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Illustration by John Lamberger LISTEN TO THIS ARTICLE In October 2021, Boris Johnson  stood on the observation deck of the Colosseum for an interview  with Channel 4. His odd manner – a mix of aristocratic bewilderment and the look of a suburban pub lout – clashed intensely with the enigmatic ruins. The focus of his semi-intellectual fumblings was the most downtrodden of the global order: climate refugees. He did his best to summon the classic image of the fall of the Empire; hordes of unwashed barbarians tearing down the symbols of a glittering civilization to replace them with indoor excrement buckets and illiteracy. In the interview, he spoke briefly of the history, brushing past it as a simple, clarifiable fact: “The Roman Empire fell because of out-of-control immigration,” and that “People should not be so naive to think that history moves in one direction,” that “history is moving backwards.” In reality, Johnson's muddied xenophobic reframing of history is blissful, clean, pure nonsense. I pick Johnson’s example out of a myriad right-wing reactionaries using this “interpretation” of Roman history because it's the least effective and, thus, the funniest. The wider right-wing consistently holds up migration as the reason for the Empire’s fall and a universal warning sign for an Empire in decline. The “historical” example is then applied to the position of the contemporary West: These Twitter posts are much more deft examples of right-wing reactionary propaganda than Boris’. They’re interesting in the way that the best propaganda is – it grabs your attention. But they’re just that: propaganda. The rigor of the Classics, the study of the ancient Mediterranean world, comes not from reading the ancient documents, but in understanding how every subsequent generation of historians understood the period that they’re describing. Many of what we consider “primary sources” from the Roman Period were written hundreds of years after the events described, or inextricably politically biased. What few extant secondary and tertiary sources are biased in both respects. In other words, Roman history has always been highly political and highly fluid. So any study of the Classics is inherently a reflection of the author's contemporary political feelings; to what extent is almost impossible to decipher. The reactionary right’s interpretation of the Empire’s fall, however, is not founded in history whatsoever. It’s constrained to 140-character tweets and 7-minute interviews; in other words, the Late Empire becomes a simple rhetorical device.  A real study of Rome’s relationship with Germanic immigration can inform, as the right is suggesting, national policy and migration policy in the upcoming period of climate migration. As the period of contemporary climate migration intensifies over the next quarter-century, studying how the Romans interacted with their Germanic neighbors during the Period of Migration (300 AD - 600 AD) can help illuminate how we can successfully withstand the great demographic changes that will soon grip our own political systems. The truth is, the Fall of the Roman Empire was precipitated not by the acceptance of German immigrants but by their violent rejection. The Empire enjoyed a hundred-year-long “stay of execution” by essentially throwing open its borders to German immigration. Let me be the first to say that the story below is also a thumbnail sketch of Late Roman Imperial scholarship. It perhaps isn’t even a good one. Classicists more ideologically conservative than I would certainly accuse me of selecting, as every historian does, information based on how I view contemporary politics. I encourage you to keep that in mind while reading this article. Without further ado, let's travel back in time together. The Crisis of the Third Century (234-284) In 234 AD, overlapping and self-reinforcing environmental, economic, and political crises enveloped the entire Mediterranean world. Plague, probably smallpox , devastated urban and rural populations alike. Hyperinflation devoured a huge portion of the Roman economy, rendering the currency so valueless that the Empire ceased collecting taxes in money . A permanent change in the climate , the end of the Roman Warm Period, made agriculture permanently less productive. This is just to name a few of the existential issues that all of Europe faced. The Empire needed to adapt to fundamentally different circumstances than it had faced throughout its history. Roman administrators pulled off some of the most agile feats of bureaucratic gymnastics in history, sticking the landing almost every time on the first attempt. They pursued an agenda marked by radically open immigration reform, political reorganization, systemic changes to the basic functions of the Roman economy, and the creation of entirely new socioeconomic classes. 284 AD is perhaps a more logical beginning to the Middle Ages than the expulsion of Romulus Augustulus in 476. The reforms of the late 200s AD created what we understand as Medieval: patrimonial labor organizations, serfdom, and the divinely appointed monarch. The Germanic tribes outside the Empire’s borders simply collapsed in the face of climate migration, plague, economic collapse, and external invasion. They migrated en masse to the Empire, looking for safety and competent administration. The Romans, for their part, were ecstatic to welcome new bodies to serve their legions and in the marketplaces sapped by the compounding crises. Roman administrators, looking at their empty streets and unplowed fields, essentially threw open the doors. The Process of Roman Immigration What we might understand as “legal immigration” into the Roman Empire happened through a process called consensus. Roman borders, with few exceptions, were almost entirely porous to individuals and small parties. As an individual, one could cross the border and become a Roman taxpayer with all the benefits that came with it. As a large group, however, you needed consensus. What this process looked like varied between time and place, but was much the same in its essential characteristics. A tribe of 250,000 or more would appear at the border and petition for admittance into the empire. Local magistrates would collect certain information on the new arrivals and call in a legionary presence to meet the barbarians at a pre-arranged spot. The Germans would cross the border, leave their weapons behind, and swear allegiance to the Emperor. The Roman apparatus would then split the tribe up and disperse them evenly across the vast size of the Empire; this family to Spain, this one to Italy, and so on. They were disarmed, separated, and settled . To put it plainly, the Empire needed these injections of manpower between the third and fourth centuries. To a lesser extent, that’s the way the Romans had always worked. To be Roman wasn’t like being German; to be Roman was a way of life, a system of values, not an ethnicity. The Imperii Populii Romanii, the Power of the Roman People, always rested on their ability to convince new people to become Romans and lend their efforts to the imperial project. New Arrivals (376) The positive feedback loop between Roman power and German immigration established in the aftermath of the Crisis of the Third Century suffered a relatively simple end. For one, the Huns were galloping over the Eastern European Plain, from where we aren’t sure, displacing more people and causing cascading refugee waves. The Romans had been at the top of their integration game, welcoming or forcing hundreds of thousands of Goths, Franks, Quadii, and Marcomanii into the fabric of Roman society for the last hundred years. Their ability to welcome newcomers had been the only reason the Empire had not collapsed back in the third century. In 376, a group of 200,000 Goths, likely from modern Ukraine, presented themselves at the Roman border requesting asylum from the unstoppable Hunnic invasion from the East. Then, Roman Emperor Valens was ecstatic. One of the recurrent outbreaks of the Antonine Plague had devastated the legions at the very start of a major conflict with the Sassanians, an equally powerful empire centered in modern Iran.  This massive group of Goths crossed the Danube and, as usual, they left their weapons on the far bank of the Danube, content in the knowledge that now they were safe in Roman territory. Because of the extensive conflict in the East and recurrent cycles of plague, the Roman force that met them was large but not overwhelmingly so. A temporary camp was set up to accommodate the Goths before they were dispersed by their new Roman leaders across the Empire.  The Romans were never a people to protest their bureaucrats skimming a bit of the top, but the abuse suffered by the Goths at the hands of their Roman administrators while in this temporary camp was cruel. The camp became semi-permanent as weeks of waiting turned into months. The Roman administrators of this camp schemed constantly to separate the Goths under their purview from their gold. Going so far as to exchange dog meat for their women and children to abate starvation. This was after, of course, they had sold the provisions the central government had been sending them to feed the Goths on the private market. When the Goths heard that Emperor Valens was on his way, their leaders gathered to petition him to punish the greedy administrators who wreaked such cruelty on their people. The administrators of the camp, in way over their heads, killed the Gothic leaders before they could inform their bosses of their misdeeds. The Goths were enraged. In convulsions of pain only known to the dispossessed and abused, they broke out of camp, sacked a nearby city for all its food, and relished in torturing the Roman citizens they were once so hopeful to become. The Beginning of the End (376 - 476) Emperor   Valens was furious. The greed and ineptitude of a few low-level bureaucrats had turned hundreds of thousands of allies into an apocalyptic threat. The Empire was fighting a war with a near-peer adversary to the East and now had to contend with a large-scale enemy army within its borders. The Emperor ordered the legions stationed on the border to join the major force the Emperor was leading with all haste towards the Gothic army.  He attacked the Gothic army outside the city of Hadrianopolis near the modern Greek border with Bulgaria. The Romans were crushed. Emperor Valens was killed on the field, two-thirds of the Roman army was slaughtered, and Hadrianopolis was burned to the ground. The borders were undefended, and no army within a thousand miles could challenge the Goths now, let alone the Huns from which they were initially fleeing. The Western Empire never truly recovered from the blow suffered at Adrianople. The Huns penetrated Roman territory, now completely undefended. The Romans bargained with the Goths to ally with them against the Huns in exchange for gold and political privileges. Valens’ successors were increasingly unable to impose terms on the arriving tribes. They began crossing the borders without first asking Roman officials, bringing their weapons, settling together, and only coming to those “agreements” after they had taken what they could. Consensus was permanently broken. The Romans could no longer effectively impose their terms and culture on the new arrivals. The Western Roman Empire went with a whimper, not a bang. Tribes were increasingly only nominally subservient to the Emperor in Rome and, in practice, held all the cards in the relationship. The last Roman emperors even abandoned Rome as the capital, unable to defend such a large and attractive pile of treasure. The Eternal City was looted twice in the 400s AD. Instead, they ruled from Ravenna, playacting as masters of the world from behind the swamps that encircled the city.  Conclusion Studying the Migration Period (300-600 AD) to understand how the Romans and German migrants interacted with one another can help policymakers determine how to react to the upcoming period of climate migration. The Migration Policy Institute predicts up to 1.2 billion people will be internationally displaced by 2050; the vast majority moving north from the equator. It’s imperative that leaders understand the decisions that caused alignment of Roman and Gothic interests versus those that pitted them against each other. There are two lessons that present themselves to me as a Roman historian and scholar of current events: The United States is facing a demographic cliff and entering into competition with the most populous nation on Earth. Just as Rome needed German immigration to fill its legions and coffers, the United States needs immigrants from the South. The wisest course of action is to model Roman consensus and make friends where natural friends exist. Welcome them under the auspices of overwhelming power but extend a generous hand; In other words, talk softly but carry a big stick. Go to elaborate lengths to avoid violent confrontation with large groups of migrants. At some point, the flow of migrants will be such as to represent an irresistible faction. Appearances of overwhelming power on the part of the assimilating group are more important than the actual ability to militarily resist the newcomers. Avoiding the possibility of an Adrianople is paramount to the survival of the American Empire. Of course, the same reason these lessons can’t be learned in hindsight is the same reason simplified tellings are so rhetorically attractive. It is, however, important to distinguish leaders from Twitter influencers. I can understand why the backwards interpretation of history proliferates on a platform like Twitter, but to be repeated by the decision-makers themselves signals a fundamental issue. If Boris Johnson is himself repeating the propaganda and perhaps believing it, how can we trust him and people like him to make discerning, unbiased strategic decisions? Let this be realized: if we make unnecessary enemies of these people, they will learn quickly that we can’t stop them even if we try. Braxton Fuller is a current master’s candidate for International Studies at the University of Denver’s Josef Korbel School of Global and Public Affairs. If you enjoyed this work, please consider sharing our content and website or donating to a non-profit organization linked in the   Donate  tab. DISCLAIMER Mooreposts publishes independent analysis, commentary, and research for informational and educational purposes only. Content on Mooreposts—including articles, Mooreposts Bites, strategic intelligence assessments, opinion pieces, interviews, and visual materials—does not constitute legal, financial, medical, or professional advice, nor does it represent any government agency, official position, or classified assessment. Unless explicitly stated, all analyses and interpretations reflect the views and analytic judgments of the individual author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Mooreposts, its editorial staff, or affiliated contributors. Strategic intelligence and analytical content is based on open-source information and publicly available materials. Mooreposts strives for accuracy, transparency, and rigorous sourcing; however, information may change as events develop. Readers are encouraged to consult primary sources and exercise independent judgment.

How Moscow Sustains its War in Ukraine on the Front Lines and at Home Illustration by Connor JL Moore & Kash Harrison LISTEN TO THIS ARTICLE In the days before Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Western intelligence believed Kyiv’s fall was imminent . Yet, as the war approaches its fourth year, it has devolved into the bloodiest conflict in Europe since the Second World War.  Estimates place total Russian battlefield casualties —those killed, wounded, and missing—at 1.2 million, with deaths believed to be as high as 325,000. These numbers are remarkable, given that Moscow has advanced only 50 to 230 feet per day . In total, Russia has acquired just 12% of Ukrainian territory since 2022. Experts have noted that Moscow’s willingness to endure high losses indicates a belief it can outlast Ukraine’s ability  to continue fighting. Given this, one might wonder how Moscow has sustained its attritional war strategy and public support amid mounting losses. Replenishing Russia’s Frontlines To avoid a nationwide conscription—like in Ukraine—Moscow has pursued a variety of efforts to replenish its frontlines. Research indicates that the Kremlin continues to recruit 30,000–40,000 troops  each month.  Recruitment efforts have focused on low-income Russians in rural areas, who make up most of its forces. Financial incentives like high pay and bonuses  have been found instrumental, often several times  what most Russians earn each paycheck.  Rights activists, however, dispute these recruitment numbers . In some cases, conscripts were forced to sign contracts  requiring them to serve on the front lines. In others, what were originally one-year terms of service have been indefinitely extended .  Other methods of replenishing Russian forces have included recruiting convicts and foreign nationals. Legislation signed in 2024 by Russian President Vladimir Putin permits Russians with criminal convictions—or those facing sentencing—to avoid prosecution by enlisting  in the military.  Further, after Russia’s   mutual defense treaty   with North Korea in 2024, Western officials estimate 14,000–15,000 North Korean soldiers  are now fighting on Russia’s frontlines. Investigative journalists and rights groups have uncovered that foreign nationals from 128 nations  have been trafficked to the front or recruited under false pretenses. Domestic Repression  Under immense human and economic  losses, Moscow’s strategy of outlasting Ukraine has coincided with intensified domestic repression. Since the invasion, Moscow has enhanced censorship laws, making public dissent or scrutiny  of Russia’s ‘special military operation’ risky. Those spreading information deemed contradictory to Moscow's official positions could face up to 15 years’ imprisonment .  These measures have empowered Putin to eliminate all opposition to his regime, most notably key political opponent   Alexei Navalny , and former ally Yevgeny Prigozhin, who led a revolt against Moscow  in June of 2023.  Further, major news outlets like The Moscow Times , Echo Moskvy , and Dozhd  have been banned or shut down under newly expanded ‘foreign influence laws’. Some claim these actions have effectively put an end to all  independent media groups in Russia.  The Russian state has also been accused of classifying and  hiding data  regarding losses in the war. Exiled Russian media reported that by the end of 2025, lawsuits seeking a formal declaration of killed or missing military personnel amounted to 90,000 , of which 70,000 related cases  quickly vanished. Payments to Russian families who lost or had injured service members in the war (amounting to $15.3 billion) have been highlighted as a means to mitigate unrest and maintain domestic support . Militarizing Russian Youth  In tandem with its   domestic repression, Moscow appears to be pursuing long-term efforts to condition its people for a prolonged struggle and future conflict. Scholars note that Moscow’s amplified use of   nationalism, traditional values, and historical narratives is intended to frame and legitimize  the conflict as an existential threat to Russian values from a ‘demonic’ West. These efforts are reflected in Moscow’s policy initiatives to militarize the country’s youth. Between 2022 and 2024, funding for new “patriotic” educational initiatives increased tenfold . Required courses like Health and Safety, now called Fundamentals of Security and Defense of the Homeland , focus on military basics , from the structure of the Russian Armed Forces to battlefield medical care.  Moreover, newly implemented history textbooks  reportedly focus on narratives that justify and glorify Russia’s ‘special military operation’ in Ukraine. Other independent investigations have highlighted new classrooms equipped to train students in drone operation , a warfare capability that has become essential  in the conflict.  The Oscar-nominated documentary Mr. Nobody Against Putin  reveals how state-mandated classroom recordings—intended to enforce compliance with a new curriculum—depict lectures branding dissenters as “parasites” who should leave Russia. Lessons also incorporated Moscow’s historical narratives, teaching about the necessity to ‘denazify’ Ukraine and praising those fighting today as akin to Soviet troops against Nazi Germany.  Further footage shows members of the Wagner Group—mercenaries infamous for their brutality  and war crimes —teaching primary school students how to handle weapons and mitigate battlefield risks of losing limbs.  Other school activities   across all grades include loyalty oaths, military drills, and grenade-throwing contests. Analysts have argued that this militarization of Russian youth is intended to prepare the country for extended conflict ,  which will require a growing population forever loyal to the war effort.  Conclusion Russia’s war in Ukraine has imposed unprecedented losses on both sides, yet under current circumstances—heavy Russian losses and slow battlefield progress—it would take 152 years  for Russian forces to conquer the rest of Ukraine. For the time being, Moscow appears committed to its war strategy of outlasting Ukraine, no matter the cost.  Connor JL Moore is a current master’s candidate for International Security at the University of Denver’s Josef Korbel School of Global and Public Affairs.  If you enjoyed this work, please consider sharing our content and website or donating to a non-profit organization linked in the Donate tab. DISCLAIMER Mooreposts publishes independent analysis, commentary, and research for informational and educational purposes only. Content on Mooreposts—including articles, Mooreposts Bites, strategic intelligence assessments, opinion pieces, interviews, and visual materials—does not constitute legal, financial, medical, or professional advice, nor does it represent any government agency, official position, or classified assessment. Unless explicitly stated, all analyses and interpretations reflect the views and analytic judgments of the individual author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Mooreposts, its editorial staff, or affiliated contributors. Strategic intelligence and analytical content is based on open-source information and publicly available materials. Mooreposts strives for accuracy, transparency, and rigorous sourcing; however, information may change as events develop. Readers are encouraged to consult primary sources and exercise independent judgment.

