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Illustration by Connor JL Moore LISTEN TO THIS ARTICLE The general goal of the peculiar brand of conservatism that grew out of twentieth century America was to decrease the role of government by creating markets that achieve policy aims. While a strong public-private nexus is certainly important to the functioning of a modern state, the United States’ legislation during the ‘War on Drugs’ seemed to flip the script entirely, prioritizing market stimulation over completion of traditional Republican policy goals. American anti-drug policy is best understood in this context of comparison between its lack of effect on the international illicit marketplace and its creation of multibillion dollar domestic industries. This can be seen no clearer than in the steps the U.S. has taken in combating the ever-notorious cocaine trade. Despite decades of effort and billions of dollars of taxpayer money, the cocaine marketplace has only grown more efficient in bringing products to market. The price has consistently fallen year over year for the last three decades. All the while, domestic industries spawned from the same ineffective anti-drug policies which saw outsized corporate returns to American shareholders. It’s clear from the contrast between the lack of damage to the drug marketplace and the rapidly growing domestic industries that support American anti-drug policy, that the War on Drugs has essentially benefited, and continues to benefit, private corporations far more than it hinders drug traffickers, manufacturers or users. This paper will narrow its focus from the temporal and corporeal totality of the War on Drugs to specifically the cocaine marketplace between 1990 and 2005. To preface, American anti-cocaine policy has been further divided into two main strategies: Foreign Market Interventions (FMIs) and Increasing Jurisdictional Severity (IJS). FMIs are focused primarily on undermining the functions of the international cocaine supply chain through diplomatic, military, and economic agreements with foreign nations. Two FMIs occurred in the period being studied: The Andean Initiative and Plan Colombia. Both emphasized the delivery of military hardware to assist South American countries in directly combating traffickers, as well as herbicidal aerial fumigation to destroy coca crops in their fields. The plans also included insignificant investment in agricultural alternatives to illicit crops, much to their operational detriment. The latter strategy, IJS, is based on the assumption that increasing the penalties for drug use and trafficking will lead to less users, or at minimum less users outside of prison. One significant investment in IJS occurred during the period of focus: The 1994 Crime Bill. This piece of legislation sought to expand correctional capacity in the U.S. while simultaneously increasing the punishments for drug use, possession, and distribution. The crime bill allocated billions of dollars to the construction of 125,000 new state prison cells, the expansion of the police force by 100,000 new officers, and the establishment of 70 new mandatory minimum drug sentencing guidelines. [ 1 ] This paper will narrow its focus from the temporal and corporeal totality of the War on Drugs to specifically the cocaine marketplace between 1990 and 2005. To preface, American anti-cocaine policy has been further divided into two main strategies: Foreign Market Interventions (FMIs) and Increasing Jurisdictional Severity (IJS). FMIs are focused primarily on undermining the functions of the international cocaine supply chain through diplomatic, military, and economic agreements with foreign nations. Two FMIs occurred in the period being studied: The Andean Initiative and Plan Colombia. Both emphasized the delivery of military hardware to assist South American countries in directly combating traffickers, as well as herbicidal aerial fumigation to destroy coca crops in their fields. The plans also included insignificant investment in agricultural alternatives to illicit crops, much to their operational detriment. The latter strategy, IJS, is based on the assumption that increasing the penalties for drug use and trafficking will lead to less users, or at minimum less users outside of prison. One significant investment in IJS occurred during the period of focus: The 1994 Crime Bill. This piece of legislation sought to expand correctional capacity in the U.S. while simultaneously increasing the punishments for drug use, possession, and distribution. The crime bill allocated billions of dollars to the construction of 125,000 new state prison cells, the expansion of the police force by 100,000 new officers, and the establishment of 70 new mandatory minimum drug sentencing guidelines. [ 1 ] This paper is not an in-depth discussion of the three anti-drug actions taken between 1990 and 2005. The details of the voluminous 1994 Crime Bill alone would require many more pages than the scope of research conducted would allow. Likewise, a study of every facet of the Andean Initiative and its impacts on each portion of the illicit supply chain that brings the drug to market, although illuminating, would be a book length endeavor. Instead, the broad strategies of each FMI and IJS initiative will be outlined and discussed as much as is relevant to their general impact on domestic industry and illicit markets. Only the end data point of the cocaine supply chain, the average price per gram in the U.S., will be used to illustrate each plan's effect on the illicit marketplace over time. The assumption here is that even if Plan Colombia’s allocation of military hardware to Colombia, for example, significantly hindered cocaine manufacturing, then the cartel would react by increasing the retail price of their product. The same goes for the theory that increasing legal penalties for drug use will result in fewer drug users; If any of these were effective in undermining the illicit cocaine marketplace, it would manifest itself in increased prices being passed to drug users in the U.S. Increasing Jurisdictional Severity The 1994 Crime Bill was aimed at increasing penalties for drug trafficking, possession, and distribution. Then Senator Joe Biden emphasized the overwhelming bipartisan nature of the 1994 Crime Bill saying, “The liberal wing of the Democratic Party is for sixty new death penalties. That’s what’s in this bill. The liberal wing of the Democratic Party is for seventy enhanced penalties. The liberal wing of the Democratic Party is for one hundred thousand cops and one hundred twenty-five thousand new state prison cells.” [ 2 ] IJS contributed significantly to corporate shareholder returns and had little to no impact on the international cocaine marketplace. It is important to note that the 1994 Crime Bill by no means constitutes the entire IJS investment over the period 1990 to 2005. Rather it defined the period of American politics in which it was passed, but dozens of other bills, budgets, executive orders, and court decisions contributed substantially to IJS during this period. The ‘94 Crime Bill is simply an easy shorthand for evaluating the success, or lack thereof, of the strategy that IJS represents. The 1994 Crime Bill, officially the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, is an example of how sentencing policies are employed to make America a less appealing jurisdiction for American drug traffickers and consumers. The bill stipulates mandatory minimum drug sentencing laws for a variety of crimes and even goes so far as to mandate life imprisonment in certain felony combinations common for drug users and traffickers. Due significantly in part to the ‘94 Crime Bill, between 1990 and 1997 the incarcerated population in America increased 7% year over year from 689,577 to 1,100,850. [ 3 ] To house an additional half million inmates, the 1994 Federal Budget directly allocated $771,000,000 for the construction of new facilities in the Federal Prison System, or a 67% increase compared with the 1992 budget. [ 4 ] The Effect of IJS The Netherlands is the most attractive jurisdiction for cocaine traffickers and users outside of South America. The Dutch have famously lenient drug sentencing laws and enshrined legal protections for the use of “soft drugs.” The problem for the European market of cocaine traffickers is the complex logistics involved in bringing the illicit product to market. The Netherlands, then, is an interesting comparison to the U.S. Low jurisdictional barriers combined with logistics of similar complexity in circumventing American anti-drug policing measures can help illuminate what portion of cocaine pricing is associated with fear of legal repercussions. It is clear from a comparison of Dutch and American average cocaine prices per gram that most of the pricing model of cocaine isn’t associated with IJS. The Netherlands, whose government pursued a policy of limiting jurisdictional severity, managed to maintain relative stability in average cocaine prices; only fluctuating from $66 per gram to $60 per gram. The U.S. on the other hand saw a drop in price from $184 to $75 over the same period despite investing billions in IJS. Fig. 1 Dutch versus American Cocaine Price Per Gram 1990 - 2005. Graph by Braxton Fuller compiled from UNODC data. Figure 1, compiled from two datasets from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), shows a comparison between average Dutch and American cocaine prices per gram between 1990 and 2005. [ 5 ] Cocaine prices in the Netherlands are predictably low and stable. The Dutch have not pursued a strategy of IJS, so it can be assumed that a substantial portion of Dutch cocaine prices are the group's profit margin and transportation costs. American cocaine prices per gram, on the other hand, see a consistent decline throughout the period. This despite considerable investment in making the American market a less appealing jurisdiction for traffickers and users of cocaine alike. The American strategy of IJS did achieve some of its policy goals; namely, increasing domestic American corporate returns. Although anti-cocaine policy failed to hinder the illicit marketplace, it did prove to be a boon for American corporate shareholders. Two of the largest recipients of federal construction contracts in the 1990s were the Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) and the Wackenhut Corrections Corporation (WCC). Their financial performance in the wake of the 1994 Crime Bill and later history of corporate mergers is illustrative of the calcification of shareholder interest in the War on Drugs strategy. WCC described its position in a 2002 financial filing: “We have a leading share of the privatized correctional and detention facilities management services market for the states of California, Florida and Texas, the three U.S. states with the largest inmate populations. As of July 31, 2003, we operated a total of 47 correctional, detention and mental health facilities and had over 36,000 beds under management or for which we had been awarded contracts. We maintained an average facility occupancy rate of over 97% and 99% for the fiscal year ended December 29, 2002 and the thirteen weeks ended March 30, 2003, respectively. For fiscal year ended December 29, 2002, we had consolidated revenues of $568.6 million and consolidated operating income of $27.9 million.” [ 6 ] In the previous four years, WCC saw an increase in earnings per share from $0.54 to $0.96, or a 56% increase between 1997 and 2001. [ 7 ] Likewise, CCA earnings per share doubled from $0.34 to $0.74 