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The Russian Kidnappings of Ukrainian Children Illustration by Jonathan Rockford Another day begins in a small village in the Ukrainian region of Kherson. The morning is relatively peaceful for a place that Russia has occupied for more than four years. Ukrainian didi (grandfathers) lament the lack of cabbage in the markets while babusi (grandmothers) collect mushrooms at the edge of the forest. Children from the local orphanage play in the yard. Suddenly, the quiet is pierced by the sound of armored military vehicles. When the trucks roll to a stop in the village center, masked Russian soldiers pour out. They’ve come not to wage war on the village or demand supplies from its citizens, but rather to give candy to the children at the orphanage. Once the soldiers have gained the Ukrainian children's trust with a few chocolates, they will load them into their trucks and drive them further behind Russian lines. There, Russian “caretakers” will indoctrinate the Ukrainian children into Russian nationalism. They will change their names and give them new passports and birth certificates. Finally, they will send them to be adopted by Russian families. Why is Russia Stealing Children? Though Russia claims it is taking Ukrainian children to save them from the war, this hardly explains the new birth certificates and indoctrination camps. Ukraine, instead, argues that the deportation of children is part of a greater strategy to integrate Ukraine fully into Russia. Through targeting the country’s youngest and most vulnerable generation, Ukraine, international legal experts, and human rights organizations argue that Russia is trying to erase Ukrainian identity. If Russia succeeds in turning every Ukrainian child into a Russian citizen, the future of Ukrainian identity will, in theory, cease to exist. How Ukrainian Children are Being Indoctrinated with Russian Nationalism Russia is working to erase Ukrainian identity through large-scale institutions which impact both Ukrainian children who simply live in Russian-occupied territory and those who have already been taken. Ukrainian children in occupied territories are forcibly enrolled in youth organizations such as Yunarmiya or “The Youth Army,” where they receive a militarized education about Russian history and national values. Russia has a history of using children’s organizations like The Youth Army as a method of spreading its values across generations. During the Soviet Union, children were enrolled in a similar sociopolitical organization called The Young Pioneers. Like the Soviet Young Pioneers, Yunarmiya is designed to socialize the children through military education, patriotic activities, and state-sponsored engagement. The Youth Army portrays Russian soldiers as heroes and role models. Children are often enrolled in weapons training, and Ukrainian parents are sometimes made to sign release forms for their children to go to training exercises or summer camps with the organization. Despite being told their children will only be gone for a short time, they do not return. Once children are taken, they go to camps either in Russia or further behind Russian lines in Ukraine. Many testimonies from returned children indicate that they were not allowed to speak Ukrainian or express their Ukrainian cultural identity in any way. They instead spent time writing letters to Russian soldiers, participating in military drills designed for children, and singing the Russian national anthem. The children reported to United24 Media that they were placed in isolation cells or physically punished for disobedience or refusal to participate. This treatment of children serves two specific purposes: forcing pro-Russian nationalistic beliefs onto the children and erasing their Ukrainian culture and identity. This erasure, in turn, threatens the future of a Ukrainian national identity. The Impacts of the Kidnappings The kidnappings are extremely stressful and psychologically harmful to Ukrainian children. Psychologists are finding it to be extremely difficult to reverse the impacts and thought patterns of indoctrination, reporting that those who come back to Ukraine are traumatized and alarmingly docile. One psychologist described some returned children as behaving like obedient “little soldiers,” displaying symptoms of trauma, emotional withdrawal, and apathy. In addition to the difficult reversal of indoctrination, stolen children are suffering psychological consequences on an individual level. Those who return are reported to have “left normal” and come back completely changed. One kidnapped child died by suicide in Russia while living with an adoptive family in Krasnodar. Even if Russian soldiers were to stop kidnapping children and return all of those who have already been stolen, the psychological toll on Ukraine’s youngest generation will continue to have a widespread impact. Some estimates suggest that more than 200,000 Ukrainian children have been taken. But because soldiers largely target orphans in group homes, foster children, and children whose parents have died during the war, many do not have anyone in Ukraine who would know to look for them. It’s hard to know just how many children are missing. How Can the International Community Help Ukraine’s Children? Despite the fact that international organizations have condemned the deportation of Ukrainian children and demanded their immediate return, fewer than 1,400 children have been brought home as of June 2025. Russia refuses to discuss the issue publicly, often denying taking children at all. Additionally, because many children’s legal documentation has been changed by Russia and international organizations lack access to occupied areas, recovery efforts are tedious and slow-going. Because stolen Ukrainian children rarely make headlines, one of the first steps international organizations, governments, and news sources can take is to recognize the plight of kidnapped Ukrainian children. Greater public recognition of the situation may lead to its inclusion in more negotiations and peace talks with Russia. It should be one of the underlying reasons for continued sanctions and international condemnation. Even as Russia is trying to erase the true identities of Ukrainian children, the international community can help ensure they are recognized. International organizations can also partner with Ukrainian organizations such as Save Ukraine, Bring Kids Back, and Children of War. These organizations know the most about the missing children, have established contact with some Ukrainian families whose children have been taken, and most importantly, are already working to get them back. The Future of Ukraine Russia is not only stealing children from their homes and families but also stealing the future of Ukraine’s national identity. Russia’s crimes against both the humanity of individual children and Ukraine as a nation should remain at the forefront of every negotiation, sanction, and media report. With every child whom Russia steals and every day they are not returned, the future of the Ukrainian national identity becomes more endangered. It is only with the return of these children that Ukraine’s future can be protected and the children, themselves, can begin to heal. Anna Kubas is an International Security student with a concentration in Strategic Intelligence. Her focus is on Russian Arctic strategy, especially regarding critical minerals and the Northern Sea Route, as well as geopolitics and sociology of the greater post-Soviet space. If you enjoyed this work, please consider sharing this content and supporting a non-profit promoted by the author above. DISCLAIMER Mooreposts publishes independent analysis, commentary, and research for informational and educational purposes only. Content on Mooreposts—including articles, Mooreposts Bites, strategic intelligence assessments, opinion pieces, interviews, and visual materials—does not constitute legal, financial, medical, or professional advice, nor does it represent any government agency, official position, or classified assessment. Unless explicitly stated, all analyses and interpretations reflect the views and analytic judgments of the individual author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Mooreposts, its editorial staff, or affiliated contributors. Strategic intelligence and analytical content is based on open-source information and publicly available materials. Mooreposts strives for accuracy, transparency, and rigorous sourcing; however, information may change as events develop. Readers are encouraged to consult primary sources and exercise independent judgment.

Illustration by Jonathan Rockford On February 28th, the United States of America and the State of Israel initiated a campaign of airstrikes against the Islamic Republic of Iran, eliminating the country’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, and vast swathes of the upper echelons of the Iranian leadership. These two states then progressed on to an effort at degrading Iranian military capabilities and industry. From the outset, it looked like Washington aimed to replicate the rapid success it had seen in its decapitation strike against the Maduro regime in Venezuela while neutralizing the threat to Middle Eastern stability that Iran’s nuclear and conventional weapons programs represent. The latter objective would be achieved through undermining Iranian efforts to reconstruct their ballistic missile program and deterring any progress towards a nuclear weapon. Months later, it looks more and more like any American ambitions of obtaining a quick strategic victory in Iran along those lines were predicated on a fundamental misestimation of Iran’s capacity for resistance. On the political front, the regime remains intact and, in fact, more willing to resist American efforts to facilitate its overthrow or force any major change in its behavior. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and paramilitary Basij appear empowered, even while their actual capacities have degraded, leading to a deepening of hardline policy. On the military front, Iran has leveraged its asymmetric advantages against the US to a profound effect. Tehran has blockaded the Strait of Hormuz, thus disrupting global shipping and sending oil prices soaring, while also using its Shahed drones to inflict damage on US and Israeli assets, attacking Iran’s Persian Gulf neighbors to boot. In the coming days and weeks, there may be a negotiated settlement or a further escalation of the conflict. The actual progression towards some kind of agreement is something that the eyes of the global public have rarely seen, outside of recent talks in Pakistan as part of an abortive ceasefire. This has created a dynamic where it’s difficult to assess whether or not they even have a remote likelihood of success. Escalation would likely include tit-for-tat strikes by the Iranians and the Gulf States on each others’ energy infrastructure and desalination plants, as foreshadowed by previous developments. This would be coupled with something like an attempted takeover of the Iranian military complex at Kharg Island and/or the Strait of Hormuz by the US, moving beyond the existing American blockade, in addition to the continuation of Israel’s airstrikes and operations against Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. Regardless of where this conflict is headed, it is worth considering how American strategy has impacted the actual play-by-play of the conflict in order to assess how the current situation developed. To a large extent, the current war is the direct product of a desire to promote full-on regime change premised on opportunistically attacking at a time when the Islamic Republic appeared weak. As international media have extensively documented, US President Donald Trump originally threatened intervention after the Iranian regime’s brutal crackdown on widespread protests began in late January. These protests, stemming from frustrations with Iran’s recent economic downturn, saw the heavy involvement of figures like Reza Pahlavi, the exiled crown prince of Iran, in catalyzing protests and coordinating some international anti-regime efforts. Public life was fully disrupted, protests grew violent, and the regime responded with what amounts to a brutal politicide: likely killing more than thirty thousand protestors, hunting wounded dissidents down in hospitals, and imprisoning many thousands more. It was assessed by Iranian experts like Karim Sadjadpour that no actual regime change would come from these particular protests, barring the sudden defection of security forces like the conventional military, the Artesh, from the regime. Regardless, the way they proceeded proved that the Islamic Republic was highly vulnerable and could no longer rely on anti-Western nationalism and national security as an airtight source for legitimacy. After all, the regime casting protestors as Western stooges failed to stymie further participation. In the midst of this, Washington and Jerusalem likely perceived an opportunity to incapacitate the regime militarily and kill its most prominent leaders. It was believed that, then, either their successors would calculate that capitulation was in their best interests or a new, more vigorous popular uprising would start, with enhanced potential to overthrow the regime. In this, both Israel and the US fatally miscalculated. They failed to apprehend the extent of the regime’s entrenchment in Iranian society, as well as its capacity for resistance along the aforementioned asymmetric line. The result has been a turn towards a longer war, now concluding its second month. Behind this failure, there is a fundamental strategic sickness, one that comes out of the specific policy preferences Trump has avowed and a failure to appreciate the limits of American military power, one which I have previously discussed. Late last year, I proposed a new foreign policy paradigm for the US premised on leveraging the proximity of America’s allies to major destabilizing challenges as a means of mitigating their effect. I called this approach “sponsorial hegemony” and cast it against comparatively wrong-headed kinds of unilateralism that the US has previously pursued. This would mean giving less powerful countries aligned with the United States the room and resources necessary for deterring aggressive policy actions by states opposed to American and allied interests, while also creating ways for stable commerce and diplomacy to continue in their respective regions. While I was cautiously hopeful for what the Trump administration could achieve via its possible employment of sponsorial hegemony, it seems clear to me that it has little interest in recalibrating in that direction. Instead, we are seeing something I feared: a movement towards the revival of 19th-century gunboat diplomacy. Gunboat diplomacy is an interventionist method of foreign policy premised on using limited military actions to either destabilize a foe or extract a certain concession or set of concessions from them. This policy was traditionally the domain of globe-spanning empires, like the British, prior to the creation of the post-World War II international system, and it gave way to multilateral military action and/or extended interventions on the part of major superpowers, as in Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, etc. To a large extent, this was a positive change, as the insistence on multilateral and democratic consultations before an intervention made certain powers less likely to engage in interventions while creating a way for states that did pursue unilateral action to see immediate economic and political consequences for their actions, either at a ballot box influenced by the global public square or in the form of increased isolation. In another sense, the fixation on large-scale operations with open-ended ambitions like “nation-building” produced risks of long-run strategic miscalculation and the constant risk of the US biting off more than it could chew, leading to notable failures, something which has directly motivated the turn towards gunboat diplomacy. What is lost in the pursuit of this new mission is a capacity for risk management. Now fully abandoning the Powell Doctrine, the US and Israel proceeded with these strikes without seeking international support for military action or coordination with Persian Gulf allies. As a result, Iran’s deployment of a decentralized “mosaic defense” and its initiation of a widespread campaign of airstrikes and commercial disruption against its neighbors expanded the conflict. Now, with further destruction potentially on the horizon, a rethink of American foreign policy’s current descent into gunboat diplomacy appears worthwhile. The emerging multipolar world is extremely complex. A simplistic foreign policy built on ham-fisted intervention cannot deal with this new international system in a comprehensive way. The US carries along with its desire to revive the style of 19th-century imperialism at its – and all the world’s – peril, and one can only hope for a change of course. Nikolas Vacano is a master’s candidate in international security at the University of Denver’s Josef Korbel School of Global and Public Affairs, specializing in the study of geoeconomics and grand strategy. If you enjoyed this work, please consider sharing our content and website, or donating to a non-profit organization linked in the Donate tab. DISCLAIMER Mooreposts publishes independent analysis, commentary, and research for informational and educational purposes only. Content on Mooreposts—including articles, Mooreposts Bites, strategic intelligence assessments, opinion pieces, interviews, and visual materials—does not constitute legal, financial, medical, or professional advice, nor does it represent any government agency, official position, or classified assessment. Unless explicitly stated, all analyses and interpretations reflect the views and analytic judgments of the individual author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Mooreposts, its editorial staff, or affiliated contributors. Strategic intelligence and analytical content is based on open-source information and publicly available materials. Mooreposts strives for accuracy, transparency, and rigorous sourcing; however, information may change as events develop. Readers are encouraged to consult primary sources and exercise independent judgment.

