Why One of International Relations’ Top Scholars is Wrong About Ukraine

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After Vladimir Putin initiated the Russo-Ukrainian War in 2022, John Mearsheimer—one of international relations’ leading scholars—garnered over 30 million views on his lecture, blaming the West for Russia’s aggression. Since then, Mearsheimer’s realist arguments have taken root in popular conceptions of the war. The second Trump Administration has even claimed a ‘strategic realist’ foreign policy and gone so far as to blame the war on Ukraine. My argument: Mearsheimer’s perspective may appear convincing at face value, but it contains glaring issues. Instead, the war’s causes are best understood through Putin’s protection of his autocracy and imperialist ambitions.

MEARSHEIMER’S ARGUMENT 

In Mearsheimer’s eyes, the path to the Russo-Ukrainian War began in 2008, when the West promised eventual NATO membership to Georgia and Ukraine—a move Moscow clearly warned constituted a red line. Yet, America continued making Ukraine a ‘bulwark’ on Russia’s front door; most notably by supporting the Ukrainian 2014 ‘coup’ that ousted its pro-Kremlin president. Responding to perceived Western provocations, Putin ‘rationally’ invaded Georgia in 2008 and annexed Crimea in 2014. 

After further Western provocations—arms sent to Ukraine during the first Trump Administration, 2021 NATO-Ukrainian military exercises, and a Biden-brokered US-Ukrainian partnership—Putin still made one final peace attempt. Here, Moscow demanded Ukrainian neutrality and the removal of long-established Western military equipment across Eastern Europe. US officials subsequently refused, ultimately forcing Putin’s 2022 invasion. 

MEARSHEIMER’S FLAWS

Arguments like Mearsheimer’s hinge on Moscow perceiving Ukraine’s drift towards a Western orbit as an existential threat to Russian security since its geographical location serves as a springboard into Russia proper. This premise is ludicrous. 

As Robert Kagan puts it, Russia has “never enjoyed greater security on its western frontier” than during its three post-Soviet decades. Why, then, would Moscow perceive any ‘existential’ threat? This is pronounced when considering NATO drew down its military capacity during this period, while Putin expanded Russia’s. Realism is contradicted here, as this would indicate a substantial power shift in Russia’s favor, negating any threat or security dilemma. 

Further, if NATO’s eastern expansion (1999-2004) was driving Russian concerns, why didn’t Russia intervene when it had the military wherewithal to do so? If NATO is currently a threat to Russia, why is Moscow leaving nearly 1,600 miles of unguarded border with NATO’s Finland? Another consideration: could anyone seriously imagine a scenario or argument for a nuclear-armed West invading a nuclear-armed Russia? The answer is simply no. 

This point is underpinned by America’s little-to-no-response towards Russian aggression in Georgia (2008), Crimea (2014), and Syria (2015). Additionally, the West’s initial belief that Ukraine’s fall was imminent upon invasion, along with its slow provision of Ukrainian aid and persistent risk-averse approach throughout the conflict, further undermines Mearsheimer’s realist description of great power behavior. 

Mearsheimer’s reliance on official Russian statements for evidence presents another serious issue, as one can easily point to contradictory remarks from Moscow. In the 2000s, Putin spoke of potential Russian NATO membership, dismissed notions that NATO was Russia’s enemy, and even acknowledged Baltic and Ukrainian agency in seeking NATO accession. Putin’s continued rhetoric accentuates Mearsheimer’s apparent confirmation bias. From claiming Ukrainians are Russian at heart, to condemning their ‘neo-Nazi’ government, and labeling Ukraine’s self-defence as ‘terrorism’, Putin’s paradoxical assertions discount Mearsheimer's reliance on Moscow's statements.

Ironically, Mearsheimer's core realist beliefs deal the most significant blows to his argument. These are: (1) states act as single, unified forces—citizens have no influence. (2) Leaders pursue rational, not ideological, policies aimed at securing the state’s survival and, if possible, maximizing its power. (3) Power, mainly militarily, is the central driver of international relations. Here, lesser powers’ influence becomes superfluous, placing them at the whims of great powers’ orbits of control. In other words, “the weak suffer what they must.” Such assumptions enable Mearsheimer to conveniently discard compelling factors like Putin’s ideology, the influence of individuals, and lesser powers in the war’s causes.

BETTER EXPLANATIONS

Strong evidence exists that Putin’s autocratic, anti-Western, and nationalistic imperial ideology was formed out of his anger over the Soviet collapse. This wasn’t just the loss of a political bloc, but a Western dismemberment of Russia’s rightful position as a great power. In turn, Putin aims to undermine democracy to protect his autocracy and simultaneously chip away at the US-led order. His ultimate goal: return Russia to a great power status and dominate the territory that once constituted Greater Russia. 

Events leading up to Putin’s 2022 invasion included the 2000s Color Revolutions, the 2010 Arab Spring, the 2012 anti-Putin protests in Russia, and Ukraine’s 2014 Euromaidan Revolution, which alarmed Putin. Primarily, the Euromaidan Revolution posed an existential threat to Putin’s authoritarian legitimacy, since a democratic, economically thriving Ukraine next to Moscow might instigate discontented Russians to revolt against Putin’s oppression. Yet, these democratic movements also presented imperial opportunities.

Cunningly, Putin used these events to scapegoat the West, claiming its ‘satanic’ power was sponsoring these uprisings, which were resolute on dismantling Russian security and values. This empowered Putin to eliminate all internal opposition and justify his military interventions.

Putin’s imperial endeavors are further exposed by Russia’s multi-front, covert operations against the West, which nearly tripled from 2023 to 2024. Some include: sabotaging critical NATO infrastructure and defense industries, as well as infiltrating US social media by impersonating Americans—further sowing disinformation and division amongst the US electorate. Russian tactics have also embraced politically motivated assassination attempts on European leaders and undermining European democratic processes.

While scapegoating Western-sponsored ‘revolts’, Putin also incorporates NATO expansionist arguments like Mearsheimer’s. Yet, in the face of Putin’s military interventions for over two decades, one cannot discard the agency of alarmed European states pursuing NATO membership to assure their sovereignty and security. Regarding ‘US-sponsored’ anti-Putin protests, Russians instead took to the streets in unprecedented numbers over evidence of blatant electoral fraud that returned Putin to power. Likewise, no evidence suggests that Ukraine’s 2014 uprising was caused by foreign meddling. Rather, it was sparked by Ukraine’s then-pro-Kremlin president's termination of a 2013 Ukrainian-EU association agreement.

What then caused the bloodshed in Ukraine? It surely wasn’t Mearsheimer’s deterministic NATO-expansion argument. Realities contradict his subscribed-to realist theory of great power behavior. Doubt is further cast over the fragile scaffolding of contradictory evidence, and his intentional neglect of critical factors in the war’s causes provides the final knock-out punch. More compelling narratives are Putin’s protection of his autocracy and imperialist ambitions. 

In light of Mearsheimer’s serious flaws, it's important to note that his argument innately lets imperialist leaders like Putin off the hook, who—at the end of the day—are responsible for the immense suffering these conflicts impose on normal people. Given this and Putin’s track record of invading sovereign states, international warrants for his war crimes, and ruthless termination of Russian dissidents, it’s best not to side with arguments that inherently justify Putin’s behavior.

Connor JL Moore is a current master’s candidate for International Security at the University of Denver’s Josef Korbel School of Global and Public Affairs. 

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