between 1999 and 2000. [ 8 ] The nascent private prison contractor business model proved itself attractive to institutional investors during this period and the marketplace rapidly consolidated. CCA earnings per share were $5.64 due to an acquisition by a large private prison conglomerate, CoreCivic, in 2001. [ 9 ] Likewise, WCC was acquired by the GEO Group, a large security and correctional conglomerate, in 2004. GEO would go on to be purchased by a group of institutional investors, including BlackRock and Vanguard Investments, in 2008. Both companies’ performance in the immediate aftermath of the 1994 Crime Bill overperform the wider American market during the same period. Foreign Market Intervention The U.S. pursued two FMIs during the period of focus: The Andean Initiative and Plan Columbia. Both prioritized the delivery of military aid to combat traffickers in producing regions and aerial fumigation to destroy coca crops in their fields. The Andean Initiative was a collaboration between the U.S., Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru to address the international drug trade. As a result, this effort was widely criticized in hindsight by historians and intellectuals of the War on Drugs for its emphasis on the delivery of military hardware over economic incentives for alternative agricultural material production in lieu of coca. The scale of military hardware deliveries under the plan is almost difficult to comprehend. Just in the first year of the plan's implementation in Peru, twenty A-37 ground attack aircraft, twelve UH-1H Huey helicopters, rifles and light infantry equipment for six new infantry battalions, dozens of patrol boats, and a classified number of Blackhawk helicopters were delivered. In totality, the Andean Initiative would dispense $250,000,000 in military aid and $129,000,000 in economic aid. Plan Columbia placed a heavy emphasis on military aid as well. Between 2000 and 2006 military hardware deliveries never dipped below 72.6% of annual Plan Colombia aid packages. In 2001, the first complete year of Plan Colombia implementation, the proportion of military to non-military aid was 97.2% or $1,263,000,000 of $1,300,000,000. [ 10 ] Even proponents of the plan such as Michael Shifter acknowledge that, “In framing and defending Plan Colombia as an anti-narcotics and security policy initiative, both countries focused too narrowly on military and police aid—with a resulting cost to human rights and the rule of law in the short term, and to the sustainability and consolidation of security over the long term. ” [ 11 ] There was even a tacit understanding that vast amounts of humanitarian funding needed to be allocated, but the political environment in America would make such funding infeasible. There was an expectation that European partners would fund the humanitarian half of the operation, but this never materialized. [ 12 ] Both plans failed to address the root socioeconomic causes of the drug trade. This makes evaluating the success of Plan Colombia and the Andean Initiative by their own metrics unworkable. Reported statistics such as hectares of coca destroyed, successful prosecution of cartel members, or number of cocaine labs destroyed, fail to capture a picture of operational success because they lack any connection to the factors that drive the drug market. Violent and draconian market interventions have repeatedly failed in controlling marketplaces throughout history and these two are no different. The Effect of FMIs The two FMIs pursued during the period of study are the Andean Initiative beginning in 1990 and Plan Colombia in 2000. In total, these plans cost the U.S. a combined $8,379,000,000 between 1990 and 2005. Both interventions prioritized aerial fumigation strategies and military aid while marginally supporting alternative agricultural development. To each plan’s credit, the land devoted to coca cultivation between 1990 and 2005 decreased by 52,100 hectares, from 211,700 to 159,600. [ 13 ] Although they achieved desired metric goals, both plans failed to increase the price of cocaine in American markets. In fact, the price of cocaine decreased between 72% [ 14 ] and 40% [ 15 ] in the period of study. Both UNODC datasets show a substantial decrease in the price per gram of cocaine between 1990 and 2005. In total, the $8,379,000,000 spent by the U.S. on FMIs in the region between 1990 and 2005 breaks down to $76,871,559 per dollar the price of a gram of cocaine decreased. The largest single beneficiary of American anti-cocaine policy was Monsanto; the company that produced the herbicide used in aerial fumigation efforts for most of the period of focus. From 1990 to 2000, Monsanto owned industrial patents enabling sole commercial production of glyphosate. [ 16 ] From 2000 until well past 2005, Monsanto was the only company with sufficient industrial capacity to produce glyphosate at sufficient scale for herbicidal aerial fumigation. UNODC annual coca surveys in Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia track the total number of hectares aerially fumigated with glyphosate but the data is incomplete for the period of study. According to UNODC agricultural monitoring reports, 169,588 acres were fumigated in Peru [ 17 ] , 204,400 in Bolivia [ 18 ] , and 1,466,407 in Colombia [ 19 ] between 1996 and 2003. The State Department noted on July 9, 2001, that, “ In aerial eradication of coca in Colombia, 3.35 pounds of glyphosate is used per acre sprayed, well within U.S.-approved application levels.” [ 20 ] When combined with historical price data for glyphosate collected by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, a low order estimate can be produced. In 1996, the average cost per pound of glyphosate sold in bulk to American farmers was $12.25. [ 21 ] This means that between the years of 1996 and 2003 the U.S. contracted Monsanto to the effect of $75,525,181. This is akin in size to the entire $129,000,000 allocated for nonmilitary application in the Andean Initiative alone. The total land fumigated in the plan, 1,840,395 acres, is well over ten times the total reduction in land devoted to coca cultivation, 128,741 acres. In summation, aerial fumigation cost the U.S. around $41 per acre sprayed, but over $500 per acre removed from the illicit agricultural marketplace. There are a couple of explanations as to why a specific American FMI strategy failed to increase the price of cocaine in the U.S. The first is an analysis of the procurement structure of the cocaine manufacturers in South America. Tom Wainwright summarizes the seeming market incongruity in his book, Narconomics: How to Run a Drug Cartel by saying, “The armed groups that control the cocaine trade in Colombia act as monopsonies. Under normal market conditions, coca farmers would be able to shop around and sell their leaves to the highest bidder. That would mean that in times of scarcity, coca buyers raise their bids, and the price of the leaf goes up. But Colombia’s armed conflict is such that in any given region, there is usually only one group of traffickers that holds sway. That group is the sole local buyer of coca leaf, so it dictates the price… That means if the price of producing the leaf goes up - owing to eradication, disease, or anything else - it will be the farmers who bear the cost, not the cartels.” [ 22 ] This same monopsonistic environment exists in the cocaine manufacturing market across the Andes. In effect, sellers of bulk amounts of raw coca can only turn to criminal manufacturing groups to offload their product. In this analysis, it doesn’t matter how many hectares or tons of raw coca are burned or fumigated with glyphosate: the price to acquire the raw materials necessary to produce cocaine won’t change. The only people that the U.S. is hurting by perpetuating a strategy of crop eradication are the growers themselves, not the cartels, and certainly not the bottom line of illicit criminal groups. Fig. 2 Total Land Devoted to Coca Cultivation in Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia 1990 - 2005 By Braxton Fuller Compiled from UNODC Data. Conclusion American anti-Cocaine policy is effective from a perspective of increasing shareholder returns. The public has been indoctrinated to believe that undermining the drug trade looks a certain way. In reality, it presents itself as the rapid arming of police forces and overcrowding of prisons, planes spraying chemicals, and young men who look different from the idealized white American in handcuffs. It is a story of victimization by people in faraway places through the drugs Americans take by their own free will. This is by no means an effective strategy to combat the cocaine trade. It is, however, the most attractive to American institutional investors because it’s the most cost intensive to the American taxpayer. This strategy and this story have failed time and time again to undermine the illicit drug marketplace. In truth, the cocaine market became healthier and more efficient by America’s involvement in both IJS and FMIs. So too did America’s own domestic industries. The effects of American anti-drug policy are increased profits and more efficient business models for both sides of the War on Drugs. The notion of whether intervening in foreign marketplaces or increasing penalties for participation in the drug economy are good ways to undermine transnational criminal groups is beyond the scope of this paper. However, the specific structure of FMIs and IJS that the U.S. has employed fails to place the social and economic costs associated with drug use on those who perpetuate the international drug trade from positions of power. The people whom American anti-drug policy hurts the most are those with the least power, and therefore they are the least likely constituency to have any influence in creating change in the system of drug use and manufacture. It has also continued to dispense huge quantities to corporations tasked with supporting the same failed policies. In effect, it benefits the people who need it least and hurts those who need help the most. In a good faith reading of American anti-drug policy, it is clear that this is a strategic error. The structure of interventions in the illicit marketplace should ensure that increased costs are passed as high up the supply chain as possible. Braxton Fuller is a current master’s candidate for International Studies at the University of Denver’s Josef Korbel School of Global and Public Affairs. If you enjoyed this work, please consider sharing our content and website or donating to a non-profit organization linked in the Donate  tab. DISCLAIMER Mooreposts publishes independent analysis, commentary, and research for informational and educational purposes only. Content on Mooreposts—including articles, Mooreposts Bites, strategic intelligence assessments, opinion pieces, interviews, and visual materials—does not constitute legal, financial, medical, or professional advice, nor does it represent any government agency, official position, or classified assessment. Unless explicitly stated, all analyses and interpretations reflect the views and analytic judgments of the individual author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Mooreposts, its editorial staff, or affiliated contributors. Strategic intelligence and analytical content is based on open-source information and publicly available materials. Mooreposts strives for accuracy, transparency, and rigorous sourcing; however, information may change as events develop. Readers are encouraged to consult primary sources and exercise independent judgment.