South Korean Women's Historic Lawsuit Illustration by John Lamberger & Connor JL Moore Park Young-ja was 15 when she went to a job placement agency seeking work. She was placed in a coffee shop and sold for 15,000 Won. She tried to escape after experiencing sexual abuse and was sold again—this time to bars in the military camptowns of Dongducheon and later Uijeongbu. Debt made leaving impossible. Bar or club owners recorded the cost of a woman's purchase price, housing, food, and clothing—this all became money she owed them. These manufactured debts compounded faster than they could ever be repaid, trapping women inside a system that considered their captivity a business contract. Every week, camp authorities required her to submit to STD testing. When she tested positive, she was forcibly detained in a medical detention center and injected with penicillin. If she was caught without her health card during a random inspection, she was detained without any testing at all. Park spent 24 years in the camptown system. In 2014, she was one of 122 women who sued the South Korean government. She testified: “We were abandoned in this country where we were born. In the kijich’ons [US military camptowns], we were only subjected to violence and extortion. Nobody cared about us.” In 2022, South Korea's Supreme Court ruled that the government had mediated, aided, and abetted an illegal sex trade, violating the government’s duty to protect its citizens. The court found that survivors had a right to compensation. This ruling was historic, but the next step for these survivors was US accountability. GI Heaven The camptown system trapped as many as one million South Korean women and girls across five decades—a state-sanctioned sex trade built into the infrastructure of the US-South Korean alliance. The system was bureaucratized: government-managed, medically surveilled, and coordinated with US military priorities. American soldiers called the strip of camptowns stretching from the DMZ down to Seoul “GI Heaven.” For these girls, the reality was the opposite. This isn't simply a story of interpersonal violence or wartime chaos. It implicates actors whom the dominant historical narrative treats as liberators, which is part of why the camptowns remain largely absent from international memory. While many may be aware of the Japanese “comfort women,” the camptown system has no obvious villain for Western audiences. The perpetrators are allies, the infrastructure was built under the banner of collective security, and the violence was administered through bureaucratic procedure. It is harder to assign blame or seek accountability when the perpetrators are also your protectors. Archival photographs of U.S. military personnel and camptown (gijichon) life in South Korea during the Cold War era. Images courtesy of Blair KH Naujok, Founder & Director, Korean Image Archive. In the 1960s, rates of STIs among American soldiers in South Korea were “far above the norm for American military installations in Japan and Europe.” In response, the South Korean and US governments jointly launched a “cleanup” campaign to control the spread of STIs. This campaign led to the creation of a detention facility, colloquially called the “Monkey House” in Dongducheon, where women suspected of carrying STIs were involuntarily held. US military personnel conducted random inspections at clubs, rounding up women without valid registration or VD test cards. Women wore numbered badges or name tags at the clubs, and the US military kept photo files of women at base clinics to help infected soldiers identify contacts. Failure to produce a card—or a positive test result—meant forced detention. Once detained, these women were forcibly examined and injected with penicillin, often administered by US military medics in doses higher than Korean physicians would typically prescribe, without adequate research into side effects. According to survivors, many women received overdoses; some died. The 2022 South Korean Supreme Court ruling upheld the finding that these detentions violated human rights. This ruling established the legal and moral groundwork for asking what the Korean government's security partner owes. The New Lawsuit: How it Works, Why it's Complicated In 2025, survivors of the camptown system filed a new suit against the South Korean Justice Ministry. They are seeking 10 million won (roughly $7,200) per plaintiff, but more than that, they are seeking a formal apology and official acknowledgement of US complicity. The South Korean government is the named defendant, but the US military is the real target. The Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which governs the legal status of US military personnel in South Korea, contains no mechanism for naming the US military as an institutional defendant in Korean civil courts. Survivors cannot sue the US government directly for what was done to them. SOFA, in this sense, functions as a built-in accountability gap—a legal architecture designed to insulate US military conduct from host-nation redress. The South Korean Justice Ministry is serving as a defendant by proxy. This isn't the first time SOFA has blocked Korean civilians from seeking justice against US military conduct. In 2002, two US soldiers driving an armored vehicle killed two 14-year-old girls, Shin Hyo-sun and Shim Mi-seon. SOFA required the soldiers to be tried in American military courts. Both were acquitted. The same legal architecture that shielded those soldiers is what prevents the survivors of US camptowns from naming their actual defendant. This new lawsuit seeks something the US has never offered: accountability. The plaintiffs want the US to admit it was directly involved in a state-sponsored sex trade, that American medics administered dangerous doses of penicillin to detained women, and that US military personnel operated and benefited from a system of gendered violence. As one plaintiff shared, “Our story is not a history of shame. Our story is a cry for truth. We are victims. We are human beings. We will fight to the very end.” Madalyn Jane Shircliff is an M.A. candidate in International Security from the Josef Korbel School of Global and Public Affairs. If you enjoyed this work, please consider sharing our content and website or donating to a non-profit organization linked in the Donate tab. DISCLAIMER Mooreposts publishes independent analysis, commentary, and research for informational and educational purposes only. Content on Mooreposts—including articles, Mooreposts Bites, strategic intelligence assessments, opinion pieces, interviews, and visual materials—does not constitute legal, financial, medical, or professional advice, nor does it represent any government agency, official position, or classified assessment. Unless explicitly stated, all analyses and interpretations reflect the views and analytic judgments of the individual author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Mooreposts, its editorial staff, or affiliated contributors. Strategic intelligence and analytical content is based on open-source information and publicly available materials. Mooreposts strives for accuracy, transparency, and rigorous sourcing; however, information may change as events develop. Readers are encouraged to consult primary sources and exercise independent judgment.

Ramifications for Great Power Competition Illustration by Jonathan Rockford The ‘Digital Silk Road’ (DSR) is a plan developed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to provide a technological framework to developing nations and middle powers, intending to grow Chinese technological dominance. Much like the physical Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the CCP views investment in middle powers and developing nations as a key mechanism of its revisionist world-order agenda, which seeks to challenge US hegemony through influence. The Middle East offers fertile soil for technological development. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members—namely Saudi Arabia and the UAE—have shown a consistent interest in developing sovereign AI mechanisms, smart cities, and digital infrastructure. China not only offers greater accessibility, tending to approve large infrastructure projects rapidly, often rolling them out faster than their Western counterparts or international entities like the World Bank, but also affordability, noted to be 20-30% cheaper. GCC states are simultaneously deepening ties with both American and Chinese tech ecosystems while pursuing their own sovereign AI capabilities; Estimates indicate that AI could contribute up to $135 billion to the Middle East’s GDP by 2030. China now looks to telecommunications, computer chips, and AI development to expand its access to this market, posing an imminent threat to US security assets, including intellectual property, critical data, strategic planning, American intelligence assets, and partnerships abroad. GCC Technological Sovereignty Ambitions Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) appear to be leading the region's drive to advance cutting-edge technology, making them key investment targets for China. Both nations have publicly launched efforts to develop sovereign AI models trained on Arabic-language data, Islamic jurisprudence, and local regulatory frameworks. At present, only about 15% of Arabic online content is suitable for training AI models, compared to over 50% for English, creating a key challenge motivating sovereign development "China now looks to telecommunications, computer chips, and AI development to expand its access to this market, posing an imminent threat to US security assets, including intellectual property, critical data, strategic planning, American intelligence assets, and partnerships abroad." to account for cultural and language-based nuances. The KSA's National Strategy for Data & AI aims to make the kingdom one of the top 15 global AI leaders by 2030. They have invested significant resources in positioning themselves as a regional economic leader, committing over $100 billion by 2026 to AI infrastructure, semiconductor manufacturing, and advanced computing. Similarly, the UAE provides another great opportunity for tech investment. In line with the KSA, the UAE is developing sovereign AI models aimed at the same goals as the Saudi model. With the addition of the UAE's tech leader approach, it positions itself as one of the most ambitious GCC countries investing in technology. Goals include a massive investment in smart vehicles, a national AI strategy embedded in governance, and the construction of the world's largest AI data center outside the US. The program aims to double the nation’s GDP from 1.49 trillion to 3 trillion AED, with a particular focus on generating non-oil exports to diversify the economy. The US Technology Relationship with the GCC Historically, the US has maintained a relatively positive relationship with many GCC nations, hosting military bases, strategic military camps, airspace, and ports. As the Gulf is a strategic location for military support, intelligence collection, partnerships, and trade, the US has continued to support GCC technological development. However, the push for GCC technological growth posits a supply chain gap ready to be filled by great powers with the capabilities to provide foundational support, whoever it may be. Limitations & Tensions Although military and strategic partnerships underpin the initial investment into Gulf technology, the US is far behind. Under the Biden administration, restrictions on sensitive tech exports capped annual chip sales, amid fears that Russia and China would use Gulf countries to evade sanctions and threaten American intellectual property. This export control uncertainty, which varies from administration to "Foreign nations have also grown weary of potential US kill-switch options—the ability to disable technology at the touch of a button—for security concerns, rendering sovereign technology useless if the underlying compute stack fails." administration, may be considered a longevity concern by Gulf countries seeking long-term consistency. Moreover, US computing chips and tech platforms come with compliance obligations, including monitoring and audit requirements under the Validated End User framework and the 2018 Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data Act. These allow US federal law enforcement to compel US-based technology companies to provide data stored on their servers, regardless of whether the data is stored in the US or on foreign soil, meaning that if US hyperscalers build a data center physically inside Saudi Arabia, the US government can legally demand access to data. Foreign nations have also grown weary of potential US kill-switch options—the ability to disable technology at the touch of a button—for security concerns, rendering sovereign technology useless if the underlying compute stack fails. On the other hand, China has no equivalent extraterritorial law affecting Gulf-stored data, but rather defensive laws to prevent foreign access to data within the mainland. China's Digital Silk Road as an Alternative Model In contrast to US tech capabilities, China offers a different kind of advantage than technological superiority: its technology is inexpensive, readily available, and ready to be integrated. The Huawei telecom infrastructure, power plant construction, smart city platforms, surveillance systems, and data centers, all bundled together and enabled by AI, offer easy integration in one fell swoop across critical infrastructure. This rivals the current US framework, which offers the technology without the integration or expertise. Beijing-controlled tech firms have adapted their strategies to local political and regulatory conditions in each GCC country, tailoring them to each nation’s specific political context, priorities, leadership, and cultural and linguistic nuances. For example, Alibaba Cloud was the first major hyperscaler to enter the KSA market, willing to satisfy the Kingdom's required domestic cloud capacity for government data via a joint venture. The DSR Framework To position its packaged technology, China launched the Digital Silk Road (DSR) in 2015 as the tech branch of the BRI. As part of this, Huawei—a Chinese tech hyper-scaler and leading telecommunications provider—plans to invest $400 million in Saudi Arabia's cloud region over five years. At the 2025 Mobile World Congress, Huawei and Zain KSA announced a "Cloud-First" agreement that aims to integrate AI-driven services into Saudi infrastructure, like building out 5G for smart city applications. Huawei Cloud's Riyadh hub has onboarded more than 1,000 customers in two years, including Saudi government agencies and major financial institutions. CSIS further identified 73 Huawei Safe City agreements across 52 countries, where potential products include facial recognition, license plate recognition, social media monitoring, and other surveillance capabilities. ZTE and Tencent, along with other Chinese tech firms, rolled out 5G test networks in the UAE and supported the digital transformation of 14 KSA government departments. The major investment makes the DSR’s angle clear: invest early and invest big in the hopes of a greater return on interest, namely influence, access to information, and competing with the US tech firms. Security Implications & Great Power Competition Though Chinese intentions in heavy technological investment in the Middle East may be altruistic, ambiguous, and multifaceted, it is clear that their increasing influence in the region poses security and political threats to the US. In the UAE, the US military shares the Al-Dhafra airbase, which hosts 3,500 US troops and acts as an essential Air Force site, particularly for reconnaissance. In the KSA, more than 2,300 US soldiers are stationed for collaborative air and missile defense, using Prince Sultan Air Base as a key US. Army outpost. Already, Chinese embedded digital infrastructure poses a security threat in these nations, however, in the region at large, the US has several other critical military establishments; CENTCOM, in Qatar, which houses over 10,000 troops and over a hundred aircraft drones and the US Navy’s 5th Fleet in Bahrain, which houses over 8,300 troops, are key military assets in a traditionally hot-conflict region for the military. Deployed in these bases are mission-critical technologies, intelligence information, key strategic plans, and sensitive information about high-level American officials. As the DSR continues to pour money and resources into the Middle East, the US faces a heightened risk of cyber espionage. Importantly, China’s 2017 National Intelligence Law requires Chinese companies to comply with the government's intelligence apparatus by sharing data, providing clarification, and ensuring complete transparency. The requirements, paired with leaks revealing hacking campaigns targeting critical infrastructure projects in other DSR partner nations, such as Vietnam, involve the use of surveillance technology. If this is any indication of the CCP's intentions, it may be a path forward for exporting a system of mass surveillance and data collection. If Chinese firms are building 5G networks, cloud platforms, and smart city systems around US military bases, the potential for significant intelligence vulnerabilities is greatly increased. Chinese digital infrastructure firms in the Gulf are not just delivering technology; they are shaping the Gulf‘s digital ecosystems in ways that globalize Chinese technical norms. Beyond the intelligence vulnerabilities, Chinese influence threatens to erode US hegemony in mediation and security umbrellas for Gulf states. With recent strikes on US-partnered countries in the wake of the US conflict with Iran, there have been concerns about the reliability of US security guarantees. After the 2025 Israeli attack on Qatar, the GCC Joint Defence Council held an emergency session, signaling a sense of distress. Some scholars argue that Gulf states may seek alternative guarantors, and that China could be an option. Conclusion As investment in evolving technology becomes an investment in the future for economic diversification and power, GCC countries are actively seeking suppliers to fulfill their orders. In the past few decades, these Middle Eastern nations have relied heavily on their American partners. Now, however, it’s clear that they are hedging their bets between the US and China, which could have serious security and geopolitical implications for the US China’s ability to offer technology as a package at a much lower cost creates an asymmetric problem for the US, as embedded infrastructure from Chinese technology in energy grids, telecommunications, and other critical infrastructure projects ties them to China for the foreseeable future. As US policy has oscillated between restricting tech exports and engaging in such, a consistent long-term plan as an alternative is more attractive for GCC countries seeking development. Mia Navarro is the Deputy Editor-in-Chief of Mooreposts and recent M.A. graduate in International Security at the Josef Korbel School of Global and Public Affairs. If you enjoyed this work, please consider sharing Mooreposts’ content, following Mia on the social media platforms listed in her bio, or supporting a non-profit organization linked in the Donate tab. DISCLAIMER Mooreposts publishes independent analysis, commentary, and research for informational and educational purposes only. Content on Mooreposts—including articles, Mooreposts Bites, strategic intelligence assessments, opinion pieces, interviews, and visual materials—does not constitute legal, financial, medical, or professional advice, nor does it represent any government agency, official position, or classified assessment. Unless explicitly stated, all analyses and interpretations reflect the views and analytic judgments of the individual author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Mooreposts, its editorial staff, or affiliated contributors. Strategic intelligence and analytical content is based on open-source information and publicly available materials. Mooreposts strives for accuracy, transparency, and rigorous sourcing; however, information may change as events develop. Readers are encouraged to consult primary sources and exercise independent judgment.

