Sheepland Episode 02: Russo-Ukrainian War | Dr. Rachel Epstein

Audio & Transcript

Executive Producers: John Lamberger, Lindsey Ferrini, Connor JL Moore

This transcript has been edited for clarity and readability while preserving the speakers’ original meaning and conversational tone. Minor repetitions, filler words, and false starts have been removed. Speaker attributions have been carefully reviewed against the audio to ensure accuracy.

Teaser

Lindsey: Around the 1700’s, Imperial Russia expanded by absorbing Ukrainian territory. The Russian Revolution, a multi-sided four-year war within Ukraine and the incorporation of the Soviet Union in 1922 cemented Moscow's centralized control over the region. On December 26th, 1991, the Soviet Union formally dissolved- breaking apart into several republics. Among these new independent countries were the Russian Federation and Ukraine, which shared a 1,200-mile-long border. 

Show Stinger

Hello, I'm Lindsay Ferrini and I'm John Lamberger. Welcome to Sheepland, the wide green pastures of our modern media environment. Sheepland where people are fenced in by politics, graze on sound bites, and fall prey to the wolves of propaganda. So where are we? Sheepland a program about the great issues facing humanity. 

A Mooreposts podcast. 

Introduction

John: In 2014, Russia began an armed conflict with its neighbor, Ukraine, seizing the Crimean Peninsula and eastern portions of the country. The next eight years were marked by skirmishes, ceasefire violations and irregular fighting between Ukraine and Russian controlled armed groups. By February 24th, 2022, over 14,000 people had been killed or wounded when Russia openly launched a wide-scale invasion. In the fall of 2022, Russia declared its annexation of four Ukrainian regions it did not fully control. The international community has condemned, diplomatically isolated, and economically sanctioned Russia for beginning a conflict considered the largest military attack in Europe since World War Two. 

John: With us to discuss the Russo-Ukrainian War is Dr. Rachel Epstein, a professor of international relations at the University of Denver. Her research spans topics from financial crises and reform- to the enlargement of the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Lindsey: Well, first, we'd like to thank you for being here

Dr. Rachel Epstein: Thank you so much for having me

L: Yeah, and taking time out of your busy schedule to answer some questions for us and inform us about the Russian-Ukrainian war

J: Yes, Very generous of you to stop by and speak to us about this, Like, really great issue facing humanity right now

L: So, I'm going to start with a more personal question

Epstein: Okay

Why Study Economic and Security Politics of Europe?

Lindsey: So, Rachel, what in your life inspired you to center your career in the economic and security politics of Europe? Hmm

Epstein: Well, I am fundamentally like many people my age, I mean, I am a kid of the Cold War, an American kid of the Cold War. And so, growing up in Portland, Oregon, in the 70’s and 80’s, I was really concerned about the nuclear standoff between the Soviet Union and the United States. And probably for a seventh grader, knew an unhealthy amount about nuclear weapons. And I would say that's where my interest started. But I also traveled a couple times on extended trips to Europe, around Europe with my family, also as a teenager, and that also sparked my interest. I would say a third thing is my Jewish heritage and knowledge of the Holocaust and a lack of understanding also as a kid, about how people could engage in such horrific atrocities. So that sparked my interest in Europe. Definitely, I was interested in understanding German, German, politics, German language better so that I could try to come to grips with how that country descended into the barbarity that it did in the 30’s and 40’s. So that combination of things, and then the end of the Cold War, when I was an undergraduate doing my BA in international relations at Stanford, when I was a sophomore, the wall came down, the Berlin Wall came down. So that was probably the fourth thing that really moved me very strongly in the direction of studying Europe and specifically post-Communist Europe.

John: It really shaped your college choices where you focused your studies and research?

Epstein: Yes, so I went to Berlin to study international relations, study German, but also to be there during German unification in 1990. And at that time, you know, the difference between East and West Berlin- It was night and day- I mean, it was just it was it was like seeing two different worlds that had been so profoundly and distinctively shaped by their respective histories. So that was fascinating and then, of course, you know, the East European, what we think of as East Central Europe now Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, etc., Baltic states, all the way down to the Western Balkans- that region had a series of really critical choices to make about their political futures and so my research interests took off from there.