Illustration by Connor JL Moore LISTEN TO THIS ARTICLE On October 3rd, 2025, the Islamic Resistance Movement, more commonly known as Hamas, agreed to release all 48 remaining living and deceased Israeli hostages in exchange for a durable, lasting ceasefire in Gaza. Soon after, the United States brokered a peace deal between Israel and Hamas, theoretically ending what has been described as a genocide by most human rights organizations and genocide scholars . Under a 20 Point Plan published by the White House, a “strong, durable, and everlasting peace” would reign over Gaza and the Levant.  In reality, Israel has continued killing Gazans unabated, as two children, aged 10 and 12, labeled as terrorists by Israel , were killed on November 29th, 2025. This incident occurred exactly 30 days after the signing of the peace plan that “ ended the war ”.  There have been 16 well-documented  violations of the Gaza peace plan by Israel as of the writing of this article, calling into question the effectiveness of the US-backed agreement. While the introduction of the Gaza peace plan was little more than a cover for Israel to continue fighting, it is important to understand what the Gaza peace plan, as proposed by the Trump Administration, would do to Gaza. This article will break down the Gaza peace plan by all 20 points.  The Gaza peace plan can be broken down into three phases, the initial phase of Immediate Ceasefire & Hostage Framework (Points 1-8) , followed by the Stabilization & Interim Governance phase (Points 9-14) , before concluding with the Reconstruction & “Peace Horizon” (Points 15–20) phase . These three phases are ultimately part of a greater plan that systematically excludes the Palestinian people as political actors, seeking to divorce Gaza from the idea of ‘Palestine’, that being a sovereign state existing within the 1967 borders . Instead, the objective appears to center on stabilizing the region through external control and technocratic autocracy. The fundamental issue of the Gaza peace plan is that it does not seek ‘peace’, it seeks to skirt around the issue of Palestinian sovereignty and self-determination, instead constructing an artificial framework of security and technocracy that will only serve to enrich Western actors while depriving Palestinians of their rights.  One of the self-professed, fundamental principles of the Gaza peace plan seeks to separate Gaza from Palestine. It states that Gaza (devoid of any mention of Palestine) will be a “ deradicalised ”  zone devoid of terrorism. Who, though, decides what constitutes deradicalization? Would a new Gazan education system seek to build a distinct   narrative for Palestine, justifying the actions of Israel both in 1948 and 2025? Violence in Gaza does not occur arbitrarily; it is intentional, directed violence aimed at resolving the Palestinian question and forcing a new political end through force. Any attempt at resolving violence in Palestine must come through the frame of addressing the root cause - that being the denial of Palestinian statehood and self-determination.   Another core thrust of the peace plan is the removal of Hamas from power. Since the October 7th attacks, support for Hamas has declined significantly in Gaza. Removing Hamas would undoubtedly improve the possibility of true peace between Palestine and Israel. However, the question then becomes, who or what will replace Hamas? Unless Israel is willing to release Marwan Barghouti , who has sworn non-violence and peace, there will not be a unifying figure for Palestinians, much less Gazans. It is unlikely that Gazans would accept the   dreadfully unpopular  Mahmoud Abbas, current President of the Palestinian Authority, who polls at 29% in Gaza, as compared to Hamas, which sat at 51%  in October 2024. As such, the Gaza peace plan goes a step further and proposes a “Board of Peace,” with Donald J. Trump serving as Chairman. Notably, the Gaza peace plan does not denote any concrete guidelines identifying when Trump would step down as Chairman of the “Board of Peace”. Critics may argue that the Gaza peace plan gives him an indefinite term in this role, making him the arbiter of any peace between Israel and Palestine beyond the end of his presidential term.  Fundamentally, the Gaza peace plan as authored by President Trump does not succeed in providing a strong likelihood of long term peace in the Middle East. Instead, it creates a shaky framework of stability without sovereignty, governance without representation, and reconstruction without autonomy. Palestinians were excluded from more than just the drafting of the Gaza peace plan, they were excluded from the very concept of peace that the plan seeks to promulgate. Yet again, the international community objectifies Palestinians as objects of political policy and a means of producing wealth, rather than as architects of their destiny and arbiters of their security. Conor Farrell is a Middle Eastern Human Rights Advocate with a M.A. in International Studies from the Josef Korbel School of Global and Public Affairs. If you enjoyed this work, please consider sharing our content and website, following Conor on the social media platforms listed in his bio , or donating to a non-profit organization linked in the Donate  tab. DISCLAIMER Mooreposts publishes independent analysis, commentary, and research for informational and educational purposes only. Content on Mooreposts—including articles, Mooreposts Bites, strategic intelligence assessments, opinion pieces, interviews, and visual materials—does not constitute legal, financial, medical, or professional advice, nor does it represent any government agency, official position, or classified assessment. Unless explicitly stated, all analyses and interpretations reflect the views and analytic judgments of the individual author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Mooreposts, its editorial staff, or affiliated contributors. Strategic intelligence and analytical content is based on open-source information and publicly available materials. Mooreposts strives for accuracy, transparency, and rigorous sourcing; however, information may change as events develop. Readers are encouraged to consult primary sources and exercise independent judgment.

Illustration by Connor JL Moore Listen to this article America's collective myopia is dooming its foreign policy. Just after exiting Afghanistan following over twenty years  of a futile exercise in nation-building by the U.S. military, the newest iteration of the Trump administration wants the U.S. military to embark on a similar undertaking in Mexico. A central tenet of Trump’s second administrative platform has been his ‘tough on cartels’ policy. When discussing the issue, he has ranged from alluding heavily  to outright stating  that he intends to employ military force against cartels to stymie illicit activity on the southern U.S. border. Mexican drug cartels undoubtedly raise legitimate security concerns for the U.S. However, military intervention in Latin America would worsen the issue. U.S. military action will fail to adequately address the demand for drugs, the economic impacts of cartels, and long-term strategic goals in Mexico. Furthermore, unilateral U.S. military action against cartels has a strong possibility of fomenting yet another insurgency, inevitably demanding far greater resources than the U.S. will be willing to dedicate. Despite the cartels’ exacerbation of public health concerns, this matter’s preeminent treatment as a national security issue may result in a loss of focus on burgeoning security threats in Europe and Asia.  Foreign Terrorist Organizations and Insurgencies Drug cartels are not terrorist organizations. While they may employ violent tactics to coerce and control aspects of their local government and populace , they lack the ideological components necessary to be considered extremists. Even if their violent strategies look familiar to other terror groups and insurgencies fought by the U.S. in the past, cartels are profit-driven entities. As such, they operate more similarly to businesses than terrorist groups. Dismantling cartels requires unique efforts divorced from their ill-advised treatment as purveyors of terrorism. In light of this reality, labeling drug cartels as foreign terrorist organizations is unhelpful in actually mitigating their influence. While this policy position may allow for a deployment of military force, it fails to address effective means of combating and categorizing cartels.  Furthermore, drug cartels are not leading an insurgency . As such, past lessons in counter-insurgency strategy will only be tangentially applicable. Despite the cartels' integration into the local populace and their past community outreach  work,   they are not insurgents bent on replacing the Mexican government. Rather, they actively benefit from the corruption and ineffectiveness of the current Mexican regime. Therefore, replacing the government through means of insurgency is of little use to Mexican criminal organizations. These groups desire the freedom necessary to continue conducting business and turning profits. Due to these unique factors, the U.S. cannot effectively fight cartels using strategies previously employed against insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan. Past Failures There is ample evidence of failed military action against drug cartels in Mexico. Numerous Mexican presidents have used varying levels of military action  to weaken, deter, and cripple drug cartels in Mexico. Past responses by Mexican presidents have demonstrated how poorly military force has fared against cartels .   Despite these attempts to suppress cartels, Mexican drug trafficking organizations are arguably at their strongest, as customers in the U.S. have increased demand for their products year over year . U.S. military action in Mexico will not change the demand from consumers. As such, addressing the supply of drugs without confronting demand in the U.S. will only result in a deficient outcome, unlikely to meaningfully reduce drug trafficking into the U.S. Attacking the cartels has no clear military end-state. It possesses echoes of yet another ‘forever-war’ where U.S. military involvement may necessitate a prolonged presence and strategy  that cannot be bound by time. In a democracy with an ever-shortening attention span, this type of conflict does not play to the strengths of the U.S. military and political structure. U.S. military action will only worsen the situation in the immediate future. Economic Impact The economic significance of  cartels cannot be ignored. Cartels supply sizable amounts of money and employment to citizens. Removing them would eliminate a notable portion of the Mexican economy, further destabilizing the region. When aggregated, the cartels are estimated to be the fifth-largest employer of people in Mexico , outpacing many large U.S. corporations operating in the country.   Their contributions to the Mexican economy are meaningful and must be thoughtfully considered when making strategic plans relating to their elimination. Simply dismantling the cartels will not be enough. Due to their lucrative nature, this will only result in the creation of a vacuum to be exploited by other industries and criminal groups. Removing supply without addressing  U.S. and global demand will not solve the issue.  The Larger Picture To be clear, the argument here is not to do nothing. Drug cartels are violent and ruthless, posing a serious threat to U.S. public health. Furthermore, a clear link of cooperation between an increasingly adversarial China and drug cartels  has emerged in the sale of chemical precursors. These are strong reasons to take action in curbing the power and influence of drug cartels. However,  a military intervention will not be an effective means of achieving this goal.  Mexico is one of the most critical actors in aiding U.S. national security. As the United States’ southern neighbor, Mexico is crucial to maintaining U.S. strategic goals. Now is a time for the U.S. to strengthen bilateral ties instead of pursuing unilateral military action in Mexico, which would only heighten tensions with the nation’s government and people. The U.S. needs to strengthen relations with its neighbors and allies to contend with rising powers like China and Russia, who are increasingly collaborating against U.S. interests. U.S. intervention against cartels will not produce or reinforce any alliances. In fact, short-sighted foreign policy decisions have the potential to create new enemies instead. Jonathan Rockford is a current master's candidate for International Security at the Josef Korbel School of Global and Public Affairs at the University of Denver. If you enjoyed this work, please consider sharing our publications and website, following Jonathan on the social media platforms listed in his bio , or donating to a non-profit organization linked in the Donate tab. DISCLAIMER Mooreposts publishes independent analysis, commentary, and research for informational and educational purposes only. Content on Mooreposts—including articles, Mooreposts Bites, strategic intelligence assessments, opinion pieces, interviews, and visual materials—does not constitute legal, financial, medical, or professional advice, nor does it represent any government agency, official position, or classified assessment. Unless explicitly stated, all analyses and interpretations reflect the views and analytic judgments of the individual author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Mooreposts, its editorial staff, or affiliated contributors. Strategic intelligence and analytical content is based on open-source information and publicly available materials. Mooreposts strives for accuracy, transparency, and rigorous sourcing; however, information may change as events develop. Readers are encouraged to consult primary sources and exercise independent judgment.