Audio & Transcript Executive Producers: John Lamberger, Lindsey Ferrini, Connor JL Moore This transcript has been edited for clarity and readability while preserving the speakers’ original meaning and conversational tone. Minor repetitions, filler words, and false starts have been removed. Speaker attributions have been carefully reviewed against the audio to ensure accuracy. John Nobody wants to look weak. So maybe you stand a little taller. Maybe you lower your voice. Maybe you act in a way that says I am strong. Countries do the same thing. But instead of a clenched fist, we see an aircraft carrier moving into position, or a country buying guns or rockets firing across a border. And this is where communicating strength can turn into war and violence, where people are asked to fight, suffer and die over ideas. We discussed this with Doctor Hilary Matfess, who researches war, political violence and the gender dynamics of conflict. This conversation is not about historic battles or what weapons are used. It is about how war and violence shape who we are, how they define strength, dignity, sacrifice, and who belongs. She planned our flock, the fence, and the wolves. Dr. Matfess I like to tell my students my career is really a function of a series of mistakes. Happy little accidents. But I never intended to study international security. Never intended to look at the gender dynamics of conflict or war. When I started undergrad, I really thought I was going to be a lawyer. And then I took a con law class, and I was like, wow, I hate this. I hate the set up. I hate the studying. Hate all of it. And I was in an international trade class, and I was like, wow, I really love economics. And then I realized I am just not good enough at math to be a real economist. And alongside that, all of these studies of economics and particularly developmental economics, where I was focused on during my brief foray into that world, the story always seemed to get derailed by war. It seemed to always be like. And then they were on track for development. And now this war broke out. And so I found myself really fascinated by this, this interregnum, this interruption. And Paul Collier, who is a very famous world Bank affiliated economist, once wrote that, war is development in reverse. And so I, I kind of came into the world of international security through the roots of economics and the way that I started focusing on gender and security, was because I was working with Doctor Peter Lewis at sites, and I was getting my master's degree. And I was working with him because my scholarship had run out and I needed money. And so I kind of walked into his office with all of that swagger that a year old can have. I was like, do you have research funds? And he was like, I sure do. And so even though I had learned Swahili wanted to work in East Africa, I started working with him on a project. On social violence in Nigeria. And that was around the time that the Boko Haram insurgency was becoming more and more mainstream. Were getting a lot of reporting. The violence was ramping up. And so I spent week after week reading all of these Nigerian newspaper reports about the violence and tallying events and deaths and all of these things. And I was frustrated that I was learning so much about a place that I had never been. So I, I then pestered Doctor Lewis into giving me like a grand to go to, to Nigeria, and talk to people and get the real story. And, you know, I really thought like, okay, you know, at that point, maybe, I'm going to go to Nigeria and I'm going to sort out this whole Boko Haram thing. I'm going to get to the bottom of it. And for me, at that time, that meant talking to, you know, young men with arms. And I had this, like, image of myself. I'm going to be like Christiane Amanpour, like, I'm going to be on the ground, wind in my hair, flak jacket on, talking to these guys. And it turns out when insurgents don't want to be found. It's hard to find them when you know no one in the country crazy. And so for my first couple trips, really, the only people I could speak to, were women who had been displaced by the conflict. And it's embarrassing to admit, but I treated that like a consolation prize. At first, I was like, oh, talk to these, like, women. Oh. Well, I wait to, to get the real story from the man. But once I, like, put aside my internalized misogyny, I realized these conversations with women were revealing things that just hadn't been reported on. I was learning about conflict dynamics that weren't being appreciated because we had focused so heavily on the kind of big military story and men's experiences. And so I, over time, became focus on, really getting women's perspectives on the insurgency and the war against Boko Haram in northeast Nigeria. And that became the subject of my first book, women in the War on Boko Haram Wives, weapons, witnesses, subtitle I liked a lot more at the time that I pitched it. And yeah, I from there I was just like I, you know, became a zealous convert, to kind of feminist security studies and fully believe that we've been leaving a lot of empirical and analytical heft on the table because we haven't paid attention to the the gender dynamics of Camp. Lindsey The idea of war. It's an emotional one. It's tied directly to our national identity and to our universal experience as humans. Heated debate can range from being called a warhawk to being weak on defense. How do we discuss war responsibly? Dr. Matfess It's such a good question, and it's something that I wrestle with all of the time because there are so many heavy political implications surrounding war and political violence, and who participates and who benefits. And I remember I was briefing at Africom and, I was talking about, you know, why would people join Boko Haram and talking about all of the the state failures and the state abuses and the the lack of opportunity for a generation of young people who felt that, you know, civilian life couldn't provide for them what they expected or what they wanted. And this military guy, you know, calls me like a terrorist sympathizer. And, I mean, he was really heated about it. And I remember just, like, thinking to myself, what? I'm never being invited back here. Right? I've just been accused of supporting terrorism in front of, like, people. If I ever get a job with the government, there's no way I'm getting a security clearance. But I also just remember thinking, like, oh, we have a real problem when we can't, you know, consider what might drive someone to take up arms. You know, how dire does the situation have to be? Or how appealing does the alternative offered by these armed groups have to be in order to to make you put your life on the line? And so I, I think centering the individuals and the humanity of the people involved is a really important step. In discussing war responsibly. And when I was getting my PhD, I had a very good friend who was getting his master's degree, and he was also a U.S. Army infantry officer. And he would say, you know, every now and then things like, oh, you know, the bad guys. And I would get so mad because I was like, you are too smart. And like, frankly, too high ranking to be talking like that. That that narrative of bad guys versus good guys is, you know, it's appealing and it's mobilizing, but like, can't actually take that seriously, right? Because I think it is just really dehumanizing and unhelpful. So paying attention to the, the humanity of folks on both sides or whichever side of of conflicts, I think is really critical for being able to discuss political violence and war and all of these other kind of violent interactions in a way that's ethical and responsible. John On that note, Doctor Mattis wore. What is it good for? Dr. Matfess Actually some things. John O-okay! Dr. Matfess Say it, again! Yeah. I mean, it's, there's a real anti-military strain in feminist security studies, which I don't totally disagree with, but I, I sometimes find myself a little frustrated by because I can sometimes sidestep that. Yeah. The war has been linked to, you know, a variety of civil rights movements in the United States and elsewhere. Participation in war has been a way in which marginalized communities have gotten kind of citizenship and become a part of, you know, national communities, all of these imagined communities, as Benedict Anderson would call them. You know, sacrificing during war has been linked to citizenship rights and valorization. And I think we can't really look past that. Right. When we think about the the United States civil rights movement. A lot of the, the kind of fervor and movement came in the aftermath of World War II to when American troops had served alongside integrated European armies and came back and said, we fought for liberty over there. Why are we treated as second class citizens at home? And because I also focus on gender. So much of my research, you know, there's this finding that's often treated as paradoxical, which is that civil war can often lead to improvements in women's rights and representation in the short to medium term. And a lot of that is because war opens up opportunities for women to break out of traditionally feminine roles that are devalued, then participate in traditionally masculine roles that are valued. So that means things like going into the factories. There's a reason that in the United States, Rosie the Riveter became an iconic image. That also means, you know, playing a bigger role in politics in the absence of, you know, men who are mobilized to participate in conflict. So war, what is it good for? I don't want to act like war is, you know, unmitigated good. Because it's not, War is bad art, but it has been associated with opportunities to advance causes that I think kind of normatively we all agree with. And so it's, I think, a pressing question to think through, you know, are there other opportunities that don't require, you know, militarization or the violence implicated in war to push forward political agendas like civil rights, like equal rights, things like that? You know, it's also worth considering why do we devalue things that are associated with femininity and work in the home and all of these things? Why do women traditionally only get political rights and representation when they take on quote unquote men's work? And all of those things are worth investigating at the root. But at the same time, we can't ignore that war seems to be a pretty consistent feature of modern life. Certainly earlier than modern life as well. And we can find ways to, to leverage that opportunity, in order to advance pushes for equal rights. John War is unimaginably horrific. No one here is saying otherwise. But Doctor Mathis highlights an uncomfortable history. Marginalized communities have sometimes turned war time participation and sacrifice into claims for citizenship rights, representation and political power. So if war can redefine politics in that way, the next question is where violence comes from. Is it human nature, or is it part of a larger system around us? Lindsey We obviously never want to resort to violence. That's not the goal. Do you think violence is built into human nature, or do you think we're naturally peaceful? Dr. Matfess I don't want to give in to the like, evolutionary biologist burros who are like, you know, because, like, apes fought, we're going to fight. But I also, I think. John You know, this is like a, like a Hobbesian take. Dr. Matfess Right? Like, what would what would people be if they were left to their to their own devices and. I'll do that, like academic thing, which is infuriating, which is like, please. Yeah. Which is like. John You could say anything. Lindsey And do whatever you want. Dr. Matfess There's infinite recording space! No, but I, I wonder how relevant the idea of human nature is because it kind of posits like, humans in a vacuum, and it's like, but the vacuum does not exist. You know, like, we have all of these, you know, cultural, political, social, economic institutions that have, you know, evolved, in the face of war that can perpetuate war. I mean, unfortunately, whether or not human nature is, you know, naturally war like or naturally peace loving, we we do have a system where certain disputes are handled through violence. The United States spends quite a lot of money making sure that we have a large, well-trained, well-equipped army. And you can optimistically say that's to deter violence, but that's also so that we can make good on our threats of violence that we use to try and compel other actors in the international system to do what we want. And so it's, you know, it really speaks to the importance of making sure that we have good people in a system that is built with kind of violence baked into the available tools. What the system that's, that has just a foundation of violence. We want peaceful people involved in that to try to balance it out a little bit. Is that kind of what you're getting at? Yeah. And just folks who understand kind of the the awesome weight and the toll of warfare and political violence and the deployment of the military. And, you know, the, the implicit harm that comes through militarization as well. So when you think through, not just like the deployment of force, but also the training of U.S. military members to be able to practice that violence is is both it's expensive in terms of money, in terms of staff calories, but also it shapes how people think about themselves and their surroundings and shapes how they relate to their community members. You know, I mean, those training and deployment schedules are also really hard on families. So when we think through that, like total weight and cost, it's not something that should be done lightly or flippantly or without, you know, clear strategic objectives which, you know, I think we've unfortunately seen a lot of missteps in the past , years, with the use of American military power. John Is violence inherent in humans is an impossible question because there aren't humans in a vacuum to compare. What we can compare are the cultural, political, social, and economic systems. People live inside and inside those systems. Violence can become one of the available tools. So if society chooses violence tomorrow, how does it explain that choice? How does it justify it? And would everyone agree on what that violence means? Dr. Matfess I find it really hard to disaggregate, you know, the the ideological, the political and the economic drivers underneath war. And I think part of that is, you know, you can ask ten members of an armed group, you know, why they're fighting and get ten different answers, because motivation to to join an armed group is often a reflection of an individual's position within that political, economic and social structure. And so, you know, my partner as all my students now, went to West Point or entered infantry, served his country because in the aftermath of , he wanted to protect American lives. And he has this, like, very kind of an earnest, plaintive patriotism. His father served. There was a real understanding that this was a good he could do for a country that he loved. I don't the same time, I know you know, folks who had a similar path not to West Point, but into the U.S. Army where it was like, man, I forgot to apply to college. Like, woops, gotta do something or I can't afford college. And this is a way that I can, you know, serve my country but also improve my economic standing. You know, I think it's also worth considering, particularly in the United States context, the extent to which, like service in the US military has become almost an inherited profession. You know, so it's since the introduction of the all volunteer force, we've seen, you know, certain communities kind of opt out of service entirely. And, a lot more of this, like, inherited. Oh, my father served. So I served, like, understanding of service. And that's a little bit troubling to me as someone who never served, but I grew up in a military town, has been served, I was really struck when I went back north, for my PhD, that, some people I'd never met in Active-Duty service men in their lives. You know, we're in our mid s. Had worked, but we're completely divorced from the lived experiences of, you know, our men and women in uniform. And that was, I don't know, that was really troubling to me. We had someone who was getting a PhD who was going to go teach at West Point. And so that's how it came up in conversation was a number of people were like, oh, yeah, it's my first time meeting someone who's active duty. And that was yeah, I mean, just mind blowing to me. You know, I think that we have a lot of publicly articulated reasons for war. And then there are often much more crass political calculations behind closed doors when we think about the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. What always springs to mind is that, then First Lady Laura Bush gave a guest presidential radio address where she really wanted the American people to know that the Taliban was abusing women and that it was the United States duty to step in and protect these