John: That must have been fascinating!

Epstein: It's pretty interesting time

John: The epicenter of the Cold War for so long.

Epstein: Yeah

Berlin Time

Lindsey: How much time did you spend in Berlin at that point? 

Epstein: I was there for six months So, like the University of Denver, Stanford was on quarters, So it was, I think September through March, I was there and also for unification.

John: And the wall had already been down?

Epstein: Yeah, so it had come down the previous year in 1989. And a remarkable development of that time was the decision, and with the agreement of Germany, West Germany's allies, for the country to unify that quickly. I think people, you know, don't talk about it a lot now, but that was a monumental shift for all of Europe. Obviously, Germany was really strongly in favor of the country's unification, but many other countries were extremely nervous. And in critical ways the decision for Germany to unify was then linked to additional steps the Europeans took to integrate further in order to counter German power, and in particular, the origins of the common currency in Europe, the euro lie within the decision of German unification.

Russian Whiplash

John: So, getting into the topic of the current conflict, the Russo-Ukrainian war, how did the threat from Moscow go from Soviet domination of Eastern Europe to embraced member of the global community? They became a G8 member, they hosted the Olympics and now they're back to Russian Domination of Eastern Europe. How did how did that- almost whiplash, come about? 

Epstein: So, this is a great question and I would say, in keeping with my decision to study East Central Europe and the post-communist transition, the mood in the 1990’s, particularly in the West, it was extremely optimistic with respect to the trajectory the political and economic trajectories of the East Central European countries, but also with respect to Russia. So I think in the United States, under the Clinton administration, the Americans were very excited about the idea of having a totally different and much more productive relationship with Russia, which emerged as the Russian Federation following the collapse of the Soviet Union to a huge extent, and even consideration and questions about conversations about whether Russia could be in NATO or whether NATO could be dissolved and we might use a different security architecture, which included Russia. The Russians, after all, as a population, the leadership long considered themselves European and as belonging within the European fold. And I think when Yeltsin was president in Russia, his close relationship with Bill Clinton and, you know, other elements of international politics at the time, the agreement to return all of the nuclear weapons, for example, that were in Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to Russia for safe keeping-right? There was just an enormous amount of optimism in the 90’s about a broader reconciliation between Russia, what had been the Soviet bloc, and the West. And, you know, to the heart of your question, why did that turn sour? Economic reform in Russia was catastrophic, volatile, and painful for many normal citizens of the country. What developed was enormous concentration of economic power. A lot of economic advising coming from the West that was not appropriately contextualized, and some of it was very self-serving. So, you know, enormous, enormous hardship and unhappiness in Russia itself. By the time Putin comes to power in 1999 and 2000, I think he's very intent on establishing a different trajectory, which ultimately became very authoritarian and now somewhat argue even totalitarian. So increasing tensions over NATO enlargement, which the previous president Yeltsin, had accepted. Tensions over Russian behavior in its near abroad, tensions over NATO intervention in the Western Balkans. Tensions over how to define international terrorists and how to treat them, I mean, a myriad of difficult diplomatic issues emerged, and I think a very difficult point in that relationship was the 2008 Russian invasion of Georgia and I think things have only gotten more difficult from there. But I think as we'll get to in this conversation, also a lot of disagreement and tension with respect to Ukraine.

Source of the Conflict

Lindsey: Well, I know that there's a long list of tensions that you just named, one of them being the NATO enlargement. So how much of the decision to begin this war is structured by that NATO or EU expansion, or was the decision how much of the decision of Russian elites or just Vladimir Putin, caused the war? 

