant investment in agricultural alternatives to illicit crops, much to their operational detriment. The latter strategy, IJS, is based on the assumption that increasing the penalties for drug use and trafficking will lead to less users, or at minimum less users outside of prison. One significant investment in IJS occurred during the period of focus: The 1994 Crime Bill. This piece of legislation sought to expand correctional capacity in the U.S. while simultaneously increasing the punishments for drug use, possession, and distribution. The crime bill allocated billions of dollars to the construction of 125,000 new state prison cells, the expansion of the police force by 100,000 new officers, and the establishment of 70 new mandatory minimum drug sentencing guidelines. [ 1 ] This paper will narrow its focus from the temporal and corporeal totality of the War on Drugs to specifically the cocaine marketplace between 1990 and 2005. To preface, American anti-cocaine policy has been further divided into two main strategies: Foreign Market Interventions (FMIs) and Increasing Jurisdictional Severity (IJS). FMIs are focused primarily on undermining the functions of the international cocaine supply chain through diplomatic, military, and economic agreements with foreign nations. Two FMIs occurred in the period being studied: The Andean Initiative and Plan Colombia. Both emphasized the delivery of military hardware to assist South American countries in directly combating traffickers, as well as herbicidal aerial fumigation to destroy coca crops in their fields. The plans also included insignificant investment in agricultural alternatives to illicit crops, much to their operational detriment. The latter strategy, IJS, is based on the assumption that increasing the penalties for drug use and trafficking will lead to less users, or at minimum less users outside of prison. One significant investment in IJS occurred during the period of focus: The 1994 Crime Bill. This piece of legislation sought to expand correctional capacity in the U.S. while simultaneously increasing the punishments for drug use, possession, and distribution. The crime bill allocated billions of dollars to the construction of 125,000 new state prison cells, the expansion of the police force by 100,000 new officers, and the establishment of 70 new mandatory minimum drug sentencing guidelines. [ 1 ] This paper is not an in-depth discussion of the three anti-drug actions taken between 1990 and 2005. The details of the voluminous 1994 Crime Bill alone would require many more pages than the scope of research conducted would allow. Likewise, a study of every facet of the Andean Initiative and its impacts on each portion of the illicit supply chain that brings the drug to market, although illuminating, would be a book length endeavor. Instead, the broad strategies of each FMI and IJS initiative will be outlined and discussed as much as is relevant to their general impact on domestic industry and illicit markets. Only the end data point of the cocaine supply chain, the average price per gram in the U.S., will be used to illustrate each plan's effect on the illicit marketplace over time. The assumption here is that even if Plan Colombia’s allocation of military hardware to Colombia, for example, significantly hindered cocaine manufacturing, then the cartel would react by increasing the retail price of their product. The same goes for the theory that increasing legal penalties for drug use will result in fewer drug users; If any of these were effective in undermining the illicit cocaine marketplace, it would manifest itself in increased prices being passed to drug users in the U.S. Increasing Jurisdictional Severity The 1994 Crime Bill was aimed at increasing penalties for drug trafficking, possession, and distribution. Then Senator Joe Biden emphasized the overwhelming bipartisan nature of the 1994 Crime Bill saying, “The liberal wing of the Democratic Party is for sixty new death penalties. That’s what’s in this bill. The liberal wing of the Democratic Party is for seventy enhanced penalties. The liberal wing of the Democratic Party is for one hundred thousand cops and one hundred twenty-five thousand new state prison cells.” [ 2 ] IJS contributed significantly to corporate shareholder returns and had little to no impact on the international cocaine marketplace. It is important to note that the 1994 Crime Bill by no means constitutes the entire IJS investment over the period 1990 to 2005. Rather it defined the period of American politics in which it was passed, but dozens of other bills, budgets, executive orders, and court decisions contributed substantially to IJS during this period. The ‘94 Crime Bill is simply an easy shorthand for evaluating the success, or lack thereof, of the strategy that IJS represents. The 1994 Crime Bill, officially the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, is an example of how sentencing policies are employed to make America a less appealing jurisdiction for American drug traffickers and consumers. The bill stipulates mandatory minimum drug sentencing laws for a variety of crimes