women. Right. So very similar to that kind of narrative of like our the United States is going into Europe to protect democracy. The United States was going to go into Afghanistan to protect these women who are abused by the Taliban. And certainly the Taliban was engaging in gross human rights abuses, gross violations of women's rights. I'm I'm certainly not a defender of the Taliban's policies, but I also find it very interesting the narratives that are articulated publicly and particularly by women that are associated with like government officials and then kind of the discussions behind closed doors about what is the national security threat presented by the Taliban. So I don't think that it's possible to detangle all of these because I think they're all wrapped up in each other, but I find it really useful to think through which audiences are being given which set of reasons. And how do they converse with each other, and are there ever going to be uncomfortable moments when kind of the the inherent contradictions that often accompany decisions to go to war, when those audiences kind of come in conversation with one another? What does that look like? Yeah. If you've been sold a bill of goods about what this war is about, and then someone comes and tells you like, oh, no, actually it's, you know, about getting oil or, you know, whatever. It's about keeping the military industrial complex afloat. All of these things, you know, that's going to lead to some cognitive dissonance and real frustration. John War is not one thing. People can experience the same war with different meanings patriotism, economic opportunity, public duty, political calculation, and different audiences can be presented with different reasons for the same violence. But when those meanings collide, any contradiction becomes part of the war's legacy. So before we ask whether any war can be morally defended, we have to sit with that tension. Who gets to decide what a war meant? John The following excerpt from the book With the Old Breed by Eugene Sledge. United States Marine who fought in the Pacific during World War two. He recalls when his military unit heard about the end of the war. Quote, we received the news with quiet disbelief coupled with an indescribable sense of relief. We thought the Japanese would never surrender. Many refused to believe it. Sitting in stunned silence, we remembered our dead. So many dead. So many maimed. So many bright futures. Consigned to the ashes of the past. So many dreams lost in the madness that had engulfed us. Except for a few widely scattered shouts of joy. The survivors of the abyss sat hollow-eyed and silent, trying to comprehend a world without war. Doctor Matfess, are there just wars? Wars that are righteous? Dr. Matfess That’s’ a really beautiful excerpt. It's impossible to think through this question without returning to the kind of hack adage write that history is written by the victors. And so I think during wartime mobilization around the idea that you're going to go fight a just war. And I think that's common to armed groups around the world. All right. No one recruits on the kind of platform of, yeah, and we're going to be the bad guys. What we're doing here is illegal, wrong and immoral. And then in the aftermath of conflict, you know, those who survived or those who won the war also then get to kind of write the history. And that can come with refashioning their experiences. It can come with, you know, justifying what they did. I think part of the reason that, you know, this excerpt is so compelling and also the reason that Kurt Vonnegut's writing has been so popular is because it shows the vulnerability and the uncertainty surrounding the end of war and participation in violence. And this this understanding that even though it could be a righteous cause or you participated because you believed it was a righteous cause that comes with tremendous loss, and sacrifice. And so I, I do believe that there are just wars and that could be me drinking the, you know, US military industrial complex Kool-Aid. But, also the descendant of Jewish immigrants. And it's hard for me to think through. Oh, what those who had been, you know, interned in concentration camps were feeling when they were liberated by, you know, U.S. forces and allied forces and, you know, I just can't bring myself to think that that's not a righteous cause, even when it came on, you know, on the backs and in the face of so much loss, I mean, truly indescribable loss. In terms of the lives lost, but also just I mean, in terms of the. The wholesale destruction of a generation. So I, I do believe in just wars and I, you know, I don't I don't need to pull out my Sir Thomas Aquinas and be like, oh, here are the conditions for, you know, just war theory. I'm not a theorist. Never have been, never will be. But I also think it's it's worth particularly as academics and analysts and folks that want to work in policy world really considering what it means when both sides think that they're fighting a righteous war. You know, when those narratives have come head to head with one another and, you know, God, I think I'm going to, I believe, quote, Ronald Reagan, which is a rarity. But, you know, one man's terrorism is another man's freedom fighter is very real. And part of that is, again, you know, you don't mobilize people by saying, like, we're going to do bad shit to people who don't deserve it. That's that's not a compelling reason to take up arms. But like, if we think through the narratives that are being propagated by the Kremlin right now about Ukraine, it's not. Yeah. I really think we need this land because, like, we're bigger and tougher, right? They're selling it as this idea of, well, you know, we're going to restore ourselves to this previous greatness by reclaiming territory that was unjustly taken from us. And, you know, Ukrainians are saying, no, we have the right to sovereignty and self-determination and territorial integrity, and we are fighting this just cause to protect ourselves from this illegal onslaught. And like, yeah. But no, I think it's it's really worth considering, particularly if you're thinking through like post-conflict reintegration or transitional justice, like how do we square different notions of what was right in war? And then coexist in the post-conflict period? I mean, it is a tremendous task. Particularly, you know, if you've been involved in, like, protracted political violence to, to kind of undo the idea of, like, yeah, I was, I was fighting a just war. Yeah. So I do think there are just wars, as I think most people think they're fighting a just war, which makes it very tricky to to figure out who which war is actually draws. Lindsey Well, this next question's kind of about the population on either side of a conflict. And I know we were just talking about the Russo Ukraine conflict. So I'm thinking about the people of Russia and the people of Ukraine. The government has complete oversight of violence and the legal authority to wage war. How responsible are the people for the violence conducted on their behalf by their government? Dr. Matfess Such a good question. You know, to say that each individual citizen is culpable for the violence perpetrated by their government kind of invites collective punishment, which I don't want to do. Right. Attacks on U.S. citizens in response to U.S. military intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan would still be considered acts of terrorism. So stipulating I don't believe in collective punishment. I do think particularly for those of us living in electoral democracies, I do think that those of us who are living in democracies, whether they be imperfect or well-oiled machines, do have a responsibility to to voice our displeasure. Right. And to stand up and articulate what it is we expect from our professional practitioners of violence, and hold that standard and, you know, really demand that the legal system of checks and balances to restrain the power of any one governmental entity, be respected. And that, you know, when those who have been entrusted to use violence on behalf of its citizenry misbehave or break the law, that they are punished in accordance with, you know, the guidelines governing them, right? And that means that means that we have to speak out when we see police violence, when we see our military behaving inappropriately overseas. You know, I, I certainly don't think that we can hold citizens responsible for the violence that that government enacts. But I do think that we can judge people for not when they have the capability to do so relatively safely. Speaking out against that and demanding that their government uphold the values that they believe in. Traditionally we're supposed to do that at the ballot box. John In his January 1848 speech opposing the Mexican-American War, Congressman Abraham Lincoln accused President Polk of unjustly rallying war support by, quote, fixing the public gaze upon the exceeding brightness of military glory, that attractive rainbow that rises in showers of blood, doctor madness. What makes military glory and war and violence so attractive? Dr. Matfess Man, this Abe Lincoln guy's a real good public speaker, he's really going places. If only he had a signature hat to really stand out of the crowd. Yeah. So like I said, a little bit earlier, so often military glory and sacrifice has been connected to citizenship and respect and heroism, and it comes with the kind of coding of like the public sphere, which is such a like clunky academic term to mean, like anything that's not domestic life, as a place that's masculine and for men, and home and kind of softness and femininity all being wrapped up in this idea of like, womanhood, but part of making the public sphere, you know, masculine and for men is also speaking to like a hierarchy that exists among men in gender hierarchy. Right? It's not just about like men are given more status than women, more prestige, more respect. So it's certain types of men are held up as like the apex of masculinity. And the Association of Militarization and Warfighting and masculinity has so often meant that, like the manliest dude, the guy that's like, most worthy of being in the public sphere is like a military man, is someone with this kind of distinguished career as a practitioner of violence. And I've talked about this in my classes before, like, you know, that's harmful to a lot of people. Right. If if participation in warfare is a means by which men distinguish themselves and compete with one another, well, then that kind of produces a motor towards militarization and towards war. And that's obviously destructive and problematic. And that's to, you know, have sympathy for men. What's the tough thing to do in ? But it does seem, you know, exhausting that there's this hierarchy of men is is a never ending treadmill of, of trying to be the toughest and the biggest. And we have all of these really interesting psychological studies about how masculinity is easily lost, you know, like one singular display of feminine behavior. And you suddenly have to like, quote unquote, like return your man card in a way that, like, I'm wearing pants today. This hasn't dampened my femininity. I don't have to prove myself to be a woman. I'm out here earning money at a job. When I go home, I don't have to be like, My God, let me go full s housewife to reclaim my femininity. Because it's not attached to as much prestige or stature. Whereas I think, John, if you came to school today in a skirt, there would be like a lot of like, what's up with John? You know, and like, oh, is John as tough as I thought he was? In ways that are really damaging to men. And bringing this back to, to violence, we see in armed groups, you know, state affiliated, non-state affiliated, whatever. The closer you are to the front lines, the more respect you get. And it I mean, even within like super, you know, specialized aspects of service, you can be an infantryman in the U.S. Army. Do you have your range or tap? Well, have you got your Ranger tab? Did you go Ranger Regiment? Well, if you want Ranger Regiment, then why don't you go over to Delta? You know, like there's always the next thing about being, like, super tough. There's always a next level of of masculinity to be achieved. So what makes military glory and war so attractive? To go back, because it comes with prestige and respect and kind of climbing up that pyramid of masculinity and status, Yeah. So to the point where I had a friend who was like, very successful at performing masculinity, which is a weird thing to say. And I think if he heard it, he'd be like, what the fuck are you talking about? Sounds like a really nice way of putting it. I don't know, I don't know exactly what you're about to say, but it sounds very nice. He's a good looking guy. He's a tall guy, full head of hair, despite his age, which is compelling. I got it. Yep. It was, my husband does too. And, like, he was in the Army and was, like, doing, you know, cool guy, tough guy. Shit. But he was so frustrated by this, like, performative, preening masculinity that he was, like, wear t shirts about, like, mental health matters, like. And all of these kind of, like, softer, you know, quote unquote, like girly things I want to point out, like, you know, no, I don't need to I don't need to compete with you guys to be the toughest because I'm comfortable with myself. Which, like, I don't think that this man would be like, yeah, I'm a radical feminist. But I do think that that behavior, like, does help kind of undermine gender hierarchy and undermine the sort of like, I don't know, race to be a protein powder snorting Neanderthal who, like, hates anything feminine or associated with women. John It's like a, like a positive thing that men can do to, like, use privilege to change things in society? So not to brag on my husband because I, we joke, we don't say nice things to each other. We say nice things about each other. It's great. It's a very solid way to communicate. I highly recommend, Lindsey You just go around insulting each other. Dr. Matfess Pretty much. Yeah, but behind each other's backs, it's positive. Yes. Yeah. No, no. To his face. I did, I, I taught our daughter, who's like two and some change, a call and response where I go. What is that? You know, she goes, nothing. And I'm like, that's right, daddy. No, nothing. Yeah. It's he gives it as well as he gets it. Don't worry. But anyway, when we were engaged, we're still living in Connecticut, and he was at his office where there's a bunch of, like, pro dudes. And they were talking some guy in the office whose fiance I wasn't going to take his last name. Basically, like a fucking pussy. Like. Well, my wife took mine. It like an incredible thing to try and flex about. And my husband is also very successful at performing masculinity. So without a full head of hair, like, he's, you know, he's a tough, strong guy. He's got a military background, all of that stuff that's associated with prestige, like interrupt him is like, my fiance is not going to take my name. Do you have a problem with that? And they all like, shut up. Because my husband's a strong man. And I think they were a little bit like me. Okay. But I do think, like. Yeah, it matters when men stand up and are like, what you're doing is ridiculous, right? And like, oh, no. Like, disrespecting women are like exerting control over them is not a means in which are like proving what a big tough guy you are. Like, so yeah, no, I as I say this very frequently to my husband, like, guys that don't respect women aren't going to listen to me. Right. So I can, you know, I could literally talk all day about like, patriarchy and gender hierarchy and discrimination and, you know, precarious masculinity, blah, blah, blah. But like, they're not going to take me seriously. And so it requires people that are already pretty high up on that hierarchy of men to say, like, this is all bullshit, and the way that you're acting is ridiculous. For for change to come about from certain, you know, subsets of people. John At the height of the Cold War, the president of France, Charles de Gaulle, announced that France would withdraw from NATO's integrated military command, and he asked the US to remove its military bases and armed forces from French soil. President Lyndon Johnson reportedly then asked whether that decision also applied to Americans buried in French cemeteries. Doctor Memphis do the dead of past wars belong to history? Or does the meaning of their deaths continue to guide how societies should act in the present? Dr. Matfess I'm trying to think of this in a way that's not quite so America centric. Because the United States has this particular relationship, to to those that we lost in war. Right? We have annual commemorations of it. We have. I mean, Arlington National Cemetery is a national icon. It is a revered space because of the kind of weight and the understanding that those men and women sacrificed our lives in the service of the American project. And what there's always debate over what is the American project, right. Like, should we be intervening