Epstein: I put most of the source of the conflict with Putin, Russia, Russia's vision of itself in the world You know, if you're trying to establish the causal forces in social phenomena, the NATO explanation doesn't add up very well in terms of timing and then action. But what we do see over time is that the Ukrainians, you know, since the early 1990’s, increasingly look for ways to chart their own path independent of Russia. And that becomes highly problematic from a Russian point of view. So, in 2004, in Ukraine, you had the Orange Revolution, which was a major mass mobilization against the perceived rigged election of Yanukovych. And what happens in that instance is that the opposition, Yushchenko and Tymoshenko, they managed to rerun those Ukrainian elections and that nationalist coalition comes to power instead. So that is an important data point, I think, for the Russians and for Putin to see that the preferred Russian candidate can't necessarily win in free and fair Ukrainian elections. Now, interestingly, Yanukovych comes back in a later election and does win free and fair elections without what, you know, anyone observing would have thought was undue influence. But the relationship, I think, between Ukraine and Russia nevertheless becomes more tense because even with Yanukovych in power, Yanukovych representing Ukraine, does want to move closer to the EU. And so agreed in twenty thirteen to sign an association agreement with the European Union. At the very last minute, Yanukovych had a meeting with Putin, and we don't know what transpired during that meeting. But on very short notice, he informed the public in Ukraine that he was no longer going to sign the EU Association Agreement

John: And these are economic ties? These are trade agreements?

Epstein: These are trade agreements that establish regulatory harmonization, to make more trade possible and to liberalize trade and to reduce tariff and non-tariff barriers. So, at the last minute, in late twenty thirteen, Yanukovych reneges on his earlier agreement to sign this deal and you get another mass mobilization in Ukraine, particularly in Kyiv. And Russia is watching this, Putin is watching this and essentially comes to the conclusion that Russia is no longer in a position to have a pro-Russian government in power, necessarily, because what happens with the mass mobilization is that Yanukovych calls out the security services. The security services end up killing a number of the protesters and this, you can imagine in flames, even more outrage in Ukraine. And Yanukovych ends up fleeing to Russia, and he certainly would have been removed from office, had decided to stay in Ukraine. So, at that point, Putin, I think, tries to paint a picture as dictators around the world often do, that there's nefarious foreign interference in Ukrainian politics and uses Yanukovych's ouster to justify the Russian invasion of eastern Ukraine in 2014 and to justify the seizure of Crimea. And, of course, at the same time, part of the nefarious foreign influence that he gravitates towards as an explanation, because it's very convincing vis a vis his public is NATO enlargement. And it is true that in 2008, the alliance under US pressure had said to Georgia and Ukraine, you will become members of NATO. At the same time, there was no time frame for that and there was no action plan for accession. So, by 2014, Ukraine and Georgia were in essence no closer to NATO membership than they had been earlier. But nevertheless, at that time, Putin used NATO enlargement as a pretext for his invasion.

Signs of the War Ending

John: As we've established in 2014, Russia seizes Crimea, they build the Kerch Bridge. They have, separatists in eastern portions of Ukraine, and in 2022- February 24th, 2022, a wide scale invasion along their long border happens. So, it's been almost four years for both Ukraine and Russia. What is your perspective on their capacity to sustain and continue this war? Is there any signs of this war may be ending? I don't see signs of it ending?

Epstein: As you probably know, the Trump administration came into office very intent that they could negotiate an end to the conflict rather quickly. And that's turned out not to be true, I think, because the, you know, the Russian side is extremely committed to, you know, their idea of a victory. I think primarily for domestic political reasons. I think that, you know, for Putin and his power position, and it's very hard to see into the inner workings of the Russian regime. But they've lost a lot of life. A lot of soldiers have absorbed, you know, terrible injury, trauma. I think, you know, the sunk cost of the situation, even though rationally they might suggest Russia should get out before it loses more life. The opposite effect, psychologically, is taken hold. So, I think Putin's power position depends on the conflict ending in a way that allows him to save face. And given everything that he's said about why Russia is there fighting, it seems that it would be very hard for him to save face. Short of a victory that accords Russia a lot of authority over who's running Ukraine and authority to keep control of the territory that they've taken by force. So short of those things, it's not clear to expert observers that Russia is prepared to give up the fight. Ukraine, in the intervening period, if it had been on a trajectory before Russian or Russia's invasion in 2014 Towards the west, towards the EU, even towards NATO membership. Those impulses and desires have only been strengthened and concretized by the war. And because it's Ukrainian territory and sovereignty and independence, Identity, Language, Democratic governance, economic opportunity. The Ukrainian population sees all of these things as being at stake, and they are also very reluctant to give up. So, to the extent that psychology helps us understand the continuation of war when we know how horrible war is, the psychology of this war is that both sides seem to be extremely committed. And from that point of view,  it's really hard to see a way out. In terms of the logistical question, of course, Russia has the personnel advantage. They have a financial advantage. In some ways, we know that the Russian economy is under enormous strain, as is the Ukrainian economy. You know, for Westerners or even Ukrainians to look at the state of the Russian economy and to conclude that, you know, the economy in Russia must break at some point is probably a kind of triumphalism that we should not resort to, right? I think Russia and Putin's regime and even the population historically that country has put up with incredible, unthinkable misery in order to prevail in conflicts. They've done that. And the political culture may be that they will do that again. So, for as many people as Russia is losing, and we think it's around a thousand people a day to death or injury, they have the capacity for some time to continue to do that. And I think the Ukrainians are looking for ways to not have to reduce the age of conscription, um, to save their younger generations of people. So, they're looking at, you know, how can we fight more effectively while trying to guarantee simultaneously that we don't lose enormous life or we don't lose people to injury? And they're, you know, they're very effective at that, I mean, they're running pretty effective operations deep into Russian territory that affect that country's munitions situation and transport and energy.