and even goes so far as to mandate life imprisonment in certain felony combinations common for drug users and traffickers. Due significantly in part to the ‘94 Crime Bill, between 1990 and 1997 the incarcerated population in America increased 7% year over year from 689,577 to 1,100,850. [ 3 ] To house an additional half million inmates, the 1994 Federal Budget directly allocated $771,000,000 for the construction of new facilities in the Federal Prison System, or a 67% increase compared with the 1992 budget. [ 4 ] The Effect of IJS The Netherlands is the most attractive jurisdiction for cocaine traffickers and users outside of South America. The Dutch have famously lenient drug sentencing laws and enshrined legal protections for the use of “soft drugs.” The problem for the European market of cocaine traffickers is the complex logistics involved in bringing the illicit product to market. The Netherlands, then, is an interesting comparison to the U.S. Low jurisdictional barriers combined with logistics of similar complexity in circumventing American anti-drug policing measures can help illuminate what portion of cocaine pricing is associated with fear of legal repercussions. It is clear from a comparison of Dutch and American average cocaine prices per gram that most of the pricing model of cocaine isn’t associated with IJS. The Netherlands, whose government pursued a policy of limiting jurisdictional severity, managed to maintain relative stability in average cocaine prices; only fluctuating from $66 per gram to $60 per gram. The U.S. on the other hand saw a drop in price from $184 to $75 over the same period despite investing billions in IJS. Fig. 1 Dutch versus American Cocaine Price Per Gram 1990 - 2005. Graph by Braxton Fuller compiled from UNODC data. Figure 1, compiled from two datasets from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), shows a comparison between average Dutch and American cocaine prices per gram between 1990 and 2005. [ 5 ] Cocaine prices in the Netherlands are predictably low and stable. The Dutch have not pursued a strategy of IJS, so it can be assumed that a substantial portion of Dutch cocaine prices are the group's profit margin and transportation costs. American cocaine prices per gram, on the other hand, see a consistent decline throughout the period. This despite considerable investment in making the American market a less appealing jurisdiction for traffickers and users of cocaine alike. The American strategy of IJS did achieve some of its policy goals; namely, increasing domestic American corporate returns. Although anti-cocaine policy failed to hinder the illicit marketplace, it did prove to be a boon for American corporate shareholders. Two of the largest recipients of federal construction contracts in the 1990s were the Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) and the Wackenhut Corrections Corporation (WCC). Their financial performance in the wake of the 1994 Crime Bill and later history of corporate mergers is illustrative of the calcification of shareholder interest in the War on Drugs strategy. WCC described its position in a 2002 financial filing: “We have a leading share of the privatized correctional and detention facilities management services market for the states of California, Florida and Texas, the three U.S. states with the largest inmate populations. As of July 31, 2003, we operated a total of 47 correctional, detention and mental health facilities and had over 36,000 beds under management or for which we had been awarded contracts. We maintained an average facility occupancy rate of over 97% and 99% for the fiscal year ended December 29, 2002 and the thirteen weeks ended March 30, 2003, respectively. For fiscal year ended December 29, 2002, we had consolidated revenues of $568.6 million and consolidated operating income of $27.9 million.” [ 6 ] In the previous four years, WCC saw an increase in earnings per share from $0.54 to $0.96, or a 56% increase between 1997 and 2001. [ 7 ] Likewise, CCA earnings per share doubled from $0.34 to $0.74 between 1999 and 2000. [ 8 ] The nascent private prison contractor business model proved itself attractive to institutional investors during this period and the marketplace rapidly consolidated. CCA earnings per share were $5.64 due to an acquisition by a large private prison conglomerate, CoreCivic, in 2001. [ 9 ] Likewise, WCC was acquired by the GEO Group, a large security and correctional conglomerate, in 2004. GEO would go on to be purchased by a group of institutional investors, including BlackRock and Vanguard Investments, in 2008. Both companies’ performance in the immediate aftermath of the 1994 Crime Bill overperform the wider American market during the same period. Foreign Market Intervention The U.S. pursued two FMIs during the period of focus: The Andean Initiative and Plan Columbia. Both prioritized the delivery of military aid to combat traffickers in producing regions and aerial fumigation to destroy coca crops in their fields. The Andean Initiative was a collaboration between the U.S., Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru to address the international drug trade. As a result, this effort was widely criticized in hindsight by historians and intellectuals of the War on Drugs for its emphasis on the delivery of military hardware over economic incentives for alternative agricultural material production in lieu of coca. The scale of military hardware deliveries under the plan is almost difficult to comprehend. Just in the first year of the plan's implementation in Peru, twenty A-37 ground attack aircraft, twelve UH-1H Huey helicopters, rifles and light infantry equipment for six new infantry battalions, dozens of patrol boats, and a classified number of Blackhawk helicopters were delivered. In totality, the Andean Initiative would dispense $250,000,000 in military aid and $129,000,000 in economic aid. Plan Columbia placed a heavy emphasis on military aid as well. Between 2000 and 2006 military hardware deliveries never dipped below 72.6% of annual Plan Colombia aid packages. In 2001, the first complete year of Plan Colombia implementation, the proportion of military to non-military aid was 97.2% or $1,263,000,000 of $1,300,000,000. [ 10 ] Even proponents of the plan such as Michael Shifter acknowledge that, “In framing and defending Plan Colombia as an anti-narcotics and security policy initiative, both countries focused too narrowly on military and police aid—with a resulting cost to human rights and the rule of law in the short term, and to the sustainability and consolidation of security over the long term. ” [ 11 ] There was even a tacit understanding that vast amounts of humanitarian funding needed to be allocated, but the political environment in America would make such funding infeasible. There was an expectation that European partners would fund the humanitarian half of the operation, but this never materialized. [ 12 ] Both plans failed to address the root socioeconomic causes of the drug trade. This makes evaluating the success of Plan Colombia and the Andean Initiative by their own metrics unworkable. Reported statistics such as hectares of coca destroyed, successful prosecution of cartel members, or number of cocaine labs destroyed, fail to capture a picture of operational success because they lack any connection to the factors that drive the drug market. Violent and draconian market interventions have repeatedly failed in controlling marketplaces throughout history and these two are no different. The Effect of FMIs The two FMIs pursued during the period of study are the Andean Initiative beginning in 1990 and Plan Colombia in 2000. In total, these plans cost the U.S. a combined $8,379,000,000 between 1990 and 2005. Both interventions prioritized aerial fumigation strategies and military aid while marginally supporting alternative agricultural development. To each plan’s credit, the land devoted to coca cultivation between 1990 and 2005 decreased by 52,100 hectares, from 211,700 to 159,600. [ 13 ] Although they achieved desired metric goals, both plans failed to increase the price of cocaine in American markets. In fact, the price of cocaine decreased between 72% [ 14 ] and 40% [ 15 ] in the period of study. Both UNODC datasets show a substantial decrease in the price per gram of cocaine between 1990 and 2005. In total, the $8,379,000,000 spent by the U.S. on FMIs in the region between 1990 and 2005 breaks down to $76,871,559 per dollar the price of a gram of cocaine decreased. The largest single beneficiary of American anti-cocaine policy was Monsanto; the company that produced the herbicide used in aerial fumigation efforts for most of the period of focus. From 1990 to 2000, Monsanto owned industrial patents enabling sole commercial production of glyphosate. [ 16 ] From 2000 until well past 2005, Monsanto was the only company with sufficient industrial capacity to produce glyphosate at sufficient scale for herbicidal aerial fumigation. UNODC annual coca surveys in Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia track the total number of hectares aerially fumigated with glyphosate but the data is incomplete for the period of study. According to UNODC agricultural monitoring reports, 169,588 acres were fumigated in Peru [ 17 ] , 204,400 in Bolivia [ 18 ] , and 1,466,407 in Colombia [ 19 ] between 1996 and 2003. The State Department noted on July 9, 2001, that, “ In aerial eradication of coca in Colombia, 3.35 pounds of glyphosate is used per acre sprayed, well within U.S.