to promote democracy? Should we be doing x, y, z? You know, there's intense political debates around it, but it's kind of anathema in American political life to say anything along the lines of like, we need to forget about the dead, or, you know, their their sacrifice was in vain. Because we have it so deeply ingrained, in our national consciousness that there's was a sacrifice that is to be respected and lauded and remembered. And as an American that grew up near a military town, though in a deeply civilian family, you know, I was I was obviously raised in that. And so. You know, I, I don't think really anywhere there's like a kind of waiving off of past sacrifices that have been made in people's minds. I do think in places where, you know, the military has been complicit in violence against their own civilians, that there's perhaps more complicated, feeling. But I do think when we we think about what motivates people to take up arms, to join militaries, to join non-state armed groups, it is worth considering the kind of narratives we tell about those that have lost their lives in the service of that cause. Because I do think it's a compelling way in which, you know, imagined communities of all sorts really define themselves. So I don't think they belong to the history. I think that kind of the sacrifices of those who served in armed groups are unfortunately very frequently politicized in the service of this idea that, like, their sacrifice shouldn't be in vain. But yeah, that's, that's all I've got to say about that. No, I will also say, like, as I'm like, realize like, you know, I can't even bring myself to, like, speak ill of of those who lost their lives in service of their country. I do you think it's worth noting you can serve your country quite a lot of ways. And we have a tendency to valorize military service, but, like, if you've ever toured the CIA headquarters, you also see that they have a, a wall full of those who, you know, died during their their service to the intelligence community. And there's also those who lost their lives as diplomats, as aid workers. I certainly don't want to suggest the only way that you can serve your country is through the military. Lindsey With conflict and thinking about, just devastation. We tend to focus on Taiwan, Venezuela, Iran, Ukraine and Gaza. What wars are we not hearing about and why aren't we hearing about them? I've spent a lot of my career working on political violence in sub-Saharan Africa. So like my initial slate of like I have one should be paying attention to these conflicts is pretty much focused there. So, like, I'm really struck by how quiet the press has been about the war in Sudan. Right? There was a kind of initial burst of reporting, and now it's kind of faded into the background of like, oh, yeah, still war in Sudan isn't that crazy? And it's like, yes. And geopolitically quite important. More broadly, you know, we focus a lot on kind of declared wars between, you know, either different government in two different governments or a government and a non-state armed group. But I don't think that the international community, academics, analysts are paying enough attention to kind of inter fighting, between non-state armed groups. So battles between, you know, Salafi jihadist insurgents in the Sahel, disagreements between cartels and non-state armed groups. Yeah, all of those are really significant contributors to the instability and insecurity throughout the world. And then the final thing I'll say that we we don't really focus on that we should is the the loss of life and the violence, that go on in the home and the kind of really troublingly high rates of intimate partner violence and domestic violence. And we don't frame it as a war because it's not, but it is a significant form of violence that shapes, you know, so many people's lives. And we frame it often as a private matter. And that takes away a lot of the politics of it and the ways in which it's, you know, an assertion of masculinity and men's power over women. Let's step back and widen the frame. Our conversation began where conversations about war usually begin countries, militaries, armed groups, and clearly defined conflicts. But Doctor Mattis pushes us beyond that. She is careful here. Domestic violence is not war, but it is a significant form of violence. And when it is treated as a private matter, we can miss the politics inside it power, gender control and whose safety gets treated as a public concern. John So the next turn may feel sharp, but it follows the same thread. If violence can be framed as protection, dignity, discipline or control, then stopping it becomes much harder than simply deciding the harm should end. Lindsey We've been talking a lot about what causes war, what prolongs it, why does it happen? What is it with ending a long and difficult war? Is it the perception of weakness on the world stage? The global stage? Is it an aversion to betraying the public good? Dr. Matfess You know, the sunk cost fallacy is a really powerful force, right? This idea that like, well, we've already sacrificed so much, we've spent so much time, we have to at least accomplish this objective before we can get out. And, you know, I'm, I'm a s baby, so I was raised in the kind of era of America's endless wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. And from my perspective, it seemed like so often there was just this sunk cost fallacy of like, well, we can't cut and run. We've already spent so much there. Iraq's going to be a democracy, you know, like we're we're going to democratize and that there's just no way around it. And, you know, that the the Taliban was going to be eradicated. And, it's safe to say here in , neither one of those goals were achieved. And I don't think had we stayed on for another years, they would have been achieved that. But it's very difficult to admit defeat. It's very difficult to admit that, like, you have spent a lot of time, money, energy, and lost so many lives in the service of an objective that you did not accomplish. So, yeah, I mean, that would be. That would be my guess. Lindsey If violence is being committed against me, aka if someone punches me in the face, I would feel the need to respond violently by punching them in the face. In self-defense, of course. Is there a paradox to violence, and is war self-perpetuating? Dr. Matfess Yeah. I mean, I definitely think that there's kind of an inherent escalatory nature to this. And, you know, in conflict studies, there's this idea of kind of the escalation ladder, and how I was one person is advancing up the other party feels the need to, to advance further so that they're not caught off guard. I mean, you can also see it in the sort of arms race that accompany the cold War. This idea of, like, you don't even have to be punched in the face so you can see someone, you know, putting on brass knuckles and you're like, oh, shit, should I get my brass knuckles? And then someone cocks their fists and you're like, guess what? Both hands have brass knuckles on it. Now, I've never been in a fight. I assume people just carry their brass knuckles with- John -I left mine at home. Dr. Matfess Oh, no. Oh, I hate when that happens. But I do think that there's there's something self-perpetuating in that kind of cycle of escalation. And then also, I think in, in kind of the sense of we have to restore our dignity through enacting harm, which like, I like chuckled midway through because it sounds ridiculous on its face, but that is at the heart of quite a lot of violence. Right? Like from bar fights where it's like, hey man, you couldn't again never been in a bar fight. But like, do you cut in line or you bumped into my girl and like, that harmed my dignity. So now I need to throw punch all the way to, you know, the Cuban missile crisis and the encroachment. You know, too close to America's territory with Soviet nuclear weapons. And, yeah, I mean, if I'm going to go full feminist security studies, it's worth considering the ways that that attempt to restore dignity through a show of force is linked to masculinity and militarism and and that kind of Gordian knot that really has implications for all of our well-being. John If we could like, scale this to like how states perceive like a fist. Yeah. Coming out or anything, is it is it almost like a, like a language of like recognizing, oh, you're moving muscles in Cuba. We have to react. Dr. Matfess Yeah. I mean, you see- John Miscommunications as well. Dr. Matfess Miscommunications and perception and there's this sort of inherent tension. But yeah, you think about like in the aftermath of like tough talk, you'll hear like, oh, you know, the United States moved an aircraft carrier closer to Taiwan and it's like, okay, that is to some the equivalent of taking a defensive posture, but could be perceived to others as a raised fist. And so what do you what do you do from there? How do you make sure that, like if you see someone advancing towards you in a way that's threatening, how do you adopt a defensive posture that isn't kind of cowering in fear? And we see a lot of this in international relations, a lot of posturing at the same time that you try to reassure someone, saying, like, I'm not going to attack you first, but if you attack me, you're going to regret it. You know, if you're a casual consumer of the news and you read these reports about like troop movements and deployments and even, you know, high level talks about like weapons sales or transfers, it's worth considering, like, okay, what are they reacting to? And what is the message that they're trying to portray? There is a lot of like performance of national identity wrapped up in this, and attempts to like, protect the, the dignity of your nation. John In an undelivered speech written just before his death, President Franklin Roosevelt summarized his hope following the Second World War, quote, but the mere conquest of our enemies is not enough. We must go on to do all in our power to conquer the doubts and the fears, the ignorance and the greed which made this horror possible. Today, science has brought all the different corners of the globe so close together that it is impossible to isolate them from one another. We are faced with the preeminent fact that if civilization is to survive, we must cultivate the science of human relationships, the ability of all peoples of all kinds to live together and work together in the same world at peace. Doctor Matfess, is a better world possible? Are we capable of cultivating this ability to wage peace? Dr. Matfess Not to be too self-serious about what it is we're doing here at Korbel, but that's very much the mission. Is cultivation of a a more stable, more peaceful, more prosperous world through the study of international relations, and by training the next generation of analysts and policymakers and thinkers and doers to work towards a more peaceful world. And, you know, to tie back to the, our discussion of World War Two earlier and whether or not there can be just wars to also be prepared to fight when there's a challenge to that. Karl Popper, who was a political theorist, has this idea that for a tolerant society to emerge, the only thing that we cannot tolerate is intolerance. And it becomes this, like fun little paradox. But I very much think that way about like, yes, a more peaceful world is possible, but it also requires standing up to or pugnacious and dominating forces, unjustly, using violence when necessary. The debate comes in when it's necessary. But yeah, no, I, I think there are a God. I hope there can be a brighter future. I've got a two year old here, like two competing approaches to this is a better world possible question. And one is yes, and it's radical. And we have to uproot the whole system and put in place something brand spanking new. And I have a lot of friends who believe that, and I respect that. And it's very romantic. And then on the other hand, there are the like marginal improvements over time. People, and I count myself amongst them. And it is boring and unsexy, and it's very hard to convince people like you don't go out marching like, what's the GI Bill for this generation? I want like a marginally better set up for upward mobility through tax credits and education subsidies like it's not a great rallying cry, but that's also like where I see a better world being possible is using and reforming existing institutions to improve our lives and work towards that world. Yeah. I want to direct to the front like, yeah, I'm not huge into revolutions because they tend to blame the Jews and I don't feel safe. So yeah, no, I think like the there's a really compelling debate about is it is the revolutionary or the incremental approach the way to go? And I think what's really fun about being at Korbel is you have people on both sides of that debate, and you can learn, you know, what each side expects. Lindsey Well, we would like to thank you for taking the time to do this and answer some of these tough questions. So to lighten the mood, we have two more fun questions to end it. One of them being, if you could personally recommend one place that everyone should visit for its beauty or culture. Where would that be? Dr. Matfess There's so many places that spring to mind. I loved living in Ethiopia. I just, I love coffee, I love kind of I was had the ability to kind of travel in the North a little bit. And it's got this, like, really beautiful mountainous terrain. And, there's this great little, like Lake City and Amhara state called Vardar and like, I was able to take a boat to all of these little islands that had old Orthodox churches on them and you'd like kind of island hop. And I saw a hippo in the lake. And Ethiopian food is just so good. And as a vegetarian, that is not always exciting when you're traveling. But in Ethiopia, there's a ton of incredible vegetarian food. So that would definitely be one the other one, and I'll limit myself to two. Crested Butte, Colorado, to do one domestic is just one of the most breathtakingly beautiful places I've ever been. My husband and I have gone two years in a row now, and just. It is stunning. And for the parents out there, really incredible playground, which is something I never, ever thought I would care about. But after, like, driving the five hours or whatever to get there, my toddler wanted to play, and she was able to, like, play on this gorgeous playground. And I was able to look at these, like, beautiful panoramic mountain views. And they've got great pizza, a place called Secret Stash and a little local bookstore that's also great. Like, a very solid mountain town that often does not have the crowds of Vail or Breck. So Crested Butte, Colorado. John Here at Mooreposts. We want to make it a point to promote nonprofits or organizations that create positive impacts. Are there any you would like to share with us? Dr. Matfess Yeah. Since we focus so much on global violence, right. I'll kind of direct my, recommendations in that vein, Doctors Without Borders does incredible work. All over the world, they provide lifesaving medical care in some of the most intense conflicts, and they are one of the most worthy organizations in the world I can think of. So, yeah, Doctors Without Borders is incredible. I also am so deeply grateful to the folks at places like Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, International Crisis Group, who are really focusing on providing clarity and well-researched accounts of how wars are actually fought. So any of those three, I think, are also incredibly deserving. And then the last one I would say would be, the International Planned Parenthood Foundation, who provide reproductive and women's health care all around the world. And I think her fighting the good fight, in a particularly difficult time to provide those types of services. Doctor Hilary Matfess, thank you so much for being here. This is awesome. No, thank you all. John After discussing maybe the heaviest subject imaginable, we ended somewhere quieter. Family trips to beautiful mountain towns and the work of health organizations. I don't think those are separate from the conversation. I think they point to the same reality. War and violence are not just things that happened far away or long ago, or only between armies. They reach into how we understand strength, dignity, sacrifice and who belongs. And maybe restoration begins with what violence tries to take away family, truth and the chance to live without proving anything through force. So the question is not only how we prevent war and violence, it is how we start mistaking them for strength. Thanks for listening. If you enjoyed this work, please consider sharing our content and website or donating to a non-profit organization linked in the Donate tab. DISCLAIMER The views and opinions expressed by podcast guests are their own and do not necessarily reflect those of Mooreposts, its editors, contributors, or affiliates. Podcast transcripts are edited for clarity and readability; section headers have been added for navigational purposes. The substance and intent of all remarks remain unchanged.