The Role of Women in Building Sustainable Peace in Israel and Palestine Illustration by Mia Navarro and Connor JL Moore LISTEN TO THIS ARTICLE It has been over two years since the deadly October 7th attacks that exacerbated the destructive conflict between Israel and Palestine. With over 72,000 dead  and counting ,  the world is looking for any glimmer of hope to produce a lasting peace agreement. Attempts at a ceasefire have been at the forefront of foreign policy agendas, yet no enduring solution has materialized. This persistent failure has prompted the following questions: Is there a new way to look at the Israel-Palestinian conflict-resolution process? Which perspectives have been neglected that could lead to an organic and sustainable end to this conflict? The answer may be as simple as including women at the negotiating table.  Historically, women’s political action in the Middle East has aligned with other social justice movements . Most recently, during the Arab Spring, women's role on social media and at protests calling for democratization and civil liberties was remarkably impactful. At present, Palestinian women protest Israeli occupation, while Israeli women have lodged their own protest against Israel’s continued war. A key factor that makes the role of women in the Middle East so consequential at present is the disproportionate impact the Israel-Palestinian conflict has on women, versus those at the negotiating table . Women continue to face sexual assault and harassment , miss critical prenatal care windows, and lack access to reproductive care. By October 2024, women in Gaza were three times more likely to die from childbirth and three times more likely to miscarry  compared to levels before October 2023. Yet the international community seems to overlook the role of women in global conflict resolution and their propensity to coalesce grassroots peace campaigns and civil society across ethnic and socioeconomic divides.  Traditional perspectives that dominate decision-making processes have an exclusionary focus on areas considered 'high' politics , such as sovereignty and military security, overlooking women's decision-making, social influence, and the gendered impacts of global politics. In particular, the female perspective is beneficial for understanding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as it uncovers the gendered power structures that shape military conflict while amplifying women’s contributions to peace-building. A deep understanding of international relations and the foundations of peace-building requires a lens that examines the role of women and their often untapped diplomatic potential. Including women’s voices in high-level decision-making highlights the importance of intersectionality in global politics, emphasizing the need for a bottom-up approach to peace, rather than a trickle-down one.  Why then are women positioned to be a key factor in the peace-making process?  The United Nations Development Programme indicates that   women’s involvement in peace negotiations  contributes to the “quality and durability” of peace agreements, including stipulations aimed at political reform, human security, and, overall, higher implementation rates. Beyond their roles as intermediaries,   women are adept at building coalitions  for peace. Women frequently mobilize groups in civil society, working across ethnic, religious, political, and cultural divides, otherwise referred to as horizontal bridge-building. Their involvement in community-building and influence on maternal protection can help to build trust and safety within communities. Women also bridge the   vertical divide between elites and the grassroots , increasing the odds of lasting peace through promoting buy-in incentives and community-based legitimacy. The participation or representation of civil society groups in the peace-making process   reduces the likelihood of a peace agreement failing by 64% .  What’s more, female security sector officials tend to have access to populations and organizations that are either closed to men or female-dominated, as seen in the Afghan conflict, where only women security officials were able to visit, speak to, and gather information from Afghan women in hospitals, camps, and even at their homes. This advantage allows women to gather intelligence, observe lived experiences, and understand the desires and needs of the general population within the framework of peace-building. This ground-level work allows women to focus on human security that improves civilians’ quality of life, rather than focusing solely on big-picture diplomacy, which often lacks the necessary nuance. It is important to note that although the importance of women’s participation in governance and conflict prevention and resolution has been enshrined in policy by both the   Israeli  and   Palestinian  governments,   both parties have fallen short  in   achieving  inclusive representation. In essence, empirical benchmarks don’t necessarily translate to de facto representation and inclusion, particularly at the negotiating table.  It is important to note that although the importance of women’s participation in governance and conflict prevention and resolution has been enshrined in policy by both the   Israeli  and   Palestinian  governments,   both parties have fallen short  in   achieving  inclusive representation. In essence, empirical benchmarks don’t necessarily translate to de facto representation and inclusion, particularly at the negotiating table.  It is important to note that although the importance of women’s participation in governance and conflict prevention and resolution has been enshrined in policy by both the   Israeli  and   Palestinian  governments,   both parties have fallen short  in   achieving  inclusive representation. In essence, empirical benchmarks don’t necessarily translate to de facto representation and inclusion, particularly at the negotiating table.  The Israeli-Palestinian conflict’s disproportionate gendered impacts and exclusive high politics peace-building neglect a key voice at the negotiating table. Gender-inclusive policymaking helps to question the automatic assumption that military force is the most effective or appropriate response, and reiterate the importance of basic human security measures and stability. The lived experience of women may guide decision-makers away from continued violence and towards a more sustainable and inclusive peace. Mia is the Deputy Editor-in-Chief of Mooreposts and an M.A. candidate in International Security at the Josef Korbel School of Global and Public Affairs. If you enjoyed this work, please consider sharing Mooreposts’ content, following Mia on the social media platforms listed in her bio , or supporting a non-profit organization linked in the Donate tab. DISCLAIMER Mooreposts publishes independent analysis, commentary, and research for informational and educational purposes only. Content on Mooreposts—including articles, Mooreposts Bites, strategic intelligence assessments, opinion pieces, interviews, and visual materials—does not constitute legal, financial, medical, or professional advice, nor does it represent any government agency, official position, or classified assessment. Unless explicitly stated, all analyses and interpretations reflect the views and analytic judgments of the individual author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Mooreposts, its editorial staff, or affiliated contributors. Strategic intelligence and analytical content is based on open-source information and publicly available materials. Mooreposts strives for accuracy, transparency, and rigorous sourcing; however, information may change as events develop. Readers are encouraged to consult primary sources and exercise independent judgment.

Audio & Transcript Executive Producers: John Lamberger, Lindsey Ferrini, Connor JL Moore This transcript has been edited for clarity and readability while preserving the speakers’ original meaning and conversational tone. Minor repetitions, filler words, and false starts have been removed. Speaker attributions have been carefully reviewed against the audio to ensure accuracy. Introduction Atomic bombs. Thermonuclear warheads. Intercontinental ballistic missiles. The bomb. The big one. The fat man. The little boy. Lindsey:  Hello, I'm Lindsey Ferrini. John:  And I'm John Lamberger. Welcome to Sheepland, the wide green pastures of our modern media environment. Lindsey:  Sheepland, where people are fenced in by politics, graze on soundbites, and fall prey to the wolves of propaganda. So where are we? John:  Sheepland, a program about the great issues facing humanity. Lindsey:  A Mooreposts Podcast… Lindsey: All nuclear weapons employ a phenomenon called fission to create a chain reaction that releases an immense amount of energy in a fraction of a second. John:  A fission or fusion reaction involving the unstable atoms of uranium or plutonium releases an immense amount of energy, creating an explosion so powerful that a single device can destroy an entire city. Lindsey:  The physical blast, thermal radiation, and radioactive fallout combined with long-term environmental damage have the potential to kill hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of people. John:  On September 23, 1992, the United States conducted its 1,054th and final nuclear weapons test. Soon after, President Clinton signed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. With the Soviet Union dissolved, It seemed as though an era had ended, an era in which the science of human relationships finally outpaced the science of waging war. Lindsey:  Today, roughly 90% of the world's 12,241 nuclear weapons remain in the arsenals of the United States and Russia. The rest are held by China, the United Kingdom, France, North Korea, India, Pakistan and Israel. John:  So did the nuclear age really end with the Cold War? Or merely fall silent, waiting for humanity to forget? Introducing Dr. Debak Das Lindsey:  Dr. Debak Das is an assistant professor in peace and security at the Joseph Korbel School of Global and Public Affairs at the University of Denver. John:  The scope of his research and study includes international security, nuclear proliferation, crises, and international history. Lindsey:  Nuclear weapons is obviously a very important topic and it can be scary, it can be a lot to take in and controversial. So how did you first learn about them? Dr. Das:  Thanks, that's a great question. I first learned about nuclear weapons as a kid actually. So I grew up in India. In a city called Kolkata. And in 1998, India conducted five nuclear tests, nuclear weapons tests, in Western India, in the desert of Rajasthan. And for the first time, nuclear weapons suddenly were in the public domain. People were talking about it, newspapers were writing about it, culturally, too, we have this huge festival which happens actually around October in Kolkata especially where all kinds of it's like the city becomes this moving art installation. There was a lot of art dedicated to nuclear weapons in a way that did not necessarily convey the dangers that we think of today. It was more of a celebration of strength of power and things like that. And really, that's my first memory of getting introduced to this idea of what nuclear weapons are.  Then 1999 happens, India and Pakistan fight this war, which is under the nuclear shadow, both countries have nuclear weapons. They're fighting a war. Again, this is being talked about a fair amount, internationally, but also in the public domain. So those are some of my early memories of how I thought of or got interested in nuclear weapons. And of course, then as graduate school progresses, as you may well know, you go into different kinds of specializations. I was fortunate enough to have a few professors and a few classes offered on nuclear weapons, took those, got involved in the think tank circle, started organizing track two dialogues between India and Pakistan on nuclear issues, India, Pakistan and China as well. So really that's when what was an early interest transformed into a broader academic interest. What do we think about these weapons? How do these weapons proliferate? What are the different ways in which we should be thinking about the dangers and threats posed by these weapons? So I started thinking about that a lot more. Why Study Nuclear Weapons? John:  What has really, like, what about nuclear weapons stood out to you the most? That, like, is there like a deeper just thing that drives you to center a career around this? Like, something about nuclear weapons that is just so different from any other interesting subject. Dr. Das:  Absolutely. I think in terms of the sheer destruction and the sheer nature and magnitude of the, the weapon itself is awe-inspiring? So there is this broader question of what are we doing here? Why are we building more of these things? Why is it that these weapons have become a core part of the security strategies of the countries that have nuclear weapons? Why do countries covet nuclear weapons, even non-nuclear countries? Why haven't we, and when I say we, I don't just mean academics, I mean we as a broader public, interested in survival, interested in thriving in a future that is positive and good for the climate, good for the environment, good for the future generations. Why do we embrace these horrendously dangerous systems? And make them an almost everyday part of the business of securing ourselves. It's very antithetical. There are a lot of dilemmas in that? And there are a lot of contradictions in that. That to me is fascinating. Lindsey:  Yeah, it's just such a complex topic. Dr. Das:  Yeah, absolutely. Lindsey:  A lot of people, when they think of nuclear weapons and even when I like brought up that, we're going to be speaking with you to family members and things and they just say, well, what are you going to talk about? Like, do we use them? Do we like them? I'm like, no, it's actually, there's a lot that goes into it. It's not just the nuclear weapon itself. That's like the center of all these topics and politics and, it's, it's really complex. Dr. Das:  Yeah, absolutely. And, and when you say there are a lot of things that go into it that really resonates. Because first it's like peeling an onion. Of course, there's the bomb. There's and in fact, even before the bomb, there's the uranium that's like in under a mountain somewhere that has to be mined. There's an entire mining operation there that has to get extracted. There are scientific processes that, pre-process that turn it into uranium that could potentially be used in a weapon. So that means enrichment. Things that you hear about when you talk about Iran's nuclear program potentially. Then there's a question of, will you use plutonium? Then you have to reprocess the waste from the uranium. Then you have to take all of that, package that into a bomb itself. But the bomb can't go anywhere by itself, so you have to build delivery vehicles. So missiles, nuclear submarines, aircraft? Then there's a question of, okay, how are we going to control these weapons? So what is our command and control setup? So there's satellites, communication cables underwater? There's this entire infrastructure, which is not just the bomb and the missile? And then there's the broader political question of where is, where are the people here? Are the people, are the public involved? And do they have a role in this decision making process? Is it just the political elite and nuclear weapons? Decision making is a very Elite driven Enterprise. There's so many different layers. And that's another going back to your earlier question. That's another thing that fascinates me about the subject itself. Human Consequences of Nuclear Weapons John:  It sort of touches everything, environment, democracy, anything. I have two little short stories that really shook me that have stayed with me for a while. Just to preface, flavor the question. So Moto Musuro, and her daughter Toshiko Saiki lived in Hiroshima. Because of the Second World War and American firebombing, Toshiko had evacuated her son to the outlying suburbs of the city. In mid-summer 1945, she went to visit him. On August 6th, the United States exploded the first atomic bomb over Hiroshima. Toshiko, in the suburbs, rushed back to the city but could not find her mother. Misoru. A month later, Toshiko's brother-in-law searched the destroyed home and was able to recover only her head. Glasses, which she always wore, were stuck to it. I saw those glasses at the Hiroshima Peace Museum in Japan. The 2017 Nobel Peace Prize winning organization the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, conducted an interview with George Coleman. He was a former Navy officer. In 1952, he participated as a test subject on the risks of being exposed to a nuclear blast. He recalled in the interview of lying in a trench with his hands covering his closed eyes as a shield from the bright light. When the bomb exploded, he recalled seeing the bones in his hands as if he were looking at an x-ray. He soon began losing his hair, his thyroid stopped functioning, and he later developed prostate cancer. So I say both of those things because it is just so unimaginable. And we have inherited this legacy and these weapons. But our humans, including those in the future, are capable of truly understanding the destructive scope of these weapons. Dr. Das:  Both of those stories are so evocative and both true stories which give us a flavor of how truly dangerous and destructive these weapons are in a way that we do not talk about, you know, when we talk about nuclear weapons policy, when we are talking about building more nuclear weapons, when we are talking about deterrence, we are not talking about some of the effects of what does this actually mean? What do your policies actually lead to? Sort of encapsulated in these stories that you just said. Are we capable of understanding the scope of the harm and damage? I think we are. I think the more you actually are curious and you learn, you find out that these weapons have in fact affected millions of lives over the years and I don't just mean in Hiroshima, which, you know, your story very much sort of brought out an aspect of what happens when you use nuclear weapons in or on a population, on a civilian population, more importantly. It's also people who have lived in areas where nuclear testing has taken place. So I'm thinking about the South Pacific, the Marshall Islands. I'm also thinking of the United States, places like New Mexico and Nevada. And people have lived with the effects of radiation in those populations. And lived with the intergenerational sort of damage that has been done to their bodies, which has probably passed down through different generations. So I think we have the science, we have the knowledge, we have the stories of survivors, these accounts, which are extremely harrowing. If you listen to the stories of the Hibakusha, the folks who survived the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and those stories are extremely well documented. So it's a question of do you have the interest of going out and finding out what is the effect of these weapons? And it's not just about your own interest, it's also a question of the policy community and us as the academic community, are we able to communicate these stories across to the broader public so that people understand? And I think there are efforts there. Perhaps those efforts aren't enough. There can always be more. I think my direct answer to you is yes, we can understand the scope of the harm. And at the same time we are not understanding it because there is a gap in access to that knowledge. And that's what we need to try and bridge. Arms Racing and Nuclear Reduction Lindsey:  In 1986, there were around 70,000 nuclear warheads in the world. Today, there are about 12,241, most of those being held by the United States and the Soviet Union. Why were there so many to begin with, and what led to that reduction? Dr. Das:  So one, To answer the question of why we get to those numbers, of course, this was a great power competition. We were in a world in the 1960s and 1970s. In the 50s, it was a slow ramping up, but there was definitely President Eisenhower who sent sort of a full push forward towards building as many nuclear weapons as possible. A part of that was feeling insecure about what the Soviet Union was doing. And at the same time, the Soviet Union was feeling insecure about what the United States was doing. This is what we call a classic security dilemma. I think that I'm not safe enough, and so I keep building more. And you think that you're not safe enough because you don't know exactly what I'm doing, and so you keep building more, or you don't trust me. So you keep building more regardless of what's going on in terms of diplomacy, etc. And so that's how we get to this mind blowing sort of 70,000 is just such a ridiculous number when you think about the number of nuclear weapons that two countries possess. John:  It seems divorced from like how many do you even need?  