Transformational Ideological Divisions

Lindsey: How has the ideological division shaped Ukraine as a nation and the Ukrainian identity in the face of total war? For example, when I think about this question, I think of the territorial defense forces, um, as a Ukrainian identity unification.

Epstein: Yeah, I think that's right, I think that wars can be transformative in all kinds of ways. And I think this one has spurred a kind of Ukrainian identity, which is built around some of the things that we talked about before independence, sovereignty, having the authority to decide for itself with whom it's allied in the international system. When I talk to Ukrainians about this very question, I mean, they will also say, given the existential threat that the Ukrainians face, they feel more connected to government in a way and governance, and they are more inclined to hold government accountable. And I think we saw that recently with protests against the threatened incursions on independence for the anti-corruption agency in Ukraine. So, getting to territorial defense forces, this is a really interesting phenomenon in, in Eastern Europe, because when NATO was first contemplating enlarging to places like Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, which NATO did in 1999. The existence and elevation of territorial defense forces, particularly in Poland, where it was kind of a hot idea, I would say in the 1990’s since that country had just regained its independence. It encouraged new NATO members to downsize their forces, make their forces voluntary, and spend less money on defense, but to do it more efficiently. And in the 1990’s and early two thousand, for the Americans and for the broader alliance, that meant creating expeditionary forces to assist countries like the United States in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. So the idea now that we're returning, including in places like Poland and the Baltic states and in Ukraine to this idea of territorial or total defense, where, you know, members of the public have responsibility for protecting their homeland is, Lindsey, I think, in the spirit of your question, an identity forming and concretizing exercise which will very likely endure, you know, for a very long period after the war ends. And it's part, I think, of what drives the psychology of commitment on the Ukrainian side for people to feel very invested in and responsible for their own country's defense and survival.

Putin and His Regime

Epstein: We should appreciate about the Russian regime at this point is that Putin and his regime have killed, imprisoned, sent into exile all of his major opponents. And I think for members of the public, the idea that you would participate in a protest, uh, would, you know, certainly end in your arrest or death. I think that the Russian regime today is similarly repressive as the Iranian regime. And we know that thousands, if not tens of thousands of people were just killed in Iran. Given their willingness and bravery to protest. And that is certainly not something I would wish on any population. So, I look at Russia and I think it is, you know, it is too dangerous for ordinary Russians to contemplate getting out into the streets and voicing a view different from that of the government's. The other thing I would say is that surveys that are conducted by Russian pollsters, at least in some cases, frame questions in ways that seem to be designed not to get a pulse on what people are thinking, but to tell them what they should be thinking. And one is also under the impression that as pollsters are doing their surveys, they're collecting information. I mean, I would definitely not as a research subject in Russia, take it for granted that somebody actually wanted to know my opinion for knowing my opinions sake. I would think they would want to know my opinion in case they wanted to come after me. The judicial system in Russia is also terribly politicized and compromised, and there is no equal protection under the law, as we would understand it. So, in answer to your initial question, John, about why isn't it a similar dynamic? I mean, fundamentally, the Russian regime now is too repressive. It's too dangerous. Opposition leaders have been eliminated, and I think it would be very difficult. I don't know what the circumstances would have to be for people to come out and revolt. You know, I said, they're Russians are divided on this. When I express my skepticism about how well we can actually assess Russian public opinion. A couple Russians have come up to me and said, you know, there's actually more genuine enthusiasm for Putin and the war than what you, Rachel, are saying. So, I also, you know, that's also valuable information that I think a lot of the propaganda, a lot of the framing of the war that Putin has very successfully done really resonates with people that Russia is under attack, it's being humiliated, it's encircled. It's not respected. The Ukrainians, you know, in the Russian discourse, are either actually Russian or, you know, don't have a meaningful identity of their own- I think that's also a sentiment that's out there. 