Sudan and the Limits of the International Order Illustration by Connor JL Moore Since the outbreak of civil war in April 2023, Sudan has experienced the world’s largest humanitarian crisis by population in need of humanitarian aid. The conflict is primarily between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), the country’s national military, and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a paramilitary group from Darfur. As fighting has intensified, it has produced widespread violence, mass displacement, and the breakdown of basic services. The scale of the crisis is catastrophic; an estimated 15 million people are displaced because of the conflict, and death toll estimates range from roughly 56,000 to 150,000 people. Large areas of the country face acute food insecurity, collapsing infrastructure, and extremely limited humanitarian access, making Sudan one of the fastest-growing displacement crises globally. Despite the scale of suffering, the war has not generated the same level of international attention, political engagement, or urgency as other major global crises. This gap is not accidental: the war in Sudan exposes deep inequalities in who the international order prioritizes. Addressing these disparities requires rethinking how the international community determines which crises receive attention, resources, and political action. Inequity in Global Responses After the war in Ukraine began, governments across the world mobilized quickly, providing large-scale military aid, coordinating sanctions against Russia, sustaining diplomatic engagement, and offering extensive humanitarian assistance. The conflict became central to global security discussions, particularly within Europe and NATO, where it has reshaped strategic thinking on regional defense and responses. In Gaza, sustained diplomatic engagement, repeated high-level visits, and mediation efforts by the United States, Qatar, and Egypt have kept the conflict at the center of international attention and negotiation. Despite being a crisis in the Global South, the conflict prompted repeated attention on the international stage, reflecting its perceived importance for Western and regional political interests. Both the conflicts in Gaza and Sudan have been described as genocidal by numerous experts, yet the international response to each has been very different. By contrast, responses to Sudan have been slower, less coordinated, and far less visible. Humanitarian aid is consistently underfunded, diplomatic engagement is fragmented, and media coverage remains limited relative to the scale of violence. The war in Sudan receives 97% less media coverage than Gaza, and even when international statements are issued, they are rarely followed by political pressure or coordinated action. Unlike Sudan, both Gaza and Ukraine are closely tied to the strategic interests of major powers and broader concerns about regional stability, which may partially explain their heightened visibility. The scale of this imbalance raises important questions about which crises are treated as urgent and which are marginalized. How It Happens This disparity reflects how the international order operates in practice rather than according to its stated commitments to universal human rights, sovereign equality, and the protection of civilians. States tend to prioritize conflicts tied to strategic interests, regional stability, or political alliances, which produces uneven attention across crises. Scholars often explain this as a reflection of rational state behavior: governments respond to threats that directly affect their national interests and security commitments. While this narrative captures part of how states act, it does not explain why certain regions consistently receive less attention even when the scale of humanitarian need is comparable, or why some crises generate sustained diplomatic engagement while others remain secondary. The persistence of this pattern points to deeper structural dynamics within the international system. One of these is the continued blindness in international relations to racial and colonial hierarchies. In practice, this means some countries and populations are consistently treated as more deserving of international attention and protection than those in poorer, historically marginalized regions. As a result, some crises are framed as immediate international priorities in the media and policymaking, while others remain marginal, regardless of severity. Responses are therefore not neutral: they reflect longstanding power structures that shape which crises receive global attention and whose suffering is deemed politically consequential. These assumptions extend beyond visibility and shape how security itself is understood. Dominant security frameworks tend to privilege the concerns of powerful states and treat crises in the Global South as less urgent. Structural realism, an international relations theory that defines a state's motivations as driven by security and power, helps explain how these priorities translate into policy. From this perspective, crises that do not affect the interests of powerful states are less likely to receive sustained diplomatic engagement, funding, or political attention. This pattern of uneven attention and resource allocation—often described as "selectivity"—demonstrates that humanitarian responses are driven as much by geopolitical interests as by human need. By April 2026, donors had funded only 20% of Sudan's humanitarian response appeal, despite the UN identifying the conflict as the world's largest humanitarian crisis. Selectivity is ultimately a political choice that determines which lives receive protection, assistance, and sustained international attention. The Stakes Selectivity has real consequences. When conflicts receive limited attention, they are more likely to escalate, become prolonged, and deepen humanitarian crises in the region. This is because international attention often drives humanitarian funding, diplomatic engagement, media scrutiny, and political pressure on the parties to a conflict. In places like Sudan, this means reduced humanitarian access, slower diplomatic intervention, and fewer incentives for parties to negotiate. It also weakens the credibility of international norms that claim to protect civilians and promote global security. If protection is inconsistent, then the idea of universal security becomes harder to sustain in practice. Over time, these inconsistencies undermine claims that the international order operates on shared principles rather than shifting priorities. Instead, it begins to resemble a system where the value of security is unevenly assigned depending on who is affected and where the crisis occurs. Sudan is not an isolated case but an example of how these patterns operate across the international system. It shows how global attention is conditional and that some forms of suffering have long been treated as more visible and politically actionable than others. Without change, these disparities will continue to reproduce themselves rather than diminish. Moving Forward Acknowledging these disparities is not enough. Reducing selectivity in international responses requires concrete institutional reforms, including: Make humanitarian funding needs-based. Allocate emergency funding based on objective indicators of humanitarian need rather than geopolitical interests or media attention to ensure crises like Sudan receive timely assistance. Strengthen the African Union (AU). Provide sustained financial and diplomatic support to expand the AU's capacity for conflict prevention, mediation, and civilian protection. Deepen AU–UN coordination. Improve early-warning systems for signs of instability, escalating violence, and risks to civilians, alongside information sharing and joint response mechanisms, so the international community can act before crises escalate. Ultimately, the credibility of the international order depends on whether security is treated as a universal principle rather than a selective privilege. Sudan shows that humanitarian need alone is often insufficient to generate international action. Unless institutions become more consistent in how they allocate attention, resources, and political pressure, the inequalities exposed by the war in Sudan will continue to persist. About the Author Leslie Carvalho is a recent graduate with an M.A. in International Security from the University of Denver’s Josef Korbel School of Global and Public Affairs. Her work focuses on human rights, peacebuilding, and policy. If you enjoyed this work, please consider sharing our content and website, or donating to Mooreposts to help us cover essential site costs so we can continue spreading credible, high-quality analysis. DISCLAIMER Mooreposts publishes independent analysis, commentary, and research for informational and educational purposes only. Content on Mooreposts does not constitute professional advice, nor does it represent any government agency, official position, or classified assessment. Unless explicitly stated, all analyses and interpretations reflect the views and analytic judgments of the individual author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Mooreposts, its editorial staff, or affiliated contributors. Mooreposts strives for accuracy, transparency, and rigorous sourcing; however, information may change as events develop. Readers are encouraged to consult primary sources and exercise independent judgment.

Illustration by Connor JL Moore The European Union Military Committee (EUMC) should advise EU leadership to implement a coordinated, multi-year EU-Ukraine production and sustainment framework for Ukrainian air defense and artillery ammunition, as Russia likely retains the capacity to continue its war of attrition, and diverting U.S. commitments risks enhancing critical capability gaps. Strategic Context Russia’s war in Ukraine has evolved into a protracted conflict of attrition in which industrial production, manpower replenishment, and external military assistance increasingly shape battlefield outcomes. Current assessments indicate that Moscow likely has the economic and military ability to sustain military operations for several more years, despite heavy losses and economic pressures. Russia continues to replenish its forces at sufficient rates while expanding its defense industrial production (e.g., weapons manufacturing, combat training, and battlefield innovation). This quick force adaptation has resulted in intense missile and drone campaigns against Ukraine’s critical infrastructure and civilians. Russia has fired over 700 missiles since the start of 2026 against Ukraine’s infrastructure. As of late January, Ukraine’s electrical system could reportedly meet only ~60% of national demand. Russia’s drone production capacity is ~30,000 per year and could double in 2026. Ukraine’s ability to resist this strategy remains heavily dependent on Western military assistance, particularly advanced air-defense systems and critical munitions. Western support has enabled Kyiv to maintain frontline operations and offset Moscow’s advantages in defense production and manpower. Although European states account for most assistance, the U.S. still supplies critical military assets dubbed ‘high-end enablers’ (e.g., High Mobility Artillery Rocket System [HIMARS], Patriot systems [PAC-3], and howitzer ammunition). Ukraine’s annual interceptor demand is estimated at ~4,800. These trends likely reinforce Moscow’s belief that prolonging the war will gradually erode Western support and Kyiv’s ability to sustain its defense. Critical Analysis Three factors threaten the sustainability of Ukraine’s defenses. (1) Europe’s current support structure continues to treat the war as a crisis-response aid instead of a prolonged war. Through ad hoc national initiatives, European states have transferred critical equipment from national stockpiles and launched numerous assistance programs, but these efforts have remained fragmented across national procurement systems and lack sustained coordination for long-term force deployment. As U.S. military aid is projected to decline—sharply by 2028—the EU’s current voluntary, ad hoc support framework is insufficient to the predictable, strategically coordinated, industrial-scale production needed to offset the loss of U.S. assistance. (2) This production gap is compounded by Europe and Ukraine’s structural reliance on U.S. systems. Ukraine’s U.S.-made munitions include 70% of long-range anti-aircraft systems, 86% of rocket artillery, and 82% of howitzer ammunition. While the European defense base has significantly ramped up production of ballistic missile defense interceptors, it has not kept pace with Moscow’s ballistic missile production. (3) The expanding U.S. conflict in Iran could further complicate this situation as the U.S. risks depleting its stockpiles (i.e., PAC-3 systems). Over the four years of war in Ukraine, Kyiv has received ~600 PAC-3s for its air defense, whereas the U.S. used 800 in just the first five days of its war with Iran. Although the U.S. aims to scale up PAC-3 production to 2,000 per year, this increase is likely too late to adequately support Ukrainian air defenses in 2026, forcing Kyiv to make difficult decisions about what to protect. Recommendations (1) The EUMC should advise the Political and Security Committee to establish a coordinated multi-year European munitions sustainment framework focused on expanding production of air defense systems, artillery ammunition, and other high-demand munitions required for prolonged industrial warfare. The conflict has demonstrated the necessity for sustained production capacity and reliable supply chains. Coordinated European procurement and long-term contracts would meet the demand required for Europe's defense industry to further ramp up production and reduce reliance on depleting U.S. stockpiles. (2) Coinciding with the European framework, the EUMC should direct the EU Military Staff to establish a standing, integrated EU-Ukraine force-and-industry partnership. Ukraine’s wartime innovation has rapidly expanded domestic capabilities in drones, electronic warfare systems, and other battlefield technologies. Integrating these networks would increase output and procurement efficiency for Ukraine while also bolstering Europe’s long-term deterrence posture. Connor JL Moore is a current master’s candidate for International Security at the University of Denver’s Josef Korbel School of Global and Public Affairs. If you enjoyed this work, please consider sharing our content and website or donating to a non-profit organization linked in the Donate tab. DISCLAIMER Mooreposts publishes independent analysis, commentary, and research for informational and educational purposes only. Content on Mooreposts—including articles, Mooreposts Bites, strategic intelligence assessments, opinion pieces, interviews, and visual materials—does not constitute legal, financial, medical, or professional advice, nor does it represent any government agency, official position, or classified assessment. Unless explicitly stated, all analyses and interpretations reflect the views and analytic judgments of the individual author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Mooreposts, its editorial staff, or affiliated contributors. Strategic intelligence and analytical content is based on open-source information and publicly available materials. Mooreposts strives for accuracy, transparency, and rigorous sourcing; however, information may change as events develop. Readers are encouraged to consult primary sources and exercise independent judgment.

Illustration by Bodhi Harrison We are currently living in uncertain times in the international landscape. Challenges are being made against the international status quo and balance of power that was established by the U.S. and its allies following the Soviet Union’s collapse. Contemporary debates now surround what type of international system currently exists with its given balance of power. This piece educates on these debates and answers: How can the current international system be defined? Starting with concepts, definitions, and perspectives, a framework is established to then review the system’s current polarity. America and China are predominantly considered due to a lack of other powers that can fit a challenger status, but also since what was expected to be a swift victory in Ukraine, exposed severe military and economic weaknesses for Russia. We then conclude with a critical assessment of the debate and polarity’s methodological issues. I argue: The current system is uni-multipolar due to U.S. predominance in traditional measurements and apparent independent national interests amongst second-tier powers who compete with one another and with tertiary powers in their respective regions. However, polarity itself should only be used as a starting point to power inquiries and not go beyond that as it has significant conceptual and application issues. Polarity in international relations is a method that measures the power distribution among nation-states and coalitions/blocs in an international system. Traditional power measurements typically measure control over resources—economic, military, technological, and geopolitical capacities, and/or control over actors—a state’s hard and soft power abilities to influence or control the actions, preferences, and decisions of other states.[1] The method defines three systems. Unipolarity has one predominant power whose capabilities are fundamentally unmatched by any other power(s).[2] Bipolarity requires parity between two dominant powers’ capabilities. Both wield control over international affairs, creating a zero-sum game where lesser powers join either of the two powers’ blocs.[3] Multipolarity consists of at least three significant powers.[4] Here, states can alter relationships with one another with little repercussion, yet resolving international issues requires multilateralism.[5] Importantly, in bi-and-multipolarity, there is frequent and systemic power-balancing, whereas unipolarity has no meaningful power-balancing efforts against the unipole since it holds predominance.[6] Contemporary debates include some who believe the system is multipolar due to an emerging range of divergent interests amongst states and a significantly decreased share of power between America and China.[7] Others argue it’s bipolar and will remain so because America and China’s capacities are unmatched, creating an all-encompassing rivalry.[8] Those opposing both claim there’s a “partial unipolarity” which won’t shift for decades due to the dominance of U.S. capacities.[9] Below, we assess the polarity of the current system. Starting with economic metrics, America retains the largest and strongest economy with a $10.2 billion gap in GDP over China.[10] Moreover, no other power comes close to America’s staggering leads in global corporate profit shares and R&D investing.[11] Importantly, post-pandemic, America’s economy has fully recovered and grown, while China’s has stagnated and even declined, indicating it may not economically displace America for the foreseeable future.