Dr. Das:  Exactly. And in the 60s, there used to be this talk of a gap. A nuclear gap. So if there is a gap, we have to meet it because we have to be at parity. And people always perceived there to be a gap. There was talk of a missile gap. If you have 100 missiles, I need to have 100 missiles. But hey, you're probably going to build 50 more, so let me try and build 200. And then you look at me trying to build 200 and you think, I need to build 250. And so on and so forth. And that's how you get to 70. So that's one. I think in the 80s, what happens is slowly but surely there is a broader sense of the danger that is present in, and pretty much the, the idea of head trigger alerts, where you could potentially launch a nuclear weapon pretty much as soon as you thought that the other side was to launch. Because you needed time to fill your missiles, it would take time to actually launch those missiles, etc. So we were in the United States as well as in the Soviet Union pretty much on the precipice. There was an exercise called the Able Archer exercise in the early 80s, which the NATO countries, including the United States, conducted, and that really freaked the Soviet Union out. As a part of while all of this is taking place, of like, you know, states sort of posturing against each other, building up more, there's also a very strong disarmament movement, which is grassroots organizations, non-governmental organizations, college campuses, people on the streets. About a million people land up in Central Park in New York protesting against nuclear weapons, which was at that point in time the largest sort of gathering of people for a cause, any political cause. So there's that happening in the United States. The other thing that's very interesting is, and this sounds a little ridiculous, but it actually did happen, which is that in 1983, there's this movie called the Day After that was released. And the Day After is about NATO and Warsaw Pact countries sort of basically ramping up the rhetoric and eventually launching nuclear weapons against each other. And then the destruction that follows the day after the nuclear bombs have fallen. And a million people, at least I think millions of people, watch this on the same evening that it's sort of broadcast in the United States. One of the people who watched it was President Reagan. And it freaks President Reagan out. And it truly represents this change in somebody who is fairly, before that, hawkish on a number of different security issues, to think we can't destroy ourselves. Then, of course, Reagan finds a partner in Gorbachev, who's the premier of the Soviet Union, who also is like minded in the sense of thinking there is an inherent danger to keeping nuclear weapons and staying on this hair trigger alert. So those two actually come together to bring forward all these treaties like the INF, which is the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, like START, which is, you know, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. And so there is a move as you kind of reach this height of 70,000 and great vulnerability for people, there is a backlash against that, not only from the people but also from the political class. And so hence we start seeing a reduction. And then, of course, the Soviet Union collapses. The threat of nuclear weapons strike from a great power adversary reduces. So the United States is also ready to reduce the number of nuclear weapons that it has. Countries like France give up a leg. So you generally have an air, sea and land-based sort of nuclear weapons. And the French give up their land-based nuclear weapons. In the 90s, because they say, look, the threat has changed, the threat has reduced. So there is this hopeful moment where people are reducing numbers, the START treaty has come into place, there's a dramatic reduction. Of course, today we are in a place that's very different. We'll talk about that in a second, I'm sure, but that's kind of the story of the dramatic reduction. Tactical Nuclear Weapons and Escalation John:  That's a good place to transition so that was a hopeful peak of nuclear weapons. I'm really concerned about the valley. And if we're entering a valley today, Russia has deployed tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus and has begun joint tactical drills around them. These weapons are intended to be used on the battlefield against troops, although it could vary greatly. Battlefield nukes could unleash an explosion from less than one kiloton, which is a kiloton is 1000 tons of TNT, if you can even imagine that, to tens of kilotons. For reference, the bomb used in Hiroshima was 15 kilotons. Do you think that it's possible to use nuclear weapons in a responsible manner or within some sort of ethical framework where harm is proportional, like against troops on a battlefield? Dr. Das: I think the answer to that is no. The answer to that is no because when you say in proportional terms you assume that there is a certain level of controllability, that you can control the proportion, the harm that is being caused by the nuclear explosion itself but also the radiation that comes after. Then there's a question of what happens to the other side. Do they think of it as being proportional or not? So can you control escalation? Once a single nuclear weapon has been used, there is this spiral that you're very likely to fall into where I think that I need to use more against you and you might think that you need to use more against me. And before you know it, there is no tactical use of nuclear weapons. There is another fallacy around this idea of a tactical use of nuclear weapons. If you think of where are these weapons going to be used, so if you think of a nuclear competition between countries like say India and Pakistan, if a single tactical nuclear weapon is used in a battlefield along the border of India and Pakistan, the population densities are such that there can never be just a tactical use where only members of the military are being affected. Broader and larger civilian populations will be impacted naturally. And then there's that question that we talked about earlier about intergenerational harm. What does this mean for harm of the land, but also of the people, of the animals on it? The Physicians for Social Responsibility, which is a set of scientists who look at nuclear weapons use and also advocate for nuclear disarmament, did this study on what would happen if a few tactical nuclear weapons were used in South Asia. And they came to the conclusion that 2 billion people in the world would be at risk because the use of these weapons would lead to maybe a very marginal change in the climate, the temperatures that you would have, which might then lead to famine, which would lead to crop failure broadly. Which would then lead to all this death. So when we say tactical nuclear weapons use, we should be really careful about what we are talking about and how do you actually differentiate between tactical and strategic? Deterrence and the Kargil Conflict John: The Cold War is often framed as an indirect conflict in which the US, Soviet Union, two nuclear armed states confronted each other through third party actors, espionage, and extremely violent wars in satellite countries such as Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan. Yet virtually no American or Soviet military forces ever directly fought each other because of the nuclear exchange that could possibly escalate from that. However, in 1999 from May to July, a violent conflict occurred between two nuclear armed states, Pakistan and India. In the Cargill War. Depending on the source, the number of casualties on both sides range from hundreds to several thousands. Please correct me if you have a good source for that. War between two nuclear armed states. Do you feel as though that is an encouraging development that this conflict remained limited without the use of nuclear weapons? Or is this a discouraging development as it hollows out that deterrent value of not avoiding conflict at all times between these two states? Dr. Das: Any time nuclear weapons are not used, that’s encouraging. So let me start there. The good news is that we did not see an escalation beyond the theater of Kashmir, where the two armies fought, which is where the, which is why we call it a limited war. Other parts of the India-Pakistan border could have potentially been opened up. Both sides did not decide to open up those borders. So, the conflict remained limited. And so that's a good thing. Now, you asked me about the deterrent value of, of nuclear weapons, what's, how does that figure in this story? And I think this is where we need to question, what is deterrence by you. What does this idea of nuclear weapons mean to you? So in 1999, when the Pakistani irregular forces as well as the Army forces crossed over to the Indian side and occupied about 500 square miles of territory before, at, let me say, in the, in the height of winter in the Himalayas, which is no mean feat. India only found out that this had happened when the snow started thawing and sometime in April. When they realized that, oh, we don't actually have those, those peaks anymore. People who were going out to graze with their animals were like, that's not you up there. And so then there's the question of, Well, India had nuclear weapons in 1999. Why did that not deter Pakistan from doing that? India has had nuclear weapons since 1998. We still see terrorist attacks happen on it, on its soil, intermittently. With the most recent one taking place earlier this year in May. So why does that continue to happen? Why do conventional armies fight each other even when both sides have nuclear weapons? Why does one side attack another one? So it's telling us and it's giving us these data points that, well, nuclear weapons don't actually deter that. There is, let's, let's temper our expectations about what deterrent value we get from nuclear weapons. It's not going to deter everything. There's folks who might say, you know, maybe it doesn't deter much at all. So if these weapons are in fact unusable, which a lot of people have talked about and claimed, then what is it actually deterring? The Korean Peninsula and Demilitarization Lindsey: So nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula. Are often cited by North Korea as an obstruction to peace and reunification. But South Korea doesn't have any nuclear weapons. I mean, they rely on the, you know, the United States for that. And would this mean that, like, demilitarization and the removal of American troops in South Korea, would it allow for, like, a future United Korea or Korean Peninsula? Dr. Das: That’s a very difficult question. There are no easy answers. Lindsey:  Yeah, it is. That's why we're asking you. Dr. Das:  No easy questions here. You know, it's difficult to say whether the demilitarization, in the sense whether the removal of US troops from South Korea would lead to reunification. But I would say that that would be the first step because you cannot have reunification without the removal of US troops. The other thing here is you have between North Korea and South Korea and the United States, the Korean War has not ended officially for any of these countries. There's a ceasefire and we've been in that ceasefire for the last, let's say, 70 something years. So step one is to actually acknowledge that this war has ended. And can we talk about the terms of what that peace would look like? And that in itself would lead to some kind of demilitarization presumably because then you would stop treating the Korean Peninsula as an active war zone where US troops for example have to be deployed. That's pretty much step one. Then it's a business of diplomacy. How can you actually have a stable situation between South Korea and North Korea along the border? Can you have diplomatic relations? And then can you talk reunification? That's up to those two parties specifically. And at the same time, North Korea has security concerns. South Korea has very severe security concerns. So there's a question of how can you assure if you're the United States or if you're China. Interested parties in that peninsula, how can you assure that there is some kind of security provided or there are some sort of assurances of security given? To either side so that there can be some kind of negotiation around either reunification or coexistence. But as you say, demilitarization is probably the first step and I don't think that's going to happen without first acknowledging the end of the war. South Korean Nuclearization and Proliferation Risks Lindsey:  My follow-up question to that and I'm I'm specifically curious about this, especially because you previously talked about how much deterrent value nuclear weapons actually hold. So as tensions of the Indo-Pacific conflict with China and North Korea increase, and the future commitment by the United States starts to become uncertain, Should South Korea compete in nuclear armament to protect itself? Would that cause an uproar? Just increase the tension in that region? Dr. Das:  It would certainly increase the tension in the region. And yes, it would certainly create an uproar. South Korea getting nuclear weapons would be an extremely dangerous outcome for the world. And I'll tell you why I say that. One is, of course, for the region itself, because then you'll have, for the first time, a sort of contiguous number of countries in Asia which have nuclear weapons that share borders? So you'll have, let's say if we start with Russia right at the top, you would have North Korea, South Korea, North Korea shares a border with China, Russia also shares a border with China, India shares a border with China, Pakistan shares a border with India? So that's one straight line of countries that share each other, that share borders that will have nuclear weapons. So that's one terrifying idea. And even without South Korea, that's terrifying enough? That would just be in addition, more terror. Then there's this question of how do we see North Korea potentially responding to South Korea having nuclear weapons? Does it mean that it's going to ramp up production somehow? Does it mean that it's going to increase its potential nuclear delivery capacity? There's also a question of how China is going to feel about this? Does that mean that we are going to see more Chinese nuclear weapons potentially targeting South Korea? Are we going to just see more ramping up of the Chinese nuclear weapons production line, which, by the way, is already at a pretty high sort of cadence? They're building nuclear weapons pretty fast to the best of our knowledge. And then on the other side, if you think of it beyond the adversary's question, what's Japan going to do if South Korea gets nuclear weapons? And if South Korea gets nuclear weapons and there is no consequence for that, why shouldn't Poland? Because South Korea getting nuclear weapons is also a sign that, hey, we don't believe in the United States' capabilities or assurances to secure our borders or we don't believe in the nuclear umbrella that the United States is giving us. Once that happens, other countries which are under the nuclear umbrella, especially in Europe, are also going to reconsider their position on that nuclear umbrella. So what does that mean for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty? What does that mean for other nuclear, non-nuclear countries? If,  South Korea builds these nuclear weapons and sort of breaks with what has been the international norms of not building more nuclear weapons. It's a difficult question, and it's certainly a very dangerous sort of situation, given the kind of public support there is for South Korean nuclearization right now. Preemptive Strikes and Nuclear Self-Defense Lindsey:  In Chapter 7, Article 51 of the UN Charter, it states that nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations. With the immense speed and destructive power of nuclear weapons is even just the possibility or thought of obtaining them by one state, a threat or a preemptive attack by another state. Dr. Das:  This is something that's happened in the past. Where when a country thinks that another country is going to get a nuclear weapon and that is going to potentially threaten them, Countries have gone in and attacked the potential proliferator. So we saw this with Israel attacking Iraq, the Osirak reactor in the early 80s. We've seen Israel striking Syria's potential nuclear capabilities in I think it was 2006 or around then. The United States and Israel together set back Iran's nuclear program with the use of the Stuxnet cyber attack, as well as the recent attacks this summer over in Iran by the United States. So, do countries often try to conduct preemptive attacks? Yes. Now, then there's a question of how effective those attacks are? If we take the most recent example of these attacks on Iran, have they been effective? We don't know. Even though there are certain folks who have claimed that this was a great success, if you look at the statements of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the IAEA in the following months. They've essentially said, some of these facilities still remain. Iran has a big scientific base to draw from, and it potentially has a fair amount of enriched uranium, which is not terribly far away from reaching weapons agreement. Ultimately, military attacks, preemptive attacks might set back a nuclear program for a certain amount of time, depending on how severe those attacks are. But to give up a nuclear weapons program requires diplomacy. It requires a change in a state's feeling threatened, as well as what is going to make it secure. You have to convince somebody that, hey, this is not going to make you secure. Bombing them is not going to make them feel more secure. I think we've got to think about some of those sorts of questions as we think about whether preemptive strike potentially on a potential nuclear weapons program is going to help that process of denuclearization. You might also potentially strengthen the resolve of the country that you're bombing. And so then you're going to have the opposite outcome of what you were trying to do in the first place. So, that's something to think about. Leadership Psychology and Nuclear Decision-Making Lindsey: Yeah. And I would imagine it would have to also depend on exactly what state would be obtaining that nuclear weapon. I know we keep going back to the Korean Peninsula, but if South Korea were to obtain nuclear weapons like North Korea, we know that the leader is a pretty hawkish leader. That would have a pretty negative outcome, of course, with other states in that region. I think depending on the relationship, you have to take that into account and the leaders and how they're going to respond as well, and the strength of that state. Dr. Das:  Absolutely. I think you're totally right about it matters who the leader is of any country. Whether they're going to feel more threatened. And there's actually literature on this. My colleague Rachel Whitlark, who has written a book on leaders and nuclear counterproliferation, talks about how there is a lot of evidence on how a leader thinks about the world, what their life experiences have been, all of those things shape their political positions. And then it also shapes how they might respond to crises, especially nuclear crises and crises which involve a potential country getting nuclear weapons, that is their adversary. So you see a difference, for example, between Kennedy and Johnson. These are two administrations that are almost the same in terms of staffers, secretaries of state, cabinet, they're exactly the same apart from the fact that the president changes after Kennedy is assassinated. There you see very different outlooks on whether you should be going in and trying to proactively stop a country from getting nuclear weapons or not. So leadership matters, how they think, who they are, how secure do they feel. All of those things matter. John:  And countries have given up nukes like South Africa, Ukraine, although they might not have had access to them, but they still, politics did exist, through diplomacy and pressure to have them do so. Dr. Das:  Absolutely. South Africa giving up nuclear weapons in the 1990s, on somewhat questionable grounds of political change and potentially the ANC coming into power, their bombs themselves were potentially aimed at internally against internal resistance to the apartheid regime. That particular regime I sort of think of as a little bit of an outlier to the broader to other sort of denuclearization examples. When we think about countries like Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus, for example, those are countries that have truly given up nuclear weapons who inherited thousands of nuclear weapons when the Soviet Union collapsed and they gave up those weapons under the most famous memorandum, of course, is the Budapest Memorandum, which we've heard about a lot in recent years. But also Kazakhstan and Belarus had separate agreements with the United States with other P5 countries. In return for giving up these nuclear weapons, there were, you know, financial aid that was given to those countries. And not only that, part of them giving up nuclear weapons was not just external pressure, it was also internal sort of churn and anti-nuclear sentiment. These existed both in Ukraine as well as in Kazakhstan. There are two books which have come out very recently which I think are worth reading. One is called Inheriting the Bomb by Mariana Bujarin talks about Ukraine's nuclear weapons, about Ukraine inheriting nuclear weapons and how they gave them up. And the other one is on Kazakhstan's nuclear weapons called Atomic Step by Tokhtar Kasenova. And that talks about how Kazakhstan had the experience of Kazakhstan as a place where the Soviet Union tested nuclear weapons, harbored nuclear weapons, and then eventually left nuclear weapons. And sort of the anti-nuclear movement within Kazakhstan that led to them giving up nuclear weapons. So it was an interplay of both international politics and domestic politics. John:  Certainly the legacy of Chernobyl was fresh in everyone's mind too. Dr. Das:  Absolutely. And that's where the anti-nuclear sentiment in the region really comes from. This idea that it could happen anywhere. In a sense, that's still true today. We assume that we can control nuclear technology. And here I mean civilian nuclear power technology as well as nuclear weapons technology. But every now and then you have a very, very rare case, what we call a black swan event, and you get a Chernobyl, you get a Fukushima. You get a three mile island. So the United States is not alien to this idea. It has happened on United States soil before. And those are things that we need to think about as we go forward and we think about either nuclear energy as being something that is desirable or building more nuclear weapons as something that is more desirable. The Future, New START, and China John:  So let's talk about where we go from here, the future. In 2017, the Congressional Budget Office estimated the Obama administration's plans for the future of the US nuclear forces would cost $1.2 trillion in 2017 dollars over the 2017 to 2046 period, a figure that has only grown with modernization and subsequent administrations. On February 5th, 2026, the New START treaty, the only remaining bilateral arms control agreement between the US and Russia, will expire, effectively ending any legally binding limits on nuclear arsenal size. And in the deserts of the Gansu province in China, China is constructing about 120 missile silos, part of a broader effort to rapidly expand its strategic forces. And you talked about the high cadence of them. Constructing their nuclear arsenal. According to the US Department of Defense, China could possibly field a stockpile of around 1,500 nuclear warheads by 2035. Are we in that valley? Are we re-entering a nuclear arms race? Will we always be in one? Dr. Das:  First, I'd say we don't always have to be in a nuclear arms race. Being in a nuclear arms race is an active choice. Like most other things in life, you choose to be in one. You can also choose not to be in one. But I see what you're talking about here as being one. That is the issue of China ramping up its nuclear arms production of the New START treaty essentially ceasing to exist in 2026 in February, which is not terribly far away. All of those are points of concern. So let's start with the New START treaty. There is no mechanism to renew the treaty as it stands because it has been extended. President Putin about a month ago, said that he and Russia would unilaterally adhere to the stipulations of the treaty for at least one year. Now it remains to be seen what the United States is going to do. The United States could well say, well, okay, we will do the same, and that will give us a year to potentially negotiate some kind of new agreement. That is very similar to New Start. So that's an option and we can continue to hold out hope for that because despite everything, President Trump has in fact in the past made statements about how dangerous nuclear weapons are. It seems that in the US administration there is hence an understanding that more nuclear weapons might be more dangerous for the world. So one can hold out hope that there might be some kind of agreement there. At the same time, the United States might also be reluctant to come to an agreement like this because once the New START treaty expires, keeping an eye on China and the ramping up of nuclear weapons there, the United States might say, well, this is an opportunity for us now that we are not limited by the new start treaty to build more strategic Warheads and increase our stockpile. And if that happens, there is a broader question of what is strategic logic that is going to drive that? Do more nuclear weapons necessarily make you safer? I'd argue the answer is no. Even somebody like Henry Kissinger, who is extremely hawkish, of course became anti-nuclear towards the end of his life. Even somebody like Henry Kissinger in the 1950s when he was writing about nuclear weapons, says beyond a certain number, what are you going to do with more nuclear weapons? Are you going to make the rubble bounce? Which means that you don't actually need that many nuclear weapons to, say, destroy Beijing, to destroy, you know, Moscow. So beyond the 1550 deployed nuclear weapons, do you need more? And likewise is applicable to China or Russia. Do they need more to be able to target their adversary primarily, which is the United States? And I'd argue the answer is no. Countries like India and Pakistan, for example, have kept the number of nuclear weapons that they have at what they call a minimum, sort of talking about a credible minimum deterrence, which basically says we don't need more than a few hundred. That number could even be lower potentially. But it really depends on what you believe, which is why I say being in an arms race is a choice. Because you could choose to say, how about we cap our nuclear numbers at 100 each? Then we can talk about the next step. So that's, that's one part of it.  