West vs East?

John: During the Cold War, there's very much this concept of the free world, the Eastern Bloc, the Warsaw Pact. Is that still useful to use these terms, like West, like we're in the West and they're in the East? It's us versus them? Poland is this NATO country, liberal democracy- they're clearly in the West now, is this is this a useful term? 

Epstein: Increasingly, no, I think because of developments in the United States, I mean, I think Europe, for the most part is, you know, it's highly democratic. It's wealthy for the post-communist countries, including Poland, that have joined the EU since 2004. It's provided enormous economic opportunity. Of course, the EU isn't perfect. No international organization or government is. But from a prosperity, democratic and stability point of view, membership in the EU and NATO has been life changing for those countries. I mean, so transformational like they've never they've never had the degree, I think, of independence and, um, volition choice opportunity in the international system voice. They have voice in these organizations that they've never enjoyed before. But given the state of US politics, I feel that the United States is increasingly divided from some of the core democratic principles that underpin the EU's functioning. So, I wouldn't necessarily, in the current period, refer to the West as a quasi-unified whole based on shared values, at least if we're talking about the people in power.

European Transformation

John: How has this war shaped Europe? Do you think we'll see more European integration, possibly less reliance on the United States, 

Epstein: So, less reliance on the United States? Not necessarily because of the war, but because the United States at this point is reluctant to assist Ukraine directly? I think I hope it will result in more integration in the in the following very critical way. The advantage of NATO for almost eighty years has been that in addition to having been victorious in the Cold War and the Soviet Union broke up and was no longer occupying and essentially running puppet governments through East-Central Europe was the fact that the alliance successfully really quashed regional rivalries within Europe itself and restructured relationships critical ones, including between certainly Germany and France, but Germany and the rest of Europe fundamentally. And that has been really essential for the prosperity and democratic governance in most of Europe to really accelerate and expand the way that I hope that it shapes European integration going forward, is that as the Europeans take more independent responsibility, both for securing their own borders and military security, well-being, let's say that they do it in a way where it is a genuinely shared enterprise and done collaboratively rather than competitively among them. So, you know, I think what the Europeans are trying to do is to be able to assist Ukraine independently to replace what had been over the last four years, but really since 2014, American military assistance, advising, observation. So that's one way in which we see a shift happening. And we just want to understand that it's partly a consequence of the war, but it's partly a consequence of from the Biden administration to this Trump administration, a shift in U.S policy, which is urging Europe to become more independent. So that's one change. The other enormous change is, and I don't think this gets reported on enough, the energy transition that's underway in Europe as a consequence of radically reducing the continent's reliance on Russian energy resources. And that's critical for accelerating the green transition. So, it's been incredibly costly and painful, particularly for economies like Germany but also some of the East European economies. But I'd say that's also a very important way in which Europe is being changed. And then I think political sensibilities on the continent are changing to a certain extent. It's shaping political cleavages in many European countries, in Germany, in France, for example, where you have current governing parties which are highly critical of Russia's war in Ukraine, but in opposition are also major political parties embraced by the Trump administration. But, you know, political parties that are much more interested in probably returning to a situation where they can do business with Russia and they're less concerned about Ukraine's ultimate fate.