Illustration by Connor JL Moore Listen to this article Introduction Years of political turmoil and totalitarian politics have led Syria to a crossroads – will the nation seek to move towards liberalization, or revert to sectarian tendencies? After the fall of Bashar al-Assad via coup d’etat, the Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) political party assumed interim control. The commentary below provides context for pre-civil war governance, the legacy of the Arab Spring, lessons to heed from it, and the concept of democracy in the Middle East. Finally, a discussion of liberal reforms needed to foster the seed of democracy and the challenges that come with each is included.  Contemporary Political Context  After over 14 years of civil war,   600,000 citizens and combatants dead , and half of the population displaced, cautious optimism seems to dominate international dialogue surrounding the future of Syria after the fall of Bashar al-Assad. The emerging regime, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), maintains that the new governing body aims to respect the rights of minority citizens, aid in constitutional reform, and form an inclusive and representative government . To understand the rise of HTS, however, it is critical to grasp the deterioration of Syria under the Assad regime.  In 1971, after a coup d’état, the Alawite minority Hafez al-Assad established a totalitarian monarchy through the Ba’ath Party. The party gained control of trade unions, civil society, and state institutions, supported internationally and regionally by presenting itself as an anti-imperialist and anti-Israeli regime . Iran and Russia provided financial and military support   in exchange for proxy influence in the Middle East, particularly the Levant. The Assad family’s rule was often denoted by exploiting societal divisions, suppressing dissent and free speech, restricting Sunni government participation and political reach, and utilizing violence as an enforcement mechanism . In 2000, after Hafez al-Assad’s death, his son, Bashar al-Assad, assumed power. Initially, Syrians were hopeful for liberalization and reform, yet quickly realized that there would be a continuation of authoritarian rule, one marked by corruption, violence, and brutality.  In 2011, with the sweeping Arab Spring uprisings, the duplicity and cruelty of the Assad regime were further revealed and spread through social media and civil unrest. To combat the protests, Bashar al-Assad engaged in violent crackdowns, such as chemical attacks and prolonged slow conflict, that displaced over 7 million Syrians . Although HTS’ rebel-led offensive catalyzed the physical collapse of the Assad regime in 2024, the cracks had been widening for years. Simultaneously, as the continued civil war eroded Assad’s coalition and military strength, the war in Ukraine captured Russia’s attention, and Iran and Hezbollah focused on Israel. On December 7th, 2024, just 10 days after the start of the offensive, Bashar al-Assad fled to Russia. The following day, Assad’s military unit – the Syrian Arab Army – announced its dissolution, leaving room for HTS and the rebels to claim victory. Although this decisive victory marked the end of a 50-year brutal authoritarian regime, it also signified a significant regional shift. Syria was far from mended, Iran suffered a severe strategic blow in the loss of its proxy power, and a vacuum now left room for a new sphere of influence.  The functioning interim government, led by HTS and Ahmed al-Sharaa, now faces the ruins of a sovereign state, hoping to unite sectarian divisions, reopen diplomatic channels, and restore normalcy in civilian livelihood. Al-Sharaa has signaled that constitutional reform and stability to foster free and fair elections will require an estimated four years of interim work, namely, constitution drafting and institution hardening. The eye of the international community is watching closely. The question then remains: Can Syria stabilize and become one of the first codified and enduring democratic regimes in the Middle East?  In truth, only time will tell. However, if HTS and al-Sharaa can successfully institute liberal democratic processes, economic reform, international cooperation, and cultivate a desire for democracy from within, there remains great potential for a liberal stronghold.  The Legacy of the Arab Spring To foster an environment in which the seed of democracy can grow, it is necessary to understand modern-day democracy-building attempts in the Middle East and North Africa. In particular, lessons from the Arab Spring ought to be considered carefully, showing not only what motivated citizens to mobilize for democracy and liberalization, but also as a cautionary tale of what went wrong and the lasting consequences of such mistakes.  For a democratic transition, there must be a foundation of trust, protection, and inclusion of civil society influence in the new regime. In the wake of the Arab Spring, Tunisia was one of the few states to adopt institutional liberalization. However, their democracy proved to be volatile, as the process focused primarily on legal and procedural changes, rather than addressing deep-rooted social and economic issues. On paper, the Tunisian democracy codified democratic processes and free elections, but trust in newly developed institutions eroded over time, as they failed to protect human security. The role of civil society in Tunisia was limited to acting as a mediator rather than a full governance partner. Instead of simply coexisting with the government, civil society organizations should play an active role in decision-making ; their influence is in the best interest of citizens and their everyday lives. Syria’s transition will benefit from an empowered civil society that helps maintain accountability and represents diverse societal interests.  Another critical lesson from the Arab Spring is the need for bottom-up liberalization from the people, for the people. After the Arab Spring, many countries implemented democracy through political elites , who excluded ordinary citizens from decision-making, weakening legitimacy and reinstating a notion of instability. The only form of liberalization that can take root and endure in Syria is one pushed through grassroots movements designed for citizens' safety, security, and prosperity . Previous, unsuccessful attempts to institute democracy have been viewed by citizens as an imposition of Western ideology, rather than an attempt to increase civil liberties. After years of colonialism, the Arab world, particularly in the Levant, has a sour taste of Western influence and, by extension, most foreign intervention.  Although traditional imperialism ceased decades ago in the Middle East, the enduring consequences are ever-present, highlighted by much of the foreign intervention in post-Arab Spring governance. In several cases, the machinations of foreign governments have resulted in democratic sabotage, fueling the very instability they feared. For instance, interest competition between Egypt, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates contributed to the fracturing of Libya into rival governments . Ostensibly, foreign powers intervened to protect civilians under the Right to Protect principle, but in reality, it is understood that intervention was linked to geopolitical interests and regional power. As learned from foreign intervention in the Arab Spring, HTS must toe the line between diplomacy, geopolitical exchange, trade, investment, and foreign intervention that may harm stabilization and democracy.  Fragmentation is another aspect of the failures of the Arab Spring that Syria must diverge from. Sectarianism and factions dominate Syrian society  as a product of the prolonged civil war and competition between minority religious groups that have historically been persecuted. The Arab Spring showed the world  that a fragmented society and a fragile security landscape can destabilize democratic transition. The most prominent example of this failure is the case of Libya. Their inability to integrate factional militias into a state-sanctioned military force eventually led to long-term instability and violent rivalries. Syria already mirrors some of Libya’s faction issues – ethnic and religious fragments around the state are armed and have been acting as their protector for over a decade. In order to consolidate state power and rebuild the security apparatus , and thus trust in the government, the threat of violence and instability must be replaced with a clear chain of command. Finally, a key lesson of the Arab Spring is that overloading a reform agenda can be counterproductive . Liberalization is a complicated process, requiring the restructuring of government laws and institutions. However, as seen in the case of Yemen post-Arab Spring, attempting to tackle numerous reforms simultaneously, whether it be economic, anti-corruption, or others, can overwhelm a system and oversaturate citizens. Instead, Syria should adopt a phased approach, focusing on realistic benchmarks and gradual improvement, rather than attempting to overhaul everything at once. If al-Sharaa and the HTS coalition can manage to differ from the faults of the Arab Spring, yet cultivate the fervor for significant liberalization, Syria may be able to lead the Middle East to a stable future.  Implementation of Democratic Institutions and Overhauls All considered, the critical steps outlined above are necessary for Syria to move towards liberalization, stability, and security. First and foremost, the new Syrian regime must make a serious effort at institutional rebuilding, as the Assad regime corroded any true bureaucracy. To foster faith in government-funded organizations, it is necessary to build a secular, civil, and decentralized state , emphasizing equality for all citizens regardless of religion or ethnicity. This may be difficult to navigate as Syrians reconcile with decades of religious and ethnic prejudice. Still, it may be possible for HTS to find a compromise in the construction of the governing and military apparatuses. Beyond just the structural aspect of the government, there needs to be reasonable public confidence and trust in government institutions after decades of corruption, bribery, and cronyism. As seen in the failures of Libya , the inability to develop a central bank, military, defense ministry, stable local-level institutions, and governing bodies fails in post-revolution state-building. To develop those critical institutions, capable bureaucrats must be appointed based on merit and statutes that constrain institutions must be codified via constitutional and legal reform.  Next, the Syrian government must acknowledge and work to alleviate the acute and dire humanitarian crises that plague the general public. Preliminary, conservative estimates note that seven out of ten Syrians need humanitarian aid. The nation ranks fourth in the world for food insecurity; there are over seven million internally displaced people (IDPs), over four million internationally displaced, and more than half of the population lacks stable access to water . Although international aid plays a large role in the rehabilitation of human security, the ruling regime is responsible for the distribution of a lot of monetary aid. Under Bashar al-Assad, Syria redirected large portions of international aid funds to the Assad family and elites by skewing exchange rates, allowing them to divert over 51 cents on the dollar away from the real crises to its reserves. Moreover, with high levels of food insecurity, the Assad regime diverted food and supplies to the military  rather than civilians in need. Ahmed al-Sharaa and the interim regime need to aid the acute crisis by equally distributing funds to those in need and transparently reporting to international aid institutions to continue support. For legitimacy and confidence in the current regime to lead Syria to a more prosperous future, human security must be fundamentally supported. Democracy for the people, by the people, can only be mobilized when citizens have the agency to focus on political progress rather than only basic human survival mechanisms.  