I do want to flag something that we don't often talk about, which should be talked about more, which is that there is, beyond these nuclear countries, an entire movement, which is called the tree, which is centered around the treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons. It's called the nuclear ban movement. About 120 countries essentially passed this treaty in the UN in 2017. More than 90 countries are signatories to this. And they essentially are countries that have given up the right to build nuclear weapons. They are in favor of getting nuclear weapons to zero. So they're in favor of nuclear disarmament. And they essentially say, look, the consequences of the use of nuclear weapons is not just going to be on nuclear countries. So, if you use a nuclear weapon against China or if China uses a nuclear weapon against the United States, that's going to affect everybody? That's going to affect the world. Nowhere in the world are you going to be exempt from it. So, even if you're a non-nuclear country, you are affected by something that you have no control over. So, they are trying to build up this movement and, you know, half the countries in the world have signed on to that. Of course, the nuclear countries have not. But it's important to note that there is a countervailing force against this idea that building more nuclear weapons is a normal thing. These countries are saying, no, it's not normal. In fact, you need to be building. Well, you need to stop building and give up your nuclear weapons because you're all making us more unsafe. So let's think about that as well. And how do we factor that into our understanding of what is the threat? Is it a threat that the United States is building more nuclear weapons? Is it a threat that China is building more nuclear weapons? Is it a threat just that there are too many nuclear weapons in the world and something might happen to one one day and then, you know, all bets are off? Public Opinion and Democracy Lindsey: Well, it is hopeful to hear that a lot of the world is rooting for less of them. And it is always a tense subject, isn't it? John:  I mean, something got us from 70,000 to 12,000 is too many, but it's certainly a dramatic shift. Dr. Das:  For sure. And we're seeing at this moment a slow ticking up of that number from 12,000. 12,000. And so it's on us to talk about this more. It's on us to do what you both have just done, which is, you know, talk about this and put this out to the public and help, hopefully spark conversations and also think about what we want? Sure, the intelligence Community thinks something and the government thinks something and the white house thinks something and likewise across the world? Like the leadership of every country thinks a certain thing about what makes us safe. What about the people living in democracies? What do you think makes you safe? If you're sitting in, you know, we are sitting in Colorado? We've got nuclear ICBMs in the northern part of our state? Does that make you feel any safer? I don't know. I certainly worry about those nuclear ICBM silos being potential targets if there is a war between Russia and the United States or China and the United States. So that doesn't necessarily make me feel terribly safe. Does that make you terribly safe? And is it possible for you to shape the conversation from the ground up into trying to craft a policy that you'd like rather than a bunch of people who are elites in the world? Lindsey:  I think you're absolutely right that it needs to be talked about more, especially with the general public and people living in a democracy. I feel like nuclear weapons tend to be sort of taboo to people who don't look into them and don't understand anything about them or what they are and what they do. And, you bring it up and people say, oh, no, that's too much. I can't, I don't know. That's a lot to talk about. I don't know. John:  Or it's, it keeps us safe and they slap their knee or something. Lindsey:  Yeah. So it is, I agree with you that it's important. It should be more of a normal thing to talk about, especially today. Dr. Das:  Absolutely. Yeah. So thank you for doing that. Lindsey:  Yeah. We're glad we got to sit down with you and pick your brain about something we've just been just so curious about, because we talk about it with each other and with our peers, especially in grad school and It's nice to sit down with someone who has built a career around it and studies it and can inform us. John:  This was everything we wanted to ask, but we're too afraid to ask.  Closing Lindsey:  To lighten the mood a little bit, and just to kind of wrap it up, we thought we would ask you a fun question, which is if you could personally recommend one place that everyone should visit, whether it's for its beauty, importance, for its people, whatever it may be. What is one place that everyone should visit? Dr. Das:  So I'm going to give you a very biased answer here. I'm from India, and I think for those of you who have not been to India, you should absolutely visit. And you can visit in any season. And there's always a part of India. It's such a huge country. There's always a part that you can go to. If it's hot, you can go to the Himalayas. If it's kind of, you know, like, cold, you can go to the beach and go. You can come to Calcutta, which is where I'm from, where you'll get the best food in India. And that's, you know, that this, this is, this is not a hot steak, at least in my opinion, but sure to create a little bit of controversy amongst others, but so I would say, you know, go to the subcontinent. There's a lot to do, there's a lot to experience, there's a lot of, uh, not just Scenic Beauty, but also, cultural insight that you might yet, and if you're listening to this in the United States, it's definitely a very different sort of language. I don't mean language in the sense of, like, most Indians will speak in English to you, but the language of how we think and how we're talking about things is often different in different parts of the world. Wherever you go, that's, that's true of any So yeah, I would say go find yourself in India. John:  I'm sold. Organizations to Highlight John:  And lastly, at Mooreposts, we want to make it a point to promote nonprofits or organizations that create positive impacts. Are there any that you'd want to share, promote, or just have people know about that are important to you? Dr. Das:  I'd flag two. One is the Ploughshares Fund. The Ploughshares Fund has been working for decades now on reducing the threat of nuclear weapons in the world. And they also have a podcast. They fund a lot of different projects around community building, as well as spreading information as well as understanding of the threat from nuclear weapons.  Another organization that I've been sort of thinking about and following their work recently is called the NDN Collective. They work with Indigenous communities and Indigenous-led organizations in the United States, Canada, Latin America, and I know that a part of their work has been to work with survivors of areas where there's been nuclear testing in the United States. So areas in New Mexico, for example, especially, and we know the native populations are the ones who have been the most affected by some of those nuclear tests. And so they work with them in trying to create policy advocacy for them. And so those are a couple of organizations that I would follow. Final Thanks and Outro John:  Absolutely. Dr. Das, thank you so much for doing this. This was very generous of your time. Dr. Das:  This was an absolute joy. It's always a pleasure to talk to students. It's always a pleasure for me to be talking about nuclear weapons. Talking about the different ways in which they affect us. So thank you for having me. This was a delight. John:  Sheepland. A program about the great issues facing humanity. Lindsey:  A Mooreposts Podcast. If you enjoyed this work, please consider sharing our content and website or donating to a non-profit organization linked in the Donate  tab. DISCLAIMER The views and opinions expressed by podcast guests are their own and do not necessarily reflect those of Mooreposts, its editors, contributors, or affiliates. Podcast transcripts are edited for clarity and readability; section headers have been added for navigational purposes. The substance and intent of all remarks remain unchanged.

Audio & Transcript Executive Producers: John Lamberger, Lindsey Ferrini, Connor JL Moore Opening John:  Hello, I'm Jon Lamberger. Lindsey:  I'm Lindsay Ferrini. John:  And you're listening to Sheepland. This is a podcast about great issues. It's not necessarily about the history of everything that's happened. It's not really about the news of today. It's somewhere in the middle. Lindsey:  Yeah, and we're trying to ask the questions that everyone is wondering. They just don't have the outlets to ask them. John:  Sheepland, a program about the great issues facing humanity. Lindsey:  A Mooreposts podcast. Why We’re Studying International Relations John:  So we are currently, we are graduate students. Lindsay, why are you studying international relations? Lindsey:  Well, I actually have quite a bit of background in not necessarily international relations, but cultures and languages. And when I was in high school, I did a study abroad program in Spain for Spanish, and then I did a study abroad program in Argentina for Spanish. And that kind of got me interested in cultures. So I went to Utah State and I did my undergrad in international studies and global peace building, and yeah, after I got done with that, I didn't think that I would ever go back to school, but then I moved to Denver and I saw this international security program here at Denver University. I thought I'd give it a shot. And here we are. John:  So you were already living in Denver and then you came? Lindsey:  I was already living in Denver and then I decided to go back to school. I've only lived here now for a couple of years. I haven't been here very long. I moved here just for fun and I didn't really know what I was doing. It just happened to work out that I'm here at this school and I'm finding my niche and yeah, yeah, what about you, John? What about you? You have quite an extensive background. John’s Background John:  Um, I, in some ways, I think I don't. Like, every day I come to school, I'm like, oh, I don't really know anything about any of this. Lindsey:  I don't think anyone knows anything. John:  That's true. Gosh, where do I start? Well, I graduated high school. I went to film school for two years. It was like a weird trade. Film school. A few years after that, I joined the Marine Corps and they sent me away to Asia and Japan. And I've always loved social studies, geography and history. And I've always found that to be very compelling because this happened. This isn't like, not to say that fiction work isn't beautiful or compelling, but I don't know, nonfiction always spoke to me more. I decided to end my contract when it expired. And before that, I knew I was going to go to college. And I found out about the University of Denver in 2012 when Obama and Romney debated here. Lindsey:  I heard that. I learned that. Just recently. John:  At a Magnus Arena they debated. And I'm like, oh, they have colleges in Denver? You know, imagine that. It's 2011, 2012, I have no idea. So it was always in the back of my mind. And then I was like, well, I should go there for my master's. And then I was looking around other schools for my bachelor's. And I'm like, oh wait, I should just go here too. And I've just, I love it. I love the classes, I love the culture, I love everything about the political science of this all is deeply fascinating. I can't picture a more important thing. Lindsey:  No, no especially in today's world. John:  Maybe like medicine, like being a doctor, I'm sure, you know, that's great. But for me, like, this is it. Lindsey:  It's just such a large scale. You know, you're dealing with the world. And especially in, you know, today's time, it's really, I mean, it's an important topic to be studying. But this is definitely the school to do it at. I didn't realize it. I didn't realize the impact that it had and the type of people that went here, my peers currently, my instructors, everybody. I had no idea the experience that they have and what the school had to offer. And it's just a great environment to be in. And it's interesting because we're studying such, I mean, depressing topics, but somehow, like our peers in the classes that we're in, we still find a way to find hope and positivity and smile and giggle a little bit, which I think is pretty cool. Is It Better to Know or Not Know? John:  And a lot of the subjects are very like these things happen. People get hurt. It's how the world is operating. And while it can get really dark, I feel very proud because it's me that is putting myself out there to look at this, to be at the forefront of studying this. Lindsey:  Yeah. John:  Because part of me was like, I don't want [No message] a protective thing, I guess. I'll talk to my relatives and some of them will be like, oh yeah, like, mispronounce this group of people in a different part of the world or like... Yeah, totally. Lindsey:  I mean, I used to, I kind of am not too happy to admit this, but I used to be pretty ignorant and I just would say leave me out of it. I don't like it, I don't want conflict, like keep me out of it, I don't want to know, it's too depressing. And it's just been interesting. Since being here to feel that shift and be like, wow, I'm actually really proud that I'm studying this. And like what you said, putting myself out there to be willing to do such important things and essentially make a difference or an impact on something super important that's affecting people's lives. John:  Right. I always think about this deep question, but like, is it better to know or to not know? Lindsey:  Yeah. John:  About anything. Lindsey:  I know. Well, people say ignorance is bliss. John:  Right. Lindsey:  Which is true, but then you're not, nothing's getting better. John:  Yeah. Lindsey:  So I don't know. John:  Right. Lindsey:  It's a tough question. John:  Right. Lindsey:  We'll never know. We'll never know, really. John:  Well, I would rather know, because I think I can be the one that maybe can help people. Lindsey:  Yeah. John:  Or to make things easier or just to be part of the process. Lindsey:  Right. John:  I think I have a good brain, I think. Lindsey:  Yeah, you got something up there. John:  I got a good brain, the brain said. Lindsey:  It's not completely hollow when I talk. John:  Not completely. Yeah, there's some loose change up there, I think. But to be in it, I think, is important. Mooreposts and Why a Podcast Lindsey:  Yeah, it is. More posts, the website. How did you get into it? Just tell me how you, yeah, tell me the process. John:  I was last spring. I got a text from a peer, a student, a friend of mine. His name is Connor Moore. And he, out of the blue, just asked me, Hey, do you want to live together next year? And I'm like, Sure. So then we moved in together and then I was in the kitchen. He might have been in the living room and he was like, Hey, do you want to do creative work for this publication? And I said, Sure. That's really it. And here we are. And here we are. And I've always wanted to start a podcast, but why start a podcast? Lindsey:  Yeah, right. John:  Like in 2025, podcasting is almost over, but I feel like it's a good medium to talk to people, to listen to people, to hear. Lindsey:  Yeah. John:  It's like a new golden age of radio. Lindsey:  Yeah, it is actually. That's a good way to put it. John:  So this is really episode zero of just introducing us to each other in a way, but then to anyone who listens to this. Yeah. But we want to do episodes around great issues essentially. So we're really excited. Our episode one will be about nuclear weapons. Lindsey:  Yeah. It'll be with Debak Das, who is an expert, and his primary studies are nuclear weapons. John:  Right. Lindsey:  And everything around them. John:  Yeah, it's kind of, I'm, I'm pretty excited because it's like, oh wow, like a world class expert. I just like it, I know. Lindsey:  And there's just so many questions. I mean, I even have brought it up to people like, oh, I'm gonna interview this guy. And he's in love, he studies nuclear weapons. And they're like, what do you mean he studies nuclear weapons? Like how do you use them? I was like, no. I mean, everyone has so many questions. John:  Right. Lindsey:  And it's just such a profound topic. So it'll be interesting to pick his brain. John:  Right. Lindsey:  You know? John:  Everything you wanted to know about nuclear weapons, but were too afraid to ask. Like, what about, like, what if they were bigger? I don't know. No, it'll be a little, a little better, I think. We're gonna, we've compiled a bunch. Lindsey:  Yeah, we got some questions to ask him. John:  And it's beyond like, nuclear weapons, great or the greatest to use or not use. Good, bad, what do you think? It'll be nuanced and fun, interesting. Lindsey:  Kind of just, Stuff that no one, including ourselves, like, thinks about when we talk about nuclear weapons. John:  Yeah. And we are laughing and very excited, but it is actually very scary and surreal. It is. Lindsey:  It's an intense topic, it's a very intense topic. John:  Right. I'm laughing because I'm uncomfortable. Lindsey:  Yeah. Right. John:  Right? That's why we laugh. Lindsey:  We just laugh for the next one. John:  Anywho, the apocalypse. Do you like podcasts? Podcast Tastes and Format Lindsey:  I do like podcasts. I mean, I pretty much listen to crime podcasts just because when I listen to, you know, when I listen to podcasts, it's in my free time and I'm trying to Well, when I say I'm trying to unwind by listening to a crime podcast, that doesn't sound too great. But I've done that. John:  I've listened to, like, I like Cereal a lot. Lindsey:  Cereal was a good one. John:  I liked, what was it called? Lindsey:  What was the podcast? You were just, I know you really like podcasts as well. What was the one that you were telling me to listen to? And I think they talk about any subject. John:  In Our Time by the BBC. Lindsey:  Yeah, In Our Time. Yeah, what's that one about again? John:  Melvin Bragg, he's the BBC, like, he basically just sits down with a few subject matter experts, like world-class academic voices on whatever, and for 50 minutes they all compile the most important, concise way of thinking or talking about that topic. And they'll talk about, like, Jupiter, they'll talk about the Christmas Carol. Lindsey:  Like the most random, just miscellaneous. John:  Miscellaneous things, but like they are miscellaneous, but they're not though. It was like, oh my God, 15th century Chinese poetry is changing my life. You know, deeply fascinating things. But my favorite part is that it has to be concise. And so he's constantly ensuring that the subject experts don't stray too far. And he's like, no, I'm sorry, we can't be talking about that. Reel it in, reel it in. Outside the scope, reel it in, reel it in. And the experts are like, no, no, this is actually important to know about the War of 1786, whatever. And he's like, I'm sorry, that's outside the scope. We're moving on. So it's like... Lindsey:  Keeps everyone on track. John:  Highly recommend it. He's retiring this year. Lindsey:  Oh. John:  Very sad, but he's done it for 20 years. Lindsey:  Right when I'm about to get into this podcast. John:  Well, they're all available at 20 years worth of these podcasts. They're all... That'll do. There's no commercials. They just put them out online. What do you look for in a podcast? Lindsey:  What do I look for in a podcast? Hmm. I mean, flow is really important. You know? John:  Dead silence. Lindsey:  Yeah, no flow. But I don't know. I mean, I personally have a fairly short attention span, so when the episodes get too long, you lose me. So I like short and sweet podcasts. I like information, I like informative podcasts, you know? Pretty much the opposite of what you and I are doing right now. John:  Right, well, this isn't that long. No, we're not. So a four hour epic on the first year of World War I doesn't interest you? Silence, Flow, and Conversation Lindsey:  Yeah. John:  I think we can lean into silence. I think we can be, you know, it doesn't have to, we don't have. Lindsey:  To fill every, that's funny, I was actually just watching a podcast and it was a casual one. It was two actors from like SNL, Saturday Night Live, I can't remember, but they were talking and she was like, One of your many talents is leaning into silence. How do you do that? And the other one's just sitting there, like not saying a word, like leaning into the silence. And I don't know, I just thought it was kind of funny. John:  Is it Amy Palmer? Lindsey:  Yes, it was Amy. Yes, it was Amy Poehler and Dakota Johnson. But Amy Poehler was like, how do you just, how do you handle silence so well. And the other one's just sitting there nodding her head. John:  I think silence, I think we should use silence more in our daily lives. You know, it doesn't, it doesn't have to be like this hostile thing. Lindsey:  Like awkward, weird. John:  It doesn't have to be. And even if it is awkward, like life is awkward. Lindsey:  It's only, it's as awkward as you make it. John:  Yeah. Yeah. Call to action. Lindsey:  And on a serious note. And on a serious note. John:  War, politics, sports. Closing: Looking Ahead Lindsey:  No, but actually, I think it's pretty cool that we're given a platform. Like more posts to be able to do something like this. And we're able to even have the opportunity to, in the future, interview and pick experts' brains about these kinds of topics and great issues. And we're just excited to see what happens and who we get to meet and what we learn. And yeah, we're looking forward to it. John:  I find this to be an extension of everything else that I think is important about learning about international relations, international studies, the science of humans and communities, and I absolutely agree. Sheepland. Lindsey:  Sheepland. If you enjoyed this work, please consider sharing our content and website or donating to a non-profit organization linked in the Donate  tab. DISCLAIMER The views and opinions expressed by podcast guests are their own and do not necessarily reflect those of Mooreposts, its editors, contributors, or affiliates. Podcast transcripts are edited for clarity and readability; section headers have been added for navigational purposes. The substance and intent of all remarks remain unchanged.