Global View on Conflict

Lindsey: Aside from Europe, because I know we just talked about their view on the on the war in the previous question, how has this war shaped the global view on conflict and what normal behavior is for a state? 

Epstein: So, I think in much of the world it probably hasn't changed it at all. I think one of the hard things for Europeanists to accept is that the Russian invasion of Ukraine does not stir the sympathies of a lot of people in India or China or on the African continent. I mean, it is true. The United States led a coalition building effort at the United Nations after the full-scale invasion, which was impressively large in terms of the number of countries, but really not very impressive with respect to the share of the global population represented, because it's mostly wealthier, Industrialized, post-industrial countries that came to Ukraine's defense. So, in one way, it doesn't seem to have changed many normal global citizens perceptions. Many people around the world seem to accept that Ukraine is in Russia's sphere of influence. Um, NATO enlarged to include many post-communist countries. Russia over time did not perceive this development to be in its interests. So, I think for many people around the world, it is normal state behavior that one country will invade another if it feels like its own existence is threatened, which is the case that Putin has made in my mind, not very convincingly. But, you know, I don't represent the minds of many people living in India and China and elsewhere in terms of what it means for, you know, countries that have with more vigor come to Ukraine's defense. I think it it's it appears to be very, very out of bounds, really antithetical to what a lot of people thought the post-World War Two order, at least among countries in the transatlantic community, should be about. It's a clear violation of the UN charter. The idea that Ukraine was in a position to do any meaningful harm to Russia in a military sense, is implausible. But again, going back to what we were talking about earlier with respect to Ukraine's evolution and evolution increasingly in the direction of the West, that I think was a threat to Russia in the sense that Ukraine was never going to launch a land invasion. But if you had a democratic, prosperous, Western oriented, active civil society country on Russia's neighbor, that was going to make it very hard for Putin to maintain, I think his style of rule, both in Russia and in Belarus. We saw also enormous protests erupt in Belarus a few years ago that were quashed with Russian support. In Belarus, people imprisoned, people killed, people disappeared So I think in answer to the question, is this normal behavior? Um, maybe we could reframe the question to say, is this the kind of behavior that we want to encourage in the international system? Is this the direction in which we want to go? And I think hopefully everybody would say, no, this is not the direction in which we should be going.

The Threat of Democratic Proximately

John: Something that I just thought of was, you know, this, you know, perceived threat from NATO You know, if Ukraine joined NATO, joined EU, is it really like just bordering like the proximity? Is that like a spillover effect? Is that really a phenomenon they're looking at, like Moscow is so far away? Can something truly like a domino theory, if you will, if I could use an old Cold War idea? Is that still- is that a plausible concept? 

Epstein: I think it is plausible, especially given what had been the really intense familial, civil society and economic ties between Ukraine and Russia a couple of years ago. Well, it must have been more than a couple of years ago. It must have been. In 2022, the Korbel School hosted four mayors, um, from East Ukrainian cities, including the mayor of Kharkiv, which is in the news all the time. And one of the questions they got was, you know, what is the state of your relationship with people in Russia now? Family members, business partners, etc.? And, you know, the relationships were had been devastated by the conflict, in part because I think the Ukrainians felt that their Russian counterparts were not sympathetic to their cause. But part of what I learned in those conversations was how deeply integrated and tied together these countries were, and particularly in that eastern part of Ukraine. So, we do think, especially in an age of pretty rapid and large-scale information flows, which, of course, we understand governments can shut off at certain points. But one engine of change in the Soviet Union itself was certainly the perception, which was correct among people living in the Soviet bloc and the Eastern Bloc, that their Western counterparts had more economic opportunity, educational opportunity, freedom, personal autonomy, efficacy, everything. And that discontent, particularly in countries like Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia during the Cold War led to very large and repeated protest movements. So, I think we can say with some certainty that it is harder for countries that are autocratic to reside in comfort and seeming, you know, security next to highly democratic. You know, if they're prospering countries, I think that does make it a lot harder for autocratic countries to stay the course.