[12] Yet, if China is able to correct its economic woes and current trends continue, the Chinese economy could surpass America’s by 2035.[13] Demographically, China may face a dire population crisis. Projections expect a decrease of almost half its population by 2100.[14] Extrapolating this, China’s rapidly declining working-age population poses serious issues of providing for its aging population. The U.S. population, however, is expected to remain stable and when put together with its alliance blocs, it will be competitive with China this next century.[15] Regarding other powers, India’s demographics are incredibly strong. Yet their prevalent poverty hinders their ability to translate its demographics into significant power projection, negating its challenger status until late this century.[16] In total, in the near-term, China will maintain a significant population, holding over 50 million young males to the U.S.’s 12 million.[17] However, America checks off the first box of economic power, retaining the strongest and largest economy, but this is likely tentative. Militarily, there’s evidence that America holds a lead over China in every key military category. America’s unmatched defense spending and military R&D investments have maintained its technologically superior military material and in turn its command over the sea, air, land, and space.[18] In the past three years, however, measurements have become blurred. China has conducted the most rapid military build-up since World War II. Along with China holding the world's largest number of active troops, its defense firms have produced hundreds of military assets and doubled its nuclear arsenal, making them now competitive with the U.S.’s leviathans (i.e., Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Boeing, etc.).[19] There are two possible ways to make a distinction between the two powers’ military capacities. The first, which is most shaky for arguing U.S. military dominance, is U.S.-Chinese wargame simulations. These indicate the U.S. would prevail in most scenarios in a conflict over Taiwan, leaving China completely devastated. However, the cost of Taiwan’s defense would be steep. Hundreds of military assets and tens of thousands of American troops would be lost, but also, America’s global standing would be diminished for many years[20] and the world’s economy would likely fall into crisis.[21] Second, in projection capabilities, China is likely limited to only Taiwan and a while out from being capable of threatening Japan.[22] This is part due to its lacking military sophistication but also its unfavorable geographical position where it’s flanked by “distrustful neighbors” who hedge against its rise.[23] Conversely, America can still “go global” responding to aggressors with severe hard power and economic punishments through its deeply embedded alliance structures.[24] This has been apparent in President Biden’s recent Indo-Pacific military build-up, deployment of nuclear-capable military assets to the region, and enhanced partnerships like AUKUS. These actions have increased the level of complexity for Chinese contingencies and created multiple “pathways to preclude Chinese efforts to overturn the status quo.”[25] This all indicates an apparent—yet slipping—American military advantage over China, checking off the second power criteria box. Diplomacy-wise, we bring in the emerging middle powers[26] whose strong demographics and rising economies have enhanced their geopolitical capacities and formed independent interests.[27] China has targeted such powers and other Global South nations through efforts like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which has 150 member-states, and offers great incentives (i.e., Chinese foreign investments for infrastructure) to joining an alternative world order to the U.S.’s.[28] With efforts like the BRI, China has been successful in embedding such initiatives in the UN. This has paid dividends. In 2023, China’s influence over its initiative’s member-states successfully voted to quash debate in the UN’s Human Rights Council over China’s human rights abuses against its Uyghur population. However, the effectiveness of these efforts in swaying public opinion is unclear and amongst key Asian leaders, there remains a preference for further U.S. alignment. Globally too, U.S. foreign investment remains more desired than China’s.[29] Additionally, the Russo-Chinese led BRICS+ aims to transpose the global dollar-standard.[30] This conglomerate now makes up 45 percent of the world’s population, 30 percent of oil output, and 35 percent of purchasing power parity (PPP)—compared to the G7’s 27 percent PPP.[31] However, BRICS+ also appears divided with diverging interests over its objectives. Some members want the organization to be a tool for coalescing against the U.S. Others want to utilize it to reform the system where powers can steer between the U.S. and China.[32] America has issues too. The EU overlooks China’s involvement in Ukraine as China still makes up 15 percent of total EU trade.[33] China also remains Japan’s and most Asian state’s largest trading partner.[34] Furthermore, in a visit to China, German leadership recently stated it would make partnerships with all newly emerging “centers of power”[35] and France’s president noted that France wouldn’t follow America in matters (i.e., Taiwan) that don’t concern French interests.[36] In review, China has been making strides in growing its influence, yet its efforts are still met with skepticism and while there are emerging cracks in U.S. alliance structures, America maintains stronger alliances and global preference for its aid—checking off the final box of diplomatic power metrics. One final aspect of power omitted from rudimentary assessments are Chinese covert cyber operations. China and its autocratic allies like Iran and Russia have conducted information warfare that aims to cause domestic chaos within America and spread disinformation globally. Using digital media platforms, they have attempted to undermine democracy by manipulating public opinion, eroding trust in the electoral system, and enhancing political divisions in the U.S. electorate.[37] Internationally, Moscow’s disinformation campaign has been effective in keeping the middle powers neutral over their war in Ukraine while even growing resentment against America, framing it as a belligerent power.[38] China has bankrolled many of these efforts[39] and spends billions annually on digital censorship, disinformation, and propaganda across the globe.[40] While it’s hard, if not unrealistic, to measure efforts like these, they present new metrics and challenges to appraise a state’s ability to exert power and achieve its international objectives. Moving to a critical assessment, we start with bipolarity advocates whose arguments don’t fit the bill. China hasn’t yet reached parity with U.S. capacities and the nature amongst both isn’t a zero-sum game. Here, multipolarity succeeds. Pertinent powers dominantly desire neutrality, navigating between America and China, while pursuing their interests. However, multipolarity isn’t resolved since America holds, albeit a dissipating, predominance and no other power is in the league of either America or China. Bi-and-multipolarity proponents might cite current power-balancing as evidence against unipolarity. However, U.S.-Israeli aid has produced successes against its adversaries and potentially ended Iran’s regional ascendency.[41] Moscow’s Ukraine miscalculation too has imposed significant stress on Russia’s military, exposing deficiencies, and serious economic obstacles to its survival.[42] Thus, these don’t pose meaningful power-balancing in traditional measurements as they aren't direct threats to America's near-term security and capacities. That said, multipolarity is correct with contemporary issues requiring multilateralism like NATO’s support for Ukraine, the EU’s sanctions against Russia, and Israeli balancing against Iran. America, then, maintains an advantage with no meaningful balancing against it—negating true multipolarity, yet there’s apparent multilateralism and independent interests—questioning unipolarity. What’s to be made of this? Huntington (1991) provides a solution, “a strange hybrid,” where the system is uni-multipolar. The system consists of one predominant power in every power metric who has highly desired resources, letting it flex significant power to alter/negate other powers actions. But it still requires multilateralism for addressing international issues. Simultaneously, second-tier regional powers pursue their interests but compete with one another and tertiary powers in their respective regions.[43] These secondary powers include China, India, and Japan in Asia; Germany, France, the EU, and Russia in Europe; Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Iran in the Middle East; South Africa and Egypt in Africa; and Brazil in South America. Such powers compete with one another (e.g., India and China over territorial disputes and their geo-political rivalry; the EU, Germany, and France against Russia over Ukraine; and Israel against Iran within the ongoing regional conflict). Then, there are the tertiary powers who compete with secondary powers in their respective regions (e.g., Pakistan and India’s rivalry; Britain’s Brexit against the EU and challenges to EU and NATO policy from the likes of Hungary and Türkiye, respectively; Lebanon in relation to Israel; and Argentina and Mexico’s geopolitical competition towards Brazil). While the system is best described as uni-multipolar, polarity has conceptual and application issues. It over-simplifies the complexity of power and neglects critical factors like the force of ideology, culture, leaders’ characteristics, and covert methods that possibly have significant impacts on power. In addition, it’s unclear if polarity measurements create an adequate construct when attempting to predict and explain the likelihood of how a great power’s capabilities can be translated into achieving its international objectives. Consider the Vietnam War and the war in Afghanistan where the U.S. was on paper the clear military favorite in both. Yet, the Viet Cong prevailed in Vietnam and the war in Afghanistan became the longest American military conflict, reaching 20 years until it pulled out in 2021. Clearly too, the method struggles to capture moments of power shifts or transitions, hence the need for a “uni-multipolar” concept. Polarity, moreover, cannot account for the interdependencies in such a globalized world and the lack of consistent and transparent data reporting from China creates skepticism for any of its measurements. Finally, on top of these, the lack of any consensus on the polarity of the current system and the wide range of different techniques used, displays its inadequacy as a normative method. Therefore, polarity should only be used as a starting point in power inquiries. Indeed, it can be a valuable tool in gaining a basic understanding, but it should not go beyond that, especially in foreign policy considerations and development. Connor J.L. Moore is a current master’s candidate for International Security at the University of Denver’s Josef Korbel School of Global and Public Affairs. If you enjoyed this work, please consider sharing our content and website or donating to a non-profit organization linked in the Donate tab.

Illustration by Connor JL Moore America's collective myopia is dooming its foreign policy. Just after exiting Afghanistan following over twenty years of a futile exercise in nation-building by the U.S. military, the newest iteration of the Trump administration wants the U.S. military to embark on a similar undertaking in Mexico. A central tenet of Trump’s second administrative platform has been his ‘tough on cartels’ policy. When discussing the issue, he has ranged from alluding heavily to outright stating that he intends to employ military force against cartels to stymie illicit activity on the southern U.S. border. Mexican drug cartels undoubtedly raise legitimate security concerns for the U.S. However, military intervention in Latin America would worsen the issue. U.S. military action will fail to adequately address the demand for drugs, the economic impacts of cartels, and long-term strategic goals in Mexico. Furthermore, unilateral U.S. military action against cartels has a strong possibility of fomenting yet another insurgency, inevitably demanding far greater resources than the U.S. will be willing to dedicate. Despite the cartels’ exacerbation of public health concerns, this matter’s preeminent treatment as a national security issue may result in a loss of focus on burgeoning security threats in Europe and Asia. Foreign Terrorist Organizations and Insurgencies Drug cartels are not terrorist organizations. While they may employ violent tactics to coerce and control aspects of their local government and populace, they lack the ideological components necessary to be considered extremists. Even if their violent strategies look familiar to other terror groups and insurgencies fought by the U.S. in the past, cartels are profit-driven entities. As such, they operate more similarly to businesses than terrorist groups. Dismantling cartels requires unique efforts divorced from their ill-advised treatment as purveyors of terrorism. In light of this reality, labeling drug cartels as foreign terrorist organizations is unhelpful in actually mitigating their influence. While this policy position may allow for a deployment of military force, it fails to address effective means of combating and categorizing cartels. Furthermore, drug cartels are not leading an insurgency. As such, past lessons in counter-insurgency strategy will only be tangentially applicable. Despite the cartels' integration into the local populace and their past community outreach work, they are not insurgents bent on replacing the Mexican government. Rather, they actively benefit from the corruption and ineffectiveness of the current Mexican regime. Therefore, replacing the government through means of insurgency is of little use to Mexican criminal organizations. These groups desire the freedom necessary to continue conducting business and turning profits. Due to these unique factors, the U.S. cannot effectively fight cartels using strategies previously employed against insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan. Past Failures There is ample evidence of failed military action against drug cartels in Mexico. Numerous Mexican presidents have used varying levels of military action to weaken, deter, and cripple drug cartels in Mexico. Past responses by Mexican presidents have demonstrated how poorly military force has fared against cartels. Despite these attempts to suppress cartels, Mexican drug trafficking organizations are arguably at their strongest, as customers in the U.S. have increased demand for their products year over year. U.S. military action in Mexico will not change the demand from consumers. As such, addressing the supply of drugs without confronting demand in the U.S. will only result in a deficient outcome, unlikely to meaningfully reduce drug trafficking into the U.S. Attacking the cartels has no clear military end-state. It possesses echoes of yet another ‘forever-war’ where U.S. military involvement may necessitate a prolonged presence and strategy that cannot be bound by time. In a democracy with an ever-shortening attention span, this type of conflict does not play to the strengths of the U.S. military and political structure. U.S. military action will only worsen the situation in the immediate future. Economic Impact The economic significance of cartels cannot be ignored. Cartels supply sizable amounts of money and employment to citizens. Removing them would eliminate a notable portion of the Mexican economy, further destabilizing the region. When aggregated, the cartels are estimated to be the fifth-largest employer of people in Mexico, outpacing many large U.S. corporations operating in the country. Their contributions to the Mexican economy are meaningful and must be thoughtfully considered when making strategic plans relating to their elimination. Simply dismantling the cartels will not be enough. Due to their lucrative nature, this will only result in the creation of a vacuum to be exploited by other industries and criminal groups. Removing supply without addressing U.S. and global demand will not solve the issue. The Larger Picture To be clear, the argument here is not to do nothing. Drug cartels are violent and ruthless, posing a serious threat to U.S. public health. Furthermore, a clear link of cooperation between an increasingly adversarial China and drug cartels has emerged in the sale of chemical precursors. These are strong reasons to take action in curbing the power and influence of drug cartels. However, a military intervention will not be an effective means of achieving this goal. Mexico is one of the most critical actors in aiding U.S. national security. As the United States’ southern neighbor, Mexico is crucial to maintaining U.S. strategic goals. Now is a time for the U.S. to strengthen bilateral ties instead of pursuing unilateral military action in Mexico, which would only heighten tensions with the nation’s government and people. The U.S. needs to strengthen relations with its neighbors and allies to contend with rising powers like China and Russia, who are increasingly collaborating against U.S. interests. U.S. intervention against cartels will not produce or reinforce any alliances. In fact, short-sighted foreign policy decisions have the potential to create new enemies instead. Jonathan Rockford is a current master's candidate for International Security at the Josef Korbel School of Global and Public Affairs at the University of Denver. If you enjoyed this work, please consider sharing our publications and website, following Jonathan on the social media platforms listed in his bio, or donating to a non-profit organization linked in the Donate tab. DISCLAIMER Mooreposts publishes independent analysis, commentary, and research for informational and educational purposes only. Content on Mooreposts—including articles, Mooreposts Bites, strategic intelligence assessments, opinion pieces, interviews, and visual materials—does not constitute legal, financial, medical, or professional advice, nor does it represent any government agency, official position, or classified assessment. Unless explicitly stated, all analyses and interpretations reflect the views and analytic judgments of the individual author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Mooreposts, its editorial staff, or affiliated contributors. Strategic intelligence and analytical content is based on open-source information and publicly available materials. Mooreposts strives for accuracy, transparency, and rigorous sourcing; however, information may change as events develop. Readers are encouraged to consult primary sources and exercise independent judgment.