-approved application levels.” [ 20 ] When combined with historical price data for glyphosate collected by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, a low order estimate can be produced. In 1996, the average cost per pound of glyphosate sold in bulk to American farmers was $12.25. [ 21 ] This means that between the years of 1996 and 2003 the U.S. contracted Monsanto to the effect of $75,525,181. This is akin in size to the entire $129,000,000 allocated for nonmilitary application in the Andean Initiative alone. The total land fumigated in the plan, 1,840,395 acres, is well over ten times the total reduction in land devoted to coca cultivation, 128,741 acres. In summation, aerial fumigation cost the U.S. around $41 per acre sprayed, but over $500 per acre removed from the illicit agricultural marketplace. There are a couple of explanations as to why a specific American FMI strategy failed to increase the price of cocaine in the U.S. The first is an analysis of the procurement structure of the cocaine manufacturers in South America. Tom Wainwright summarizes the seeming market incongruity in his book, Narconomics: How to Run a Drug Cartel by saying, “The armed groups that control the cocaine trade in Colombia act as monopsonies. Under normal market conditions, coca farmers would be able to shop around and sell their leaves to the highest bidder. That would mean that in times of scarcity, coca buyers raise their bids, and the price of the leaf goes up. But Colombia’s armed conflict is such that in any given region, there is usually only one group of traffickers that holds sway. That group is the sole local buyer of coca leaf, so it dictates the price… That means if the price of producing the leaf goes up - owing to eradication, disease, or anything else - it will be the farmers who bear the cost, not the cartels.” [ 22 ] This same monopsonistic environment exists in the cocaine manufacturing market across the Andes. In effect, sellers of bulk amounts of raw coca can only turn to criminal manufacturing groups to offload their product. In this analysis, it doesn’t matter how many hectares or tons of raw coca are burned or fumigated with glyphosate: the price to acquire the raw materials necessary to produce cocaine won’t change. The only people that the U.S. is hurting by perpetuating a strategy of crop eradication are the growers themselves, not the cartels, and certainly not the bottom line of illicit criminal groups. Fig. 2 Total Land Devoted to Coca Cultivation in Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia 1990 - 2005 By Braxton Fuller Compiled from UNODC Data. Conclusion American anti-Cocaine policy is effective from a perspective of increasing shareholder returns. The public has been indoctrinated to believe that undermining the drug trade looks a certain way. In reality, it presents itself as the rapid arming of police forces and overcrowding of prisons, planes spraying chemicals, and young men who look different from the idealized white American in handcuffs. It is a story of victimization by people in faraway places through the drugs Americans take by their own free will. This is by no means an effective strategy to combat the cocaine trade. It is, however, the most attractive to American institutional investors because it’s the most cost intensive to the American taxpayer. This strategy and this story have failed time and time again to undermine the illicit drug marketplace. In truth, the cocaine market became healthier and more efficient by America’s involvement in both IJS and FMIs. So too did America’s own domestic industries. The effects of American anti-drug policy are increased profits and more efficient business models for both sides of the War on Drugs. The notion of whether intervening in foreign marketplaces or increasing penalties for participation in the drug economy are good ways to undermine transnational criminal groups is beyond the scope of this paper. However, the specific structure of FMIs and IJS that the U.S. has employed fails to place the social and economic costs associated with drug use on those who perpetuate the international drug trade from positions of power. The people whom American anti-drug policy hurts the most are those with the least power, and therefore they are the least likely constituency to have any influence in creating change in the system of drug use and manufacture. It has also continued to dispense huge quantities to corporations tasked with supporting the same failed policies. In effect, it benefits the people who need it least and hurts those who need help the most. In a good faith reading of American anti-drug policy, it is clear that this is a strategic error. The structure of interventions in the illicit marketplace should ensure that increased costs are passed as high up the supply chain as possible. Braxton Fuller is a current master’s candidate for International Studies at the University of Denver’s Josef Korbel School of Global and Public Affairs. If you enjoyed this work, please consider sharing our content and website or donating to a non-profit organization linked in the Donate  tab. DISCLAIMER Mooreposts publishes independent analysis, commentary, and research for informational and educational purposes only. Content on Mooreposts—including articles, Mooreposts Bites, strategic intelligence assessments, opinion pieces, interviews, and visual materials—does not constitute legal, financial, medical, or professional advice, nor does it represent any government agency, official position, or classified assessment. Unless explicitly stated, all analyses and interpretations reflect the views and analytic judgments of the individual author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Mooreposts, its editorial staff, or affiliated contributors. 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