Democracy for the people, by the people, can only be mobilized when citizens have the agency to focus on political progress rather than only basic human survival mechanisms. Fiscally, the interim government needs to reform and overhaul the tax system, increase public sector salaries, and restructure ministries for greater efficiency and accountability. One of the most corrupt features of the Assad regime, beyond the diversion of humanitarian funds, was the mismanagement of national funds. It is suggested that Bashar al-Assad redirected nearly three billion dollars meant for the reconstruction of Syrian society to his inner circle and sectors that strengthened the regime's hard power . The corruption and a clear effort to evade international standards for aid resulted in sanctions from many Western nations, which devastated the Syrian economy. Thus, a negative feedback loop was born: diversion of funds perpetuated not only the humanitarian crises in Syria but also the erosion of legitimacy for international organizations and other states, resulting in more sanctions, which in turn resulted in more money allocated to the regime for strength amidst a failing economy. The crippled Syrian economy is limited in access to capital, aid, and foreign investment , so they must work with the international community to lower sanctions and reallocate funds to rebuild the economy from the bottom up. Rehabilitation of a healthy oil industry  and rebuilding infrastructure for power plants, water systems, and roads are the first steps. As international sanctions begin to lift, it is critical that Syrians welcome foreign direct investment, invest in energy and agriculture, and stimulate local economies. To attract such investment, it is imperative that HTS establish legal protections for investigators , tighten bureaucratic processes, and reopen and modernize ports to encourage trade.  Diplomatically, al-Sharaa’s government ought to develop more of a working relationship with regional powers, like Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and even Israel, to signal a shift away from dependency and alliance with Iran. Although, unfortunately, strikes between Syria and Israel have continued, al-Sharaa has signaled a desire to open diplomatic channels via indirect talks . Turkey, while advancing on the issue of Kurds at the border, may be a helpful regional ally in terms of energy and the renewal of the sector in Syria. Thus far, Turkey has established procedures for connecting a 400kV line to link Syria and Turkey’s electrical connection by the end of 2025. Moreover, the Turkish energy minister has promised to supply Syria with two billion cubic meters  to generate electricity, which has long been unreliable throughout the country. This partnership could set a precedent for regional investment and diplomacy. Past regional support, Syria must reintegrate itself into geopolitics and global institutions. After years of corruption, mismanagement, and non-compliance with international laws, the interim regime must establish transparency in the allocation of funds, buy into institutional constraints, and comply with humanitarian law. In doing so, Syria opens the window for a relief of sanctions, and further foreign direct investment from Western states with the capital and bandwidth to support Syria’s reconstruction. Inflow of capital can stabilize spiraling inflation and reduce the lack of trust in banking institutions.  Politically, it is essential that Syria, after stabilization, establishes free and open elections for citizens. Al-Sharaa has noted that it could take up to four years  to reconstruct the constitution and stabilize the nation enough for an election. While the stabilizing capabilities of the interim HTS regime are critical, efforts to reconstruct Syria may be rendered illegitimate if there is not a peaceful transition of power and civil liberties are not established. Bottom-up democracy and inclusive politics directly correlate to improved quality of life and stability. Take, for example, Senegal. A USAID project  engaged over six hundred civil society organizations in budget processes and advocacy practices, resulting in large improvements in health services and improved infrastructure. This model is easily applicable to Syria, as infrastructure rebuilding and human security are among the most pressing concerns for citizens. Moreover, the pressure of open elections creates a sense of accountability for those in power. The better quality of life under a given regime often correlates with reelection and maintenance of power. Therefore, political parties vying for power are forced to compete for societal support rather than military coalitions and hard power.  Through a scaffolded approach, the interim Syrian government can take steps in the right direction by reopening the Syrian economy, providing humanitarian support, and engaging in diplomacy, all of which are foundational to liberalization. However, this path is not without its challenges.  Challenges to a Democratic Transition  While there is tentative optimism about Syria’s status due to displayed diplomacy and moderation, former extremism, debilitating divides between Syrian political coalitions, and international interference may prove to be serious roadblocks in the path towards liberalism. The current regime, led by HTS, has made strides towards international diplomacy and claims about restored institutionalism, but has its roots in Islamist ideology. Formed in 2011, the original organization functioned as an al-Qaeda affiliate , carrying out insurgent attacks against the Assad regime. The organization quickly became legitimate by securing funding from the Persian Gulf, collecting taxes in controlled territory, and providing regional security. In 2017, the original organization made a critical political move in separating from al-Qaeda as a competitor jihadist regime, likely as a mechanism to form a legitimate path to political leadership. At present, al-Sharaa and HTS have and will continue to promote higher education , as they did with the provinces they controlled since 2011, particularly for women. Moreover, HTS aims to ideologically separate from al-Qaeda , citing the need for constitutional reform and more relaxed social norms compared to those proposed by extremist groups.  Finally, the looming threat of international intervention poses a great threat to Syria’s future, particularly in the wake of Iraq’s sectarian spiral, and the hope to avoid the same fate. The over-influence of regional powers, like Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Turkey, will threaten to dislodge political stability. As mentioned, it is critical that Syria engages in a degree of regional stability as a method by which to not only prop up a recovering economy but also lessen reliance on Iran and dissolve as a proxy. However, the overreach of neighboring actors also poses a threat to Syrian stability. Although Turkey is well-positioned to aid in the restructuring of domestic industries in Syria, their inherent desire to suppress the conflict with the Kurds on the Syrian border. HTS needs to be accepting of Turkey’s aid, but strong in the defense of Syrian Kurds to avoid the sectarian spiral seen in Iraq. Rather, a unified state, protecting all Syrian citizens regardless of their religious or ethnic minority, is key. The role of the United States and Russia may also be a defining factor in the success and stabilization of Syria. The US holds significant leverage through not only economic sanctions and diplomacy, but also international signaling and soft power influence. The United States’ recent alleviation of sanctions on Syria, as well as a diplomatic visit with al-Sharaa, have signaled that other Western states may do the same. The symbolic support of the US can open up diplomatic support from the rest of the Western World for Syria, and it is mutually beneficial as a secure ally in the Middle East, which is strategically significant to the US. Russia, on the other hand, has a substantial role in the endurance of the Assad regime, hand in hand with Iran, complicating the path to democracy. Their influence   creates significant obstacles to establishing a governance model  free of external control and codified in democratic institutions and ideology. For Iran and Russia, Syria had been a consistent regional opportunity to project power in the Middle East. Increased scrutiny from Western states pushed Syria towards a coalition with the two, acknowledged as an “alliance of convenience”, which included mutual defense and shared intelligence . However, as Russia is preoccupied with the conflict in Ukraine and Iran is dealing with the dissolution of proxy strongholds in Lebanon and Palestine, there is an opportunity to drive Syria away from dependence on the two. It is then up to Western powers to support Syria in a time of need and development, rather than leaving them to revert to support from Russia and Iran. Walking the tightrope between engagement and interference is difficult to gauge, but crucial for societal reconstruction and the liberalization of Syria.  Conclusion Syria is a nation at a crossroads, where ideas of democracy and liberalization meet the lasting consequences of a nation scarred by war. The deeply fractured social and political fabric, woven through years of devastating conflict and foreign interference, must be sewed together again. The path to establishing a democratic ecosystem in Syria is likely to be fraught with challenges, yet the potential for such a transformation remains achievable, albeit slowly. Constructing widespread liberalization requires the rigorous implementation of comprehensive reforms, including the codification of checks and balances, institutionalization of civil liberties, and the establishment of free, fair, and competitive elections. These measures are critical to fostering a political environment conducive to sustainable and inclusive democracy. Syria is a nation at a crossroads, where ideas of democracy and liberalization meet the lasting consequences of a nation scarred by war. Syria’s revolution and regime change carry profound implications for the Middle East, with neighboring nations and global powers keenly invested in its outcome. A shifting Syrian political landscape could redefine regional and geopolitical alignments, which further underscores the interconnected stakes of Syria’s democratic experiment. Neighboring countries and world powers are watching closely, understanding that Syria's political future could reshape the entire regional order. A successful democratic transition in Syria could serve as a beacon for other Arab states, demonstrating that modernization and liberalization can coexist with traditional Arab cultural norms and practices. This transformation would challenge long-held assumptions about authoritarian durability, offering a compelling alternative that empowers citizens without erasing their heritage. Mia Navarro  is a current master's candidate for International Security at the Josef Korbel School of Global and Public Affairs at the University of Denver. If you enjoyed this work, please consider sharing our content and website, following Mia on the social media platforms listed in her bio , or donating to a non-profit organization linked in the Donate  tab. DISCLAIMER Mooreposts publishes independent analysis, commentary, and research for informational and educational purposes only. Content on Mooreposts—including articles, Mooreposts Bites, strategic intelligence assessments, opinion pieces, interviews, and visual materials—does not constitute legal, financial, medical, or professional advice, nor does it represent any government agency, official position, or classified assessment. Unless explicitly stated, all analyses and interpretations reflect the views and analytic judgments of the individual author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Mooreposts, its editorial staff, or affiliated contributors. Strategic intelligence and analytical content is based on open-source information and publicly available materials. Mooreposts strives for accuracy, transparency, and rigorous sourcing; however, information may change as events develop. Readers are encouraged to consult primary sources and exercise independent judgment.