Illustration by Connor JL Moore LISTEN TO THIS ARTICLE The general goal of the peculiar brand of conservatism that grew out of twentieth century America was to decrease the role of government by creating markets that achieve policy aims. While a strong public-private nexus is certainly important to the functioning of a modern state, the United States’ legislation during the ‘War on Drugs’ seemed to flip the script entirely, prioritizing market stimulation over completion of traditional Republican policy goals. American anti-drug policy is best understood in this context of comparison between its lack of effect on the international illicit marketplace and its creation of multibillion dollar domestic industries. This can be seen no clearer than in the steps the U.S. has taken in combating the ever-notorious cocaine trade. Despite decades of effort and billions of dollars of taxpayer money, the cocaine marketplace has only grown more efficient in bringing products to market. The price has consistently fallen year over year for the last three decades. All the while, domestic industries spawned from the same ineffective anti-drug policies which saw outsized corporate returns to American shareholders. It’s clear from the contrast between the lack of damage to the drug marketplace and the rapidly growing domestic industries that support American anti-drug policy, that the War on Drugs has essentially benefited, and continues to benefit, private corporations far more than it hinders drug traffickers, manufacturers or users. This paper will narrow its focus from the temporal and corporeal totality of the War on Drugs to specifically the cocaine marketplace between 1990 and 2005. To preface, American anti-cocaine policy has been further divided into two main strategies: Foreign Market Interventions (FMIs) and Increasing Jurisdictional Severity (IJS). FMIs are focused primarily on undermining the functions of the international cocaine supply chain through diplomatic, military, and economic agreements with foreign nations. Two FMIs occurred in the period being studied: The Andean Initiative and Plan Colombia. Both emphasized the delivery of military hardware to assist South American countries in directly combating traffickers, as well as herbicidal aerial fumigation to destroy coca crops in their fields. The plans also included insignificant investment in agricultural alternatives to illicit crops, much to their operational detriment. The latter strategy, IJS, is based on the assumption that increasing the penalties for drug use and trafficking will lead to less users, or at minimum less users outside of prison. One significant investment in IJS occurred during the period of focus: The 1994 Crime Bill. This piece of legislation sought to expand correctional capacity in the U.S. while simultaneously increasing the punishments for drug use, possession, and distribution. The crime bill allocated billions of dollars to the construction of 125,000 new state prison cells, the expansion of the police force by 100,000 new officers, and the establishment of 70 new mandatory minimum drug sentencing guidelines. [ 1 ] This paper will narrow its focus from the temporal and corporeal totality of the War on Drugs to specifically the cocaine marketplace between 1990 and 2005. To preface, American anti-cocaine policy has been further divided into two main strategies: Foreign Market Interventions (FMIs) and Increasing Jurisdictional Severity (IJS). FMIs are focused primarily on undermining the functions of the international cocaine supply chain through diplomatic, military, and economic agreements with foreign nations. Two FMIs occurred in the period being studied: The Andean Initiative and Plan Colombia. Both emphasized the delivery of military hardware to assist South American countries in directly combating traffickers, as well as herbicidal aerial fumigation to destroy coca crops in their fields. The plans also included insignificant investment in agricultural alternatives to illicit crops, much to their operational detriment. The latter strategy, IJS, is based on the assumption that increasing the penalties for drug use and trafficking will lead to less users, or at minimum less users outside of prison. One significant investment in IJS occurred during the period of focus: The 1994 Crime Bill. This piece of legislation sought to expand correctional capacity in the U.S. while simultaneously increasing the punishments for drug use, possession, and distribution. The crime bill allocated billions of dollars to the construction of 125,000 new state prison cells, the expansion of the police force by 100,000 new officers, and the establishment of 70 new mandatory minimum drug sentencing guidelines. [ 1 ] This paper is not an in-depth discussion of the three anti-drug actions taken between 1990 and 2005. The details of the voluminous 1994 Crime Bill alone would require many more pages than the scope of research conducted would allow. Likewise, a study of every facet of the Andean Initiative and its impacts on each portion of the illicit supply chain that brings the drug to market, although illuminating, would be a book length endeavor. Instead, the broad strategies of each FMI and IJS initiative will be outlined and discussed as much as is relevant to their general impact on domestic industry and illicit markets. Only the end data point of the cocaine supply chain, the average price per gram in the U.S., will be used to illustrate each plan's effect on the illicit marketplace over time. The assumption here is that even if Plan Colombia’s allocation of military hardware to Colombia, for example, significantly hindered cocaine manufacturing, then the cartel would react by increasing the retail price of their product. The same goes for the theory that increasing legal penalties for drug use will result in fewer drug users; If any of these were effective in undermining the illicit cocaine marketplace, it would manifest itself in increased prices being passed to drug users in the U.S. Increasing Jurisdictional Severity The 1994 Crime Bill was aimed at increasing penalties for drug trafficking, possession, and distribution. Then Senator Joe Biden emphasized the overwhelming bipartisan nature of the 1994 Crime Bill saying, “The liberal wing of the Democratic Party is for sixty new death penalties. That’s what’s in this bill. The liberal wing of the Democratic Party is for seventy enhanced penalties. The liberal wing of the Democratic Party is for one hundred thousand cops and one hundred twenty-five thousand new state prison cells.” [ 2 ] IJS contributed significantly to corporate shareholder returns and had little to no impact on the international cocaine marketplace. It is important to note that the 1994 Crime Bill by no means constitutes the entire IJS investment over the period 1990 to 2005. Rather it defined the period of American politics in which it was passed, but dozens of other bills, budgets, executive orders, and court decisions contributed substantially to IJS during this period. The ‘94 Crime Bill is simply an easy shorthand for evaluating the success, or lack thereof, of the strategy that IJS represents. The 1994 Crime Bill, officially the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, is an example of how sentencing policies are employed to make America a less appealing jurisdiction for American drug traffickers and consumers. The bill stipulates mandatory minimum drug sentencing laws for a variety of crimes and even goes so far as to mandate life imprisonment in certain felony combinations common for drug users and traffickers. Due significantly in part to the ‘94 Crime Bill, between 1990 and 1997 the incarcerated population in America increased 7% year over year from 689,577 to 1,100,850. [ 3 ] To house an additional half million inmates, the 1994 Federal Budget directly allocated $771,000,000 for the construction of new facilities in the Federal Prison System, or a 67% increase compared with the 1992 budget. [ 4 ] The Effect of IJS The Netherlands is the most attractive jurisdiction for cocaine traffickers and users outside of South America. The Dutch have famously lenient drug sentencing laws and enshrined legal protections for the use of “soft drugs.” The problem for the European market of cocaine traffickers is the complex logistics involved in bringing the illicit product to market. The Netherlands, then, is an interesting comparison to the U.S. Low jurisdictional barriers combined with logistics of similar complexity in circumventing American anti-drug policing measures can help illuminate what portion of cocaine pricing is associated with fear of legal repercussions. It is clear from a comparison of Dutch and American average cocaine prices per gram that most of the pricing model of cocaine isn’t associated with IJS. The Netherlands, whose government pursued a policy of limiting jurisdictional severity, managed to maintain relative stability in average cocaine prices; only fluctuating from $66 per gram to $60 per gram. The U.S. on the other hand saw a drop in price from $184 to $75 over the same period despite investing billions in IJS. Fig. 1 Dutch versus American Cocaine Price Per Gram 1990 - 2005. Graph by Braxton Fuller compiled from UNODC data. Figure 1, compiled from two datasets from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), shows a comparison between average Dutch and American cocaine prices per gram between 1990 and 2005. [ 5 ] Cocaine prices in the Netherlands are predictably low and stable. The Dutch have not pursued a strategy of IJS, so it can be assumed that a substantial portion of Dutch cocaine prices are the group's profit margin and transportation costs. American cocaine prices per gram, on the other hand, see a consistent decline throughout the period. This despite considerable investment in making the American market a less appealing jurisdiction for traffickers and users of cocaine alike. The American strategy of IJS did achieve some of its policy goals; namely, increasing domestic American corporate returns. Although anti-cocaine policy failed to hinder the illicit marketplace, it did prove to be a boon for American corporate shareholders. Two of the largest recipients of federal construction contracts in the 1990s were the Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) and the Wackenhut Corrections Corporation (WCC). Their financial performance in the wake of the 1994 Crime Bill and later history of corporate mergers is illustrative of the calcification of shareholder interest in the War on Drugs strategy. WCC described its position in a 2002 financial filing: “We have a leading share of the privatized correctional and detention facilities management services market for the states of California, Florida and Texas, the three U.S. states with the largest inmate populations. As of July 31, 2003, we operated a total of 47 correctional, detention and mental health facilities and had over 36,000 beds under management or for which we had been awarded contracts. We maintained an average facility occupancy rate of over 97% and 99% for the fiscal year ended December 29, 2002 and the thirteen weeks ended March 30, 2003, respectively. For fiscal year ended December 29, 2002, we had consolidated revenues of $568.6 million and consolidated operating income of $27.9 million.” [ 6 ] In the previous four years, WCC saw an increase in earnings per share from $0.54 to $0.96, or a 56% increase between 1997 and 2001. [ 7 ] Likewise, CCA earnings per share doubled from $0.34 to $0.74 between 1999 and 2000. [ 8 ] The nascent private prison contractor business model proved itself attractive to institutional investors during this period and the marketplace rapidly consolidated. CCA earnings per share were $5.64 due to an acquisition by a large private prison conglomerate, CoreCivic, in 2001. [ 9 ] Likewise, WCC was acquired by the GEO Group, a large security and correctional conglomerate, in 2004. GEO would go on to be purchased by a group of institutional investors, including BlackRock and Vanguard Investments, in 2008. Both companies’ performance in the immediate aftermath of the 1994 Crime Bill overperform the wider American market during the same period. Foreign Market Intervention The U.S. pursued two FMIs during the period of focus: The Andean Initiative and Plan Columbia. Both prioritized the delivery of military aid to combat traffickers in producing regions and aerial fumigation to destroy coca crops in their fields. The Andean Initiative was a collaboration between the U.S., Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru to address the international drug trade. As a result, this effort was widely criticized in hindsight by historians and intellectuals of the War on Drugs for its emphasis on the delivery of military hardware over economic incentives for alternative agricultural material production in lieu of coca. The scale of military hardware deliveries under the plan is almost difficult to comprehend. Just in the first year of the plan's implementation in Peru, twenty A-37 ground attack aircraft, twelve UH-1H Huey helicopters, rifles and light infantry equipment for six new infantry battalions, dozens of patrol boats, and a classified number of Blackhawk helicopters were delivered. In totality, the Andean Initiative would dispense $250,000,000 in military aid and $129,000,000 in economic aid. Plan Columbia placed a heavy emphasis on military aid as well. Between 2000 and 2006 military hardware deliveries never dipped below 72.6% of annual Plan Colombia aid packages. In 2001, the first complete year of Plan Colombia implementation, the proportion of military to non-military aid was 97.2% or $1,263,000,000 of $1,300,000,000. [ 10 ] Even proponents of the plan such as Michael Shifter acknowledge that, “In framing and defending Plan Colombia as an anti-narcotics and security policy initiative, both countries focused too narrowly on military and police aid—with a resulting cost to human rights and the rule of law in the short term, and to the sustainability and consolidation of security over the long term. ” [ 11 ] There was even a tacit understanding that vast amounts of humanitarian funding needed to be allocated, but the political environment in America would make such funding infeasible. There was an expectation that European partners would fund the humanitarian half of the operation, but this never materialized. [ 12 ] Both plans failed to address the root socioeconomic causes of the drug trade. This makes evaluating the success of Plan Colombia and the Andean Initiative by their own metrics unworkable. Reported statistics such as hectares of coca destroyed, successful prosecution of cartel members, or number of cocaine labs destroyed, fail to capture a picture of operational success because they lack any connection to the factors that drive the drug market. Violent and draconian market interventions have repeatedly failed in controlling marketplaces throughout history and these two are no different. The Effect of FMIs The two FMIs pursued during the period of study are the Andean Initiative beginning in 1990 and Plan Colombia in 2000. In total, these plans cost the U.S. a combined $8,379,000,000 between 1990 and 2005. Both interventions prioritized aerial fumigation strategies and military aid while marginally supporting alternative agricultural development. To each plan’s credit, the land devoted to coca cultivation between 1990 and 2005 decreased by 52,100 hectares, from 211,700 to 159,600. [ 13 ] Although they achieved desired metric goals, both plans failed to increase the price of cocaine in American markets. In fact, the price of cocaine decreased between 72% [ 14 ] and 40% [ 15 ] in the period of study. Both UNODC datasets show a substantial decrease in the price per gram of cocaine between 1990 and 2005. In total, the $8,379,000,000 spent by the U.S. on FMIs in the region between 1990 and 2005 breaks down to $76,871,559 per dollar the price of a gram of cocaine decreased. The largest single beneficiary of American anti-cocaine policy was Monsanto; the company that produced the herbicide used in aerial fumigation efforts for most of the period of focus. From 1990 to 2000, Monsanto owned industrial patents enabling sole commercial production of glyphosate. [ 16 ] From 2000 until well past 2005, Monsanto was the only company with sufficient industrial capacity to produce glyphosate at sufficient scale for herbicidal aerial fumigation. UNODC annual coca surveys in Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia track the total number of hectares aerially fumigated with glyphosate but the data is incomplete for the period of study. According to UNODC agricultural monitoring reports, 169,588 acres were fumigated in Peru [ 17 ] , 204,400 in Bolivia [ 18 ] , and 1,466,407 in Colombia [ 19 ] between 1996 and 2003. The State Department noted on July 9, 2001, that, “ In aerial eradication of coca in Colombia, 3.35 pounds of glyphosate is used per acre sprayed, well within U.S.-approved application levels.” [ 20 ] When combined with historical price data for glyphosate collected by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, a low order estimate can be produced. In 1996, the average cost per pound of glyphosate sold in bulk to American farmers was $12.25. [ 21 ] This means that between the years of 1996 and 2003 the U.S. contracted Monsanto to the effect of $75,525,181. This is akin in size to the entire $129,000,000 allocated for nonmilitary application in the Andean Initiative alone. The total land fumigated in the plan, 1,840,395 acres, is well over ten times the total reduction in land devoted to coca cultivation, 128,741 acres. In summation, aerial fumigation cost the U.S. around $41 per acre sprayed, but over $500 per acre removed from the illicit agricultural marketplace. There are a couple of explanations as to why a specific American FMI strategy failed to increase the price of cocaine in the U.S. The first is an analysis of the procurement structure of the cocaine manufacturers in South America. Tom Wainwright summarizes the seeming market incongruity in his book, Narconomics: How to Run a Drug Cartel by saying, “The armed groups that control the cocaine trade in Colombia act as monopsonies. Under normal market conditions, coca farmers would be able to shop around and sell their leaves to the highest bidder. That would mean that in times of scarcity, coca buyers raise their bids, and the price of the leaf goes up. But Colombia’s armed conflict is such that in any given region, there is usually only one group of traffickers that holds sway. That group is the sole local buyer of coca leaf, so it dictates the price… That means if the price of producing the leaf goes up - owing to eradication, disease, or anything else - it will be the farmers who bear the cost, not the cartels.” [ 22 ] This same monopsonistic environment exists in the cocaine manufacturing market across the Andes. In effect, sellers of bulk amounts of raw coca can only turn to criminal manufacturing groups to offload their product. In this analysis, it doesn’t matter how many hectares or tons of raw coca are burned or fumigated with glyphosate: the price to acquire the raw materials necessary to produce cocaine won’t change. The only people that the U.S. is hurting by perpetuating a strategy of crop eradication are the growers themselves, not the cartels, and certainly not the bottom line of illicit criminal groups. Fig. 2 Total Land Devoted to Coca Cultivation in Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia 1990 - 2005 By Braxton Fuller Compiled from UNODC Data. Conclusion American anti-Cocaine policy is effective from a perspective of increasing shareholder returns. The public has been indoctrinated to believe that undermining the drug trade looks a certain way. In reality, it presents itself as the rapid arming of police forces and overcrowding of prisons, planes spraying chemicals, and young men who look different from the idealized white American in handcuffs. It is a story of victimization by people in faraway places through the drugs Americans take by their own free will. This is by no means an effective strategy to combat the cocaine trade. It is, however, the most attractive to American institutional investors because it’s the most cost intensive to the American taxpayer. This strategy and this story have failed time and time again to undermine the illicit drug marketplace. In truth, the cocaine market became healthier and more efficient by America’s involvement in both IJS and FMIs. So too did America’s own domestic industries. The effects of American anti-drug policy are increased profits and more efficient business models for both sides of the War on Drugs. The notion of whether intervening in foreign marketplaces or increasing penalties for participation in the drug economy are good ways to undermine transnational criminal groups is beyond the scope of this paper. However, the specific structure of FMIs and IJS that the U.S. has employed fails to place the social and economic costs associated with drug use on those who perpetuate the international drug trade from positions of power. The people whom American anti-drug policy hurts the most are those with the least power, and therefore they are the least likely constituency to have any influence in creating change in the system of drug use and manufacture. It has also continued to dispense huge quantities to corporations tasked with supporting the same failed policies. In effect, it benefits the people who need it least and hurts those who need help the most. In a good faith reading of American anti-drug policy, it is clear that this is a strategic error. The structure of interventions in the illicit marketplace should ensure that increased costs are passed as high up the supply chain as possible. Braxton Fuller is a current master’s candidate for International Studies at the University of Denver’s Josef Korbel School of Global and Public Affairs. If you enjoyed this work, please consider sharing our content and website or donating to a non-profit organization linked in the Donate  tab. DISCLAIMER Mooreposts publishes independent analysis, commentary, and research for informational and educational purposes only. Content on Mooreposts—including articles, Mooreposts Bites, strategic intelligence assessments, opinion pieces, interviews, and visual materials—does not constitute legal, financial, medical, or professional advice, nor does it represent any government agency, official position, or classified assessment. Unless explicitly stated, all analyses and interpretations reflect the views and analytic judgments of the individual author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Mooreposts, its editorial staff, or affiliated contributors. Strategic intelligence and analytical content is based on open-source information and publicly available materials. Mooreposts strives for accuracy, transparency, and rigorous sourcing; however, information may change as events develop. Readers are encouraged to consult primary sources and exercise independent judgment.

