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Why is there a U.S.-Greenland Deal and Who Benefits?

4 hours ago
4 min read

Collage of Greenland flags, an Arctic map, a military aircraft, a naval vessel, radar domes, sea ice, and the NATO emblem in blue, red, and white.
Illustration by Jonathan Rockford

On September 22, 2026, Denmark, Greenland, and the United States signed a military agreement updating the 1951 Defense of Greenland treaty, but it largely preserves the existing 1951 agreement. Considering the overwhelmingly negative responses to President Trump’s attempts to acquire Greenland coming from the territory itself, Denmark, and other NATO countries, it may be surprising that an agreement was reached. 


Trump took to X to celebrate it as an accomplishment for himself and a success of his campaign for Greenland to become a U.S. territory, while the other signatories celebrated it as a victory for NATO’s defensive capabilities and cooperation. But why would each party agree to it, and who does it actually benefit? While the changes between the 1951 text and the new agreement are minimal, each of the parties involved can frame this as a win in their own diplomatic ways.



Why Is There a Deal?


This new agreement followed President Trump’s renewed remarks in January 2026 that the U.S. should take control of Greenland, claiming Denmark could not provide for its defense. Washington’s rhetoric only intensified as Trump repeatedly stated he would do whatever it takes to make that happen. 


Since then, Denmark has defended Greenland as its own territory, Greenland has advocated for its independence, and Trump has attempted to bribe Greenlanders into accepting American rule. Other NATO members vehemently rejected annexation and banded together to support the island’s sovereignty, with some European countries even deploying troops to serve as a tripwire for NATO’s Article V in the case of an American invasion of Greenland. 


Even under such tensions, geopolitical reasons to cooperate remain. The Arctic’s growing accessibility and economic potential have drawn greater international attention to shipping routes and natural resources. Russia’s Arctic military capabilities dramatically outrank those of the U.S., including offensive missile equipment and nuclear-capable submarines based in the region. Additionally, China has declared itself a ‘near-Arctic state’, attempting to gain a foothold in the region through critical mineral extraction and shipping. 


The U.S.’ recent increased focus on the Arctic was long overdue, but threatening and alienating key allies that Washington relies on was not the solution. Relations between the U.S. and the rest of NATO have frayed in part due to Trump’s insistence on claiming Greenland. Mending that relationship and promoting Arctic cooperation should be a high priority, and hopefully this agreement will be a step towards reconciliation.


What Changed from the 1951 Agreement?


The changes between the 1951 text and the new agreement are minimal and largely inconsequential on their own, but they do represent key diplomatic shifts between the three parties.


The new agreement differs in three ways: 

  1. Greenland became an equal signatory alongside the U.S. and Denmark, and the treaty will remain in place even if the territory becomes independent.

  2. It conditionally approved the creation of two new U.S.-operated defense areas in Narsarsuaq and Mestersvig.

  3. It forbids countries that are not members of NATO or the EU from having “significant influence” in Greenland.


Rather than granting the U.S. a new ability to create bases in Greenland, it simply uses the existing agreement under the 1951 text for the U.S. to build, maintain, and run military bases to approve two additional facilities.


For over two decades, the only defense area operating under the 1951 agreement has been Pituffik Space Force Base. Importantly, the creation of new defense areas has always required the approval of both the U.S. and Denmark. That requirement remains, but now, the agreement also requires Greenland’s approval. The new defense areas are not officially created until the U.S. submits specific plans for the locations, sizes, and purposes of the bases to the parliaments of both Denmark and Greenland, and they approve them through the process that has been in place since 1951, now with the addition of the latter.


Who Achieved What? 


Diplomatically, all primary actors can frame this as a win. Trump has claimed that he expanded U.S. influence and military presence in Greenland. In a speech following the signing, he said that “This agreement… gives the United States permanent control over security and all other needs on [Greenland]”. This is not entirely true, because it does not grant the U.S. the ability to build bases or station troops unless both Greenland and Denmark approve the exact specifications of the facilities. But experts have claimed that it has served as a foreign policy victory before the midterms, which could distract from failures in Iran.


For Denmark and NATO, Copenhagen was essentially able to gain diplomatic credit with the U.S. without conceding Danish sovereignty or Greenlanders’ right to self-determination. And under Article 2, all three parties support stronger NATO engagement in the Arctic, including planning, presence, exercises, and joint intelligence gathering. 


In Greenland’s case, becoming an equal signatory to the text is a long-awaited achievement for Nuuk. In the island’s first Arctic strategy document, published independently of Denmark in 2024, the Greenlandic Ministry for Statehood and Foreign Affairs stated that it “will work to ensure that the Defense Agreement of 1951 is expanded to include us as a party and for the greater benefit of our country.” At the time, Denmark and the U.S. made no moves towards that change, so this shift may signal Greenland coming out as the clearest winner of the new agreement in terms of real change.


Overall, the agreement is a victory in that it offers a way to settle a months-long disagreement over the U.S.’s role in Greenland. It alleviates an issue that was driving a wedge between NATO countries that felt betrayed by Washington, and it comes at a time when Arctic cooperation is more important than ever.


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