Illustration by Bodhi Harrison Listen to this article On December 8, 2024, the world watched in astonishment as Bashar al-Assad’s regime collapsed after his family’s 50-year reign in Syria. As Assad’s two critical partners, Russia and Iran, became incapable of supporting the regime due to the Russo-Ukrainian War and Israel’s decapitation of Hezbollah, the environment was ripe for overthrow. In just ten days, the leading opposition—Hay-at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)—took de facto control over Syria. With Assad fleeing to Moscow, Syria’s bloody 13-year civil war came to a relatively nonviolent, but possibly tentative conclusion. The question now is how to foster a stable and fair Syria with the debate largely revolving around sanction relief. Some believe complete sanction removal is necessary to rebuild Syria. Others promote a wait-and-see approach to maintain leverage around the situation and over the HTS, which remains listed as a terrorist organization despite its significant steps to rehabilitate  its image. Moreover, many perspectives typically advocate for what one player should do (i.e., the U.S. challenging Türkiye ) instead of looking at larger multilateral approaches. While Assad’s deposition is widely celebrated among Syrians and many across the world, emerging threats and competing foreign interests make the climb to a stable and just Syria daunting. This situation, however, presents a tremendous opportunity for international players to coalesce over Syria via shared interests and interdependencies. Through continued, substantial, and unconditional humanitarian aid, underpinned by sanction exemptions and multilateral action, Syria can stabilize . For 13 years, Assad’s violence against his population and subsequent international sanctions decimated Syria’s infrastructure and economy. 90% of Syrians  are below the poverty line, there’s mass energy scarcity, 13 million  face food insecurity, and 14 million  remain displaced. The UN projects  that 33 million Syrians will require critical assistance this coming year, creating the potential for further deterioration of an already dire humanitarian crisis. Even with HTS’ now interim president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, positioned to consolidate power, the country remains fractured, and with competing foreign interests, a power vacuum persists. To unify Syria, HTS needs further sanction relief and to integrate the U.S.-backed Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The SDF desires  a seat at the table in the new government, full integration of their forces into a centralized Syrian army, shared energy revenues, and administrative autonomy in their controlled regions. Yet, they remain in conflict  with Turkish-backed groups, and their influence and security rely on the U.S., which desires a withdrawal from Syria . Beyond wanting to repatriate  its Syrian refugee population, Türkiye desires to dismantle the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) , who has members in the SDF, out of concerns that an autonomous Kurdish entity in Syria could embolden actors like the PKK to elicit more insurgencies in Türkiye. Worried about   Türkiye’s ambitions and influence  in Syria, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates aim to financially shape and integrate Syria into the Arab League. However, all actors need Türkiye’s influence within the HTS. At the same time, Türkiye needs the Gulf states and EU’s financial weight  in rebuilding Syria and could benefit from help in disbanding the PKK. Citing security concerns, Israel has occupied Syrian territory and conducted tactical strikes against Syrian military infrastructure, which hinders Syria’s capability  to fend off internal and external threats. Yet, Israel relies on support from the U.S. and Gulf states. The EU, moreover, is primarily concerned with HTS’ intent  of forming a fair government as Sharaa has largely excluded key Syrian opposition groups from the new government and made concerning unilateral moves. Along with such interdependencies between players, significant shared interests can spark a new bloc aimed at stabilizing Syria. These include securing 9,000 incarcerated extremists  in SDF regions, suppressing a resurgence of extremist cells, combating a hostile Iran , and locating missing chemical weapons  from Assad’s arsenal. These threats actively endanger any potential for a stable Syrian government to form. International players must continue to provide constant, unconditional, and substantial humanitarian aid. This, however, won’t be sufficient  for stabilizing Syria as it depends on economic recovery. Large, expedited exemptions are necessary, which luckily have started with the EU  and U.S.  lifting specific sector-related sanctions. Yet, if Syria does not sufficiently rebound fast enough, enhanced exemptions will need to be hastened before the country spirals into chaos . These will not only immediately save lives but also create some stability by reversing fleeing refugees  and, importantly, extend an olive branch to Syrians—reducing the risk of armed uprisings . To elicit further sanction relief, HTS must include diverse Syrian organizations and armed oppositions in its formation of a new government, which critically places safeguards against authoritarian impulses . This overture needs to be met with concurrent multilateral diplomacy, which comes with tradeoffs for all. The bloc needs to pressure Israel to withdraw from Syrian territory and halt its strikes. In turn, HTS and Türkiye must normalize relations with Israel by reestablishing the 1974 disengagement agreement, signing a non-aggression pact, and devising ways to foster further economic interdependency to solidify such efforts. Simultaneously, the bloc must establish methods to secure incarcerated extremists, suppress extremist cells from forming, locate missing chemical weapons, and thwart any Iranian efforts to upend Syrian unification. While promising negotiations  continue between the SDF and HTS, the bloc needs to assist Türkiye’s ongoing efforts to disband the PKK via a parole deal  with its founder, Abdullah Ocalan. In return, HTS and Türkiye will need to integrate most of the SDF forces, ensure that energy revenue is equitably dispersed, and both sides will need to secure an agreement that protects Syrian unity while also acknowledging the autonomy aspirations  of Kurdish peoples. When agreements have been reached, foreign players can further legitimize the new government by opening embassies in Damascus. Once Syria’s economy stabilizes and infrastructure is rebuilt, the bloc can also deploy a joint humanitarian stabilization force that assists with the safe return of Syrian refugees who desire to return, creating a major win for Türkiye and the EU, given rising populist sentiments . Finally, as requested by the Syrian National Council, UN assistance via its election monitoring could permit free and fair elections in 18 months . Regardless, as inclusive talks continue and a timeline is set for such elections, external players can delist HTS as a terrorist organization. Upon the election, moreover, players like the U.S. will have the opportunity to withdraw American troops. Given the volatile nature of the situation, where a deteriorating humanitarian crisis and permeating power vacuum could exacerbate collective threats and bring them to fruition, any wait-and-see approach is not just inadequate, but dangerous. Without continued, unconditional and, if needed, enhanced humanitarian aid and exemptions, Syria risks falling into chaos that would likely spill into the greater region. Policymakers should therefore err on the side of a fast-paced sanction relief approach, as sanctions can always be reimposed. It will not only save lives, but along with pragmatic multilateralism, a secure and stable Syria could emerge. Connor JL Moore is a current master’s candidate for International Security at the University of Denver’s Josef Korbel School of Global and Public Affairs. If you enjoyed this work, please consider sharing our content and website or donating to a non-profit organization linked in the Donate  tab.

Illustration by Julianne Moore Listen to this article After Vladimir Putin initiated the Russo-Ukrainian War in 2022, John Mearsheimer —one of international relations’ leading scholars—garnered over 30 million views on his lecture, blaming the West for Russia’s aggression . Since then, Mearsheimer’s realist arguments have taken root in popular conceptions of the war . The second Trump Administration has even claimed a ‘ strategic realist ’ foreign policy and gone so far as to blame the war on Ukraine . My argument: Mearsheimer’s perspective may appear convincing at face value, but it contains glaring issues. Instead, the war’s causes are best understood through Putin’s protection of his autocracy and imperialist ambitions. MEARSHEIMER’S ARGUMENT  In Mearsheimer’s eyes , the path to the Russo-Ukrainian War began in 2008, when the West promised eventual NATO membership to Georgia and Ukraine—a move Moscow clearly warned constituted a red line. Yet, America continued making Ukraine a ‘bulwark’ on Russia’s front door; most notably by supporting the Ukrainian 2014 ‘coup’ that ousted its pro-Kremlin president. Responding to perceived Western provocations, Putin ‘rationally’ invaded Georgia in 2008 and annexed Crimea in 2014.  After further Western provocations—arms sent to Ukraine during the first Trump Administration, 2021 NATO-Ukrainian military exercises, and a Biden-brokered US-Ukrainian partnership— Putin still made one final peace attempt . Here, Moscow demanded Ukrainian neutrality and the removal of long-established Western military equipment across Eastern Europe. US officials subsequently refused, ultimately forcing Putin’s 2022 invasion.  MEARSHEIMER’S FLAWS Arguments like Mearsheimer’s hinge on Moscow perceiving Ukraine’s drift towards a Western orbit as an existential threat to Russian security since its geographical location serves as a springboard into Russia proper . This premise is ludicrous.  As Robert Kagan puts it, Russia has “ never enjoyed greater security on its western frontier ” than during its three post-Soviet decades. Why, then, would Moscow perceive any ‘existential’ threat? This is pronounced when considering NATO drew down  its military capacity during this period, while Putin expanded Russia’s. Realism is contradicted here, as this would indicate a substantial power shift in Russia’s favor, negating any threat or security dilemma .  Further, if NATO’s eastern expansion (1999-2004) was driving Russian concerns, why didn’t Russia intervene when it had the military wherewithal to do so ? If NATO is currently a threat to Russia, why is Moscow leaving nearly 1,600 miles of unguarded border  with NATO’s Finland? Another consideration: could anyone seriously imagine a scenario or argument for a nuclear-armed West invading a nuclear-armed Russia ? The answer is simply no.  This point is underpinned by America’s little-to-no-response  towards Russian aggression in Georgia (2008), Crimea (2014), and Syria (2015). Additionally, the West’s initial belief that Ukraine’s fall was imminent upon invasion, along with its slow provision of Ukrainian aid and persistent risk-averse approach throughout the conflict, further undermines Mearsheimer’s realist description of great power behavior.  Mearsheimer’s reliance on official Russian statements for evidence presents another serious issue, as one can easily point to contradictory remarks from Moscow . In the 2000s, Putin spoke of potential Russian NATO membership, dismissed notions that NATO was Russia’s enemy, and even acknowledged Baltic and Ukrainian agency in seeking NATO accession. Putin’s continued rhetoric accentuates Mearsheimer’s apparent confirmation bias. From claiming Ukrainians are Russian at heart , to condemning their ‘ neo-Nazi ’ government, and labeling Ukraine’s self-defence as ‘ terrorism ’, Putin’s paradoxical assertions discount Mearsheimer's reliance on Moscow's statements. Ironically, Mearsheimer's core realist beliefs deal the most significant blows to his argument. These are: (1) states act as single, unified forces—citizens have no influence. (2) Leaders pursue rational, not ideological, policies  aimed at securing the state’s survival and, if possible, maximizing its power. (3) Power, mainly militarily, is the central driver  of international relations. Here, lesser powers’ influence becomes superfluous, placing them at the whims of great powers’ orbits of control. In other words, “ the weak suffer what they must .” Such assumptions enable Mearsheimer to conveniently discard compelling factors like Putin’s ideology, the influence of individuals, and lesser powers in the war’s causes. BETTER EXPLANATIONS Strong evidence exists that Putin’s autocratic, anti-Western, and nationalistic imperial ideology was formed out of his anger over the Soviet collapse . This wasn’t just the loss of a political bloc, but a Western dismemberment of Russia’s   rightful position as a great power. In turn, Putin aims to undermine democracy to protect his autocracy and simultaneously chip away at the US-led order . His ultimate goal : return Russia to a great power status and dominate the territory that once constituted Greater Russia.  Events leading up to Putin’s 2022 invasion included the 2000s Color Revolutions, the 2010 Arab Spring, the 2012 anti-Putin protests in Russia, and Ukraine’s 2014 Euromaidan Revolution, which alarmed Putin . Primarily, the Euromaidan Revolution posed an existential threat to Putin’s authoritarian legitimacy, since a democratic, economically thriving Ukraine next to Moscow might instigate discontented Russians to revolt  against Putin’s oppression. Yet, these democratic movements also presented imperial opportunities.   Cunningly, Putin used these events to scapegoat the West, claiming its ‘ satanic ’ power was sponsoring these uprisings, which were resolute on dismantling Russian security and values. This empowered Putin to eliminate all internal opposition and justify his military interventions . Putin’s imperial endeavors are further exposed by Russia’s multi-front, covert operations against the West, which nearly tripled from 2023 to 2024. Some include: sabotaging critical NATO infrastructure and defense industries , as well as infiltrating US social media by impersonating Americans—further sowing disinformation and division amongst the US electorate. Russian tactics have also embraced politically motivated assassination attempts  on European leaders and undermining European democratic processes . While scapegoating Western-sponsored ‘revolts’, Putin also incorporates NATO expansionist arguments  like Mearsheimer’s. Yet, in the face of Putin’s military interventions for over two decades, one cannot discard the agency of alarmed European states  pursuing NATO membership to assure their sovereignty and security. Regarding ‘US-sponsored’ anti-Putin protests, Russians instead took to the streets in unprecedented numbers over evidence of blatant electoral fraud  that returned Putin to power. Likewise, no evidence suggests that Ukraine’s 2014 uprising was caused by foreign meddling. Rather, it was sparked by Ukraine’s then-pro-Kremlin president's termination of a 2013 Ukrainian-EU association agreement . What then caused the bloodshed in Ukraine? It surely wasn’t Mearsheimer’s deterministic NATO-expansion argument. Realities contradict his subscribed-to realist theory of great power behavior. Doubt is further cast over the fragile scaffolding of contradictory evidence, and his intentional neglect of critical factors in the war’s causes provides the final knock-out punch. More compelling narratives are Putin’s protection of his autocracy and imperialist ambitions.  In light of Mearsheimer’s serious flaws, it's important to note that his argument innately lets imperialist leaders like Putin off the hook , who— at the end of the day —are responsible for the immense suffering these conflicts impose on normal people. Given this and Putin’s track record of invading sovereign states, international  warrants for his war crimes , and ruthless termination of Russian dissidents , it’s best not to side with arguments that inherently justify Putin’s behavior. Connor JL Moore is a current master’s candidate for International Security at the University of Denver’s Josef Korbel School of Global and Public Affairs.  If you enjoyed this work, please consider sharing our content and website or donating to a non-profit organization linked in the Donate tab. DISCLAIMER Mooreposts publishes independent analysis, commentary, and research for informational and educational purposes only. Content on Mooreposts—including articles, Mooreposts Bites, strategic intelligence assessments, opinion pieces, interviews, and visual materials—does not constitute legal, financial, medical, or professional advice, nor does it represent any government agency, official position, or classified assessment. Unless explicitly stated, all analyses and interpretations reflect the views and analytic judgments of the individual author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Mooreposts, its editorial staff, or affiliated contributors. Strategic intelligence and analytical content is based on open-source information and publicly available materials. Mooreposts strives for accuracy, transparency, and rigorous sourcing; however, information may change as events develop. Readers are encouraged to consult primary sources and exercise independent judgment.