Illustration by Connor JL Moore LISTEN TO THIS ARTICLE On October 3rd, 2025, the Islamic Resistance Movement, more commonly known as Hamas, agreed to release all 48 remaining living and deceased Israeli hostages in exchange for a durable, lasting ceasefire in Gaza. Soon after, the United States brokered a peace deal between Israel and Hamas, theoretically ending what has been described as a genocide by most human rights organizations and genocide scholars . Under a 20 Point Plan published by the White House, a “strong, durable, and everlasting peace” would reign over Gaza and the Levant.  In reality, Israel has continued killing Gazans unabated, as two children, aged 10 and 12, labeled as terrorists by Israel , were killed on November 29th, 2025. This incident occurred exactly 30 days after the signing of the peace plan that “ ended the war ”.  There have been 16 well-documented  violations of the Gaza peace plan by Israel as of the writing of this article, calling into question the effectiveness of the US-backed agreement. While the introduction of the Gaza peace plan was little more than a cover for Israel to continue fighting, it is important to understand what the Gaza peace plan, as proposed by the Trump Administration, would do to Gaza. This article will break down the Gaza peace plan by all 20 points.  The Gaza peace plan can be broken down into three phases, the initial phase of Immediate Ceasefire & Hostage Framework (Points 1-8) , followed by the Stabilization & Interim Governance phase (Points 9-14) , before concluding with the Reconstruction & “Peace Horizon” (Points 15–20) phase . These three phases are ultimately part of a greater plan that systematically excludes the Palestinian people as political actors, seeking to divorce Gaza from the idea of ‘Palestine’, that being a sovereign state existing within the 1967 borders . Instead, the objective appears to center on stabilizing the region through external control and technocratic autocracy. The fundamental issue of the Gaza peace plan is that it does not seek ‘peace’, it seeks to skirt around the issue of Palestinian sovereignty and self-determination, instead constructing an artificial framework of security and technocracy that will only serve to enrich Western actors while depriving Palestinians of their rights.  One of the self-professed, fundamental principles of the Gaza peace plan seeks to separate Gaza from Palestine. It states that Gaza (devoid of any mention of Palestine) will be a “ deradicalised ”  zone devoid of terrorism. Who, though, decides what constitutes deradicalization? Would a new Gazan education system seek to build a distinct   narrative for Palestine, justifying the actions of Israel both in 1948 and 2025? Violence in Gaza does not occur arbitrarily; it is intentional, directed violence aimed at resolving the Palestinian question and forcing a new political end through force. Any attempt at resolving violence in Palestine must come through the frame of addressing the root cause - that being the denial of Palestinian statehood and self-determination.   Another core thrust of the peace plan is the removal of Hamas from power. Since the October 7th attacks, support for Hamas has declined significantly in Gaza. Removing Hamas would undoubtedly improve the possibility of true peace between Palestine and Israel. However, the question then becomes, who or what will replace Hamas? Unless Israel is willing to release Marwan Barghouti , who has sworn non-violence and peace, there will not be a unifying figure for Palestinians, much less Gazans. It is unlikely that Gazans would accept the   dreadfully unpopular  Mahmoud Abbas, current President of the Palestinian Authority, who polls at 29% in Gaza, as compared to Hamas, which sat at 51%  in October 2024. As such, the Gaza peace plan goes a step further and proposes a “Board of Peace,” with Donald J. Trump serving as Chairman. Notably, the Gaza peace plan does not denote any concrete guidelines identifying when Trump would step down as Chairman of the “Board of Peace”. Critics may argue that the Gaza peace plan gives him an indefinite term in this role, making him the arbiter of any peace between Israel and Palestine beyond the end of his presidential term.  Fundamentally, the Gaza peace plan as authored by President Trump does not succeed in providing a strong likelihood of long term peace in the Middle East. Instead, it creates a shaky framework of stability without sovereignty, governance without representation, and reconstruction without autonomy. Palestinians were excluded from more than just the drafting of the Gaza peace plan, they were excluded from the very concept of peace that the plan seeks to promulgate. Yet again, the international community objectifies Palestinians as objects of political policy and a means of producing wealth, rather than as architects of their destiny and arbiters of their security. Conor Farrell is a Middle Eastern Human Rights Advocate with a M.A. in International Studies from the Josef Korbel School of Global and Public Affairs. If you enjoyed this work, please consider sharing our content and website, following Conor on the social media platforms listed in his bio , or donating to a non-profit organization linked in the Donate  tab. DISCLAIMER Mooreposts publishes independent analysis, commentary, and research for informational and educational purposes only. Content on Mooreposts—including articles, Mooreposts Bites, strategic intelligence assessments, opinion pieces, interviews, and visual materials—does not constitute legal, financial, medical, or professional advice, nor does it represent any government agency, official position, or classified assessment. Unless explicitly stated, all analyses and interpretations reflect the views and analytic judgments of the individual author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Mooreposts, its editorial staff, or affiliated contributors. Strategic intelligence and analytical content is based on open-source information and publicly available materials. Mooreposts strives for accuracy, transparency, and rigorous sourcing; however, information may change as events develop. Readers are encouraged to consult primary sources and exercise independent judgment.

Illustration by Connor JL Moore Listen to this article America's collective myopia is dooming its foreign policy. Just after exiting Afghanistan following over twenty years  of a futile exercise in nation-building by the U.S. military, the newest iteration of the Trump administration wants the U.S. military to embark on a similar undertaking in Mexico. A central tenet of Trump’s second administrative platform has been his ‘tough on cartels’ policy. When discussing the issue, he has ranged from alluding heavily  to outright stating  that he intends to employ military force against cartels to stymie illicit activity on the southern U.S. border. Mexican drug cartels undoubtedly raise legitimate security concerns for the U.S. However, military intervention in Latin America would worsen the issue. U.S. military action will fail to adequately address the demand for drugs, the economic impacts of cartels, and long-term strategic goals in Mexico. Furthermore, unilateral U.S. military action against cartels has a strong possibility of fomenting yet another insurgency, inevitably demanding far greater resources than the U.S. will be willing to dedicate. Despite the cartels’ exacerbation of public health concerns, this matter’s preeminent treatment as a national security issue may result in a loss of focus on burgeoning security threats in Europe and Asia.  Foreign Terrorist Organizations and Insurgencies Drug cartels are not terrorist organizations. While they may employ violent tactics to coerce and control aspects of their local government and populace , they lack the ideological components necessary to be considered extremists. Even if their violent strategies look familiar to other terror groups and insurgencies fought by the U.S. in the past, cartels are profit-driven entities. As such, they operate more similarly to businesses than terrorist groups. Dismantling cartels requires unique efforts divorced from their ill-advised treatment as purveyors of terrorism. In light of this reality, labeling drug cartels as foreign terrorist organizations is unhelpful in actually mitigating their influence. While this policy position may allow for a deployment of military force, it fails to address effective means of combating and categorizing cartels.  Furthermore, drug cartels are not leading an insurgency . As such, past lessons in counter-insurgency strategy will only be tangentially applicable. Despite the cartels' integration into the local populace and their past community outreach  work,   they are not insurgents bent on replacing the Mexican government. Rather, they actively benefit from the corruption and ineffectiveness of the current Mexican regime. Therefore, replacing the government through means of insurgency is of little use to Mexican criminal organizations. These groups desire the freedom necessary to continue conducting business and turning profits. Due to these unique factors, the U.S. cannot effectively fight cartels using strategies previously employed against insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan. Past Failures There is ample evidence of failed military action against drug cartels in Mexico. Numerous Mexican presidents have used varying levels of military action  to weaken, deter, and cripple drug cartels in Mexico. Past responses by Mexican presidents have demonstrated how poorly military force has fared against cartels .   Despite these attempts to suppress cartels, Mexican drug trafficking organizations are arguably at their strongest, as customers in the U.S. have increased demand for their products year over year . U.S. military action in Mexico will not change the demand from consumers. As such, addressing the supply of drugs without confronting demand in the U.S. will only result in a deficient outcome, unlikely to meaningfully reduce drug trafficking into the U.S. Attacking the cartels has no clear military end-state. It possesses echoes of yet another ‘forever-war’ where U.S. military involvement may necessitate a prolonged presence and strategy  that cannot be bound by time. In a democracy with an ever-shortening attention span, this type of conflict does not play to the strengths of the U.S. military and political structure. U.S. military action will only worsen the situation in the immediate future. Economic Impact The economic significance of  cartels cannot be ignored. Cartels supply sizable amounts of money and employment to citizens. Removing them would eliminate a notable portion of the Mexican economy, further destabilizing the region. When aggregated, the cartels are estimated to be the fifth-largest employer of people in Mexico , outpacing many large U.S. corporations operating in the country.   Their contributions to the Mexican economy are meaningful and must be thoughtfully considered when making strategic plans relating to their elimination. Simply dismantling the cartels will not be enough. Due to their lucrative nature, this will only result in the creation of a vacuum to be exploited by other industries and criminal groups. Removing supply without addressing  U.S. and global demand will not solve the issue.  The Larger Picture To be clear, the argument here is not to do nothing. Drug cartels are violent and ruthless, posing a serious threat to U.S. public health. Furthermore, a clear link of cooperation between an increasingly adversarial China and drug cartels  has emerged in the sale of chemical precursors. These are strong reasons to take action in curbing the power and influence of drug cartels. However,  a military intervention will not be an effective means of achieving this goal.  Mexico is one of the most critical actors in aiding U.S. national security. As the United States’ southern neighbor, Mexico is crucial to maintaining U.S. strategic goals. Now is a time for the U.S. to strengthen bilateral ties instead of pursuing unilateral military action in Mexico, which would only heighten tensions with the nation’s government and people. The U.S. needs to strengthen relations with its neighbors and allies to contend with rising powers like China and Russia, who are increasingly collaborating against U.S. interests. U.S. intervention against cartels will not produce or reinforce any alliances. In fact, short-sighted foreign policy decisions have the potential to create new enemies instead. Jonathan Rockford is a current master's candidate for International Security at the Josef Korbel School of Global and Public Affairs at the University of Denver. If you enjoyed this work, please consider sharing our publications and website, following Jonathan on the social media platforms listed in his bio , or donating to a non-profit organization linked in the Donate tab. DISCLAIMER Mooreposts publishes independent analysis, commentary, and research for informational and educational purposes only. Content on Mooreposts—including articles, Mooreposts Bites, strategic intelligence assessments, opinion pieces, interviews, and visual materials—does not constitute legal, financial, medical, or professional advice, nor does it represent any government agency, official position, or classified assessment. Unless explicitly stated, all analyses and interpretations reflect the views and analytic judgments of the individual author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Mooreposts, its editorial staff, or affiliated contributors. Strategic intelligence and analytical content is based on open-source information and publicly available materials. Mooreposts strives for accuracy, transparency, and rigorous sourcing; however, information may change as events develop. Readers are encouraged to consult primary sources and exercise independent judgment.