Russian Leverage and Ukrainian Children

John: There has been an extensive Russian campaign to specifically target civilians in drone bombings and missile strikes. The rhetoric from Putin and the Kremlin has been a denial of a Ukrainian identity as a group Yale University has tracked that 35,000 Ukrainian children have been taken and deported to Russia. Do you think the intent and actions committed by Russia constitute an attempt to eradicate Ukrainian identifying peoples?

Epstein: So, the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, you know, has long engaged in a kind of Russification. I don't I don't think eradication of Ukrainian people is necessarily the goal. I think that would be self-defeating in terms of the productivity of the region. After the war, assuming the war ends. But I do think it is a sustained, purposeful strategic plan to try to subdue the country and to create a situation which Russia has so much leverage. And this is partly what's going on, I think, with the kidnapped children. These children, we think, are being sent either into Russian homes for reeducation and total acculturation or into, you know, a couple hundred different, essentially reeducation facilities. And, you know, from what we read in the press in the United States, the infiltration of schools and the recasting of people's ideological frames for young people, it can be quite effective for turning young Ukrainians against the Ukrainian cause. So, it's not necessarily the elimination of Ukrainians. I think that is the goal, but a reorientation of people's thinking, including children's thinking about what appropriate modes of governance is and who has the right justification in this war. Something unfortunately, we've seen in many conflicts in the past. Certainly, this was a really important and terrible feature of Nazi activity during World War Two as well.

That's all an effort, I think, to try to subdue Ukraine using multiple tools and channels. Well, after hearing about how the war started and the nitty gritty of the war and just devastating actions taken by Russia and states. 

How does this War End?

Lindsey: I have possibly the most loaded question of the day. How does this war end? 

Epstein: I think there are a few ways it could end. One would be if there is political change within Russia itself, right? And this could be an internal conflict that results in Putin's ouster. You know that whatever group of people, though, that would seek to replace Putin, even if they're critical of the war, we would have to think that the job they have in ending the war and justifying the end to that war to the Russian public would be very difficult. So anybody who's unhappy with the war in Russia at the highest levels of leadership right now, even if they disagree with Putin's chosen course of action, would have a really difficult task figuring out a how to remove Putin and b how to change course in a way that wouldn't compound the already, I think, very heavy sense of humiliation that Russians feel they live under. So that's difficult to see. The other place that we could look for defection would be in the armed forces itself. So that could also. Right? If you have defections within the armed forces, generals not willing to continue to fight this war, that could be another source of change. The public and public protest, in concert with either of the other two things could also lead to a change. What would get the public out? What would get the public agitated? I think you know what John was saying before a lot of the recruiting for personnel is coming from the periphery. If it turns out that ultimately more economically and socially, politically empowered families and social groups see their children swept up in this conflict, I think the more likely it is that people will resist in a meaningful way. There are already movements of mothers and grandmothers in Russia against the mobilizations that have taken place so far. So, there are certain pressure points within Russia that could help generate a settlement. You know, the other scenario is that Ukraine, especially with a very serious divide between the United States and Europe over Greenland, trade, etc., that the United States cuts off weapons sales to Europe that are bound for Ukraine. And Ukraine becomes military militarily overwhelmed at a certain point, and then they feel pressure to negotiate an end. You know, we could also see a change in the West and a continuing ramping up of Ukrainian autonomous military capability so that they ultimately either continue on in a stalemate that Russia ultimately finds unacceptably costly, or for various reasons, they might be able to overwhelm Russia militarily and just make the cost of the war too high with certain kinds of technological innovation. But I think, you know, what we would need to see is some pressure point exerted somewhere in one of those five ways. And right now, I think what we're seeing instead is just more of the same, a kind of very costly, unproductive stalemate. Well, the other terrible eventuality, I think twice within the last two months, Russia has fired nuclear capable missiles at Ukraine, which is a not very veiled threat that the Russians could use a nuclear weapon, which would be catastrophic, certainly for the warring parties, but also for the entire global population. That would certainly precipitate a change. But we don't know in what direction.

Lindsey: Taking into account these potential outcomes and the trajectory of how it's going now, how long do you think it could go on for? Or is it just too complicated to measure? 