Illustration by Mia Navarro and Connor JL Moore Listen to this article “ Suddenly, in the very middle of saying something, I felt – it is very hard to describe what I felt, though I remember it with the utmost vividness. Roughly speaking, it was the sensation of being at the centre of an explosion. There seemed to be a loud bang and a blinding flash of light all around me, and I felt a tremendous shock - no pain, only a violent shock, such as you get from an electric terminal. ” - George Orwell, recalling what it felt like to get shot in the throat in Homage to Catalonia , 1938 George Orwell and Charlie Kirk were roughly the same age when they were shot in the throat. Both men made a healthy living at the center of national rhetoric. They impishly threw wry little hand grenades over the garden fence to the other side of the political divide. While I didn’t much care for any of Kirk’s political positions, he was a vibrant man, obviously taking a great deal of joy in promoting his ideology in the most brash way possible.  In Spain, Orwell fought for a communist militia against the fascist, General Franco. His book, Homage to Catalonia , is an account of a nation torn asunder from one ideologically committed outside observer. Kirk, conversely, was a committed ideologue and nationalist in a country that seems just as polarized as Civil War era Spain. Both possessing two juxtaposed political poles, growing wider apart. If the killing of Kirk and sequential administrative reaction demonstrate anything, it's that we have lost our shared sense of the nation and what it means to be American. In a healthy society, we should be able to tolerate people we disagree with. Even if you don’t like them or their position, you’re supposed to throw your hands in the air and give thanks that the figure you agree with can say what they will. Hell… had Kirk been given enough time to grow, he may well have written a book with an impact as significant as Animal Farm  or 1984 . We should be grateful Orwell survived his injury and would go on to live another twenty years to write his magnum opus . But alas, we live in a world where people can get shot just for what they believe: Orwell in 1930s Spain, Kirk in contemporary America.  Whether you agree with Kirk or Orwell, right or left. We can all agree that we took a wrong turn somewhere. We are off the damn rails. Being this mad at one another—digging in rhetorically and literally, “wrecking” others’ arguments, and now, pointing rifles at one another—cannot lead us anywhere better. I would emphasize to both Kirk and Orwell-aligned readers that you have bared your teeth in the wrong direction. This violent disagreement benefits no one except the politicians who brought us here. We’ve entered the Thunderdome of politics. On the left, you have some ugly, useless donkey; on the right, an intolerably mean elephant. Only one of them is leaving this alive, both of which I disdain… and you probably do too.  We’ve entered the Thunderdome of politics. On the left, you have some ugly, useless donkey; on the right, an intolerably mean elephant. Only one of them is leaving this alive, both of which I disdain… and you probably do too. One thing is without question in all this. Orwell describes his thoughts immediately after realizing he’d been hit: “My first thought, conventionally enough, was for my wife. My second was a violent resentment at having to leave this world which, when all is said and done, suits me so well.” I cannot imagine Kirk thought of anything other than leaving his wife, children, and so much of his work unfinished in those final moments. While I didn’t much  like him, no one can deny that this world suited him quite well.  God bless America. We certainly need it. Braxton Fuller is a current master’s candidate for International Security at the University of Denver’s Josef Korbel School of Global and Public Affairs. If you enjoyed this work, please consider sharing our content and website or donating to a non-profit organization linked in the Donate  tab. DISCLAIMER Mooreposts publishes independent analysis, commentary, and research for informational and educational purposes only. Content on Mooreposts—including articles, Mooreposts Bites, strategic intelligence assessments, opinion pieces, interviews, and visual materials—does not constitute legal, financial, medical, or professional advice, nor does it represent any government agency, official position, or classified assessment. Unless explicitly stated, all analyses and interpretations reflect the views and analytic judgments of the individual author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Mooreposts, its editorial staff, or affiliated contributors. Strategic intelligence and analytical content is based on open-source information and publicly available materials. Mooreposts strives for accuracy, transparency, and rigorous sourcing; however, information may change as events develop. Readers are encouraged to consult primary sources and exercise independent judgment.

Illustration by Connor JL Moore Listen to this article One hundred million books were burned in Nazi occupied territories between 1933 and 1945. It's easy to imagine tooth-brushed mustachioed SS men traveling from library to library burning centrally disapproved literature. In reality,  it was a nationwide fascistic orgy of anti-intellectual action. Every day, Germans turned in books from their homes, tore them off library shelves, and gathered by the thousands to watch them burn. They burned Goethe  and Schiller , Thomas Mann  and Heine . Germans rejected by the tens of millions the authors, musicians, poets, and artists who had defined their cultural identity for a millennium. Americans are presently doing much the same thing. Anyone who's wasted hours scrolling on TikTok or Instagram knows the truth in Bradbury’s words, just as any German did in 1935, “It feels good to burn.” We aren’t burning our books, we're just not reading them. We aren’t rejecting our authors, we’re just forgetting them.  Rejection of the written word in exchange for formats with less robust context – Hitlerian tirades on the radio, cable news on television, or short-form content on TikTok – is a common theme in authoritarian countries. Books present ideas in a well-researched format, which decreases the potential for manipulation or distortion as compared to a dictator behind a podium or an anchor behind a desk. A book is credible only because of the argument it makes and the information presented in a literary context. In contrast, cable news and short-form feed content warp our perception of information based on how it's presented.  Between 2003 and 2025, masked members of the American state began shoving protesters into unmarked vans , America conducted mass surveillance of private communication , and detained and tortured foreign nationals without due process in illegal CIA black sites . Over this same period of time, the average time Americans spent reading   declined by 33% . The conflict over public opinion in post-9/11 America was waged before green-screens in cable news studios, not in the columns of the New York Times or the shelves of a library. That is a significant shift in context compared to how we’ve conducted public discourse in the past. In the immediate aftermath of the Vietnam War, the first truly televised conflict, only 6% of Americans did not read a book all year . We’ve watched the invasion of Grenada, Panama, Iraq, and Afghanistan from LaZBoy™ chairs in the living room. By the tenth year of the war in Iraq, the percentage of Americans who had not read a book all year was 23% .  In the lead-up to Viktor Orban's consolidation of political authority in Hungary, for example, national library card ownership decreased from 2.2 to 1.4 million over a 15-year period . Over that same time period, the number of books printed in Hungary declined by half from 69 million to under 34 million . In 1990, 72% of Soviet citizens  were at least occasional readers. Now, 56% of Russians  read neither a book nor a magazine all year. It’s a universal feature of democratically backsliding countries to see a decline in public readership. What the book burnings in the 30s were meant to symbolize was a rejection of what had made Germany German. German Romanticism was focused on the goodness and equality within every person. Beethoven's 9th, the Ode to Joy, is set to a Schiller poem. Goethe’s novel, The Sorrows of Young Werther, spawned the entire genre of bildungsroman, or “novels of formation”, of which Perks of Being a Wallflower  and Catcher in the Rye  owe lineage. Much ink has been spilled regarding the mid-Twentieth Century, but suffice to say here that it was a release of mass psychic tension to embrace ignorance and reject compassion so publicly. What we have seen for the last quarter-century in America is that Americans as individuals no longer value robust information. In a world where information is the currency of politics, we’re ceding our ability to participate in the marketplace of political authority.  There are bright spots for the publishing industry and readers in general. Ebooks and audiobooks have seen a meteoric rise in the last decade , but these have not made up for overall decreases in total book consumption. Part of what matters here is the ability for a market to sustain a parallel industry. Real writers, not just academic journals that no one reads outside of university classrooms, are necessary to foster a democratic culture. If it weren’t for a powerful publishing industry, the world may not have known Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle or Oil! , or F. Scott Fitzgerald's crown jewel, The Great Gatsby .   These books exert immense influence on American culture. They changed us as individuals and as a nation. Benjamin Franklin’s warning after the first constitutional convention, “we have a republic. If we can keep it.” It’s become clear that our ability to preserve and protect our democracy rests on our ability to discern and digest information. In other words, it rests on our ability to read. Braxton Fuller is a current master’s candidate for International Security at the University of Denver’s Josef Korbel School of Global and Public Affairs. If you enjoyed this work, please consider sharing our content and website or donating to a non-profit organization linked in the Donate  tab. DISCLAIMER Mooreposts publishes independent analysis, commentary, and research for informational and educational purposes only. Content on Mooreposts—including articles, Mooreposts Bites, strategic intelligence assessments, opinion pieces, interviews, and visual materials—does not constitute legal, financial, medical, or professional advice, nor does it represent any government agency, official position, or classified assessment. Unless explicitly stated, all analyses and interpretations reflect the views and analytic judgments of the individual author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Mooreposts, its editorial staff, or affiliated contributors. Strategic intelligence and analytical content is based on open-source information and publicly available materials. Mooreposts strives for accuracy, transparency, and rigorous sourcing; however, information may change as events develop. Readers are encouraged to consult primary sources and exercise independent judgment.