Illustration by Julianne Moore After Vladimir Putin initiated the Russo-Ukrainian War in 2022, John Mearsheimer—one of international relations’ leading scholars—garnered over 30 million views on his lecture, blaming the West for Russia’s aggression. Since then, Mearsheimer’s realist arguments have taken root in popular conceptions of the war. The second Trump Administration has even claimed a ‘strategic realist’ foreign policy and gone so far as to blame the war on Ukraine. My argument: Mearsheimer’s perspective may appear convincing at face value, but it contains glaring issues. Instead, the war’s causes are best understood through Putin’s protection of his autocracy and imperialist ambitions. MEARSHEIMER’S ARGUMENT In Mearsheimer’s eyes, the path to the Russo-Ukrainian War began in 2008, when the West promised eventual NATO membership to Georgia and Ukraine—a move Moscow clearly warned constituted a red line. Yet, America continued making Ukraine a ‘bulwark’ on Russia’s front door; most notably by supporting the Ukrainian 2014 ‘coup’ that ousted its pro-Kremlin president. Responding to perceived Western provocations, Putin ‘rationally’ invaded Georgia in 2008 and annexed Crimea in 2014. After further Western provocations—arms sent to Ukraine during the first Trump Administration, 2021 NATO-Ukrainian military exercises, and a Biden-brokered US-Ukrainian partnership—Putin still made one final peace attempt. Here, Moscow demanded Ukrainian neutrality and the removal of long-established Western military equipment across Eastern Europe. US officials subsequently refused, ultimately forcing Putin’s 2022 invasion. MEARSHEIMER’S FLAWS Arguments like Mearsheimer’s hinge on Moscow perceiving Ukraine’s drift towards a Western orbit as an existential threat to Russian security since its geographical location serves as a springboard into Russia proper. This premise is ludicrous. As Robert Kagan puts it, Russia has “never enjoyed greater security on its western frontier” than during its three post-Soviet decades. Why, then, would Moscow perceive any ‘existential’ threat? This is pronounced when considering NATO drew down its military capacity during this period, while Putin expanded Russia’s. Realism is contradicted here, as this would indicate a substantial power shift in Russia’s favor, negating any threat or security dilemma. Further, if NATO’s eastern expansion (1999-2004) was driving Russian concerns, why didn’t Russia intervene when it had the military wherewithal to do so? If NATO is currently a threat to Russia, why is Moscow leaving nearly 1,600 miles of unguarded border with NATO’s Finland? Another consideration: could anyone seriously imagine a scenario or argument for a nuclear-armed West invading a nuclear-armed Russia? The answer is simply no. This point is underpinned by America’s little-to-no-response towards Russian aggression in Georgia (2008), Crimea (2014), and Syria (2015). Additionally, the West’s initial belief that Ukraine’s fall was imminent upon invasion, along with its slow provision of Ukrainian aid and persistent risk-averse approach throughout the conflict, further undermines Mearsheimer’s realist description of great power behavior. Mearsheimer’s reliance on official Russian statements for evidence presents another serious issue, as one can easily point to contradictory remarks from Moscow. In the 2000s, Putin spoke of potential Russian NATO membership, dismissed notions that NATO was Russia’s enemy, and even acknowledged Baltic and Ukrainian agency in seeking NATO accession. Putin’s continued rhetoric accentuates Mearsheimer’s apparent confirmation bias. From claiming Ukrainians are Russian at heart, to condemning their ‘neo-Nazi’ government, and labeling Ukraine’s self-defence as ‘terrorism’, Putin’s paradoxical assertions discount Mearsheimer's reliance on Moscow's statements. Ironically, Mearsheimer's core realist beliefs deal the most significant blows to his argument. These are: (1) states act as single, unified forces—citizens have no influence. (2) Leaders pursue rational, not ideological, policies aimed at securing the state’s survival and, if possible, maximizing its power. (3) Power, mainly militarily, is the central driver of international relations. Here, lesser powers’ influence becomes superfluous, placing them at the whims of great powers’ orbits of control. In other words, “the weak suffer what they must.” Such assumptions enable Mearsheimer to conveniently discard compelling factors like Putin’s ideology, the influence of individuals, and lesser powers in the war’s causes. BETTER EXPLANATIONS Strong evidence exists that Putin’s autocratic, anti-Western, and nationalistic imperial ideology was formed out of his anger over the Soviet collapse. This wasn’t just the loss of a political bloc, but a Western dismemberment of Russia’s rightful position as a great power. In turn, Putin aims to undermine democracy to protect his autocracy and simultaneously chip away at the US-led order. His ultimate goal: return Russia to a great power status and dominate the territory that once constituted Greater Russia. Events leading up to Putin’s 2022 invasion included the 2000s Color Revolutions, the 2010 Arab Spring, the 2012 anti-Putin protests in Russia, and Ukraine’s 2014 Euromaidan Revolution, which alarmed Putin. Primarily, the Euromaidan Revolution posed an existential threat to Putin’s authoritarian legitimacy, since a democratic, economically thriving Ukraine next to Moscow might instigate discontented Russians to revolt against Putin’s oppression. Yet, these democratic movements also presented imperial opportunities. Cunningly, Putin used these events to scapegoat the West, claiming its ‘satanic’ power was sponsoring these uprisings, which were resolute on dismantling Russian security and values. This empowered Putin to eliminate all internal opposition and justify his military interventions. Putin’s imperial endeavors are further exposed by Russia’s multi-front, covert operations against the West, which nearly tripled from 2023 to 2024. Some include: sabotaging critical NATO infrastructure and defense industries, as well as infiltrating US social media by impersonating Americans—further sowing disinformation and division amongst the US electorate. Russian tactics have also embraced politically motivated assassination attempts on European leaders and undermining European democratic processes. While scapegoating Western-sponsored ‘revolts’, Putin also incorporates NATO expansionist arguments like Mearsheimer’s. Yet, in the face of Putin’s military interventions for over two decades, one cannot discard the agency of alarmed European states pursuing NATO membership to assure their sovereignty and security. Regarding ‘US-sponsored’ anti-Putin protests, Russians instead took to the streets in unprecedented numbers over evidence of blatant electoral fraud that returned Putin to power. Likewise, no evidence suggests that Ukraine’s 2014 uprising was caused by foreign meddling. Rather, it was sparked by Ukraine’s then-pro-Kremlin president's termination of a 2013 Ukrainian-EU association agreement. What then caused the bloodshed in Ukraine? It surely wasn’t Mearsheimer’s deterministic NATO-expansion argument. Realities contradict his subscribed-to realist theory of great power behavior. Doubt is further cast over the fragile scaffolding of contradictory evidence, and his intentional neglect of critical factors in the war’s causes provides the final knock-out punch. More compelling narratives are Putin’s protection of his autocracy and imperialist ambitions. In light of Mearsheimer’s serious flaws, it's important to note that his argument innately lets imperialist leaders like Putin off the hook, who—at the end of the day—are responsible for the immense suffering these conflicts impose on normal people. Given this and Putin’s track record of invading sovereign states, international warrants for his war crimes, and ruthless termination of Russian dissidents, it’s best not to side with arguments that inherently justify Putin’s behavior. Connor JL Moore is a current master’s candidate for International Security at the University of Denver’s Josef Korbel School of Global and Public Affairs. If you enjoyed this work, please consider sharing our content and website or donating to a non-profit organization linked in the Donate tab. DISCLAIMER Mooreposts publishes independent analysis, commentary, and research for informational and educational purposes only. Content on Mooreposts—including articles, Mooreposts Bites, strategic intelligence assessments, opinion pieces, interviews, and visual materials—does not constitute legal, financial, medical, or professional advice, nor does it represent any government agency, official position, or classified assessment. Unless explicitly stated, all analyses and interpretations reflect the views and analytic judgments of the individual author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Mooreposts, its editorial staff, or affiliated contributors. Strategic intelligence and analytical content is based on open-source information and publicly available materials. Mooreposts strives for accuracy, transparency, and rigorous sourcing; however, information may change as events develop. Readers are encouraged to consult primary sources and exercise independent judgment.

Illustration by Mia Navarro and Connor JL Moore “Suddenly, in the very middle of saying something, I felt – it is very hard to describe what I felt, though I remember it with the utmost vividness. Roughly speaking, it was the sensation of being at the centre of an explosion. There seemed to be a loud bang and a blinding flash of light all around me, and I felt a tremendous shock - no pain, only a violent shock, such as you get from an electric terminal.” - George Orwell, recalling what it felt like to get shot in the throat in Homage to Catalonia, 1938 George Orwell and Charlie Kirk were roughly the same age when they were shot in the throat. Both men made a healthy living at the center of national rhetoric. They impishly threw wry little hand grenades over the garden fence to the other side of the political divide. While I didn’t much care for any of Kirk’s political positions, he was a vibrant man, obviously taking a great deal of joy in promoting his ideology in the most brash way possible. In Spain, Orwell fought for a communist militia against the fascist, General Franco. His book, Homage to Catalonia, is an account of a nation torn asunder from one ideologically committed outside observer. Kirk, conversely, was a committed ideologue and nationalist in a country that seems just as polarized as Civil War era Spain. Both possessing two juxtaposed political poles, growing wider apart. If the killing of Kirk and sequential administrative reaction demonstrate anything, it's that we have lost our shared sense of the nation and what it means to be American. In a healthy society, we should be able to tolerate people we disagree with. Even if you don’t like them or their position, you’re supposed to throw your hands in the air and give thanks that the figure you agree with can say what they will. Hell… had Kirk been given enough time to grow, he may well have written a book with an impact as significant as Animal Farm or 1984. We should be grateful Orwell survived his injury and would go on to live another twenty years to write his magnum opus. But alas, we live in a world where people can get shot just for what they believe: Orwell in 1930s Spain, Kirk in contemporary America. Whether you agree with Kirk or Orwell, right or left. We can all agree that we took a wrong turn somewhere. We are off the damn rails. Being this mad at one another—digging in rhetorically and literally, “wrecking” others’ arguments, and now, pointing rifles at one another—cannot lead us anywhere better. I would emphasize to both Kirk and Orwell-aligned readers that you have bared your teeth in the wrong direction. This violent disagreement benefits no one except the politicians who brought us here. We’ve entered the Thunderdome of politics. On the left, you have some ugly, useless donkey; on the right, an intolerably mean elephant. Only one of them is leaving this alive, both of which I disdain… and you probably do too. We’ve entered the Thunderdome of politics. On the left, you have some ugly, useless donkey; on the right, an intolerably mean elephant. Only one of them is leaving this alive, both of which I disdain… and you probably do too. One thing is without question in all this. Orwell describes his thoughts immediately after realizing he’d been hit: “My first thought, conventionally enough, was for my wife. My second was a violent resentment at having to leave this world which, when all is said and done, suits me so well.” I cannot imagine Kirk thought of anything other than leaving his wife, children, and so much of his work unfinished in those final moments. While I didn’t much like him, no one can deny that this world suited him quite well. God bless America. We certainly need it. Braxton Fuller is a current master’s candidate for International Security at the University of Denver’s Josef Korbel School of Global and Public Affairs. If you enjoyed this work, please consider sharing our content and website or donating to a non-profit organization linked in the Donate tab. DISCLAIMER Mooreposts publishes independent analysis, commentary, and research for informational and educational purposes only. Content on Mooreposts—including articles, Mooreposts Bites, strategic intelligence assessments, opinion pieces, interviews, and visual materials—does not constitute legal, financial, medical, or professional advice, nor does it represent any government agency, official position, or classified assessment. Unless explicitly stated, all analyses and interpretations reflect the views and analytic judgments of the individual author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Mooreposts, its editorial staff, or affiliated contributors. Strategic intelligence and analytical content is based on open-source information and publicly available materials. Mooreposts strives for accuracy, transparency, and rigorous sourcing; however, information may change as events develop. Readers are encouraged to consult primary sources and exercise independent judgment.

Illustration by Connor JL Moore One hundred million books were burned in Nazi occupied territories between 1933 and 1945. It's easy to imagine tooth-brushed mustachioed SS men traveling from library to library burning centrally disapproved literature. In reality, it was a nationwide fascistic orgy of anti-intellectual action. Every day, Germans turned in books from their homes, tore them off library shelves, and gathered by the thousands to watch them burn. They burned Goethe and Schiller, Thomas Mann and Heine. Germans rejected by the tens of millions the authors, musicians, poets, and artists who had defined their cultural identity for a millennium. Americans are presently doing much the same thing. Anyone who's wasted hours scrolling on TikTok or Instagram knows the truth in Bradbury’s words, just as any German did in 1935, “It feels good to burn.” We aren’t burning our books, we're just not reading them. We aren’t rejecting our authors, we’re just forgetting them. Rejection of the written word in exchange for formats with less robust context – Hitlerian tirades on the radio, cable news on television, or short-form content on TikTok – is a common theme in authoritarian countries. Books present ideas in a well-researched format, which decreases the potential for manipulation or distortion as compared to a dictator behind a podium or an anchor behind a desk. A book is credible only because of the argument it makes and the information presented in a literary context. In contrast, cable news and short-form feed content warp our perception of information based on how it's presented. Between 2003 and 2025, masked members of the American state began shoving protesters into unmarked vans, America conducted mass surveillance of private communication, and detained and tortured foreign nationals without due process in illegal CIA black sites. Over this same period of time, the average time Americans spent reading declined by 33%. The conflict over public opinion in post-9/11 America was waged before green-screens in cable news studios, not in the columns of the New York Times or the shelves of a library. That is a significant shift in context compared to how we’ve conducted public discourse in the past. In the immediate aftermath of the Vietnam War, the first truly televised conflict, only 6% of Americans did not read a book all year. We’ve watched the invasion of Grenada, Panama, Iraq, and Afghanistan from LaZBoy™ chairs in the living room. By the tenth year of the war in Iraq, the percentage of Americans who had not read a book all year was 23%. In the lead-up to Viktor Orban's consolidation of political authority in Hungary, for example, national library card ownership decreased from 2.2 to 1.4 million over a 15-year period. Over that same time period, the number of books printed in Hungary declined by half from 69 million to under 34 million. In 1990, 72% of Soviet citizens were at least occasional readers. Now, 56% of Russians read neither a book nor a magazine all year. It’s a universal feature of democratically backsliding countries to see a decline in public readership. What the book burnings in the 30s were meant to symbolize was a rejection of what had made Germany German. German Romanticism was focused on the goodness and equality within every person. Beethoven's 9th, the Ode to Joy, is set to a Schiller poem. Goethe’s novel, The Sorrows of Young Werther, spawned the entire genre of bildungsroman, or “novels of formation”, of which Perks of Being a Wallflower and Catcher in the Rye owe lineage. Much ink has been spilled regarding the mid-Twentieth Century, but suffice to say here that it was a release of mass psychic tension to embrace ignorance and reject compassion so publicly. What we have seen for the last quarter-century in America is that Americans as individuals no longer value robust information. In a world where information is the currency of politics, we’re ceding our ability to participate in the marketplace of political authority. There are bright spots for the publishing industry and readers in general. Ebooks and audiobooks have seen a meteoric rise in the last decade, but these have not made up for overall decreases in total book consumption. Part of what matters here is the ability for a market to sustain a parallel industry. Real writers, not just academic journals that no one reads outside of university classrooms, are necessary to foster a democratic culture. If it weren’t for a powerful publishing industry, the world may not have known Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle or Oil!, or F. Scott Fitzgerald's crown jewel, The Great Gatsby. These books exert immense influence on American culture. They changed us as individuals and as a nation. Benjamin Franklin’s warning after the first constitutional convention, “we have a republic. If we can keep it.” It’s become clear that our ability to preserve and protect our democracy rests on our ability to discern and digest information. In other words, it rests on our ability to read. Braxton Fuller is a current master’s candidate for International Security at the University of Denver’s Josef Korbel School of Global and Public Affairs. If you enjoyed this work, please consider sharing our content and website or donating to a non-profit organization linked in the Donate tab. DISCLAIMER Mooreposts publishes independent analysis, commentary, and research for informational and educational purposes only. Content on Mooreposts—including articles, Mooreposts Bites, strategic intelligence assessments, opinion pieces, interviews, and visual materials—does not constitute legal, financial, medical, or professional advice, nor does it represent any government agency, official position, or classified assessment. Unless explicitly stated, all analyses and interpretations reflect the views and analytic judgments of the individual author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Mooreposts, its editorial staff, or affiliated contributors. Strategic intelligence and analytical content is based on open-source information and publicly available materials. Mooreposts strives for accuracy, transparency, and rigorous sourcing; however, information may change as events develop. Readers are encouraged to consult primary sources and exercise independent judgment.