Illustration by Connor JL Moore Listen to this article Introduction Years of political turmoil and totalitarian politics have led Syria to a crossroads – will the nation seek to move towards liberalization, or revert to sectarian tendencies? After the fall of Bashar al-Assad via coup d’etat, the Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) political party assumed interim control. The commentary below provides context for pre-civil war governance, the legacy of the Arab Spring, lessons to heed from it, and the concept of democracy in the Middle East. Finally, a discussion of liberal reforms needed to foster the seed of democracy and the challenges that come with each is included.  Contemporary Political Context  After over 14 years of civil war,   600,000 citizens and combatants dead , and half of the population displaced, cautious optimism seems to dominate international dialogue surrounding the future of Syria after the fall of Bashar al-Assad. The emerging regime, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), maintains that the new governing body aims to respect the rights of minority citizens, aid in constitutional reform, and form an inclusive and representative government . To understand the rise of HTS, however, it is critical to grasp the deterioration of Syria under the Assad regime.  In 1971, after a coup d’état, the Alawite minority Hafez al-Assad established a totalitarian monarchy through the Ba’ath Party. The party gained control of trade unions, civil society, and state institutions, supported internationally and regionally by presenting itself as an anti-imperialist and anti-Israeli regime . Iran and Russia provided financial and military support   in exchange for proxy influence in the Middle East, particularly the Levant. The Assad family’s rule was often denoted by exploiting societal divisions, suppressing dissent and free speech, restricting Sunni government participation and political reach, and utilizing violence as an enforcement mechanism . In 2000, after Hafez al-Assad’s death, his son, Bashar al-Assad, assumed power. Initially, Syrians were hopeful for liberalization and reform, yet quickly realized that there would be a continuation of authoritarian rule, one marked by corruption, violence, and brutality.  In 2011, with the sweeping Arab Spring uprisings, the duplicity and cruelty of the Assad regime were further revealed and spread through social media and civil unrest. To combat the protests, Bashar al-Assad engaged in violent crackdowns, such as chemical attacks and prolonged slow conflict, that displaced over 7 million Syrians . Although HTS’ rebel-led offensive catalyzed the physical collapse of the Assad regime in 2024, the cracks had been widening for years. Simultaneously, as the continued civil war eroded Assad’s coalition and military strength, the war in Ukraine captured Russia’s attention, and Iran and Hezbollah focused on Israel. On December 7th, 2024, just 10 days after the start of the offensive, Bashar al-Assad fled to Russia. The following day, Assad’s military unit – the Syrian Arab Army – announced its dissolution, leaving room for HTS and the rebels to claim victory. Although this decisive victory marked the end of a 50-year brutal authoritarian regime, it also signified a significant regional shift. Syria was far from mended, Iran suffered a severe strategic blow in the loss of its proxy power, and a vacuum now left room for a new sphere of influence.  The functioning interim government, led by HTS and Ahmed al-Sharaa, now faces the ruins of a sovereign state, hoping to unite sectarian divisions, reopen diplomatic channels, and restore normalcy in civilian livelihood. Al-Sharaa has signaled that constitutional reform and stability to foster free and fair elections will require an estimated four years of interim work, namely, constitution drafting and institution hardening. The eye of the international community is watching closely. The question then remains: Can Syria stabilize and become one of the first codified and enduring democratic regimes in the Middle East?  In truth, only time will tell. However, if HTS and al-Sharaa can successfully institute liberal democratic processes, economic reform, international cooperation, and cultivate a desire for democracy from within, there remains great potential for a liberal stronghold.  The Legacy of the Arab Spring To foster an environment in which the seed of democracy can grow, it is necessary to understand modern-day democracy-building attempts in the Middle East and North Africa. In particular, lessons from the Arab Spring ought to be considered carefully, showing not only what motivated citizens to mobilize for democracy and liberalization, but also as a cautionary tale of what went wrong and the lasting consequences of such mistakes.  For a democratic transition, there must be a foundation of trust, protection, and inclusion of civil society influence in the new regime. In the wake of the Arab Spring, Tunisia was one of the few states to adopt institutional liberalization. However, their democracy proved to be volatile, as the process focused primarily on legal and procedural changes, rather than addressing deep-rooted social and economic issues. On paper, the Tunisian democracy codified democratic processes and free elections, but trust in newly developed institutions eroded over time, as they failed to protect human security. The role of civil society in Tunisia was limited to acting as a mediator rather than a full governance partner. Instead of simply coexisting with the government, civil society organizations should play an active role in decision-making ; their influence is in the best interest of citizens and their everyday lives. Syria’s transition will benefit from an empowered civil society that helps maintain accountability and represents diverse societal interests.  Another critical lesson from the Arab Spring is the need for bottom-up liberalization from the people, for the people. After the Arab Spring, many countries implemented democracy through political elites , who excluded ordinary citizens from decision-making, weakening legitimacy and reinstating a notion of instability. The only form of liberalization that can take root and endure in Syria is one pushed through grassroots movements designed for citizens' safety, security, and prosperity . Previous, unsuccessful attempts to institute democracy have been viewed by citizens as an imposition of Western ideology, rather than an attempt to increase civil liberties. After years of colonialism, the Arab world, particularly in the Levant, has a sour taste of Western influence and, by extension, most foreign intervention.  Although traditional imperialism ceased decades ago in the Middle East, the enduring consequences are ever-present, highlighted by much of the foreign intervention in post-Arab Spring governance. In several cases, the machinations of foreign governments have resulted in democratic sabotage, fueling the very instability they feared. For instance, interest competition between Egypt, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates contributed to the fracturing of Libya into rival governments . Ostensibly, foreign powers intervened to protect civilians under the Right to Protect principle, but in reality, it is understood that intervention was linked to geopolitical interests and regional power. As learned from foreign intervention in the Arab Spring, HTS must toe the line between diplomacy, geopolitical exchange, trade, investment, and foreign intervention that may harm stabilization and democracy.  Fragmentation is another aspect of the failures of the Arab Spring that Syria must diverge from. Sectarianism and factions dominate Syrian society  as a product of the prolonged civil war and competition between minority religious groups that have historically been persecuted. The Arab Spring showed the world  that a fragmented society and a fragile security landscape can destabilize democratic transition. The most prominent example of this failure is the case of Libya. Their inability to integrate factional militias into a state-sanctioned military force eventually led to long-term instability and violent rivalries. Syria already mirrors some of Libya’s faction issues – ethnic and religious fragments around the state are armed and have been acting as their protector for over a decade. In order to consolidate state power and rebuild the security apparatus , and thus trust in the government, the threat of violence and instability must be replaced with a clear chain of command. Finally, a key lesson of the Arab Spring is that overloading a reform agenda can be counterproductive . Liberalization is a complicated process, requiring the restructuring of government laws and institutions. However, as seen in the case of Yemen post-Arab Spring, attempting to tackle numerous reforms simultaneously, whether it be economic, anti-corruption, or others, can overwhelm a system and oversaturate citizens. Instead, Syria should adopt a phased approach, focusing on realistic benchmarks and gradual improvement, rather than attempting to overhaul everything at once. If al-Sharaa and the HTS coalition can manage to differ from the faults of the Arab Spring, yet cultivate the fervor for significant liberalization, Syria may be able to lead the Middle East to a stable future.  Implementation of Democratic Institutions and Overhauls All considered, the critical steps outlined above are necessary for Syria to move towards liberalization, stability, and security. First and foremost, the new Syrian regime must make a serious effort at institutional rebuilding, as the Assad regime corroded any true bureaucracy. To foster faith in government-funded organizations, it is necessary to build a secular, civil, and decentralized state , emphasizing equality for all citizens regardless of religion or ethnicity. This may be difficult to navigate as Syrians reconcile with decades of religious and ethnic prejudice. Still, it may be possible for HTS to find a compromise in the construction of the governing and military apparatuses. Beyond just the structural aspect of the government, there needs to be reasonable public confidence and trust in government institutions after decades of corruption, bribery, and cronyism. As seen in the failures of Libya , the inability to develop a central bank, military, defense ministry, stable local-level institutions, and governing bodies fails in post-revolution state-building. To develop those critical institutions, capable bureaucrats must be appointed based on merit and statutes that constrain institutions must be codified via constitutional and legal reform.  Next, the Syrian government must acknowledge and work to alleviate the acute and dire humanitarian crises that plague the general public. Preliminary, conservative estimates note that seven out of ten Syrians need humanitarian aid. The nation ranks fourth in the world for food insecurity; there are over seven million internally displaced people (IDPs), over four million internationally displaced, and more than half of the population lacks stable access to water . Although international aid plays a large role in the rehabilitation of human security, the ruling regime is responsible for the distribution of a lot of monetary aid. Under Bashar al-Assad, Syria redirected large portions of international aid funds to the Assad family and elites by skewing exchange rates, allowing them to divert over 51 cents on the dollar away from the real crises to its reserves. Moreover, with high levels of food insecurity, the Assad regime diverted food and supplies to the military  rather than civilians in need. Ahmed al-Sharaa and the interim regime need to aid the acute crisis by equally distributing funds to those in need and transparently reporting to international aid institutions to continue support. For legitimacy and confidence in the current regime to lead Syria to a more prosperous future, human security must be fundamentally supported. Democracy for the people, by the people, can only be mobilized when citizens have the agency to focus on political progress rather than only basic human survival mechanisms.  Democracy for the people, by the people, can only be mobilized when citizens have the agency to focus on political progress rather than only basic human survival mechanisms. Fiscally, the interim government needs to reform and overhaul the tax system, increase public sector salaries, and restructure ministries for greater efficiency and accountability. One of the most corrupt features of the Assad regime, beyond the diversion of humanitarian funds, was the mismanagement of national funds. It is suggested that Bashar al-Assad redirected nearly three billion dollars meant for the reconstruction of Syrian society to his inner circle and sectors that strengthened the regime's hard power . The corruption and a clear effort to evade international standards for aid resulted in sanctions from many Western nations, which devastated the Syrian economy. Thus, a negative feedback loop was born: diversion of funds perpetuated not only the humanitarian crises in Syria but also the erosion of legitimacy for international organizations and other states, resulting in more sanctions, which in turn resulted in more money allocated to the regime for strength amidst a failing economy. The crippled Syrian economy is limited in access to capital, aid, and foreign investment , so they must work with the international community to lower sanctions and reallocate funds to rebuild the economy from the bottom up. Rehabilitation of a healthy oil industry  and rebuilding infrastructure for power plants, water systems, and roads are the first steps. As international sanctions begin to lift, it is critical that Syrians welcome foreign direct investment, invest in energy and agriculture, and stimulate local economies. To attract such investment, it is imperative that HTS establish legal protections for investigators , tighten bureaucratic processes, and reopen and modernize ports to encourage trade.  Diplomatically, al-Sharaa’s government ought to develop more of a working relationship with regional powers, like Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and even Israel, to signal a shift away from dependency and alliance with Iran. Although, unfortunately, strikes between Syria and Israel have continued, al-Sharaa has signaled a desire to open diplomatic channels via indirect talks . Turkey, while advancing on the issue of Kurds at the border, may be a helpful regional ally in terms of energy and the renewal of the sector in Syria. Thus far, Turkey has established procedures for connecting a 400kV line to link Syria and Turkey’s electrical connection by the end of 2025. Moreover, the Turkish energy minister has promised to supply Syria with two billion cubic meters  to generate electricity, which has long been unreliable throughout the country. This partnership could set a precedent for regional investment and diplomacy. Past regional support, Syria must reintegrate itself into geopolitics and global institutions. After years of corruption, mismanagement, and non-compliance with international laws, the interim regime must establish transparency in the allocation of funds, buy into institutional constraints, and comply with humanitarian law. In doing so, Syria opens the window for a relief of sanctions, and further foreign direct investment from Western states with the capital and bandwidth to support Syria’s reconstruction. Inflow of capital can stabilize spiraling inflation and reduce the lack of trust in banking institutions.  Politically, it is essential that Syria, after stabilization, establishes free and open elections for citizens. Al-Sharaa has noted that it could take up to four years  to reconstruct the constitution and stabilize the nation enough for an election. While the stabilizing capabilities of the interim HTS regime are critical, efforts to reconstruct Syria may be rendered illegitimate if there is not a peaceful transition of power and civil liberties are not established. Bottom-up democracy and inclusive politics directly correlate to improved quality of life and stability. Take, for example, Senegal. A USAID project  engaged over six hundred civil society organizations in budget processes and advocacy practices, resulting in large improvements in health services and improved infrastructure. This model is easily applicable to Syria, as infrastructure rebuilding and human security are among the most pressing concerns for citizens. Moreover, the pressure of open elections creates a sense of accountability for those in power. The better quality of life under a given regime often correlates with reelection and maintenance of power. Therefore, political parties vying for power are forced to compete for societal support rather than military coalitions and hard power.  Through a scaffolded approach, the interim Syrian government can take steps in the right direction by reopening the Syrian economy, providing humanitarian support, and engaging in diplomacy, all of which are foundational to liberalization. However, this path is not without its challenges.  Challenges to a Democratic Transition  While there is tentative optimism about Syria’s status due to displayed diplomacy and moderation, former extremism, debilitating divides between Syrian political coalitions, and international interference may prove to be serious roadblocks in the path towards liberalism. The current regime, led by HTS, has made strides towards international diplomacy and claims about restored institutionalism, but has its roots in Islamist ideology. Formed in 2011, the original organization functioned as an al-Qaeda affiliate , carrying out insurgent attacks against the Assad regime. The organization quickly became legitimate by securing funding from the Persian Gulf, collecting taxes in controlled territory, and providing regional security. In 2017, the original organization made a critical political move in separating from al-Qaeda as a competitor jihadist regime, likely as a mechanism to form a legitimate path to political leadership. At present, al-Sharaa and HTS have and will continue to promote higher education , as they did with the provinces they controlled since 2011, particularly for women. Moreover, HTS aims to ideologically separate from al-Qaeda , citing the need for constitutional reform and more relaxed social norms compared to those proposed by extremist groups.  Finally, the looming threat of international intervention poses a great threat to Syria’s future, particularly in the wake of Iraq’s sectarian spiral, and the hope to avoid the same fate. The over-influence of regional powers, like Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Turkey, will threaten to dislodge political stability. As mentioned, it is critical that Syria engages in a degree of regional stability as a method by which to not only prop up a recovering economy but also lessen reliance on Iran and dissolve as a proxy. However, the overreach of neighboring actors also poses a threat to Syrian stability. Although Turkey is well-positioned to aid in the restructuring of domestic industries in Syria, their inherent desire to suppress the conflict with the Kurds on the Syrian border. HTS needs to be accepting of Turkey’s aid, but strong in the defense of Syrian Kurds to avoid the sectarian spiral seen in Iraq. Rather, a unified state, protecting all Syrian citizens regardless of their religious or ethnic minority, is key. The role of the United States and Russia may also be a defining factor in the success and stabilization of Syria. The US holds significant leverage through not only economic sanctions and diplomacy, but also international signaling and soft power influence. The United States’ recent alleviation of sanctions on Syria, as well as a diplomatic visit with al-Sharaa, have signaled that other Western states may do the same. The symbolic support of the US can open up diplomatic support from the rest of the Western World for Syria, and it is mutually beneficial as a secure ally in the Middle East, which is strategically significant to the US. Russia, on the other hand, has a substantial role in the endurance of the Assad regime, hand in hand with Iran, complicating the path to democracy. Their influence   creates significant obstacles to establishing a governance model  free of external control and codified in democratic institutions and ideology. For Iran and Russia, Syria had been a consistent regional opportunity to project power in the Middle East. Increased scrutiny from Western states pushed Syria towards a coalition with the two, acknowledged as an “alliance of convenience”, which included mutual defense and shared intelligence . However, as Russia is preoccupied with the conflict in Ukraine and Iran is dealing with the dissolution of proxy strongholds in Lebanon and Palestine, there is an opportunity to drive Syria away from dependence on the two. It is then up to Western powers to support Syria in a time of need and development, rather than leaving them to revert to support from Russia and Iran. Walking the tightrope between engagement and interference is difficult to gauge, but crucial for societal reconstruction and the liberalization of Syria.  Conclusion Syria is a nation at a crossroads, where ideas of democracy and liberalization meet the lasting consequences of a nation scarred by war. The deeply fractured social and political fabric, woven through years of devastating conflict and foreign interference, must be sewed together again. The path to establishing a democratic ecosystem in Syria is likely to be fraught with challenges, yet the potential for such a transformation remains achievable, albeit slowly. Constructing widespread liberalization requires the rigorous implementation of comprehensive reforms, including the codification of checks and balances, institutionalization of civil liberties, and the establishment of free, fair, and competitive elections. These measures are critical to fostering a political environment conducive to sustainable and inclusive democracy. Syria is a nation at a crossroads, where ideas of democracy and liberalization meet the lasting consequences of a nation scarred by war. Syria’s revolution and regime change carry profound implications for the Middle East, with neighboring nations and global powers keenly invested in its outcome. A shifting Syrian political landscape could redefine regional and geopolitical alignments, which further underscores the interconnected stakes of Syria’s democratic experiment. Neighboring countries and world powers are watching closely, understanding that Syria's political future could reshape the entire regional order. A successful democratic transition in Syria could serve as a beacon for other Arab states, demonstrating that modernization and liberalization can coexist with traditional Arab cultural norms and practices. This transformation would challenge long-held assumptions about authoritarian durability, offering a compelling alternative that empowers citizens without erasing their heritage. Mia Navarro  is a current master's candidate for International Security at the Josef Korbel School of Global and Public Affairs at the University of Denver. If you enjoyed this work, please consider sharing our content and website, following Mia on the social media platforms listed in her bio , or donating to a non-profit organization linked in the Donate  tab. DISCLAIMER Mooreposts publishes independent analysis, commentary, and research for informational and educational purposes only. Content on Mooreposts—including articles, Mooreposts Bites, strategic intelligence assessments, opinion pieces, interviews, and visual materials—does not constitute legal, financial, medical, or professional advice, nor does it represent any government agency, official position, or classified assessment. Unless explicitly stated, all analyses and interpretations reflect the views and analytic judgments of the individual author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Mooreposts, its editorial staff, or affiliated contributors. Strategic intelligence and analytical content is based on open-source information and publicly available materials. Mooreposts strives for accuracy, transparency, and rigorous sourcing; however, information may change as events develop. Readers are encouraged to consult primary sources and exercise independent judgment.