USS Gravely (DDG-107) launches a Tomahawk Land Attack Missile in response to increased Iranian-backed Houthi activity in the Red Sea on Jan. 11, 2024. (U.S. Navy photo by Petty Officer 1st Class Jonathan Word / DVIDS, Public Domain). Key Takeaway The United States will likely expand its armed conflict with Venezuela by striking land-based targets. Public Framing Beginning his second term in January, President Trump signed an executive order  legally authorizing the designation of international drug cartels as terrorist  organizations and national security threats. On 2 September, the U.S. began a series of missile attacks  aimed at boats departing Venezuela that the Trump Administration claimed were engaged in drug trafficking. On 2 October, President Trump framed the attacks as a “ non-international armed conflict ” with “ narco-terrorists ” in defense of the U.S. homeland. In his   Thanksgiving message , President Trump publicly stated that operations to strike land-based targets would begin “very soon” and has consistently   stated this intention  around 17 times. He further warned that Venezuelan airspace should   be considered closed . Indistinguishable Targets By November, the U.S. State Department labeled the Cartel de los Soles as a designated terrorist organization , alleging that it is led by Venezuela's President Nicolas Maduro. However, the “Cartel de los Soles”, a   decades-old nickname  used to describe corrupt government officials involved in the drug trade, does not formally exist . With Venezuelan leadership specified as a terror group, the Trump administration claims the   legal military authority  to act against any labeled narco-terrorists in connection to the Maduro-led Venezuelan government.  It is unknown what the legal difference between labeled members of “Cartel de los Soles” and the Venezuelan Armed Forces is and that further blurs  the rules of engagement  against targets.  Further U.S. efforts have included: federal warrants   authorizing  10 December’s   seizure of a Venezuelan oil tanker ship  carrying 1.1 million barrels of oil  and placing a   U.S. bounty  on Maduro for 50 million USD. By 17 December, roughly 26 total missile strikes on alleged drug-smuggling boats had   killed around 100 people . Increasing U.S. Military Capability The U.S. response has been   Operation Southern Spear , which has expanded the U.S. military footprint around Venezuela, from a force of about   6,000  to now   15,000  personnel. This operation has included deploying the   USS Gerald R. Ford  aircraft carrier, a Marine Expeditionary Unit, and guided-missile destroyers. Additional reporting from 10 December, confirmed six Navy   EA-18G Growlers  have been   forward-stationed in Puerto Rico . These aircraft specialize in disrupting enemy radar and missile guidance of air-defense systems, a capability outside the   scope of striking small boats . This indicates growing U.S. potential to disrupt a layered, Russian-supplied,   air defense system  and potentially strike ground targets in Venezuela. Assessment The consistent public framing for military intervention, the   indistinguishability  of military and non-military targets, and the increasing U.S. military capability indicate the U.S. is likely to expand strikes against land-based targets within Venezuela. DISCLAIMER This Strategic Intelligence assessment reflects the analytic judgments of the author, based on open-source information, and does not represent official positions or the views of Mooreposts.

Russian President Vladimir Putin Observes the Zapad 2025 Military Exercises, via The Kremlin. Between September 9 – 10, Russian drones violated Polish airspace, testing U.S. deterrence and risking greater escalation by pulling the U.S. into a European conflict through the possible invocation of NATO’s Article V . After nineteen Russian drones violated Polish airspace, Poland shot them down and called for consultations with NATO member states through NATO’s Article IV . NATO subsequently deployed its Eastern Sentry reinforcement program for the first time—including a multitude of member-states contributing major military assets to NATO’s eastern flank. [1] From September 12 – 16, Russia conducted major military exercises (Zapad 2025 or ‘West 2025’) with Belarus, including displays of Russia’s nuclear capabilities—which have not been seen since Russia held similar exercises in 2021 that provided cover before its invasion of Ukraine in early 2022. [2] These developments challenge the U.S.-dominated NATO alliance, testing its members' commitment to deter Russian aggression and willingness to implement the Alliance’s Article V —requiring all members to respond to an attack on one—if needed. [3]     DISCLAIMER This Strategic Intelligence assessment reflects the analytic judgments of the author, based on open-source information, and does not represent official positions or the views of Mooreposts. NOTES [1] NATO, “Statement by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte on the violation of Polish airspace by Russian drones,” September 10, 2025, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_237559.htm . See also: "Eastern Sentry to enhance NATO's presence along its Eastern flank," SHAPE, news release, September 12, 2025, https://shape.nato.int/news-releases/eastern-sentry-to-enhance-natos-presence-along-its-eastern-flank#:~:text=Allies%20have%20already%20begun%20to,expressed%20its%20willingness%20to%20support , and  "How NATO Is Boosting Eastern Defenses Amid Russian Air Incursions," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, September 22, 2025, https://www.rferl.org/a/nato-eastern-sentry-russia-drones-poland/33536306.html .  [2] Patrick Reevell, “Russia holds major war games in Belarus amid NATO tensions,” ABC News, September 15, 2025, https://abcnews.go.com/International/russia-holds-major-war-games-belarus-amid-nato/story?id=125576856 . [3] Elis Gjevori, "Belarus, Russia conduct joint military drills amid NATO tensions," Al Jazeera, September 15, 2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/9/15/belarus-russia-conduct-joint-military-drills-amid-nato-tensions . Lindsay Maizland and Clara Fong, "Russia Tests NATO with Poland Drone Breach," Council on Foreign Relations, September 10, 2025, https://www.cfr.org/article/russia-tests-nato-poland-drone-breach .

Map of Europe’s Suwałki Gap, via Mooreposts.com / Connor JL Moore   Intelligence Question: What is the most likely target for a future Russian conventional assault against NATO and why?   There is high confidence that the Suwałki Gap—a 60-mile corridor between Poland and Lithuania—presents the most likely target of a Russian conventional assault on NATO . Since early September, Russia has tested NATO preparedness and U.S. commitment to the Alliance in the Baltic region by intentionally violating Polish airspace with drones, Estonia’s airspace with fighter jets, and continuing its hybrid warfare tactics against critical NATO systems. [ 1 ] Moscow will almost certainly require until 2027 to replenish its ground forces at levels capable of conducting ground and missile attacks on NATO territories from Kaliningrad and Belarus. [ 2 ] Russian control of the gap would isolate NATO-members Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia, which risks exposing NATO air and sea deployments to the Baltics, direct confrontation with Russia, and damage to NATO’s credibility and U.S. defense posture. [ 3 ] NATO would likely benefit from establishing deterrence by denial via permanent deployment of forces to the gap and hardening air defense systems and communications infrastructure in the Baltics. DISCLAIMER This Strategic Intelligence assessment reflects the analytic judgments of the author, based on open-source information, and does not represent official positions or the views of Mooreposts.   NOTES [ 1 ] “Russian Jets Breach Estonian Airspace as Trump Administration Plans Baltic Security Cuts,” accessed 27 September 2025, https://www.military.com/daily-news/2025/09/22/russian-jets-breach-estonian-airspace-trumpadministration-Plans-baltic-security-cuts.html . “Putin’s hybrid war against Europe continues to escalate,” accessed 27 September 2025, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/putins-hybrid-war-against-europe-continues-to-escalate/ .  [ 2 ] “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 20, 2025,” accessed 21 September 2025,  https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-202025/#:~:text=ISW%20understandingwar,zones%20in%20the%20air%20domain . “Frontline report: Russian troops could vanish into a forest and pop out inside NATO,” accessed 27 September 2025, https://euromaidanpress.com/2025/06/25/russia-suwalki-gap-nato-infiltration/ . “Pacing scenarios,” accessed 27 September 2025, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/ac-turkey-defensejournal/pacing-scenarios/ .  [ 3 ] “The Suwalki Corridor,” accessed 27 September 2025, https://cepa.org/article/the-suwalki-corridor/?utm_ . “The Suwałki Corridor Crisis: An Analysis of a Possible Russian Offensive and NATO Response Scenarios,” accessed 27 September 2025, https://lansinginstitute.org/2025/05/27/the-suwalki-corridor-crisis-an-analysis-of-apossible-russian-offensive-and-nato-response-scenarios/?utm .

An Iranian S-200 surface-to-air missile system on display in Tehran, Iran on September 26, 2024, via Getty Images/Hossein Beris The status of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear weapons program is the most pressing issue related to U.S. national security in the Middle East. Iran, an adversary responsible for anti-American rhetoric, proxy warfare against allies in the region, and the spread of authoritarianism, cannot develop weapons of mass destruction, for fears that they could be used against Americans, critical allies, or as a bargaining tool. [ 1 ] The U.S.’s technological advantage, particularly in weapons of mass destruction, acts not only as a deterrent for hostile Iranian moves in the region, but also as a leveraging tool for negotiation, sanctions and international pressure. The most recent reporting suggests that Iran’s remaining stockpile of 60% enriched uranium is weapons usable, and that remaining stockpile could be used to develop 6-7 Fat Man-style nuclear warheads. [ 2 ] Continued surveillance of nuclear enrichment and weapons facilities, as well as an investment in diplomacy to dissuade further development of such, better positions the U.S. for its sphere of influence.   DISCLAIMER This Strategic Intelligence assessment reflects the analytic judgments of the author, based on open-source information, and does not represent official positions or the views of Mooreposts. NOTES [ 1 ] Hüseyin Faruk Şimşek, “Iran’s Proxy War Paradox: Strategic Gains, Control Issues, and Operational Constraints,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 36, no. 6 (2025): 997–1024, https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2025.2512807 .  [ 2 ] Edwin Lyman, “Iran Can Still Build Nuclear Weapons Without Further Enrichment—Only Diplomacy Will Stop It,” The Bulletin, July 2025, https://thebulletin.org/2025/07/iran-can-still-build-nuclear-weapons-without-further-enrichment-only-diplomacy-will-stop-it/ .