Russia's War of Attrition

How Moscow Sustains its War in Ukraine on the Front Lines and at Home

Illustration by Connor JL Moore & Kash Harrison

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In the days before Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Western intelligence believed Kyiv’s fall was imminent. Yet, as the war approaches its fourth year, it has devolved into the bloodiest conflict in Europe since the Second World War. 

Estimates place total Russian battlefield casualties—those killed, wounded, and missing—at 1.2 million, with deaths believed to be as high as 325,000. These numbers are remarkable, given that Moscow has advanced only 50 to 230 feet per day. In total, Russia has acquired just 12% of Ukrainian territory since 2022.

Experts have noted that Moscow’s willingness to endure high losses indicates a belief it can outlast Ukraine’s ability to continue fighting. Given this, one might wonder how Moscow has sustained its attritional war strategy and public support amid mounting losses.

Replenishing Russia’s Frontlines

To avoid a nationwide conscription—like in Ukraine—Moscow has pursued a variety of efforts to replenish its frontlines. Research indicates that the Kremlin continues to recruit 30,000–40,000 troops each month. 

Recruitment efforts have focused on low-income Russians in rural areas, who make up most of its forces. Financial incentives like high pay and bonuses have been found instrumental, often several times what most Russians earn each paycheck. 

Rights activists, however, dispute these recruitment numbers. In some cases, conscripts were forced to sign contracts requiring them to serve on the front lines. In others, what were originally one-year terms of service have been indefinitely extended. 

Other methods of replenishing Russian forces have included recruiting convicts and foreign nationals. Legislation signed in 2024 by Russian President Vladimir Putin permits Russians with criminal convictions—or those facing sentencing—to avoid prosecution by enlisting in the military. 

Further, after Russia’s mutual defense treaty with North Korea in 2024, Western officials estimate 14,000–15,000 North Korean soldiers are now fighting on Russia’s frontlines. Investigative journalists and rights groups have uncovered that foreign nationals from 128 nations have been trafficked to the front or recruited under false pretenses.

Domestic Repression 

Under immense human and economic losses, Moscow’s strategy of outlasting Ukraine has coincided with intensified domestic repression. Since the invasion, Moscow has enhanced censorship laws, making public dissent or scrutiny of Russia’s ‘special military operation’ risky. Those spreading information deemed contradictory to Moscow's official positions could face up to 15 years’ imprisonment. 

These measures have empowered Putin to eliminate all opposition to his regime, most notably key political opponent Alexei Navalny, and former ally Yevgeny Prigozhin, who led a revolt against Moscow in June of 2023. 

Further, major news outlets like The Moscow Times, Echo Moskvy, and Dozhd have been banned or shut down under newly expanded ‘foreign influence laws’. Some claim these actions have effectively put an end to all independent media groups in Russia. 

The Russian state has also been accused of classifying and hiding data regarding losses in the war. Exiled Russian media reported that by the end of 2025, lawsuits seeking a formal declaration of killed or missing military personnel amounted to 90,000, of which 70,000 related cases quickly vanished. Payments to Russian families who lost or had injured service members in the war (amounting to $15.3 billion) have been highlighted as a means to mitigate unrest and maintain domestic support.

Militarizing Russian Youth 

In tandem with its domestic repression, Moscow appears to be pursuing long-term efforts to condition its people for a prolonged struggle and future conflict. Scholars note that Moscow’s amplified use of nationalism, traditional values, and historical narratives is intended to frame and legitimize the conflict as an existential threat to Russian values from a ‘demonic’ West.

These efforts are reflected in Moscow’s policy initiatives to militarize the country’s youth. Between 2022 and 2024, funding for new “patriotic” educational initiatives increased tenfold. Required courses like Health and Safety, now called Fundamentals of Security and Defense of the Homeland, focus on military basics, from the structure of the Russian Armed Forces to battlefield medical care. 

Moreover, newly implemented history textbooks reportedly focus on narratives that justify and glorify Russia’s ‘special military operation’ in Ukraine. Other independent investigations have highlighted new classrooms equipped to train students in drone operation, a warfare capability that has become essential in the conflict. 

The Oscar-nominated documentary Mr. Nobody Against Putin reveals how state-mandated classroom recordings—intended to enforce compliance with a new curriculum—depict lectures branding dissenters as “parasites” who should leave Russia. Lessons also incorporated Moscow’s historical narratives, teaching about the necessity to ‘denazify’ Ukraine and praising those fighting today as akin to Soviet troops against Nazi Germany. 

Further footage shows members of the Wagner Group—mercenaries infamous for their brutality and war crimes—teaching primary school students how to handle weapons and mitigate battlefield risks of losing limbs. 

Other school activities across all grades include loyalty oaths, military drills, and grenade-throwing contests. Analysts have argued that this militarization of Russian youth is intended to prepare the country for extended conflict, which will require a growing population forever loyal to the war effort. 

Conclusion

Russia’s war in Ukraine has imposed unprecedented losses on both sides, yet under current circumstances—heavy Russian losses and slow battlefield progress—it would take 152 years for Russian forces to conquer the rest of Ukraine. For the time being, Moscow appears committed to its war strategy of outlasting Ukraine, no matter the cost. 

Connor JL Moore is a current master’s candidate for International Security at the University of Denver’s Josef Korbel School of Global and Public Affairs. 

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