Epstein: I think it's really hard to know how long it could go on in order for the Russian economy to come to a very, very serious breaking point on its current trajectory. If it gets harder for the Russians to sell their oil, if the United States and or Europe got serious about stopping the shadow fleet, which would be a it would be escalatory. But of the things that I've just mentioned, maybe the least escalatory and most effective thing-

John: -That's the illegal oil shipments?

Epstein: Exactly, And the United States in recent weeks has shown itself to be very competent at tracking down oil tankers and stopping them. You know, a two-year process with increased economic pressure on Russia might result in a changed cost calculation on Russia's part. So, I think we're looking at years, not months, which still isn't very precise. But I don't think nobody I've read or listened to thinks that there's an immediate resolution within this year.

Lindsey: Well, Rachel, in the time remaining, thank you so much for coming here

John: This is very gracious of your time

Cultural Beauty Recommendation

Lindsey: We have two remaining questions unrelated to the Russo-Ukrainian War. If you could personally recommend one place that everyone should visit for its beauty or culture, where would it be? 

Epstein: So, I have thought about this, I mean, the city in Europe where I've spent the most time is Berlin. It's fascinating. It's sprawling. It's not beautiful. There are parts of it that are beautiful, but it's culturally very interesting, in part because of its Cold War history of having been divided. And now when you go there, it's really hard to discern where the east was separated from the west. And it's really got everything. It's got a lot of interesting alternative culture, Turkish culture, but also, you know, lots of interesting people have moved there from the Middle East. Twenty fifteen sixteen country's been very effective at assimilating and helping people get into the labor market. And I think Berlin is among the locations in Germany that has been, in some ways at least the most open and accepting and really thrives on the vibrancy of diverse culture and backgrounds. But the other place I would recommend to people is Warsaw, where I lived in 1999 for most of the year, doing my original field research for my dissertation, and it was interesting. Then I think it's even more interesting now. I was there most recently in June, and it's got an incredible art scene, music scene. Also, you know, when we think about how countries were affected by World War Two and recovered from World War Two, Poland lost six million people in that war, which was the highest proportion of population of any country that was a combatant in World War Two. Their history in that war is extraordinary, their recovery also extraordinary. I mean, they are the country about which, you know, Westerners might feel the most sad that they ended up behind the Iron Curtain because of the very valiant efforts they made on behalf of the allies during the war and the ways in which they were betrayed, not just by the Soviets, but also ultimately the Americans and their West European counterparts. But the city of Warsaw is thriving in the current context, so I would also highly recommend going there.

Lindsey: Those are both great answers. I've never been to Warsaw, have you, John? 

John: No, no, but I want to go. It's on my list.

Lindsey: It's on my list now

Epstein: Yeah, it's great, I mean, the country was so badly destroyed. Warsaw was just decimated by the war. So, some of the historic buildings they built back stone by stone, you know, up until the nineteen seventies to try to reconstruct, for example, the historic Old Market Square and all of the beautiful homes surrounding it. It's a remarkable testament to their resilience.

Non-Profit Spotlight

John: At more posts, we want to make it a point to promote non-profits or organizations that create positive impacts. Are there any that you would like to share with us? So, one organization that I like a lot, I keep an eye on?

Epstein: I always listen to their people being interviewed as Doctors Without Borders, and I think their work is so important. They, you know, manifest so much courage and bravery. Sometimes they're speaking against the mainstream, but they have a, you know, such an admirable humanitarian orientation and they bring so much expertise and, um, you know, in a way just love and care to the work that they do and the conflict zones that we're talking about.

So, you know, if we funded Doctors Without Borders the way we fund our militaries, I feel like the world would be in much better shape.

John: Dr. Rachel Epstein, thank you so much for being here and talking to us.

Epstein: This was really great

John: Sheepland. A program about the great issues facing humanity.

Lindsey: A Mooreposts Podcast.

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The views and opinions expressed by podcast guests are their own and do not necessarily reflect those of Mooreposts, its editors, contributors, or affiliates. Podcast transcripts are edited for clarity and readability; section headers have been added for navigational purposes. The substance and intent of all remarks remain unchanged.