Illustration by Bodhi Harrison Listen to this article On December 8, 2024, the world watched in astonishment as Bashar al-Assad’s regime collapsed after his family’s 50-year reign in Syria. As Assad’s two critical partners, Russia and Iran, became incapable of supporting the regime due to the Russo-Ukrainian War and Israel’s decapitation of Hezbollah, the environment was ripe for overthrow. In just ten days, the leading opposition—Hay-at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)—took de facto control over Syria. With Assad fleeing to Moscow, Syria’s bloody 13-year civil war came to a relatively nonviolent, but possibly tentative conclusion. The question now is how to foster a stable and fair Syria with the debate largely revolving around sanction relief. Some believe complete sanction removal is necessary to rebuild Syria. Others promote a wait-and-see approach to maintain leverage around the situation and over the HTS, which remains listed as a terrorist organization despite its significant steps to rehabilitate  its image. Moreover, many perspectives typically advocate for what one player should do (i.e., the U.S. challenging Türkiye ) instead of looking at larger multilateral approaches. While Assad’s deposition is widely celebrated among Syrians and many across the world, emerging threats and competing foreign interests make the climb to a stable and just Syria daunting. This situation, however, presents a tremendous opportunity for international players to coalesce over Syria via shared interests and interdependencies. Through continued, substantial, and unconditional humanitarian aid, underpinned by sanction exemptions and multilateral action, Syria can stabilize . For 13 years, Assad’s violence against his population and subsequent international sanctions decimated Syria’s infrastructure and economy. 90% of Syrians  are below the poverty line, there’s mass energy scarcity, 13 million  face food insecurity, and 14 million  remain displaced. The UN projects  that 33 million Syrians will require critical assistance this coming year, creating the potential for further deterioration of an already dire humanitarian crisis. Even with HTS’ now interim president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, positioned to consolidate power, the country remains fractured, and with competing foreign interests, a power vacuum persists. To unify Syria, HTS needs further sanction relief and to integrate the U.S.-backed Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The SDF desires  a seat at the table in the new government, full integration of their forces into a centralized Syrian army, shared energy revenues, and administrative autonomy in their controlled regions. Yet, they remain in conflict  with Turkish-backed groups, and their influence and security rely on the U.S., which desires a withdrawal from Syria . Beyond wanting to repatriate  its Syrian refugee population, Türkiye desires to dismantle the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) , who has members in the SDF, out of concerns that an autonomous Kurdish entity in Syria could embolden actors like the PKK to elicit more insurgencies in Türkiye. Worried about   Türkiye’s ambitions and influence  in Syria, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates aim to financially shape and integrate Syria into the Arab League. However, all actors need Türkiye’s influence within the HTS. At the same time, Türkiye needs the Gulf states and EU’s financial weight  in rebuilding Syria and could benefit from help in disbanding the PKK. Citing security concerns, Israel has occupied Syrian territory and conducted tactical strikes against Syrian military infrastructure, which hinders Syria’s capability  to fend off internal and external threats. Yet, Israel relies on support from the U.S. and Gulf states. The EU, moreover, is primarily concerned with HTS’ intent  of forming a fair government as Sharaa has largely excluded key Syrian opposition groups from the new government and made concerning unilateral moves. Along with such interdependencies between players, significant shared interests can spark a new bloc aimed at stabilizing Syria. These include securing 9,000 incarcerated extremists  in SDF regions, suppressing a resurgence of extremist cells, combating a hostile Iran , and locating missing chemical weapons  from Assad’s arsenal. These threats actively endanger any potential for a stable Syrian government to form. International players must continue to provide constant, unconditional, and substantial humanitarian aid. This, however, won’t be sufficient  for stabilizing Syria as it depends on economic recovery. Large, expedited exemptions are necessary, which luckily have started with the EU  and U.S.  lifting specific sector-related sanctions. Yet, if Syria does not sufficiently rebound fast enough, enhanced exemptions will need to be hastened before the country spirals into chaos . These will not only immediately save lives but also create some stability by reversing fleeing refugees  and, importantly, extend an olive branch to Syrians—reducing the risk of armed uprisings . To elicit further sanction relief, HTS must include diverse Syrian organizations and armed oppositions in its formation of a new government, which critically places safeguards against authoritarian impulses . This overture needs to be met with concurrent multilateral diplomacy, which comes with tradeoffs for all. The bloc needs to pressure Israel to withdraw from Syrian territory and halt its strikes. In turn, HTS and Türkiye must normalize relations with Israel by reestablishing the 1974 disengagement agreement, signing a non-aggression pact, and devising ways to foster further economic interdependency to solidify such efforts. Simultaneously, the bloc must establish methods to secure incarcerated extremists, suppress extremist cells from forming, locate missing chemical weapons, and thwart any Iranian efforts to upend Syrian unification. While promising negotiations  continue between the SDF and HTS, the bloc needs to assist Türkiye’s ongoing efforts to disband the PKK via a parole deal  with its founder, Abdullah Ocalan. In return, HTS and Türkiye will need to integrate most of the SDF forces, ensure that energy revenue is equitably dispersed, and both sides will need to secure an agreement that protects Syrian unity while also acknowledging the autonomy aspirations  of Kurdish peoples. When agreements have been reached, foreign players can further legitimize the new government by opening embassies in Damascus. Once Syria’s economy stabilizes and infrastructure is rebuilt, the bloc can also deploy a joint humanitarian stabilization force that assists with the safe return of Syrian refugees who desire to return, creating a major win for Türkiye and the EU, given rising populist sentiments . Finally, as requested by the Syrian National Council, UN assistance via its election monitoring could permit free and fair elections in 18 months . Regardless, as inclusive talks continue and a timeline is set for such elections, external players can delist HTS as a terrorist organization. Upon the election, moreover, players like the U.S. will have the opportunity to withdraw American troops. Given the volatile nature of the situation, where a deteriorating humanitarian crisis and permeating power vacuum could exacerbate collective threats and bring them to fruition, any wait-and-see approach is not just inadequate, but dangerous. Without continued, unconditional and, if needed, enhanced humanitarian aid and exemptions, Syria risks falling into chaos that would likely spill into the greater region. Policymakers should therefore err on the side of a fast-paced sanction relief approach, as sanctions can always be reimposed. It will not only save lives, but along with pragmatic multilateralism, a secure and stable Syria could emerge. Connor JL Moore is a current master’s candidate for International Security at the University of Denver’s Josef Korbel School of Global and Public Affairs. If you enjoyed this work, please consider sharing our content and website or donating to a non-profit organization linked in the Donate  tab.

Illustration by Julianne Moore Listen to this article After Vladimir Putin initiated the Russo-Ukrainian War in 2022, John Mearsheimer —one of international relations’ leading scholars—garnered over 30 million views on his lecture, blaming the West for Russia’s aggression . Since then, Mearsheimer’s realist arguments have taken root in popular conceptions of the war . The second Trump Administration has even claimed a ‘ strategic realist ’ foreign policy and gone so far as to blame the war on Ukraine . My argument: Mearsheimer’s perspective may appear convincing at face value, but it contains glaring issues. Instead, the war’s causes are best understood through Putin’s protection of his autocracy and imperialist ambitions. MEARSHEIMER’S ARGUMENT  In Mearsheimer’s eyes , the path to the Russo-Ukrainian War began in 2008, when the West promised eventual NATO membership to Georgia and Ukraine—a move Moscow clearly warned constituted a red line. Yet, America continued making Ukraine a ‘bulwark’ on Russia’s front door; most notably by supporting the Ukrainian 2014 ‘coup’ that ousted its pro-Kremlin president. Responding to perceived Western provocations, Putin ‘rationally’ invaded Georgia in 2008 and annexed Crimea in 2014.  After further Western provocations—arms sent to Ukraine during the first Trump Administration, 2021 NATO-Ukrainian military exercises, and a Biden-brokered US-Ukrainian partnership— Putin still made one final peace attempt . Here, Moscow demanded Ukrainian neutrality and the removal of long-established Western military equipment across Eastern Europe. US officials subsequently refused, ultimately forcing Putin’s 2022 invasion.  MEARSHEIMER’S FLAWS Arguments like Mearsheimer’s hinge on Moscow perceiving Ukraine’s drift towards a Western orbit as an existential threat to Russian security since its geographical location serves as a springboard into Russia proper . This premise is ludicrous.  As Robert Kagan puts it, Russia has “ never enjoyed greater security on its western frontier ” than during its three post-Soviet decades. Why, then, would Moscow perceive any ‘existential’ threat? This is pronounced when considering NATO drew down  its military capacity during this period, while Putin expanded Russia’s. Realism is contradicted here, as this would indicate a substantial power shift in Russia’s favor, negating any threat or security dilemma .  Further, if NATO’s eastern expansion (1999-2004) was driving Russian concerns, why didn’t Russia intervene when it had the military wherewithal to do so ? If NATO is currently a threat to Russia, why is Moscow leaving nearly 1,600 miles of unguarded border  with NATO’s Finland? Another consideration: could anyone seriously imagine a scenario or argument for a nuclear-armed West invading a nuclear-armed Russia ? The answer is simply no.  This point is underpinned by America’s little-to-no-response  towards Russian aggression in Georgia (2008), Crimea (2014), and Syria (2015). Additionally, the West’s initial belief that Ukraine’s fall was imminent upon invasion, along with its slow provision of Ukrainian aid and persistent risk-averse approach throughout the conflict, further undermines Mearsheimer’s realist description of great power behavior.  Mearsheimer’s reliance on official Russian statements for evidence presents another serious issue, as one can easily point to contradictory remarks from Moscow . In the 2000s, Putin spoke of potential Russian NATO membership, dismissed notions that NATO was Russia’s enemy, and even acknowledged Baltic and Ukrainian agency in seeking NATO accession. Putin’s continued rhetoric accentuates Mearsheimer’s apparent confirmation bias. From claiming Ukrainians are Russian at heart , to condemning their ‘ neo-Nazi ’ government, and labeling Ukraine’s self-defence as ‘ terrorism ’, Putin’s paradoxical assertions discount Mearsheimer's reliance on Moscow's statements. Ironically, Mearsheimer's core realist beliefs deal the most significant blows to his argument. These are: (1) states act as single, unified forces—citizens have no influence. (2) Leaders pursue rational, not ideological, policies  aimed at securing the state’s survival and, if possible, maximizing its power. (3) Power, mainly militarily, is the central driver  of international relations. Here, lesser powers’ influence becomes superfluous, placing them at the whims of great powers’ orbits of control. In other words, “ the weak suffer what they must .” Such assumptions enable Mearsheimer to conveniently discard compelling factors like Putin’s ideology, the influence of individuals, and lesser powers in the war’s causes. BETTER EXPLANATIONS Strong evidence exists that Putin’s autocratic, anti-Western, and nationalistic imperial ideology was formed out of his anger over the Soviet collapse . This wasn’t just the loss of a political bloc, but a Western dismemberment of Russia’s   rightful position as a great power. In turn, Putin aims to undermine democracy to protect his autocracy and simultaneously chip away at the US-led order . His ultimate goal : return Russia to a great power status and dominate the territory that once constituted Greater Russia.  Events leading up to Putin’s 2022 invasion included the 2000s Color Revolutions, the 2010 Arab Spring, the 2012 anti-Putin protests in Russia, and Ukraine’s 2014 Euromaidan Revolution, which alarmed Putin . Primarily, the Euromaidan Revolution posed an existential threat to Putin’s authoritarian legitimacy, since a democratic, economically thriving Ukraine next to Moscow might instigate discontented Russians to revolt  against Putin’s oppression. Yet, these democratic movements also presented imperial opportunities.   Cunningly, Putin used these events to scapegoat the West, claiming its ‘ satanic ’ power was sponsoring these uprisings, which were resolute on dismantling Russian security and values. This empowered Putin to eliminate all internal opposition and justify his military interventions . Putin’s imperial endeavors are further exposed by Russia’s multi-front, covert operations against the West, which nearly tripled from 2023 to 2024. Some include: sabotaging critical NATO infrastructure and defense industries , as well as infiltrating US social media by impersonating Americans—further sowing disinformation and division amongst the US electorate. Russian tactics have also embraced politically motivated assassination attempts  on European leaders and undermining European democratic processes . While scapegoating Western-sponsored ‘revolts’, Putin also incorporates NATO expansionist arguments  like Mearsheimer’s. Yet, in the face of Putin’s military interventions for over two decades, one cannot discard the agency of alarmed European states  pursuing NATO membership to assure their sovereignty and security. Regarding ‘US-sponsored’ anti-Putin protests, Russians instead took to the streets in unprecedented numbers over evidence of blatant electoral fraud  that returned Putin to power. Likewise, no evidence suggests that Ukraine’s 2014 uprising was caused by foreign meddling. Rather, it was sparked by Ukraine’s then-pro-Kremlin president's termination of a 2013 Ukrainian-EU association agreement . What then caused the bloodshed in Ukraine? It surely wasn’t Mearsheimer’s deterministic NATO-expansion argument. Realities contradict his subscribed-to realist theory of great power behavior. Doubt is further cast over the fragile scaffolding of contradictory evidence, and his intentional neglect of critical factors in the war’s causes provides the final knock-out punch. More compelling narratives are Putin’s protection of his autocracy and imperialist ambitions.  In light of Mearsheimer’s serious flaws, it's important to note that his argument innately lets imperialist leaders like Putin off the hook , who— at the end of the day —are responsible for the immense suffering these conflicts impose on normal people. Given this and Putin’s track record of invading sovereign states, international  warrants for his war crimes , and ruthless termination of Russian dissidents , it’s best not to side with arguments that inherently justify Putin’s behavior. Connor JL Moore is a current master’s candidate for International Security at the University of Denver’s Josef Korbel School of Global and Public Affairs.  If you enjoyed this work, please consider sharing our content and website or donating to a non-profit organization linked in the Donate tab. DISCLAIMER Mooreposts publishes independent analysis, commentary, and research for informational and educational purposes only. Content on Mooreposts—including articles, Mooreposts Bites, strategic intelligence assessments, opinion pieces, interviews, and visual materials—does not constitute legal, financial, medical, or professional advice, nor does it represent any government agency, official position, or classified assessment. Unless explicitly stated, all analyses and interpretations reflect the views and analytic judgments of the individual author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Mooreposts, its editorial staff, or affiliated contributors. Strategic intelligence and analytical content is based on open-source information and publicly available materials. Mooreposts strives for accuracy, transparency, and rigorous sourcing; however, information may change as events develop. Readers are encouraged to consult primary sources and exercise independent judgment.

Illustration by Mia Navarro and Connor JL Moore Listen to this article “ Suddenly, in the very middle of saying something, I felt – it is very hard to describe what I felt, though I remember it with the utmost vividness. Roughly speaking, it was the sensation of being at the centre of an explosion. There seemed to be a loud bang and a blinding flash of light all around me, and I felt a tremendous shock - no pain, only a violent shock, such as you get from an electric terminal. ” - George Orwell, recalling what it felt like to get shot in the throat in Homage to Catalonia , 1938 George Orwell and Charlie Kirk were roughly the same age when they were shot in the throat. Both men made a healthy living at the center of national rhetoric. They impishly threw wry little hand grenades over the garden fence to the other side of the political divide. While I didn’t much care for any of Kirk’s political positions, he was a vibrant man, obviously taking a great deal of joy in promoting his ideology in the most brash way possible.  In Spain, Orwell fought for a communist militia against the fascist, General Franco. His book, Homage to Catalonia , is an account of a nation torn asunder from one ideologically committed outside observer. Kirk, conversely, was a committed ideologue and nationalist in a country that seems just as polarized as Civil War era Spain. Both possessing two juxtaposed political poles, growing wider apart. If the killing of Kirk and sequential administrative reaction demonstrate anything, it's that we have lost our shared sense of the nation and what it means to be American. In a healthy society, we should be able to tolerate people we disagree with. Even if you don’t like them or their position, you’re supposed to throw your hands in the air and give thanks that the figure you agree with can say what they will. Hell… had Kirk been given enough time to grow, he may well have written a book with an impact as significant as Animal Farm  or 1984 . We should be grateful Orwell survived his injury and would go on to live another twenty years to write his magnum opus . But alas, we live in a world where people can get shot just for what they believe: Orwell in 1930s Spain, Kirk in contemporary America.  Whether you agree with Kirk or Orwell, right or left. We can all agree that we took a wrong turn somewhere. We are off the damn rails. Being this mad at one another—digging in rhetorically and literally, “wrecking” others’ arguments, and now, pointing rifles at one another—cannot lead us anywhere better. I would emphasize to both Kirk and Orwell-aligned readers that you have bared your teeth in the wrong direction. This violent disagreement benefits no one except the politicians who brought us here. We’ve entered the Thunderdome of politics. On the left, you have some ugly, useless donkey; on the right, an intolerably mean elephant. Only one of them is leaving this alive, both of which I disdain… and you probably do too.  We’ve entered the Thunderdome of politics. On the left, you have some ugly, useless donkey; on the right, an intolerably mean elephant. Only one of them is leaving this alive, both of which I disdain… and you probably do too. One thing is without question in all this. Orwell describes his thoughts immediately after realizing he’d been hit: “My first thought, conventionally enough, was for my wife. My second was a violent resentment at having to leave this world which, when all is said and done, suits me so well.” I cannot imagine Kirk thought of anything other than leaving his wife, children, and so much of his work unfinished in those final moments. While I didn’t much  like him, no one can deny that this world suited him quite well.  God bless America. We certainly need it. Braxton Fuller is a current master’s candidate for International Security at the University of Denver’s Josef Korbel School of Global and Public Affairs. If you enjoyed this work, please consider sharing our content and website or donating to a non-profit organization linked in the Donate  tab. DISCLAIMER Mooreposts publishes independent analysis, commentary, and research for informational and educational purposes only. Content on Mooreposts—including articles, Mooreposts Bites, strategic intelligence assessments, opinion pieces, interviews, and visual materials—does not constitute legal, financial, medical, or professional advice, nor does it represent any government agency, official position, or classified assessment. Unless explicitly stated, all analyses and interpretations reflect the views and analytic judgments of the individual author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Mooreposts, its editorial staff, or affiliated contributors. Strategic intelligence and analytical content is based on open-source information and publicly available materials. Mooreposts strives for accuracy, transparency, and rigorous sourcing; however, information may change as events develop. Readers are encouraged to consult primary sources and exercise independent judgment.